

ADVANCE RESEARCH PROJECT CERTIFICATION

PROJECT TITLE
THE WRECKAGE RECONSIDERED:
FIVE OXYMORONS FROM
BALKAN DECONSTRUCTION

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
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Date: 2 June 1997

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS N/A	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Unlimited	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION Advanced Research Dept	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) 35	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Naval War College 686 Cushing Rd Newport, RI 02841-1207		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) The Wreckage Reconsidered: Five Oxymorons from Balkan Deconstruction		PROJECT NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LT COL P.H. Liotta, USAF		15. PAGE COUNT 267	
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final	13b. TIME COVERED FROM Mar 97 TO Jun 97	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 2 June 1997	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	Balkans, Yugoslavia, Chaos	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
This work challenges numerous assumptions made and conclusions drawn about the death of Yugoslavia. My intent is to provide academics, statesmen, policy makers, and military officers an alternate perspective from which to reconsider the Balkan wreckage. In war, as Clausewitz reminds us, the end result is never final. Similarly, in peace the dialectic of unresolved tensions may lead back again to war. That truth alone demonstrates why we need to learn--or at least attempt to learn--the lessons of the last Balkan conflict in order to perhaps prevent the next.			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CDR Joe Vanderlip, USN, Dep. Dir, ARP		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 401-8416568	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL 35A

The Wreckage Reconsidered
Five Oxymorons from Balkan Deconstruction

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PREFACE

The United States has no immediate vital interests in the Balkans. That said, American diplomatic and military intervention in former Yugoslavia proved the crucial linchpin that ended war in Bosnia, led to the signing of the Paris peace agreement on 14 December 1995, and created the conditions for regional peace. Absent American intervention, there would have been more deaths, more refugees, and more potential for the conflict to expand and draw deep within its vortex the neighboring nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, as well as NATO partners Greece and Turkey.

The Wreckage Reconsidered examines Yugoslav disintegration in order to suggest, through the Yugoslav example, that a reexamination of national security strategy and foreign policy concerns for the United States in a new century is not only a wise choice but an imperative one. The method by which this examination occurs is through the oxymoron, which I define through its specific Balkan application: a force or issue so contrary in nature it may remain problematic no matter what approach or resolution might be offered. The five oxymorons I consider are: U.S. strategic perspectives as they have applied to the Balkan example; the rise of the "parastate" as a result of recent Balkan history; a strategy of chaos, as it may have applied in the last Balkan war and as it may "target" American strategic culture in the future; religion, a cultural and political force in the Balkans and as it may have provided the occasion, though not the cause, for the outbreak of conflict; and, finally, the recognition that NATO enlargement may bring both unintended and unwelcome consequences.

This work challenges numerous assumptions made and conclusions drawn about the death of Yugoslavia. My intent is to provide academics, statesmen, policy makers, and military officers an alternate perspective from which to reconsider the Balkan wreckage. In war, as Clausewitz reminds us, the end result is never final. Similarly, in peace the dialectic of unresolved tensions may lead back again to war. That truth alone demonstrates why we need to learn--or at least attempt to learn--the lessons of the last Balkan conflict in order to perhaps prevent the next.

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*for Donna and for Gaia
and for those in Yugoslavia,
wherever Yugoslavia is,
I will never see again*

Ми о Вуку, и Вук на врата
PROVERB FROM THE KOSOVO CYCLE,
VUK STEFANOVIĆ KARADŽIĆ

**Καί τὴν ποθεινὴν πατρίδα παράσχοι αὐτοῖς,
Παραδείσου πάλιν ποίωι πολίτας αὐτοῦς.**
FROM THE ANCIENT GREEK

If you listen carefully, at the end you will be someone else.
THE MAHABARATA

INTRODUCTION

This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.¹
WALTER BENJAMIN, "THESES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY," IX

If the fire of prejudice could be doused with a potion of tolerance, the Balkans would be the most wonderful region in the world.²
MISHA GLENNY

"Why oxymoron?" Of all the valuable criticisms numerous readers have given my presentation of the arguments in this work, this is the question most exclusively asked at the start. The problem is both with the common understanding of the word itself and in the manner in which it is used in the English idiom today. "Oxymoron" is an invented word, often mis-used in its application.³

Oxymoron, as I will use it continuously throughout this work, however, has a very specific meaning as it applies to the current and future security environment as well as to the processes of national decision making. These five Balkan oxymorons, specifically, are forces or issues so contrary in nature they may remain problematic no matter what approach or resolution might be offered.

The oxymorons, in order, are: U.S. strategic perspectives as they have applied to the Balkan example; the rise of the "parastate" as a result of recent Balkan history; a strategy of chaos, as it may have applied in the last Balkan war and as it may "target" American strategic culture in the future; religion, a cultural and political force in the Balkans and as it may have provided the occasion, though not the cause, for the outbreak of conflict; and, finally, the recognition that NATO enlargement may bring both unintended and unwelcome consequences.

The order of these five oxymorons is also specific. The reader may find consideration of these arguments less difficult to consider if they are viewed from the "outside in" in both the

introductory and concluding sections, as well as from the "inside out" in the central section. Thus, the chapters "No Man's Land" and "After the Lost War" reflect how the United States and Europe largely view the security environment; the central essay, "Chaos," reflects how a potential adversary in the security environment may view us--the United States and Europe. The chapters "The Rise of the Parastate" and "The War in Religion?" address cultural and political factors--which, in the Balkans, are synonymous terms--as well as examine the influence of these factors in the last Balkan war.

Each of these examinations also considers potential problems and potential solutions. The following schematic suggests a general approach:

THE FIVE OXYMORONS IN PERSPECTIVE

	Reflects Strategic Culture (Ours)	Provides Potential Problem	Affects Future Security Environ.	Provides Potential Solution	Reflects Strategic Culture (Theirs)
Strategic Perspective (e.g., Realism, Neo-Liberalism)	X	X	X	X	
The Parastate		X	X	X	X
Chaos as Strategy		X	X		X
Religion as Cultural Fault	X	X	X		X
NATO Enlargement	X	X	X	X	

DECONSTRUCTING THE REAL FROM THE IDEAL


Balkan "deconstruction," as I term it, is by no means an original concept: a significant part of ancient Greek philosophy is based on the exact need to "deconstruct" phenomena in order to arrive at sound solutions of practical value, even if such solutions belong to a non-physical, abstract reality. In a similar way, now that we have entered the twenty-first century and are

largely ignorant of it, we may need to de-construct American strategic vision in order to preserve it.

These "oxymorons" suggest that a reëxamination of national security policy for the United States in a new century is not only a wise choice, but an imperative one. Much as Clausewitz developed his theory of war to maintain a balance between the three tendencies of violence, probability, and subordination "like an object suspended between three magnets," these oxymorons might offer justification for re-viewing and re-considering the balancing of American interests, policies, and commitments.⁴

To further acknowledge the influence of Clausewitz as it applies to consideration of the Balkan security, there must also be a recognition that "the probabilities [chance, interaction complexities, and human competition] of life replace the extreme and absolute required by theory."⁵ Conceptual understanding of theory, basically the "ideal type," is nonetheless essential in framing an understanding of the world we live in. The "ideal"--the conceptual--helps demonstrate the validity of claimed strategic interests which both shape and are shaped by that world--the "real."

The best "ideal type" to help consider the balancing of interests, risks, resources, and constraints, in the rational calculus of using available means to reach achievable ends is the Bartlett model, developed by faculty members of the Naval War College. This model is both a simple and a superb tool for decision makers, analysts, statesmen, and planners to consider in reference to the current and future security environment. It portrays the interactive tensions of key variables as dynamic process and proves useful in the substantive exploration of controversies as well as what should be critical national security decision making fundamentals. I reproduce it here:⁶



These five Balkan oxymorons do not negate the value of theory and the conceptual framework--the ideal. To the contrary, they validate how such an ideal framework, rather than being a static, cyclical process, is constantly changing, constantly subject to the tensions of key variables. In reality, the Bartlett model is a balloon in a state of consistent metastasis; left to its own devices, the "balloon" will burst or--even worse--transform itself into an amorphous mass constantly subject to the pull of various and competing gravitational forces, void of direction and purpose.

Deconstructing the real from the ideal, using the Balkans as a template, does not suggest that American intervention in former Yugoslavia and the re-shaping of national interests to make intervention necessary represents a watershed in American foreign policy. Such intervention, nonetheless, has proven significant and its significance will reveal itself in ways we are not fully aware of. In 1994, NATO leadership had become fractured--largely between American and British perspectives--and stood poised at the edge of dissolution over issues of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia; in 1995, firm NATO intervention, as an element of coercive diplomacy, proved essential in creating the environment in which the Dayton Agreement could take place. Indeed, I would argue that if NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia had not proven as effective as it did, the most relevant discussion of the European security architecture today would have been NATO disbandment--not enlargement.

The Balkans is a region of numerous players and many interests; within the Balkans, the nations of former Yugoslavia, Serbia in particular, will remain pivotal regional actors in this next century. Balkan problems--oxymoronic as they remain--will continue to demand European and American attention in a new millennium. The contradictions and tensions of Balkan dissolution may be the most emblematic mirror of future threats to American and European diplomacy, force employment, and international leadership.

Contradictions, of course, will increasingly confront us, whether they appear in the vast regions of the former Soviet Union, in Africa, Southwest Asia, or on the Pacific Rim. Failures to consider these provocative oxymorons and their deconstructive impact on the traditional

instruments of national power will diminish, if not void, the influence of American--indeed, "Western"--power in the future.

WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT EUROPE

What is Europe? Where is Europe? Anyone who claims to have a precise explanation for these questions has just committed fraud. Europe, today, is neither a union nor a place; Europe is a concept, and a much contested one at that. The original naming of this concept came from the Greek Aegean term "Europa," literally meaning the "broad eye," meant to represent the land lying west of the Bosphorus; "Asia," by contrast, meant those land lying to east.

Europe, as I consider it here, must stretch from Washington to Vladivostok. Without such consideration, the implications not only for NATO enlargement but for European security will be immense. Many would disagree with my concept of Europe as one covering a broad area and diverse peoples and might reply, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has replied, that "Russia is in but not of Europe." Others might equally contend, as former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke has contended, that "the United States is not in but is of Europe." With a view to the broad eye, I would offer that Russia and the United States, indeed Turkey and the former Soviet republics, all have a place in the new Europe. Here, in a new century, a new conceptual paradigm becomes manifest. Europe, as both place and idea, is in the process of transformation.

The Balkans, as I argue throughout this work, is also part of Europe. In one of the many ironies of European history, the lands to which the original concept "Europa" applied and of which Byzantine emperors considered "European" provinces--Macedonia, Thrace, Illyria (Albania), Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece--have become in the minds of most marginalized, "inhabited by uncouth warring tribes whose history is not ours and whose problems are none of our business."⁷

Yet American and European intervention in the former Yugoslavia--the ground zero of the Balkans--has changed the dynamics of Europe. And, despite the desires of many states to continue what writer and journalist Misha Glenny has referred to as "The Grand Tradition"--in

which Europe intervenes in the Balkans, often in response to conflict, only to exit as fast as possible in the aftermath of conflict termination--such tradition cannot be allowed to continue.⁸ If it does continue, Balkan conflict will reërupt, sudden interventions will occur, and temporary resolutions will be offered. A vicious cycle will continue. The far preferable solution, indeed the only pragmatic one, would be to have the Balkan states know they are "part of Europe and not some irredeemable mutant."⁹

Europe is in a state of constant change. The Balkans are at the volatile heart of this change. American diplomatic and military intervention in the former Yugoslavia proved the critical factor that brought form of resolution, however temporary. Much as Heisenberg's 1927 "Uncertainty Principle" demonstrated in quantum physics both how the act of measuring particle velocity inherently changed the measurement itself and how there are limits to what humanity can know, intervention in the former Yugoslavia has both changed the Balkans and the knowledge of Europe.¹⁰ Equally, the five oxymorons of this work demonstrate how such inherent change and limited knowledge, in the new Europe, will prevent accurate prediction of specific desired outcomes.

Thus, throughout this work, I will refer to the West as the "West" simply because of the problems of "Europe" and the various meaning of "international community." We don't know where the West ends and the East begins.

**"MY, WHAT AN INTERESTING LITTLE COUNTRY YOU HAVE!"
OR, "WHEN DO WE START GETTING SMALLER?"**

I first came to Yugoslavia, nearly a decade ago, as a Fulbright lecturer and artist-in-residence (Slobodan Umjetnik). Most recently, I served as a military attaché assigned to the Hellenic Republic with additional responsibilities for Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and the former republics of Yugoslavia. My family and I have been fortunate to travel throughout the Balkans; we have established lifelong friendships and experienced extraordinary cultural richness and diversity. We were also fortunate enough to witness Romania under the iron fist of Nicolae Ceaușescu and to see and attempt an understanding of Yugoslavia both before and

after its self-destruction. I claim this as fortunate because to know and see the "before" and "after" of these places is a privilege few others have shared.

As one example of stark contrasts in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, Warsaw and Belgrade have changed places. A decade ago,

Belgrade looked smarter than Warsaw. Schools and courts [and medical services] functioned more or less normally...Yugoslavia had a good name in the world....Now they live in a country known as Serbia and it is--everyone agrees--not in Europe but in the Balkans...This country is an international pariah...Physically, the whole place is battered and run-down. Belgrade reminds me of Warsaw in the late 1970s. If you look at the cars, the clothes, the shop windows, the shop windows, you feel that Poland and Yugoslavia have changed places.¹¹

Two remarks I recall from my decade of Balkan involvement might help provide a new perspective for the reader in considering these oxymorons. Both remarks reflect naïveté and a different, sometimes shocking, outlook.

The first remark, as it comes to mind, I overheard at a reception in Belgrade given by the Yugoslav government--our "employer" for the duration of our "visit"--for the 1988-1989 Fulbright scholars. (These scholars represented a diverse group: the youngest was an American student just out of high school; the oldest was Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling, in his ninth decade of life.) One of my Fulbright colleagues, to my horror, casually mentioned to one of Serbia's leading academics and intellectuals, "My, what an interesting little country you have!" That remark, made with a kind of nonchalance that still stings, also seems drastically out of place at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Yugoslavia, which virtually disappeared from the international collective consciousness after Tito's death, is often thought of today in inelegant though not inaccurate terms as "a malignant tumor in the rectum of Europe."¹²

The second remark came from a young man, probably eight years old, who, if he is able to keep his naïveté, will likely grow into an important and original thinker. I would like to believe he was sitting next to me on an airplane headed for Zagreb when he made his remark. The truth is that I don't remember where I heard it. What I heard him ask, though (several minutes after takeoff), when he turned from the window he was looking out of and toward his mother, was this: "When do we start getting smaller?"

*

Perhaps these remarks have some worth in them. In considering the Balkan Enigma yet again, perhaps it might equally be worth considering the questions these oxymorons offer, so that--having both an "interest" and having gotten "smaller"--we will understand the Balkans differently. T.S. Eliot best expressed this notion, of how "...the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time."¹³

THE WRECKAGE RECONSIDERED

I have plagiarized the title of this work. It is plagiarism with permission, though. The phrase, "The Wreckage Reconsidered" is taken from the 1988 poem written by Bogomil Gjuzel as an elegy to Yugoslavia (three years before the "death" of Yugoslavia). Gjuzel, who is Macedonia's greatest living poet, is also a reluctant politician and member of the executive council of the opposition Demokratska Partija. He is direct, honest, skeptical, and dedicated. Indeed, if all Balkan politicians shared the same qualities as Gjuzel, the future of Balkan security would be both safe and certain. Unfortunately, most Balkan politicians have favored manipulation of the truth over the truth itself since the end of the Cold War. Thus, Gjuzel's poem, which seems to suggest the metaphorical landing and uncertain consequence of a new ark on Mt. Ararat in the Cold War's wake, takes on new relevancy years after its first publication:¹⁴

More like a shipwreck than rough landing,
the Ark's soft gopher wood that sustained
the vessel and that precious cargo was already half
rotted by the flood's retreat when it touched
down upon the granite face of Ararat.
Then and now, the wreckage reconsidered.
(As this scroll, this palimpsest, references
its own crumbling in our hands?)

Those who survived scattered long ago
just as they were, singly or in pairs--widowers
and widows?--and those who survived that furious
disturbance, those who managed the narrowest
escape in the inhuman wave of disembarking,
were full of fear and panic. They must have been.

*

What matters most is how those whom Yahweh
(and likely Noah, too) chose, human and beast,
have lived on since then, and multiplied, though
not all have prospered. (Some circled only once
or twice above their shattered nests, and then climbed
Jacob's ladder to the stars.) New seed in the mud grows wild
now (like those missing vowels in the ancient palimpsest?) . .

The old dis-ease and embryonic forms, the new
mutation is humanity itself, the miscegenation
of all the ethnic tribes, descendants of Noah
or children of the Ark's stowaways; with
no trace of Noah himself remaining
(perished like the captain who remains on deck
while the ship goes down?), there's only
this--the sacred ritual of the broken Covenant.

What to do with all these refugees, like new Noahs,
building their separate arks, preparing for the deluge
they alone believe they'll survive, these chosen
few whose word has passed among us,
who divide us now with such prophecy of loss,
their so-called gods, their certainty damnation?

The Dayton Agreement may well provide no resolution for the Balkan Enigma. To the contrary, we may now be witnessing a period of what I have termed "Yugo-Fatigue," and should pay attention rather than withdraw, and closely study and consider the contradictions, perplexities, and security challenges that loom on the Central, East European, and former Soviet horizons. Ignorance or wrong consideration of these oxymorons may well bear adverse consequence.

I have intended The Wreckage Reconsidered for an audience with familiarity and interest in international security and foreign policy as well as for the military professional interested in the examination of security perspectives and implications for force planning. This work attempts to explore issues from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and their effect on the Balkan region as well as European and American security policy.

Throughout this work I have intentionally interwoven personal, political, and cultural observations. Here, at the beginning, I should confess that, in the end, I intend The Wreckage Reconsidered to be a testament to what we--the "West"--did and did not do in the years when the Balkan peoples sacrificed themselves to history.

¹Extracted from Illuminations, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, and quoted from Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996), ix, and Carolyn Forché, The Angel of History (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), vi.

²The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 74.

³An etymology of terms might explain my use of "oxymoron" as opposed to, for example, the less problematic term, "paradox." "Paradox" is from the Greek παράδοξος--contrary to opinion, strange, marvelous; "oxymoron," from the Modern Greek οξύμωρος, is an invented term, from the combination of οξύ (sharp, acid) and μωρός (blunt, foolish, imbecilic), and an appropriate metaphor for the magnetic "balancing" of contradictions. Liddell and Scott: Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford University Press, 1966), 521; Oxford Greek-English Learner's Dictionary, edited by D.N. Stavropoulos (Oxford University Press, 1988), 621; 580. Deconstruction of the use of "oxymoron" shows both contrary understandings of the word and contrary uses; oxymoron is more than just a pun of contradictions, as say the common example of "military intelligence," which implies (and which military officers themselves most often refer to, humorously, as an oxymoron) that "intelligence" cannot co-exist with "military." "Oxymoron" suggests that contradictions do co-exist, and, sometimes, cannot be resolved. Similarly, the use of the term "rhetoric" in the common idiom suggests the manipulation of truth, often a manipulative use associated with political figures who seek to avoid the truth; the ancient meaning of "rhetoric," and the meaning Aristotle understood in writing his classic work on the subject, meant the subtle yet precise art of verbal persuasion. Such distortions in the use of use of the idiom are not exclusive to English. In modern Greek, for example, στόχος means "target"; in Ancient Greek, στόχος also meant "guess" or "conjecture"--the complete absence of a target.

⁴Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

⁵*Ibid.* 80.

⁶Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," Naval War College Review, Spring 1995, 114-126; extracted from in Strategy and Force Planning (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1995), Chapter 2, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, editors, 17. The so-called "Lloyd" strategy and force planning framework, named for Professor Richmond M. Lloyd (also of the Naval War College), is a more complex though no less valuable model, and is commonly taught at most American war colleges. An example is illustrated in Richmond M. Lloyd, "Strategy and Force Planning Framework," Strategy and Force Planning (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1995), Chapter 1, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, editors, 3.

⁷J. G. A. Pocock, "What Do We Mean by Europe?" The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 1997, 17. Pocock's essay is the most entertaining and most provocative recent consideration on the problem of locating and understanding Europe.

⁸The use of the phrase "The Grand Tradition" is taken from private conversation with Misha Glenny.

⁹Misha Glenny, "Will the West Fail Again," The New York Times, 31 January 1997, op-ed.

¹⁰Richard P. Brennan, Dictionary of Scientific Literacy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), 138-139.

¹¹Timothy Garton Ash, "In the Serbian Soup," The New York Review of Books, Volume XLIV, Number 7, 24 April 1997, 26.

¹²Samie I. Ihejirika and Thomas A. Motzel, Ex-Yugoslavia: A Malignant Tumor in the Rectum of Europe? (Athens: The Research Institute for European Studies, 1994).

¹³"Little Gidding," from Four Quartets, The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World), 145.

¹⁴"The Wreckage Reconsidered" was published again in 1995 under the title "After the Fall, 'Them' Again". From the forthcoming book, Figures of Transfixion--Проникнување: Selected Poems from the Macedonian of Bogomil Gjuzel, copyright 1997 by P. H. Liotta. All faults in translation are exclusively mine.

The Balkans, which in Turkish means "mountains," run roughly from the Danube to the Dardanelles, from Istria to Istanbul, and is a term for the little lands of Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and part of Turkey, although neither Hungarian nor Greek welcomes inclusion in the label. It is, or was, a gay peninsula filled with sprightly clothed people who ate peppered foods, drank strong liquors, wore flamboyant clothes, loved and murdered easily and had a splendid talent for starting wars. Less imaginative westerners looked down on them with secret envy, sniffing at their royalty, scoffing at their pretensions, and fearing their savage terrorists. Karl Marx called them "ethnic trash." I...adored them.

C.L. SULZBERGER, *A Long Row of Candles*

I was among people I could understand.

DAME REBECCA WEST, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*

**NO MAN'S LAND:
U.S. GRAND STRATEGY AND YUGOSLAV INTERVENTION**

The arrival of the twenty-first century presents a need for the Clinton administration to refine its current national security doctrine.¹ As one example, the intervention, diplomatically and militarily, in former Yugoslavia may demonstrate how U.S. strategy and definition of vital interests may consistently vary and that no single grand strategic perspective may be sufficient or correct enough to confront the challenges of the new security environment. A strategy of adaptive balance may prove the best approach.

Nel mezzo del camin di nostra vita
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,
che la diritta via era smarrita.²
Dante, The Inferno
CANTO I, 1-3

One of the more intriguing images deep within the labyrinth the Clinton administration will continue to wander in during its second term did not actually surface during the current presidency, although its symbolism embodies the administration's evolving search for both strategic sense and sensibility. Rather, it occurred at the end of the twentieth century, in the few days following the inauguration of President George Herbert Walker Bush. In perhaps his first personal act in the White House, the president removed a portrait of Woodrow Wilson in the West Wing and replaced it with one of Teddy Roosevelt. In placing an imprimatur on the White House and his presidency, he also earmarked the prevailing strategic dilemma for the United States in this post-Cold War yet pre-epithet era: Who are we as a nation and how do we envision ourselves within the world community--now, in the next decade, and in this next century? Are we pluralists or authoritarian dominators, promoters of democracy or just the American way?

The West Wing incident may be apocryphal; its iconal significance is not.³ President Bush, in style and act, embraced the legacies of both the soft-spoken Presbyterian professor and the, at times, benevolent hegemon interested in the primacy of American interests and who knew what was best for the world by making it best for America. What was lacking for President Bush, of course, was "the vision thing," and its absence had direct impact as the status quo changed--and quickly. For one, the "Evil" disappeared from the "Empire," and the Cold War's significance retreated in one vast, glacial ebb. Second, the United States went to war--and not alone. From a strategic perspective, President Bush, in his prosecution of war in the Persian Gulf, spoke as a pluralist and acted as a realist, aligning states against the "rogue" actor Iraq for the sake of vital national security interests while rhetorically emphasizing why a

liberal democratic state should support human values and order under the ægis of international law and the United Nations.

In many ways, despite proclamations of difference in strategic thought, the foreign policy of the Clinton administration has danced between these poles as well.⁴ The engagements in which the United States has been involved with since late 1992 have begun, often, with a pluralist perspective and ended, when successful, with a realist approach (though Haiti may be a notable exception). Often, though, the administration moved from early enthusiasm for multilateral efforts (whether in the political, economic, or diplomatic arenas) to acting decisively and sometimes alone--living up to the frustrated comments by then President Bush in the 1992 campaign: "The New World Order means what the United States says, goes." Yet the ignominious withdrawal from Somalia is a stark contrast to the effective coalition led by the United States, militarily and diplomatically, to end the fighting in former Yugoslavia. Therein, with the first combat employment and first out-of-area operations in history for NATO forces (changing forever the original collective security identity of the North Atlantic charter), lie the opportunities for future success--and future dangers. Here, already a decade into the twenty-first century, we should draw some meaning from the Yugoslav paradigm, though not so narrowly as to apply the same remedy exactly the next time a conflict explodes on the scope of our strategic vision.

For the twentieth century is indeed over, and, as centuries go, it was a short one--lasting from 1913 to 1989.⁵ In those seventy-six years, enormous changes occurred: the Russian Revolution and communism's rise, two world conflicts in which "Western" powers established global dominance, the rise of non-Western powers in regions where our national interests seemed to have no bearing in a strictly bipolar world, and the development of nuclear weapons and the real possibility of annihilation for the planet.

The events of '89 in Eastern Europe, therefore, should be recognized as inevitabilities of extraordinary change at a century's end, horrid as some of them were, the last gasps of a rotting corpse. What happened in Yugoslavia is a process of such inevitability, and perhaps

intentional neglect by Western powers in the false hope that "nonintervention...might have prompted the belligerent parties to deal more realistically with each other."⁶

The Yugoslav disaster is also, partially, the West's fault. Woodrow Wilson's defense of self-determination helped bring about the destruction of whole empires in 1918; such admirable idealism, more recently flagged under a foreign policy of "democratic realism," and no less a commitment to the right of national self-determination, helped destroy the very states that Wilson helped create in 1918--including the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that became Yugoslavia, country of the south Slavs. One uncomfortable though obvious significance arises from the Balkan experience: Power and manipulation--not democracy--count. (Thus, those who ruthlessly manipulate power will listen only to more dominant and ruthlessly powerful force--knowledge the United States must learn to accept.) We have only begun to recognize, to use Thomas Carother's term, "Democracy without Illusions." The thrill of worldwide democratic revolution has been supplanted by harsh realisms: flawed elections in Albania, the shedding of reforms in Central Asia, the election sabotage in Armenia, the struggle for democratic truth in Serbia, and the uncertain path that may lead toward reconciliation in Bosnia.⁷ Democracy will remain a formidable force, yet a force subject to the power shifts of manipulation and self-interest.

Indeed, in former Yugoslavia, everyone--everyone who had a voice, at least--was guilty. The bullet that took Archduke Ferdinand's life in Sarajevo was the culminating point of one century's end and another's beginning; a child in Sarajevo, risking the sniper's fire, running and clutching the loaf of bread to her chest, is the icon that begins the twenty-first. The intent of this essay is partially to critique the administration's actions and policies in the former Yugoslavia. More constructively, it serves to examine the "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" in wake of Yugoslav intervention as an evolving process rather than end state vision; to consider various perspectives that often conflict, occasionally cohere, and ultimately impact future strategic options; and to offer a grand strategy framework that supports alternate, and often competing, perspectives. American intervention, diplomatically

and militarily, in former Yugoslavia may demonstrate how our strategy and definition of vital interests may consistently vary in the future and suggest that no single grand strategic perspective may be sufficient or correct enough to confront the challenges of the new security environment. A strategy of *adaptive balance* may prove the best approach.

THE CASE FOR ENLARGEMENT: A BODY OF NATIONS OR THE FACE IN THE MIRROR?

Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners and are less likely to wage war on one another. While democracy will not soon take hold everywhere, it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in Central and Eastern Europe.⁸

--A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT, FEB 1996

You must be careful what you wish for; given the resources and the means to achieve it, you will likely get it. In the case of engagement, a concept for which former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake received harsh criticisms because it was seen as ambiguous, still remains a doctrine by which the United States defines interests and intentions.⁹ A strategy of engagement serves to involve states in promoting market growth and expanding economies while also promoting the values of democracy--not as a proselytizing force for a "democratic crusade," but as an influence for stability, cooperation, and growth.¹⁰

In the case of Yugoslavia, the most recent national security strategy emphasizes less the decisive actions of the United States in stopping violence and providing opportunity for resolution and more the cooperative aspects of the Contact Group (listing the nations of the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and Germany--absent in an earlier strategy version) to reach negotiated settlement, emphasizing "security through military strength and cooperation."¹¹ At the same time, the strategy document makes subtle shifts in emphasis that reflect a hard-earned pragmatism while upholding three strategic pillars that represent American "interests": enhancing security through strong defense capability, effective democracy, and cooperative security; opening foreign markets and spurring economic growth; and promoting democracy abroad.¹² The "unparalleled" opportunities to make our nation safer and more

prosperous are now "unprecedented"; our military force, with credible security sustainment, must be "ready to fight," yet must now also have "effective representation abroad"; the "unitary" security threat that existed in the Cold War is now referred to as a first among equals "preëminent threat" (perhaps with the lessons of Korea and Vietnam acknowledged, and the hundreds of other wars that took place during the Cold War); the "development and deployment" of American military forces to support strategy goals are now advanced to the "preparation and deployment" stage. And, finally, in former Yugoslavia itself, the goals of U.S. policy have been modified from "preventing the spread of fighting into a broader European war" to a narrowing concentration on "preventing the spread of conflict into a broader Balkan war."¹³

Are these examples merely simple refinements to strategy-in-progress, one in the process of moving from the known security realm of a fin de siècle stance into a future of certain danger and hoped for prosperity? Likely not. Likely these shifted emphases are a gradual realization, perhaps not yet even fully realized, that, as Henry Kissinger has rightly noted, the new world order "in its final form will not be visible until well into the next century."¹⁴ Yet Mr. Kissinger, the practical realist, may in truth be far too optimistic in his belief that such a "form" may be visible at any time. What holds true today is how a true world order and a new world disorder (depending on where in the world you are) remain on parallel tracks in our known universe. Sometimes, these tracks converge and then worlds collide; the Yugoslav derailment, for example, was one of such twenty-first century collisions.

Our current national strategy--both a declaration of grand strategy interests and proclamation of administration achievements--tends to lump its conception of the former Yugoslavia into the parastates known today as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, which direct U.S. action shaped into existence. No mention is made of Slovenia, yet it is a model of a booming Central European economy, among the most successful in Europe, and a nation that, although no model of democratic reform, is nonetheless evolving, eager for European integration and NATO security guarantees. The actions--and sins--committed by

Serbia and Croatia are referenced only in relation to Bosnia; no reference is made to ongoing Serbian abuse and repression in the ethnically dominant Albanian province of Kosovo. Macedonia, not even included in the "Integrated Regional Approaches" section of national strategy is mentioned only in President Clinton's preface as an example of how--"to enhance our security"--American action "successfully deterred the spread of conflict to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."¹⁵ The strategy omits mention of how our commitment of forces to the United Nations peacekeeping effort in FYROM, laudably accomplished at an early stage, equally presented contradictions that have been conveniently forgotten--or perhaps not even considered. The United States declared the objectives of advancing human rights and promoting democracy as justification, but the only possible reason to employ U.S. peacekeeping forces in FYROM was to stem the potential flood of refugees into Greece (a NATO ally at odds with FYROM over the tiny nation's name and its assertion of "territorial claims" on Greek Macedonia), since neither vital national or survival interests nor economic interests were at stake.¹⁶ Added to this irony is evidence that America, at the behest of the textile industry, enforced a trade embargo against Macedonia--threatening the economic viability of the second poorest Balkan nation (after Albania)--while shoring up its security by committing troops to a U.N. peacekeeping operation.¹⁷ Further, these troops--put directly in harm's way--could have been "shot in defense of a country [the United States at the time] didn't recognize."¹⁸ The conditions for "safely" employing forces in Macedonia, nonetheless, were quite different from those in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbs constitute two percent of the Macedonian population (as opposed to approximately 39 percent in Bosnia), and ethnic Albanians, who make up 23 percent of the nation's population, in Western Macedonia, though often disgruntled, have agreed to uphold--for the present--the integrity of the Macedonian state.¹⁹ One view of such events, though not the only, is that forces were committed to Macedonia because the risks for American foreign policy, clearly, were far less than in Bosnia; the appearance of action thus allowed the deferment of action. Domestic political concerns impinged on foreign policy priorities.

Finally, the strategy of enlargement, while emphasizing the role of NATO in coöperatively solving the Bosnian problem, obliquely refers to Serbia in the effort to "build a peaceful, democratic future."²⁰ Such democracy building, however, is strategy-dependent on Serbia's determining influence in Bosnia as a whole, since Serbia remains the crucial determinant for peace, or at least the cessation of violence--a necessary condition for the construction of peace. Democracy building in Serbia, despite the recent opposition election victories, appears to be largely outside our enlargement strategy. The United States, in fact and deed, abandoned Serbian containment and portrayal of Serbia as the Third Reich of the Balkans in order to claim strategic accomplishment--to link the pursued means in order to proclaim achieved ends. We made a deal with the devil, but the devil held the cards: in order to find resolution--a sustainable political settlement in Bosnia--the United States actually violated the principles of its enlargement doctrine. For Slobodan Milošević this proved practical because it meant the elimination of his rival, Radovan Karadžić and disablement of a potential rival, General Ratko Mladić, hero of the Croatian and Bosnian "fronts," the "liberator" of Žepa and Srebrenica, the executioner--though not the architect--of ethnic cleansing.

To act precipitously is to invite precipitous consequence; equally, to act too slowly is to miss the opportunity that invites action. In some ways, this reflects the Balkan contradiction the Clinton administration allowed itself to enter into: dealing with the enemy to secure peace, while allowing the enemy to consolidate a crumbling power base. Despite the immense criticism hurled at the administration for its Yugoslav strategy, however, both prior to and after intervention, it turns out that some measure of success and credit should indeed go to United States leadership.²¹ What proves unusual in the Yugoslav example is how pragmatic solution became the strategy: "continuous air strikes" coupled with "intensive diplomatic efforts."²² The conditions for democracy to flourish grew out of a United States determination to shape and influence the course of events in Bosnia. Our current strategy emphasizes those sections of the Balkans where we had determining influence, not where we sought--or failed--to enlarge democracy.

As grand strategy evolves in this new century, the nature of enlargement should be called into question. President Clinton's 1994 State of the Union asserted that no democracies had gone to war with each other, thus providing yet another emphasis for democracy's enlargement as part of a grand strategy vision. Yet, as Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder have argued forcefully, there are limits to this logic. Mature democracies are likely nonbelligerent, while emerging democracies, those "in transition," are almost definitely, based on statistical examination of the past two centuries, less stable and more prone to war.²³ Witness Serbia and Croatia, Abkhazia and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Chechnya within Russia--all states experimenting in varying degrees with democratic process and simultaneously at war. What value then does promoting peace through democratization imply for Russia or China--or indeed any potential "peer competitor"--when promoting democracy itself may bring war rather than peace in the more immediate future? Surely, an engagement strategy must hinge on the benefits all parties will receive in the process.

A future strategy of democratic enlargement should proceed with a careful, purposeful patience. In former Yugoslavia, the imposition on warring parties to cease hostilities and the requirements for elections within one year, followed by a period of stability and transition, could lead to little more than chaos, not democracy.²⁴ Yet the Yugoslav example is not the extreme, as many have wrongly thought it to be. As the election results in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska demonstrate, the divisions of ethnic and regional lines only intensify, not ameliorate, democratic choice. Yugoslavia was a European nation with an identifiable geography and ethnic composition. Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians--all violent denials to the contrary acknowledged--are an εθνος; they are one "ethnos." And Yugoslavia's tribes lived far more peacefully together under the oppression of Marshall Tito than they have thus far lived (and many died) in the shadow of democracy.

This is not a repudiation of the Wilsonian ideal. Rather, it is a cautionary note about its valid limit within American strategy. Acknowledging that promoting democracy is not a vital national interest, while an honest declaration, does not correctly emphasize that democracy

itself is a process of evolutionary mystery, which we may neither be able to shape nor determine--and quite often not even influence.²⁵ Woodrow Wilson dreamed of "democratic governance [that] could provide political stability and end...chronic civil strife that had long presented a security concern for the United States."²⁶ Should we, nonetheless, concern ourselves more with effectively integrating a body of nations and less with shaping an American face in the mirror?

An example, taken from Kazakhstan, is appropriate here. Recently, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace received a rude awakening when, during a project in Almaty to assist in drafting electoral law, a senior member of the Kazakh parliament insisted that his parliament should follow the ideal model, claiming, "We want our Parliament to be just like your Congress." The Carnegie associate's most immediate thought was "No, you don't!"²⁷ One oxymoron, which our national strategy embodies, is how the United States seeks to promote a democratic model in other countries at a time when the health of our own democratic process, as measured by both public trust and public opinion, is treated with a doubtful cynicism. (Witness not only the scrutiny displayed toward public representatives, but also the *expectation* that public officials are often embroiled in ethical issues, often manipulate the public trust, and are not worthy stewards of that trust.) We should thus not be surprised when transitional states display an inclination more toward the acquisition and consolidation of power than in building democracy. The epiphany arising, in the first decade of this new century, that history will be defined by the triumph of liberal democracy, is unjustified. Yugoslavia, what remains of it, is the catharsis of transition. To not recognize liberal democracy's promise limit might equally promise its end as a viable strategic construct.

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: ARCHITECTURAL MOMENTS,
PIVOTAL STATES, SPHERES OF INDIFFERENCE**

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most important [sic] our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference.... Although there may be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband limited resources requires that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation...²⁸
--A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT, FEB 1996

American intervention in former Yugoslavia effectively muted what conservatives had labeled the Clinton administration's tendency toward either Wilsonian multilateralism or neo-internationalism. Former United Nations ambassador and current Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the administration's position as one of "assertive multilateralism": a foreign policy that draws on the coöperative aspects of institutions, a belief in a Gestalt synergy rising out of institution building greater than any constituent power alone.²⁹ The obvious institution to be identified as having soured the administration on "pure" multilateralism would be the United Nations, at times impotent in the face of incredible violence and incredible manipulations for power in former Yugoslavia; the U.N., both literally and symbolically, was taken hostage.³⁰

Yet perhaps one other significant institution played a significant role in convincing the Clinton administration to selectively engage: the European Union; more specifically within the EU, the powers of "Western" Europe--Germany, Britain, France.³¹ Europe, while declaring former Yugoslavia to be a European problem, realized (long before United States policy makers did) that the problem in Yugoslavia could not be solved without more active American diplomacy and more reactive American military force.³² While some might claim that European powers had the capability to deal with Bosnia as a European problem, it seems clear that no European security architecture in place--the Organization for Security and Coöperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Coöperation Council, the Western European Union, or the Council of Europe--could stop the slaughter. Only NATO, with American leadership, could shape and influence a positive outcome. Thus, NATO approved a first-ever out-of-area operation. Further, NATO's powerful force application in Bosnia--or the appearance of such

application--enshrined NATO as the "most successful peacetime collective security system in history" and implied its growing significance as a political body in the twenty-first century.³³ Indeed, the national security strategy refers to NATO as "history's greatest political-military alliance" and remains "central" to European integration and the solving of European problems.³⁴ (This itself is a further example of strategic oxymoron in the new century: NATO, as a defensive alliance, was never tested for the Cold War mission it was created for; yet, alternate post-Cold War security mechanisms-OSCE, WEU, the Council of Europe, et alia--proved ineffective in the absence of NATO's "force.")

In 1994, President Clinton could declare that former Yugoslavia was a problem for which "Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving"; yet, one year later, the president could declare that former Yugoslavia, within Central Europe, was "a region of the world that is vital to our national interests."³⁵ How could our view change so radically?

The answer is one of focus. Richard Holbrooke could declare America "a European power" and poised for the "fourth architectural moment" in which a new security architecture, one linked to American involvement and leadership, could rise out of the ruins of "Bosnia, the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s."³⁶ Yet Michael Mandelbaum could argue with equal effect in the same foreign policy journal that "the United States is not European" and "the people of former Yugoslavia were allowed to fight over its territory precisely because their wars did not pose a threat to the rest of Europe."³⁷ Mandelbaum could equally point to evidence that by selectively engaging in Bosnia-Herzegovina and with U.S. diplomacy forging (with multiple implications) the Muslim-Croat Federation in order to halt Serbian aggression, U.S. foreign policy selectively disengaged from Croatia and allowed it to gain additional territory in Bosnia, regain all territory lost to Serbia since 1991, and practice ethnic cleansing on a scale comparable to Serb atrocities.³⁸

Such contrasting perspectives have presented difficulties for both the administration and opportunities for its critics. They also represent a paradigm shift: when the Wilsonian ideal of enlargement could not work, the engagement of the benevolent hegemon proved necessary.

But there are limits to hegemony, and the sleeping giant now awakened must be selective. When assessing the competing strategic perspectives the Clinton administration has assumed during its first term--from Wilsonian liberalism, economic orientation, humanistic and morality-based concerns, as well as a realist emphasis on state actors--it becomes evident that an accurate portrayal of the final strategic vision of President Clinton's first term could be described as:

Priorities and Principles: A clear comprehension of complex trends shaping the world; a sober assessment of American interests; recognizing competing American objectives; an understanding of American power.

Foreign policy definition: While recognizing the value of coalition building, alliances (both formal and informal), and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, we must place emphasis on the freedom for America's unilateral action in order to consolidate democracy and free markets in Central Europe and Russia; contain regional conflicts; stem the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; strengthen an open and global economic system; re-define and strengthen our alliance with both Europe and Asia; and renew American leadership.

The problem with the above critique (a Reader's Digest version of our national security strategy), though it seems an accurate description of the Clinton administration's foreign policy ideal, is that it originates in a speech titled "Selective Engagement," given by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III as a harsh criticism against the Clinton presidency on the first anniversary of its inauguration.³⁹ A few short years later, William Jefferson Clinton has become what he never wanted to be: a foreign policy president. In some ways, his foreign policy record is stronger than that of his predecessor--who successfully waged war in the Persian Gulf but left office with no effective long-term resolution in the area. Further, the problems of Haiti and Bosnia, previously unresolved, have been brought to possible end states. Even in Somalia, dissolving rapidly into chaos after the departure of American forces, American intervention saved half a million lives.⁴⁰ And while America's domestic economy appears to be thriving, the United States (for the first time in history) is "locked into the center of all the giant trading blocs of the world's future growth."⁴¹ Finally, the United States has not been at war.

Here, of course, is where dangers lurk. For on the new frontier of this new century, the policy of selective engagement, while partially successful in furthering American interests on the European landmass, will have a skewed influence on our enduring involvement in the "developing" world (an imprecise term, I realize, in this post-Cold War yet pre-epithet new era --as meaningless now as the terms first, second, and third worlds). We may dismiss Robert Kaplan's warnings of "The Coming Anarchy" (in which disease, corruption, environmental devastation, and decay of the traditional state will become the overarching national security priorities), yet how do we respond to the more reasoned and reasonable accuracy of Paul Kennedy's "Pivotal States" model, in which a small number of countries whose fate is uncertain--and whose futures will profoundly affect their surrounding regions if they collapse--should receive America strategic focus, interest, and support?⁴²

Yugoslavia, of course--whatever its remains will be--is a pivotal state for the Balkans, at least, if not Europe. The conditions for intervention as a necessary action never changed. Only the argument to justify intervention--for the sake of interest--changed. We fail to recognize that, even now. The reason is simple, but its answer complex: We are limited by strategic vision. In selectively engaging to support our strategic interests, we are indeed creating spheres of influence.⁴³ Yet for those who do not "merit" American interest, we create spheres of indifference.⁴⁴ And within those spheres of indifference, current strategic vision will have little ability to influence or deflect future actions.

**PARADIGM UNBOUND:
ADAPTIVE BALANCE AS A DECONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH**

The twentieth century is drawing to its close.
I will be immured in it like a fly in amber.⁴⁵
CZESLAW MILOSZ

No doctrine can hope to provide a lens through which to view most events
or a compass by which to decide most policies.⁴⁶

Two decades ago, literature departments in France and America were set on their ears by philosopher Jacques Derrida and his theory of deconstruction. His notion stated simply (and with all the dangers of simplification) was that language, even language in the classical canon

of literature, acts to undo itself, exposing the inconsistencies and "ill-logic" of what was considered almost sacred expression of language. Language, then, refers largely to itself rather than an extratextual reality and asserts multiple conflicting interpretations. Yet Derrida's construct is by no means original: a significant part of ancient Greek philosophy is based on the exact need to "deconstruct" phenomena in order to arrive at sound solutions of practical value, even if such solutions belong to a non-physical, abstract reality.⁴⁷ In a similar way, now that we have entered the twenty-first century and are largely ignorant of it, we may need to de-construct American strategic vision in order to preserve it.

A single overarching framework will no longer suffice to address the future's diffuse and delicate relationships. While we have an interest in maintaining stability within regions "vital" to our interests and a balance between powerful actors, we cannot ignore instability in the developing world. While we cannot always declare, as General Colin Powell has declared, that "the vital interests of mankind are the vital interests of America, no matter how far from our shores," should we alternately promote American economic primacy at the expense of humanitarian issues?⁴⁸ American power is more ambiguous now than it ever was in the Cold War, subject to the deconstructing power diffusions of internal threats to national security as well as an increasing variety of external dangers. These include transnational threats from narcotics trafficking and crime syndicates, environmental decay, weapons proliferation and terrorism, economic protectionism by states and "alliances" (the European Union, as a potential future--not current--example), and the rise of nonstate and nongovernmental actors whose influence and power may seem limitless.⁴⁹ Further, our strategic engagement should address the rise of parastates (states, such as Bosnia, that cannot effectively function in a self-sufficient sense), failed states (states, such as Liberia, that can never recover), and pivotal states (such as Turkey, whose collapse would endanger Europe, the Middle East, and the world). With growing congressional pressure to reduce foreign assistance, and increasing public antipathy toward and belief that foreign policy has little or nothing to do with domestic

well-being, we can no longer live with the illusion of omnipotence. Yet we must proceed from a structure competent enough to embrace a world that seems, at times, ready to fracture.

The key to destroying the Minotaur and successfully wandering through the labyrinth lies, then, in an adaptive balance structure that supports means--America's approach to and commitment with the world--to reach meaningful ends--American objectives and American priorities. Adaptive balance breaks the basic rule of competing strategic visions: that, although current grand strategies are not mutually exclusive, "one cannot indiscriminately mix and match across strategies...without running into trouble."⁵⁰ To the contrary, the Yugoslav example should illustrate a deconstructive lesson: no current grand strategy as a foreign policy construct, of itself, will guarantee success in the future, and indeed may guarantee failure as our future diplomatic, economic, military and, by natural extension, ecological priorities evolve in the new century.⁵¹ Our adversaries, unbound by the delimitations of power diffusion, will define us most by strategic orientation.⁵² We may be most vulnerable where we now appear most strong.

Past administrations have been defined by doctrine: Wilson by a multilateral liberalist dream, Roosevelt by a primacy-based realist perspective, and the Cold War years by containment doctrine. The most popular construct recently enshrined (and toward which the Clinton administration has drifted and from which any future Republican administration would not likely stray) is selective engagement, if only because pragmatically it proves most easily digestible for American domestic consumption. Yet a single doctrinal construct, in the future, will prove as dangerous as case-by-caseism.⁵³ The policy maker, limited by the lens through which he (or, increasingly likely, she) sees, will view himself immersed (like the fly in amber) in the prism while never arriving at a longed-for end state. Indeed, a single foreign policy construct will prevent an end state's occurrence. The policy maker, confused, will be undone by doctrine.

The key to avoid the Minotaur devouring us is grasping when and how to adapt strategic construct (rather than overlapping constructs or searching for a construct that seems to

apply).⁵⁴ Accepting a deconstructive approach, a paradigm unbound, may prove difficult. One obvious criticism would be that "adapting" a grand strategy that varies to achieve policy objectives is the ultimate inconsistency (the masking of vision when no vision exists), a policy without structure, and would thus wreck havoc on economic protocols, diplomatic initiatives and--with the greatest financial significance--future military force planning and structure. To the criticism of force structure impact, an immediate response should be made. Adaptive balance recognizes that the future military force must either enlarge as our diplomatic missions shrink and foreign policy interests expand, or we take a more disciplined adaptation to a coöperative security (that is, a multilateral) regime that allows some American military action independent of yet able to support a viable future security framework.⁵⁵ For military planners, the future security environment dictates that the United States will no longer "go it alone" in military operations and that operations will increasingly be relevant within current spheres of indifference.⁵⁶ Our future strategy should therefore become increasingly projective rather than reactive, and our diplomacy prescriptive rather than simply preventive.⁵⁷ American military influence will likely grow, and need to grow, both in absolute and relative terms, yet the nature of single-state diplomatic influence as we know it will be called into question as a result of the same disrupting power diffusions. We must thus concern ourselves both with "imperial overstretch" and "security undercut."⁵⁸ We must learn to adapt and to balance.

Practicing adaptive balance will be far less difficult than intellectualizing its unbounded structure, and recognizing the need for it will soon prove imperative. We should be willing to cross lines of strategic visions to more broadly enlarge and engage with the world, not to diminish and withdraw within a focal length of one identifiable strategic construct. With the exception of the strategy of isolationism, attractive as it may seem and will continue to seem to an element of the American public (particularly in election years), there is no reason why we cannot mix and match among grand strategies, and there exist numerous reasons why we should. (It remains more practical to follow a realistic perspective-based primacy approach with China and Japan--because this is what is expected of a future military or current economic

"peer competitor" relationship and what they likely expect of us. It remains equally practical to develop and mature a cooperative security strategy within Europe, with the recognition that Europe extends to Vladivostok. Equally, it is possible to be alternately and at times simultaneously hegemonic and supportive of democracy and human rights in Africa and Asia. Adaptive balance would provide assurance without ultimate dominance, cooperation without ultimate dependence.

A criticism of adaptive balance as simply a dodge and weave approach would fail to recognize the fluid rather than static process of ends and means, and thus fail to acknowledge the varying depths of strategic engagement. How, for example, can we talk about NATO expansion in one moment and then suggest, as former Secretary of Defense William Perry suggested, that ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) consider beginning a "security dialogue" (and receive harsh attacks for such thinking)? Our levels of engagement differ; our relationships enjoy different maturities; and our strategy must adapt or ossify.

"This is a strange mission," Colonel John R. S. Batiste, United States Army, remarked on his assignment to Bosnia. "They didn't train me for this."⁵⁹ No one has prepared America's leaders for the twenty-first century. To escape from the prison of amber, in a time when even the concept of a superpower becomes superfluous, new adaptations must take place, and the practice of arbitration, bluff, restraint, predictability and unpredictability--to act in noncanonical ways--must seem reasonable in this post-Cold War yet pre-epithet new era. To do less only justifies the evidence that, although the Soviet Union certainly lost the Cold War, there remains little proof the United States has ever won it.

The Yugoslav example again proves worthwhile, viewed with a multiprismed (deconstructive) lens. The bullet in Sarajevo that took Archduke Ferdinand's life marked the end of a century, occasioning a world conflict in which rival powers sought to settle differences by war; the child in Sarajevo, until recently risking the sniper's fire, marks the beginning of another century in which no-longer rival powers worked cooperatively to solve what for many remained a regional, peripheral interest. The two events are dissimilar, and

should be deconstructed. The child in Sarajevo, after all, bears closer affiliation with Kaplan's anarchy than with the rotting consequence of dying empires.

The lessons of history are immense, nowhere more so than in the Balkans, but we should not arrive at conclusions so quickly as to be immediately convinced of a need for simplicity while ignoring complexities exponentially growing. We must be willing to be uncertain. And we should be grateful, for the moment and for the foreseeable future, that American engagement and involvement is actively welcomed in the world arena.

American intervention in former Yugoslavia and the re-shaping of national interests to make intervention necessary, of itself, does not represent a watershed in American foreign policy. Yet the Balkans will continue to demand European and American attention in the new millennium, and the contradictions and tensions of Yugoslav dissolution are emblematic of future threats to American diplomacy, force employment, and international leadership. Such tensions will increasingly confront us, whether they appear in the vast regions of the former Soviet Union, Africa, Southwest Asia, or the Pacific Rim. Failure to address the implications and their deconstructive impact on the traditional instruments of national power will diminish, if not void, the influence of American--indeed, Western--power in the future.

Perhaps then, in the search for a new strategic construct, the ghosts of both Wilson and Roosevelt should be cast in a new light, and we should be grateful for their iconal significance --yet not so narrowly as to accept the icon from a single perspective and inherit subsequent error. It was George Washington after all, and not Hans Morgenthau, who stated, "No nation is to be trusted further than its own interests."⁶⁰ The problem, of course, heretical as it seems, is that we often don't know what our interests (other than survival and prosperity) really are, let alone will be. Too often, as did Wilson and Roosevelt, we allow principles to substitute for more sustaining (and more important) national interests, and fail to see how principles may ultimately conflict with or prevent achieving interests. Yet conversely, we cannot allow interests to consistently override the moral authority that firm principle alone provides. We

must seek the balance between such tensions and adapt, or, as Dante was once, we may increasingly become "lost in a dark wood."

Therein lie the complexities of problem and solution, ends and means, and the reason to adapt. Yet this is a journey of opportunity, not an embarkation into fear. Our grand strategy in this new century must enlarge on and engage with the continuing evolution of discovery we are all a part of. In the words of poet Antonio Machado, "Traveler, there is no path./You make your path in the walk."⁶¹

¹In May 1997 the second-term Clinton administration issued A National Security Strategy for a New Century. This strategy document represents little more than a refinement of the previous National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and is not a significant departure in either conceptual idea or strategic perspective. I have chosen not to consider the May 1997 document for this essay because it would distract from consideration of the actual period during which American refusal to intervene gradually transformed to an American commitment to intervene in the former Yugoslavia. This essay serves, then, as an examination of recent history in which American strategic perspective shifted toward active NATO involvement, the transformation of the European security architecture, and the attempt to find some resolution to the Balkan Enigma. The arguments I present here are no less valid today than they were then.

²Dante Alighieri, The Inferno of Dante: A New Verse Translation by Robert Pinsky (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994), 5. My translation of The Inferno's opening lines differs from Pinsky (the current Poet Laureate of the United States): "Midway through the journey of this our life/I found myself in a dark wood/because I had lost the true path." Because this essay is meant to be as much a guidepost as warning, it is more appropriate to consider Dante's pronoun use in the plural rather than singular sense.

³Henry Kissinger confirms that President Richard Nixon chose the portraits of Wilson and Eisenhower to hang in the Cabinet Room, and that Woodrow Wilson remained the president Nixon most admired. Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994), 705-706.

⁴Richard N. Haass has suggested in "Paradigm Lost," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1995): 43-58, that American foreign policy has shifted between a set of five policy preferences--Wilsonian, economism, realism, humanitarianism, and minimalism. I do not differ with these preferences; indeed, the policies of pluralist Wilson and realist Roosevelt either embraced or rejected these preferences within their perspectives.

⁵My assertion that the twentieth century has already ended is not original. John Lukacs has previously written a provocative article on the subject: "The End of the Twentieth Century," Harper's, January 1993, 39-58. I differ with Lukacs only in the belief that the twentieth century began not with the war of 1914, but in 1913 with a revolution in ideas--the New York Armory exhibition that displayed for the first time in America the work of Duchamp, Matisse, Cézanne, van Gogh, Kandinsky, Gauguin, Brancusi, Braque and a certain "Paul" Picasso; Niels Bohr dreaming the conceptual model of the atom; William M. Burton's application for a patent process that converted oil into gasoline; Henry Ford announcing the creation of the work "assembly line" that would increase productivity; even Edgar Rice Burroughs, authoring Tarzan of the Apes--a kind of Rousseau for the common man. War followed soon after 1913, of course, perhaps as a result of a world no longer able to believe its own system or structure.

⁶Jonathan Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy," The Atlantic Monthly, September 1993, 66.

⁷Thomas Carothers, "Democracy without Illusions," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1997): 85-99.

⁸President William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 5 February 1996), 2.

⁹Haass, "Paradigm Lost," 44.

¹⁰A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, 33; 12.

¹¹Ibid., 35; A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994, 21.

¹²Ibid., 1996, 3.

¹³Ibid., 1994, i, 6, 10, 21; Ibid., 1996, i, 11, 18, 35.

¹⁴Henry Kissinger, "How to Achieve the New World Order," Time, 14 March 1994, 73.

¹⁵A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, iii. In 1996 the United States extended formal diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Macedonia; thus, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia no longer known by its "former" name.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 33-34.

¹⁷Jonathan Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy," 66.

¹⁸Michael G. Roskin, "Macedonia and Albania: The Missing Alliance," Parameters, Winter 1993-94, pg. 97.

¹⁹My thanks to journalist Sašo Ordanoski for correcting my initial claim that ethnic Serbs constitute six percent of the population. The Serb population in Macedonia is actually smaller than the Gypsy, or Romani, population--yet far more vocal. In the past, this small minority within the Macedonian republic, nonetheless, has made its presence known, from voicing Serbian "rights" to staking claims on traditional Serb lands stemming back to 1911. I have extracted the figure of two percent for the Serb minority within Macedonia, smaller than the ethnic Gypsy minority of 2.27-2.73%, from: the 1991 census of Broj i struktura na neselenieto vo Republika Makedonija po opštini i nacionalna pripadnost (Skopje: Republički zavod za statistiku, 1991), 6, as well as 1994 estimates from Nova Makedonija (13 November 1994), 3, and reported in translation in FBIS: Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 15 November 1994, 52.

²⁰A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, 36.

²¹Candidate Clinton's insistence in 1992 that bombing in Bosnia was the best solution proved to be a frequent criticism targeted at the hesitation to use military force by subsequent President Clinton.

²²*Ibid.*, 35.

²³Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995): 79. A longer edition of the authors' forceful argument appears in the Summer 1995 version of International Security. Though not directly antithetical, Tony Smith in a Foreign Affairs article (November-December 1994), "In Defense of Intervention," has noted a large body of work that emphasizes harmonious relations between democratic states without noting the evolutionary stage of democratic development. See Michael Doyle, "An International Liberal Community," in eds. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, Rethinking American Security: Beyond the Cold War to New World Order (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991); David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifist: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review (March 1992); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

²⁴Robert D. Kaplan, "Democracy's Trap," The New York Times, 24 December 1995, op-ed.

²⁵A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, 33; 12.

²⁶Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," Foreign Affairs (November/December 1994): 37.

²⁷Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy in a Postmodern World," quoted in "Which Democracy Should We Export?" Harper's, September 1996, 17.

²⁸A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, 11; 18.

²⁹Haass, "Paradigm Lost," 51. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (July-August 1996): 18.

³⁰Domestic policy again likely impinged on a critical assessment of national strategy and foreign policy: in 1995, the U.N.--rather than the administration--could more easily receive blame for strategic failures.

³¹Other European powers who influenced American action, often omitted (because they do not fit the paradigm of continuing and effective power sources in Europe), are the Netherlands,

Spain and Italy. Spanish forces flew 121 of a total 3,315 air missions during Deliberate Force; the Dutch, 198, the French, 284; the British, 326; the Germans, by contrast, constrained both domestically and perhaps by the memory of past actions in Yugoslavia, flew a meager 59 sorties--a third less than Turkey. Further, without Italy supplying basing rights, the military force applied by the NATO coalition in Bosnia would have been far less effective. U.S. Naval power and projection was insufficient in and of itself. Extracted from Laura Stanton, "Location of Forces: 30 August-14 September 1995," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 27 November-3 December 1995, 6.

³²The reasons for their desire, however--insulting though arguable--differ: Germany and France were unwilling to expend further resources without American involvement; Britain, whose foreign policy orientation has changed little since Margaret Thatcher's departure, is comfortable with American hegemony and realizes its own marginal power within the EU. Drawn from Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), no page reference cited, quoted in Jonathan Clarke, "Repeating British Mistakes," The National Interest, Spring 1995, pg. 74.

³³Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1995): 38-51.

³⁴A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, 36.

³⁵"In Clinton's Words: What U.S. Interests Are," The New York Times, 20 February 1994, 10:3-4; "Implementing the Bosnian Peace Agreement: Let Us Lead," Vital Speeches of the Day, Volume LXII, Number 5 (15 December 1995): 130.

³⁶Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," 40. At the time this article was published, Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. The other architectural moments in Europe, according to Holbrooke, were the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the failed Wilsonian vision from Versailles in 1919, and the shared achievements rising in 1947 from the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the NATO partnership.

³⁷Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1996): 25. The 1996 national security strategy (pg. 35), as previously noted, reduces the threat of conflict from spreading to a wider "Balkan" conflict, revising the earlier claim of a wider "European" threat.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 24.

³⁹"Selective Engagement: Principles for American Foreign Policy in a New Era," Vital Speeches of the Day, Volume 60, Number 10, March 1994, 299-302.

⁴⁰Mandelbaum, "'Foreign Policy as Social Work,'" 30.

⁴¹Taylor Branch, "Clinton without Apologies," Esquire, September 1996, 173, draws on an assessment by English author Martin Walker to place the Clinton presidency into the perspective of the past half century.

⁴²Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1996): 33-51. According to the Pivotal States model, the state most deeply affecting American interests--and the maintenance of the status quo--are Brazil, Mexico, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. Conversely, Robert D. Kaplan, who has made a cottage industry out of various "journeys" has had--admittedly or not--impact on current strategic vision in America. President Clinton decided, after reading Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, to intervene in former Yugoslavia, and although Kaplan's The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century (which includes the influential essays "The Coming Anarchy," as well as "Eaten from Within"--which portrays the tenuous state of contemporary Egypt) has not been taken seriously by the president and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, his work has influenced Deputy Undersecretary of State for the Environment and Global Affairs Tim Wirth.

⁴³Many will likely disagree, and some violently so, with my suggestion that new spheres of influence are being created. My suggestion remains, nonetheless, that these spheres are created as the inevitable consequence of change. NATO expansion, of course, is the prime example of change. Official American and European foreign policy specifically denies the acceptable conditions for new spheres of influence in the New Europe, and indirectly notes how past Soviet spheres of influence (which our policies such as "differentiation" did little to change or even influence) created the hard divisions of Europe. The Study on NATO Enlargement speaks of rendering "a new European security architecture...that renders obsolete..." "dividing lines" in Europe....[Further,] there can be no question of "spheres of influence" in the contemporary Europe. NATO Home Page, <www.vm.ee/nato/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm> (5 March 1997).

⁴⁴The phrase "Spheres of Indifference" is used by Professor Theodoros Couloumbis, Director of the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy and a member of the American University faculty, as a metaphor to describe an alternate universe for those states marginalized in the future--such as Greece may be in the new Europe--in the absence of U.S. interests.

⁴⁵"The Garden of Earthly Delights," Unattainable Earth, translated by the author and Robert Hass (New York: The Ecco Press, 1986.)

⁴⁶Haass, "Paradigm Lost," pg. 44.

⁴⁷Plato's concept of the idea (from ἰδέιν), for example, concerns the appearance (the "seen") of a thing apart from its reality (the "unseen"). Derrida, of course, played with this in one way by naming Socrates as history's greatest writer, because Socrates, with Plato as amanuensis, actually never wrote a word.

⁴⁸Quoted in Clarke, "Repeating British Mistakes," pg. 75.

⁴⁹For one examination of these influences and disruptions to the nation-state, see Jessica T. Mathews' "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1997): 50-66.

⁵⁰Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing U.S. Grand Strategies," in Strategy and Force Planning (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1995), Chapter 9, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, editors, 130.

⁵¹It is worth remembering the etymology of the word "ecology"--the λογία (structure and logic) of the οἶκος (the household); if the structure fails, little else matters.

⁵²Sun Tzu's opaque construct is relevant: "The supreme importance in war is to attack your enemy's strategy." From The Art of War, translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 76.

⁵³Haass, "Paradigm Lost," 44.

⁵⁴The Bush and Clinton administrations may have thus encountered strategic dissonance, and adverse domestic and international reaction, by simply failing to apply the when and how, by overlapping and/or searching for construct rather than adapting.

⁵⁵Little discussion in this article is made between collective security and coöperative security. To be fair to the proponents of coöperative security (such as former Secretary of Defense William Perry), it is a refinement of the collective security concept--alliances seeking to prevent the conditions that precipitate conflict rather than alliances reacting collectively to terminate conflict once it breaks out. The greatest drawback to the coöperative argument, however, is demonstrative proof of its refinement; the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, after all, was a collective security response to conflict outbreak; only after conflict was contained, were conditions created for preventing its possible expansion. Further, as Richard Haass has argued in the article unfortunately titled (because of its connotation of American "cowboy" mentality and Manifest Destiny) "Foreign Policy by Posse" The National Interest, Fall 1995, 58-64, it remains unclear, and the Yugoslav intervention example only confounds clarity, whether future

effective engagements (military, diplomatic, or economic) would be best served by ad hoc coalitions, rather than in structured alliances.

⁵⁶Robert D. Kaplan, "Fort Leavenworth and the Eclipse of Nationhood," The Atlantic Monthly, September 1996, 85.

⁵⁷A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, 1.

⁵⁸I use the term "imperial overstretch" in the sense that Paul Kennedy employs it--as a warning--in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Conflict from 1500 to 2000, in Chapter 8, "To the Twenty-First Century--The United States: The Problem of Number One in Relative Decline," (New York: Random House, 1987), 515.

⁵⁹Rick Atkinson, "What West Point Doesn't Teach: U.S. Peacekeepers Are Adjusting to Their New Tasks of Arbitration, Bluff, and Restraint," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 22 April-28 April 1996, pg. 12.

⁶⁰Owen Harris, "My So-Called Foreign Policy: The Case for Clinton's Diplomacy," The New Republic, 10 October 1994, 31.

⁶¹The original lines are: "Caminante, son tus huellas/el camino, y nada más;/caminante, no hay camino/se hace camino al andar"; Poesía, from "Proverbios y cantares," introducción y antología de Jorge Campos (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1981), 96.

THE RISE OF THE PARASTATE

The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia has occasioned a phenomenon that will affect the future of European security: the parastate, which emerges as the mutant offspring of an expiring previous order. In the Balkans, such parastates of the former Yugoslavia exist within the ethnic volcano, stable yet volatile, within Kosovo, or rise from the tenuous existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina (and, within it, the Republika Srpska)--states that cannot make peace because they were designed only to make war. Further, in the wake of the Serbian government's repression, the virtual parastate is created, best represented by the Internet-dependent B-92 opposition resistance movement, lacking little more than symbolic support from international agencies and diplomatic channels.

Parastasis--from the Greek, παράστασις; a putting aside, banishing.¹

Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in ours?²

VLADIMIR GLIGOROV

The time of the parastate is now. Its presence in the landscape of the current and future security environment may well be a permanent feature of the Balkan Enigma. Policy planners and decision makers ought to recognize both the parastate's existence as well as acknowledge how parastates, allowed to dead reckon their own paths absent external Balkan guidance, face less the opportunity for peaceful solution and more the chance for conflict exploding into violence and turmoil once again. If left unchecked, the tumor of the parastate may prove malignant.

What is the parastate? Precise definition is likely not possible and our understanding as we proceed forward in this new century is imperfect. At its most general level, the parastate emerges as the "mutant offspring" of an expiring order.³ Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a potential parastate paradigm for this next century: itself a parastate, Bosnia is marked internally by islands of smaller parastates adrift in a sea of landlocked identities that emerged (or vanished) in the last Balkan war.

The very existence of Bosnia as an internationally recognized nation, we know now, virtually assured its failure as a state. Internal, parastatic forces destroyed Bosnia. Today, it would be easier to think of Bosnia as a nation that does not exist, but simply has defined itself since independence as a virtual creation, marked by a series of demographic maps that shift continuously over time and space. As NATO, the United States, and Europe slowly disengage from the Balkan wreckage, the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska do not, by any measure, represent a confederative order.⁴ To the contrary, Bosnia-Herzegovina seems bound by a disorder that may move the Bosnian parastate even farther away from its current realities.

Parastates, nonetheless, are not new phenomena in the Balkans. The historic parastate of Krajina Serbs existed for centuries in western Croatia. In 1995, Croatia virtually destroyed the

parastate of the Serbian Krajina Republic in Operation Storm.⁵ In 1997, Eastern Slavonija--a geographically distinct region with a Serbian enclave within it since the 1600s--came under the wing of the United Nations Transitory Administration for Eastern Slavonija (UNTAES).⁶ The UNTAES mission is to assist in the reincorporation of Eastern Slavonija within the Croatian state.

In Kosovo, an autonomous province in the Republic of Serbia until 1989, ethnic Albanians now represent more than nine-tenths of the population, yet Serbia will likely never allow Kosovo to achieve independence or even autonomy in any foreseeable future. For Serbs, Kosovo represents the birthplace of Serbian culture, a "Balkan Jerusalem"; for the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, for decades the victims of brutal Serbian oppressions, the issue is one of self-determination and freedom of choice.

Yet paradoxically, parastates might also offer a "solution" to problems that cannot be solved by political mechanisms that proved successful in the past. Parastates, bound by identities of ethnic or religious identity, or simply aligned internally against a common enemy, represent an outcome preferable to the collapsed state, one incapable of support, sustainment or growth. Parastates can also grow out of interstate community relationships that compete for economic comparative advantage. Within the Balkans, and indeed within Europe, there is a slow recognition that regional identities (a more benign euphemism for "parastate") can best represent growth potential at the level at which daily life and interactions occur.

Thus, parastates are not exclusive Balkan phenomena. Indeed, the parastate will be the oxymoron of the new Europe, one in which the prosperous members of the European Union struggle to define themselves in the post-Maastricht order yet find themselves often defined by their unique differences.⁷ In terms of economic growth, Europe's various communities have entered parallel yet related processes: "One is regionalism, the other globalization; instead of working through national capitals, European regions are linking themselves directly to the global economy."⁸ Such "bananas," as the president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, terms them will

form Europe's parastates of growth and prosperity.⁹ Such parastates, nonetheless, might offer solutions rather than create problems.

Parastatism may also represent the continuing loss of autonomy among states, unions, and alliances. National governments will have no choice but to share power bases of core sovereignty with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and competing business interests. "The steady concentration of power in the hands of states," as Jessica Mathews claims, "that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while."¹⁰

In the Balkans, the parastate may also represent the greatest threat to future European security. When peoples struggle for survival rather than simply for comparative growth advantage, the stakes are higher and the potential for violence more definite. Bosnia may simply be passing through a phase of false peace, recovering from its own "Yugo-Fatigue," as all sides prepare again for war.

The Dayton Agreement seems to have provided no resolution for the Balkan Enigma. The existence of Balkan parastates, while failing to offer complete resolution, nonetheless provides temporary postponement of inevitable violence. At this point, the outcome for peace seems uncertain. The outcome for war, again, will loom in the shadows for years to come. As James Scheer terms it,

"Majoritization" has become the defining principle of social organization in post-Dayton Bosnia, as the ruling parties of each camp to greater or lesser degrees endeavor to concentrate their own communities geographically. This phenomenon not only impedes practical steps toward reintegration, it has also tended to expose fissures within each ethnic community, fissures that are now a central feature of Bosnia's unfolding political drama.¹¹

Bosnia represents the extreme, though not the exception, in the Balkan example. The quandary the international community faced in the wake of the Dayton Agreement, that of bringing peace, proved far more difficult than the impressive efforts made in 1995 to end the violence. In the absence of permanent solution, the parastate has become institutionalized.

THE HISTORIC PARASTATE

Kosovo

At least three pressing examples of the historic parastate exist in the Balkans. Each represents forces that bleed across borders. Each is emblematic of the potential for disaster.

The region of Kosovo, perhaps the most well-known example internationally, also presents its own peculiar problems. Kosovo has been a cultural, historical, and mystical mecca to Serbians since 1389 (the year of the Ottoman conquest and defeat of Serbian Prince Lazar). In 1989, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević placed the autonomous province of Kosovo under Serbia's total authoritarian control.¹² Milošević, emphasizing Serbian identity as dominant over human rights (while equally creating a power base for his own meteoric rise to megalomania), caused division for both Yugoslavia and the international community. Serbians claimed that Albanians were attempting to separate from Yugoslavia and align with the state of Albania. In the late 1980s the former President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia did little to allay this assertion when he referred to ethnic Albanians as "terrorists."¹³ Albanians, who form only eight percent of the national population but over ninety percent of the population in Kosovo, insisted that they wanted only the basic freedoms which seem to be guaranteed to all Yugoslavs but them.¹⁴ Today these same people are prisoners of the Yugoslav state (now comprised of Serbia and Montenegro) and are limited in their ability to hold political office or openly express disagreement with authority.¹⁵ Ethnic misunderstandings have led to extreme violence. Serbians continue to accuse Albanians of rape, murder, and mass grave desecration in thousands of separate charges of violence, while Albanians counter-react with furor and protest, even alleging past cases of chemical warfare unleashed on groups of dissenting Albanians.¹⁶ In 1981, twenty-five percent of the Yugoslav National Army (42,000) deployed to Kosovo to control regional conflict. In the 1980s, according to the President of the (Albanian) Democratic League of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, "Kosovar Albanians spent a total of 27,000 years in prison."¹⁷ In the 1990s, the violence continues.¹⁸ The Helsinki Watch Committee, a human-rights organization which monitors compliance with the 1975 Helsinki

accords, has reported the situation in Kosovo as "a frightening example of the power of a one-party dictatorship, the full weight of a police state controlled by one ethnic minority unleashed against another."¹⁹ The region and the conflict have become a Yugoslav Palestine. Indeed, Serbian opposition leader, nominal democrat, and (if you scratch the skin even lightly) fierce nationalist, Vuk Drašković, refers to Kosovo as "our Jerusalem."²⁰

While Kosovo remains the best known Balkan parastate, its freedom of action and its chance for success, even if granted independence, are both limited. Western analysts focused with almost maniacal attention on Kosovo during the last Balkan war, apparently believing that an outbreak of violence there could be the spark to ignite a wider Balkan conflagration. According to journalist Misha Glenny, this attention stemmed from "pronounced Albanophilia and Serbophobia within State Department ranks" as well as from the misperception "that irrational blood lust rather than calculated territorial expansion was the cause of the Balkan conflict."²¹ Yet this "misperception"—that ethnic furies and not calculating territorial manipulations caused the last Balkan war—still dominates American and European foreign policy toward the region.

Northern Epiros or Southern Albania?

The second example of the historic Balkan parastate is perhaps less well known, yet equally volatile given the "right" set of tripwires and clashes. This second parastate also involves a NATO member: Greece.

In 1913, in the wake of the first Balkan War, the "Great Powers" in London created what is today the independent state of Albania, "minus the Muslim province of Kossovo [sic], which the Serbs grabbed."²² This was not an isolated incident. During the time of the Balkan Wars, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria all invaded Albania in the proclaimed interest of "liberation" while equally seeking to create a Balkan sphere of influence. Indeed, since the time of Greek insurrections against the Ottomans in northern Greece in the late nineteenth-century, the borders of (former Yugoslav) Macedonia, Albania, and Greece have succumbed to various tensions. In October 1940, Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas, by electing to challenge Italian

dictator Benito Mussolini's invasion of Albania, proclaimed that his armies would fight to regain northwestern Greece as well as to conquer Albania. Thus, the Albanians were caught between the conundrum of unfavorable outcomes: either Italian occupation or Greek liberation. In the wake of the Second World War, the leader of the Communist resistance movement, General Markos, saw his forces crushed by overwhelming American-supplied firepower in the Grammos mountains of the Greek state of Macedonia (and then withdrew into southern Albania).²³ Even today in this region it is not difficult to find peoples in the same community who speak Slavic Macedonian, Greek, and Albanian.²⁴

Out of such tensions, nonetheless, has risen the existence of the parastate of "Northern Epiros." You will not find Northern Epiros on any contemporary map. Mention the name to any Greek, however, and its significance will bring immediate relevance. Epiros refers to both the Greek state of that name and to its Greek meaning of "the continent." Northern Epiros is that part of southern Albania that remains more affluent and ethnically distinct from northern Albania. To many, the "Northern Epiroites" are little more than half a million ethnic Greeks in exile on land that comprises more than half of all Albania's territory. These peoples, according to the same belief, were forced into exile by the "shameful 1913 protocol that created the Albanian state."²⁵ Metropolitan Archbishop Sevastianos of Epiros, known as "Greece's Khomeini," proclaimed contemporary Greece a "dismembered" nation and was rumored to have secretly infiltrated armed guerrillas into southern Albania/Northern Epiros in order to foment insurrection.²⁶ Today in much of western Greek Epiros and Macedonia, graffiti exists that announces how "Blood will flow in Northern Epiros" or "Northern Epiros is now and forever Greek!"

One cannot easily dismiss the existence of this parastate. The proclamations of a Greek minority (that holds an extreme nationalistic stance) make this parastate's non-existence on the map so relevant. Consider, for example, the following events: during both World Wars I and II, the Greek armed forces held Northern Epiros, finally withdrawing in 1944; until 1988, Greece maintained an official "state of war" with Albania; in 1997, the revolt and attempted

overthrow of the (northern) Albanian government began in southern Albania. Many of the villages which led the revolt had Greek names--Saranda, Vlora--and members of so-called "defense committees," such as Kyriakos Martikos, had Greek names.²⁷

Nominally, the cause of the revolt was a violent protest against the collapse of pyramid money schemes in which every Albanian had invested, and in which the more affluent southern Albanians had invested the greatest amount. Yet a simple deconstruction of the protest's moving from outrage to active effort to topple the Albanian government, a factor almost all Western media and analysts overlooked, revealed how the peoples of "Northern Epiros" were aiding the revolt. Indeed, the parastate of Northern Epiros is as much a problem for the modern Greek state as it is for the Albanian one.

Slavonija and the End of Its History

The third historic parastate died in 1995 when Croatian military forces--with the active assistance of retired General Carl E. Vuono, commander of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe from 1987 to 1992--overran the Serb Krajina Republic in Operation Storm, named after Desert Storm and its precedent of the use of overwhelming force.²⁸ This operation, according to some reports, "ethnically cleansed" more than 90 percent of the Serbs living in the Krajina parastate within Croatia.²⁹ The "West" remained silent at Croatia's violation of a nominally protected U.N. area--which drove hundreds of thousands of refugees into exile, perhaps permanent exile, in Bosnia and Serbia.³⁰ In short, what the Croatian government referred to as "occupied territories" in Eastern and Western Slavonija is actually land which Serbs have held and where Serbs had lived for over four centuries.

The Krajina Republic is particularly an unusual claim to be a so-called occupied territory since it was created as a buffer zone "to protect the shopkeepers of Vienna (and Zagreb) from the Ottomans."³¹ The term Krajina is taken from the Serbian kraj, meaning the end or the edge; the name of the parastate Krajina is taken from Vojna Krajina, literally meaning "Military Frontier." In the mid-sixteenth century, the Habsburg Empire found a convenient way to sponsor the immigration of Orthodox Serbs into the region both to create a defensive barrier

against Ottoman expansion and (according to some) to police the activities of Croatian nationalists who favored the creation of an independent state. In 1630, the Habsburg empire issued the Statuta Valachorum (Vlach Statutes), placing the Krajina directly under control of the emperor and independent of Zagreb. The Serb movement into Eastern Slavonija, modern Vojvodina, and southern Hungary came about in the late 1600s as a result of the migration, directed by Serbian Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević, from the traditional Serbian homeland of Kosovo.³²

The so-called Knin Rebellion, the tripwire which unleashed the last Balkan War, entered its final, violent stage in March 1991, in and around Plitvice National Park (a vast terraced lakeland of cascading waterfalls), where rebels and Croatian police forces engaged in a pitched battle (with 200 Italian tourists caught in the cross-fire).³³ The Serb peoples of the parastate named the Krajina Republic claimed they had no effective constitutional representation (which was true) in an independent Croatia and no desire to remain within the newly independent state (which was their self-determined right). Thus, the war in Yugoslavia began when a historic parastate exerted demands the state proved unwilling to support. From there, the rebellion spread to Eastern Slavonija--and the horrors of Vukovar. The Serbs within Croatia believed they were victims; the international community, aided by Croatia's powerful vehemence, came to regard the rebel Serbs as both fascists and terrorists. The Serbian rebellion, there can be no doubt, unleashed brutal furies; at the same time, Serbian grievances were legitimate and their decision for war (with the support of the Yugoslav national army) could be taken directly from the writings of Clausewitz as part of both a rational calculus and a determined policy choice.

THE AHISTORIC PARASTATE

Where is Bosnia-Herzegovina?

In the summer of 1995 I received a personal tour through the "Green Line" which separates the Greek and Turkish sections of Cyprus. As I walked through the shattered remains of Nicosia, separated only meters, at times, from Greek and Turkish Cypriot soldiers who "monitor" the U.N.-controlled sector, I was stunned by the absolute freezing of time that has

existed here since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on 20 July 1974. Turkish forces seized over thirty percent of Cyprus and displaced over 200,000 Greek Cypriots. In the ruins of Nicosia now separated by division, you can still see where tables had been set and left, where hand grenades had been thrown and detonated, where even the wreckage of automobiles mark dividing lines between two borders. What I most considered, however, was the question I put both to myself and my U.N. guides: "Will this be how Sarajevo looks after the fighting stops?"

The truth, revealed several months later, is that although Sarajevo may not look like a partitioned city, Bosnia-Herzegovina will most likely remain a partitioned country. General Charles Boyd's remarks about what he saw in the Balkans has an eerie resonance with what I saw in Cyprus. One can easily change the names and locales but the tragedy remains: "I have walked the streets of villages like Gornji Vakuf and seen the faces of angry, armed young men staring at one another across city squares and streets transformed into ethnic confrontation lines."³⁴

Even Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, the diplomat who brokered the Dayton Agreements and pushed for acceptance of "the key elements of a sovereign state," has reluctantly come to admit that partition of Bosnia may well be a likely outcome of NATO intervention in the Bosnian crisis. Holbrooke, nonetheless, is by no means an advocate of this likely outcome: "I believe partition would leave the region in a perpetual state of unresolved tension, keep the international community involved longer and at greater cost, and risk igniting other boundary disputes."³⁵

The international community, to be blunt, is tired of Bosnia. No simple resolution seems to exist and, as consequence, the belief has hardened that no solution is possible. Yet such belief betrays both the people of Bosnia and the international community's tacit support extended when it first offered recognition of the Bosnian state. There were only 500,000 fewer Serbs in Bosnia than Muslims at the time of independence, yet the unwillingness of Serbs to support an independent Bosnia led to war. Out of that wreckage, American leadership

led to a quasi-stabilization through the Dayton agreements and provided the chance for peace to take hold. What remains unclear is whether sufficient groundwork has been accomplished or whether the situation will once again descend into chaos.

Bosnia represents the most extraordinary example of the Balkan parastate. Bosnia is the "mutant offspring of an expiring failed state," as Misha Glenny terms it, a parastate unprepared for peace because it can only make war--or can only survive with external support through the mechanism of war. The Bosnian Muslim government, numerous examples now show, often distorted its victimization in order to continue to receive assistance from the "West." On occasion it betrayed its own people in doing so:

Some of [Sarajevo's] suffering has actually been imposed on it by actions of the Sarajevo government. Some were understandable policies, like the restriction on travel to prevent the depopulation of the city during those periods when movement was possible. Others were the by-product of government weakness, like relying on the Sarajevo underworld for the initial defense of the city, thereby empowering criminal elements that took their toll on the population, especially Serbs....Government soldiers...have shelled the Sarajevo airport....no seasoned observer in Sarajevo doubts for a moment that Muslim forces have found it in their interest to shell friendly targets. In this case, the shelling usually closes the airport for a time, driving up the price of black-market goods. Similarly, during the winter of 1993-94, the municipal government helped to deny water to the city's population....And, of course, the sight of Sarajevans lining up at water distribution points, sometimes under mortar and sniper fire, was a poignant image.³⁶

Bosnia further represents an extraordinary example of the parastate because it remains unclear how much longer it will itself remain an island of parastates aligned with bordering states who have territorial "interests." In 1974, Tito's constitution granted Muslims, the third largest national group in Yugoslavia, the status of a separate nation. (Tito's reasoning for this was likely out of cultural recognition and manipulative intent: by handing Muslims cultural recognition, new allegiance would be due to Tito and the central government.) The Muslims of Yugoslavia, however, did not constitute sufficient strength to stake a claim as a separate republic.³⁷ Further, cultural affiliations marked distinct attitudes. For Serbs, the Ottoman period was one of occupation; for Muslims, "it was in era which saw the creation and subsequent prosperity of their particular élite."³⁸

Bosnia-Herzegovina lived both under Ottoman and Austrian control, never existing, prior to 1991, as an independent state. (In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottomans occupied Croatia, eventually withdrawing to the adjacent territories of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and remaining there for another 200 years.³⁹) Both Serbia and Croatia have territorial regional interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, in 1992, two intriguing tensions revealed themselves in a "parliament" deputy Bosnian Serb's proclamation: "We are witnessing the birth of a Muslim bastard on the territory of the land of our grandfathers."⁴⁰ First, inherent racism would come to characterize the war between the Bosnian peoples--as it had always, at some eventual point, come to characterize past conflict.⁴¹ Second, the belief among Bosnians other than Muslims seemed to be that Bosnia, represented by a Muslim majority, did not have the right to exist as a separate state.

This second belief is the more ominous one. And it was in that belief, likely, that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević met in March 1991 at Karadjordjevo, Tito's favorite villa for hunting and negotiations. Although Milošević, ever the ruthless pragmatist, has never revealed the content of these discussions, Tudjman openly admitted that partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a top issue for consideration: "This partition had been started with the Croat-Serbian agreement of 1939 when the representatives of the Croatian and Serbian people agreed to create the Banovina Hrvatska."⁴²

The Bosnian (Muslim-Croatian) Federation came in being in March 1994 under the firm hand of Vice President Al Gore. Many observers would still consider the Federation today to be little more than a forced integration of contrary parastatic elements. Yet within the Republika Srpska itself, nominally an ethnically integrated community, the parastate itself is being drawn and quartered. Pale, the village ski resort outside Sarajevo and once the operations base for Radovan Karadžić's conduct of the war, is today little more than a ghost town. Attention has shifted, among Bosnian Serbs, to Banja Luka, in the north, as the principle base and nominal capital. In the northeast, attention has shifted not only to capitalizing on the gains of Brčko

(along the Bosnia-Croatia border) but to widening the corridor, up to 20 kilometers if possible, from Serbia through Croatia into Bosnia for tactical advantage. In the southeast, the nominal capital of Herzegovina's Serbs, remains focused on Trebinje. ("Trebinje, Trebinje," the aphorism goes, "If we lose Trebinje, then we're all fucked!"--In Serbian, the phrase rhymes.) These disparate tensions have also caused a hemorrhaging of Republika Srpska's citizens: of the 1.4 million Serbs in Bosnia reported in the 1991 census, as many as 500,000 have fled into Serbia proper to live or seek immigration to Canada.⁴³ In Serbia, these refugees are often considered little more than immigrants by other Serbs.⁴⁴ Slobodan Milošević, who came to decay in 1995 the forces of nationalism and betrayed the Serbian peoples outside the borders of Serbia proper--the very people he invoked to take up arms in 1991--has allowed his nation to economically collapse and flounder in the aftermath. The problem of refugees within his borders is a problem for which he bears sole responsibility.⁴⁵

The future of the Bosnian parastate is, at best, tenuous. "Bosnia," as Henry Kissinger observed, "is a geographic expression, not a nation."⁴⁶ For some, both in the Balkans and in the international community, Bosnia is a place that no longer exists.

Where is Macedonia?

The Republic of Macedonia, formally recognized by the United States in 1996, continues to be known by both Greece and Serbia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The Greek objections stem largely from objections to the name "Macedonia"; such a name, Greeks would insist, stems directly from Alexander the Great and does not belong to a state (whose borders lie partially within ancient Macedonia) that broke away from the South (Yugo) Slav disaster. Yet the truth, in the wake of Greece's lifting of its self-imposed embargo against Macedonia is an odd one: Greece is the best friend Macedonia may have in the future. Turkey, in the words of many Macedonian leaders is also "a good friend." Thus, competition between Greece and Turkey may work to Macedonia's advantage. Macedonia, nonetheless, is desperately in need of economic infrastructure. The newly independent state, in the confidential remarks made to me by one politician in May 1997, "is bankrupt." A prime region

for transnational shipment of drugs and arms, some individuals in Macedonia also benefited from the last Balkan war, breaking U.N. sanctions with the transport of goods into and out of Serbia. In the absence of war and the illegal benefits of smuggling, Macedonia has had some trouble adjusting to the "legal" peace.

Thus, Macedonia's future is uncertain. Clearly an independent state with a distinct culture and language, many Balkan neighbors prefer to view Macedonia as an ahistoric parastate that will eventually crumble of its own inability to stand upright.⁴⁷ Indeed, the standard line about Macedonia many Balkan neighbors expressed (and still some harbor belief in) is that "Macedonia" is a "Tito-ist creation fabricated after the Second World War" to help balance the dominance of the Serbs in Yugoslavia and help aggravate the Greek government during the time of the Greek Civil War. In 1993, a former head of the Greek military expressed in private the hope that Serbia would simply "carve up" Macedonia and bring it into its sphere of influence within the "new" Yugoslavia.⁴⁸ This has not happened--yet; since 1993, American troops along with a Nordic battalion have formed a perimeter line along the Macedonian-Serbian border. The operation is known today as UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force). Its meaning also betrays its euphemism: these troops are simply observers and thus their "preventive" deployment is symbolic only. Should fighting erupt, these peacekeepers have no mandate, and no intention, of being involved. Currently, their deployment mandate is renewed every six months. UNPREDEP's presence has brought a stability to Macedonia; its absence will bring a far less secure environment.

Macedonia, whose population is nearly one quarter ethnic Albanian, has survived--unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina--a wide array of ethnic conflict and tensions. Much of this is due to the political genius of President Kiro Gligorov, a veteran of five decades of Yugoslav politics and a former member of Tito's inner circle. His genius for survival and solutions--which earned him the nickname "the fox"--helped guide his nation to independence.⁴⁹ Indeed, of all the presidents of the former republics now become independent states, Gligorov can be as closely identified as the "father" of a nation as any other.⁵⁰ Most Macedonians simply refer to him as

"Kiro." Yet such common familiarity in Skopje betrays an uneasy fault that draws the peoples of Macedonia in various directions.

In northwest Macedonia, in the regions of Tetovo and Gostivar, the ethnic Albanian population clusters into various opštinas (communes) that are efficient, well maintained, and help give these Albanian communities a level of prosperity far higher than their kinsmen enjoy elsewhere in the Balkans. These Albanian peoples, in what one official termed "demographic imperialism," also have the highest birthrate of any ethnic community in Macedonia. Within a few decades, the Albanian community may constitute the Macedonian majority.⁵¹ An attempt to build an Albanian "university" in Tetovo several years ago received an immediate government response: the buildings were bulldozed. The Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP), which holds some of Macedonia's most able politicians and largely represents the Albanian community, continues to favor a "federalized Macedonia," which other Macedonians simply view as a first step toward breaking away and forming part of a Greater Albania. Compounding this potential for splitting the nation, the nation of Albania in 1994 began a series of broadcasts that expressed support for Albanian radical elements in western Macedonia, who demanded the PDP withdraw from the government coalition. American diplomacy intervened and "Albanian President Sali Berisha did as he was told and snuggled back up to his benefactors [at the time, though not now, the Americans]."⁵² Since then, American diplomacy in Skopje has clearly sent the signal that "federalism" is an unacceptable option for Macedonia.⁵³

In eastern Macedonian, although the situation is far less volatile than several years ago, the question of Bulgarian intentions toward and tensions with Macedonia remain. Note, for example, the brief summary of these tensions and Serbia's potential hand at play:

Slobodan Milosevic [sic] became threatening in 1991-1992 because of Belgrade's role in regenerating Macedonia as a regional issue. Bulgarians see Macedonia as generically Bulgarian and suspect strongly that Serbs have been trying since the late 1980s to once again foment the claims of Macedonia to part of Bulgaria—a claim vehemently rejected by Sofia. The "Ilinden" Macedonian nationalist organization in Bulgaria is proof enough of such covert Serbian involvement, according to many in Sofia. "Ilinden's" goal is to strip away "Pirin Macedonia"

from Bulgaria and to incorporate that territory into an independent Macedonia.⁵⁴

Sofia, nonetheless, has been pragmatic in its approach to Balkan relations. A nation that has struggled valiantly with little or no "Western" support since the end of the Cold War and remains perched at the abyss edge of collapse, Bulgaria saw the value of Macedonia as an independent state (as a counter to Serbian regional dominance) and became the first nation to recognize Macedonia, against strenuous Greek objections, in January 1992. Sofia would not tolerate a Belgrade seizure of Macedonia, and might coöperate with Athens, albeit for a short while, in the division of Macedonia into various spheres of influence. Clearly, the pressures and tensions, internally and externally, continue for Macedonia.

Gligorov himself survived an assassination attempt in October 1995 (although his driver died); although rumors and suspicions abound, no suspect has ever been arrested.⁵⁵ Gligorov carries permanent shrapnel fragments in his head from blast (caused when a car detonated beside his at a traffic stop). He also lost one eye. Gligorov is now entering his ninth decade. How Macedonia will succeed, or get by, without him remains unclear.⁵⁶

To think of Macedonia as merely having tensions with Greece is to miss the point. The real problem is that Macedonia, largely perceived as an ahistoric parastate by its neighbors, is threatened as well by parastatic forces within. Thus, as the poet and opposition party politician Bogomil Gjuzel expresses it: "...things are happening very fast around us (Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia...), between the extremes of crypto-communists and (not so crypto) nationalists. We are in danger of being ground between these millstones (each turning and accelerating in opposite directions)."⁵⁷ Indeed, if the Balkans is the powder keg of Europe, Macedonia--as much as Kosovo--is the dried tinder that could ignite a multi-ethnic war. Should war break out, it will be as brutal, violent, and ruthless as all Balkan wars have been. "An inefficient mayhem" will ensue, one likely to involve "ethnic cleansing" on a massive scale--a task, some claim, from which "Bulgaria would not shrink."⁵⁸

VIRTUAL DEMOCRACY AND THE HYDRA PARASTATE

I'm not a child of the Internet.

But I'd like to be.

MOMCILO RADULOVIĆ,

Belgrade University Student Protester⁵⁹

The irony is that the government meant to silence us,
but instead forced us to build on a whole new technology to stay alive.

DRAZEN PANTIĆ

Head of Radio B-92 Internet Service⁶⁰

Among foreign policy circles there has risen "the article of faith" that "instantaneous and global diplomacy" has given intentional media, with its capacity to broadcast images in real time, the upper hand in the diplomatic arena, eclipsing the traditional place of the State Department and foreign service officers at the helm of power.⁶¹ The president of CNN, Tom Johnson, has framed the change in these terms: "CNN in many ways has replaced the diplomatic pouch."⁶² Indeed, the State Department's own struggles to adapt to new computer technology several years ago highlighted a reliance on past systems that proved both familiar and inefficient in the face of change. Equally, the challenges to American diplomacy in the next century will prove far more overwhelming than even the numerous assaults waiting just outside State's doorstep in the Post-Cold War order. Whether or not the currently structured State Department can "handle" these challenges forms a rather large question mark.

What has happened in Serbia, nonetheless, has proven far more revolutionary than the advent of global media in the information age. American diplomats, forced to negotiate with Slobodan Milošević, did little more than offer press releases condemning the oppression against the Serbian people and the Serbian political opposition movement from 1996 to 1997. Thus, cut off from external support, the people of the Serbian nation effectively turned, through their own genius, against the Serbian state. The one defining cultural feature of the Serbian people is that they will be attacked at home, betrayed abroad and left alone, and will remain the guardians of their own destiny.⁶³ This cultural characteristic both defines how the Serbian people have been isolated by the "West" and have struggled to solve their own problems.

Receiving little more than symbolic support from international agencies and diplomatic channels, the Serbian opposition movements have broken into at least three groups with separate identities. First is the Zajedno (which means "Together") coalition, which consists of disparate political parties; Zajedno's leaders include the mercurial Vuk Drašković (whose nationalistic or democratic tendencies shift with the times) and the charismatic Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party. Yet neither individual has the necessary "pull" to do little more than oppose the oppression of Milošević, who remains popular despite all his sins against the Serb peoples. Djindjic admits there is no heir apparent to Milošević: "I'll be honest. That person does not yet exist."⁶⁴

In contrast to the ambivalence within the opposition political movement, there is no ambiguity in the student protest organized and run out of Belgrade University. The movement which began on 17 November 1996 (by coincidence, the same date as the 1989 protests in Prague) has now lasted many times longer than the 37 days of the Velvet Revolution--which was not so much a revolution as a witnessing of collapse. Slobodan Milošević is a far tougher egg to crack, and it seems no accident that the weapon of choice the protesters hurl against government buildings are eggs.⁶⁵ (Students also regularly send thousands of fax images of eggs to government office machines.⁶⁶) During protests, coördination cells are set into action--Propaganda, Information, Security, Culture, Protocol; instructions are passed between cells by mobile phones; jeeps with loudspeakers pass information and requests to the Belgrade crowds in the streets; each protest ends with the "Hymn of Saint Sava," the patron saint of the Serbian Orthodox Church. His hymn is the anthem of their revolution. Clearly, these are no ordinary "nationalists"; these protesters are more like patriots, fighting to pass along to the world outside their borders an image of Serbia most would otherwise chose to ignore. What links them--political opposition and student protesters--in their message is the Internet.

When Milošević responded to massive anti-government demonstrations (against the annulment of municipal elections) in November 1996 by shutting down all vestiges of independent Serbian news media, he unwittingly created the "Hydra Parastate." Dražen

Pantić, a 40-year-old Belgrade professor with basic computer skills, "accomplished what armies of soldiers, legions of diplomats, scores of journalist and hundreds of politicians could not: He gave the Serbian pro-democracy movement its first widely visible victory against the regime of Slobodan Milošević."⁶⁷ By trying to cut off the head of independent news reporting, Milošević created a technological being with thousands of connections and outlets passing information outside Serbia.

Pantić and his colleagues at Radio B-92, one of Belgrade's few independent media outlets, responded to the government information crackdown by playing a cat and mouse strategy. Announcing news reports but continuing to play music until government jammers--hearing the music and (after several minutes) thinking they've made a mistake--break off, B-92 would immediately then carry unannounced news.⁶⁸ Pantić, in response to the jamming, began encoding news bulletins in RealAudio (which employs a microphone plugged into a computer and allows audio broadcasts to be transmitted over low-speed Internet lines) and then send the bulletins over international phone lines; the only effective government response would have been to shut down the Serbian telephone system. In response, RealAudio's manufacturer, U.S.-based Progressive Networks, supplied even more powerful software to support the protest movement. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty began broadcasting news reports back into Serbia.⁶⁹ On 6 December 1996, when it became apparent to Serbian authorities that information flow and access could not be controlled, B-92's radio transmitter was switched back on. In January 1997, the original results of municipal elections were reinstated.

"It was the home page put out by B-92 that saved the revolution now under way in Serbia," claims Šaša Vučinić, managing director of the Media Development Fund, which supports East European news outlets.⁷⁰ Such invention has sustained virtual democracy with Serbia and presented to the international community a widely disparate picture of Serbian fascism and nationalism the media presented during the last Balkan war. "Democracy," claimed Biljana Dakić, a Belgrade history student, "is when the minority respects the will of the majority."⁷¹ Such an idealistic truth was far from obvious to those who destroyed Yugoslavia. Indeed,

under the circumstances in which these Belgrade students have grown into maturity--in a decade in which state television spouted virulent nationalistic lies and parents, teachers, intellectuals, and politicians constantly repeated that the death of Yugoslavia was the fault of others: Croatians, Slovenians, Germans, Americans--it seems remarkable that these students have realized that Serbia, alone, is responsible. Equally, in rejecting the failures of an older generation, the Belgrade students have produced a movement that is "relatively peaceful, responsible, wittily inventive, and basically democratic."⁷²

How effective or enduring the Serbian "Hydra Parastate" will be, absent effective international support, remains uncertain. Yet the use of simple technology in subverting the demands of the state articulates a valuable lesson, one any parastate strategist might learn from. Such technology, perhaps surprisingly, is also limited in certain regions of the world: Rwanda, for example, has only 14,000 phones but 500,000 radios; in 1994, of the 15,000 networks on the global Internet in 1994, only 42 were found in Muslim countries, and of those 42 a total of 29 were in Turkey and Indonesia.⁷³ The success of both virtual democracy and the "Hydra Parastate," nonetheless, point to the needs the parastate requires in order to achieve lasting effect.

THE "NEEDS" OF THE PARASTATE

English persons...of humanitarian and reformist dispositions constantly went to Balkan Peninsula to see who was in fact ill-treating whom, and... unable to accept the horrid hypothesis that everybody was ill-treating everybody else...all came back with a pet Balkan people established in their hearts as suffering and innocent, eternally the massacree and never the massacer.⁷⁴
DAME REBECCA WEST, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon

The uncomfortable truths Dame Rebecca articulates in the above epigraph remain astounding, 60 years later, in their contemporary response to how various "international" communities viewed the last Balkan war and how elements of the parastate used and manipulated information to their advantage. Serbia lost more than it may have deserved to lose; Croatia gained more than it may have deserved to gain; Slovenia gained independence by agreeing with Serbia not to interfere in the Croatian-Serbian conflict; Bosnia manipulated the truth, on occasion, in order to portray itself as a victim because it had no other choice--

Bosnia's very survival was at stake unless the "West" intervened.⁷⁵ The forces of the parastate, at play in the most recent Balkan crisis, and still very much alive in its aftermath, have helped unsettle effective solutions while allowing parastates to promulgate their individual causes. In a general sense, four characteristics, essentially oxymoronic, help define what has made some parastates more effective than others.

Preventive Diplomacy, or Prevented Diplomacy?

When parastates are involved, most especially when parastates are at war with each other among the ruins of an expiring failed order, diplomacy is almost never impartial. Diplomacy, in Bosnia, came to favor the Muslims and to abhor the Serbs. Diplomacy came to regard one parastate as massacrer and one as massacre. To help define that perception, the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was brought into the fold of the Bosnian Federation to harden the perspective of exclusive Serbian aggression. The Croatians (both in Zagreb and within Bosnia) were told bluntly, according to one U.S. official, to either join the federation with the Muslims or "the door to the West will be shut to them forever."⁷⁶ Former Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs Richard Holbrooke, who grabbed the lion's share of credit for bringing Serbs, Croatians, and Muslims to Dayton, admits his lack of impartiality in intentionally "stalling" peace: "Shuttle diplomacy, no matter how dramatic or productive, has its limits. In the end, an all-out push for peace would require that the three Balkan presidents gather in a single place, preferably in the United States. We decided to delay such a high-risk event in order to give the Croat-Muslim offensive time to gain ground against the Bosnian Serbs."⁷⁷ [emphasis added] Recently I mentioned my admiration to a senior member of the Holbrooke negotiating team (and, unlike Holbrooke himself, still very much an influential force in government policy making) for retired General Charles Boyd's article in Foreign Affairs titled "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth About Bosnia," in which General Boyd (former deputy commander of U.S. European Command and intimately involved with former Yugoslavia) criticized both American actions in Bosnia and American failures to see events from alternate perspectives.⁷⁸ The response the senior U.S. official

provided left no doubt about "official" opinion on the issue: "The Serbs may have legitimate grievances. But support for the Serbs is not United States policy."⁷⁹

Carrot and Stick: Ambiguity as Incentive

Both the United States and Europe were hobbled by two immense contradictions which led to the death of Yugoslavia. The pillars of European diplomacy, which grew out of Wilsonian liberalism and received "sanctification" with the 1975 Helsinki accords, have been the basic recognition of human rights, the rights of peoples to self-determination, and the inviolability of borders. Human rights have become a basic tenet in the conduct of "Western" nations with each other and toward other nations; for China, by contrast, such principle (or morality) introduced into the conduct of foreign policy is little more than insult to the basic sovereignty of the nation-state.

In Yugoslavia, however, it was the last two tenets by which the "West" allowed Yugoslavia to collapse. The "carrot" approach favored accepting the dissolution of a U.N. member nation in favor of a "pet Balkan people" in their self-determination quest. In Slovenia, a largely homogenous population, such self-determination proved relatively painless; in Bosnia, where one-third of the population (Serbs) refused to even vote on an independence referendum, the inevitable result was the rise of mutant parastates and a conflict of self-determined interests that clashed in a long, agonizing struggle.

The "stick" approach proved equally ambiguous. Even as Europe favored the rights of self-determination, various policy forces emphasized the inviolability of borders. Thus, the Yugoslav National Army, through the manipulations of Serbia's representative to the Federal Presidency Borisav Jović, felt justified in moving to "protect" Serbs outside the borders and to use force against states who declared their independence. By mid-1991, American diplomacy lagged so far behind reality no effective intervention could have proved worthwhile. By proclaiming former Yugoslavia a "European" problem, America had disassociated itself from influencing or shaping events. By the time of then Secretary of State James Baker's whirlwind visit to Yugoslavia on 21 June 1991, the clear signal had been sent: the U.S. did not favor

Slovenian and Croatian intentions to declare independence; equally, the U.S. would not sanction the use of force if Slovenia and Croatia went ahead with independence.⁸⁰

The ambiguous mix of "carrot" and "stick" led to the worst possible disaster and a vacuous tautology that served neither strategic "interests" in the Balkan nor basic principles which Europe and the United States had come to embrace in the post-Cold War world. Both Europe and America were at fault for policy mistakes; Yugoslavia--alone--is responsible for its self-destruction. Yet the push by Germany in 1991 for early and immediate European Union recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, no matter how noble Germany's intent, does not mask the truth that the push by Germany for European Union recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was a serious mistake.

Conflict of Values, Conflict of Interest

Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington has advanced a simple "civilizational" paradigm to explain post-Cold War order which seems to fit well with the perspectives of various warring sides in the former Yugoslavia. Briefly stated, the new order of the world, according to Huntington, will be along cultural and civilizational alignments. Thus, Slovenia and Croatia are part of the West, and European; Serbia, an Orthodox nation, is part of the East, and not European. Bosnia is a Muslim nation in the Balkans, but not a threat to Europe. Bosnia, based on "Western" values of basic democratic liberty and individual freedoms, deserved the support of the West.

Thus, Serbs, despite legitimate grievances, were demonized in the Balkan war; thus, Croats and Muslims, despite ethnic cleansings and brutal abuses, were supported. The conflict between value and interests serve only to heighten, not end, conflict. The final irony is that the true demon, Slobodan Milošević, who betrayed his own people for the sake of his own stranglehold on power, became the pivotal figure to bring peace to the Balkans (albeit however temporary) through the Dayton Accords. Values were betrayed for the sake of interest, an interest that secured American foreign policy ends by less than desirable means.

The Search for Sponsorship: the Parastate as Parasite

Parastates need sponsors. Without them, there is no effective leverage for change. The various opposition movements in Belgrade would have no effective voice if Serbian totalitarianism had silenced them--as it wanted to; inventive use of the Internet allowed an alternate reality of Serbia to escape to the "West," and the "West's response," however limited, proved effective in leveraging democratic change. Kosovo, already held under the boot-heel of Serbia for three decades, cannot implement change because the "West" would prefer not to deal with a parastate that cannot survive on its own and would threaten other Balkan neighbors through incorporation into a Greater Albania. The time for Kosovar revolt was 1994, when U.S. attention sharply focused on the parastate. Since then, "American policy has shifted away from the issue of Kosovo and toward four more likely flash points: Albanian-Greek relations, the Macedonian question, and the two Turkish-Greek disputes, over the Aegean and over Cyprus."⁸¹

The effective parastate must have a sponsor and must offer up its dependence so forcefully that no alternative but support can exist for the sponsor. The effective parastate must become a parasite. It must present its case so convincingly that even unfeeling members of the political machine (on both sides of the aisle in the U.S. Congress) will argue for lending a hand. Take, for example, an official U.S. embassy cable from Sarajevo which argued against troop withdrawal "on schedule" by the end of 1996. The White House and the State Department have officially declared that this cable ("leaked" to media) was "sent by mistake." Official attempts to retrieve all copies proved unsuccessful. Indeed, it matters very little if events did not turn out this way. This "non-existent" cable demonstrates how the parastate has its sponsor firmly in its clutches:

Secession: The Opening Move

Post-election Bosnia will be threatened by the Serb drive toward secession. Pale's [the Bosnian Serb "capital"] goal is no secret. [The Bosnian Serb leaders] [Momčilo] Krajišnik, [Biljana] Plavšić [in 1997 the nominal president of Republika Srpska] and [Aleksa] Buha, although very much under the influence of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić,...are staunch advocates of secession. Although publicly antiwar, they are not against war to further their own aims. All

at levels the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] preaches a sovereign Serb state. Soon after the elections, we expect a Serb referendum supporting secession. The vox populi reinforces this scenario. From Prijedor to Brčko in the north and from Bijeljina and Trebinje in the east, our contacts parrot the party line: "Republika Srpska is for the Serbs."

On September 14, the SDS will win the major seats. [SDS member Krajišnik was elected Serbian representative in Bosnia's three-way presidency.] For Bosnia, such results will signal the death of joint institutions, already undermined by continuing SDS control of local authorities. Control of the entire government will allow the SDS to move unimpeded along the road to secession.

Krajišnik, Karadžić, Mladić: The Kings

We expect an indictment [by the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal] against Krajišnik in the upcoming months. His subsequent removal from the collective presidency will be perceived by the Republika Srpska as anti-Serb. The resulting backlash could be extreme.

The physical presence of Karadžić and Mladić in the Serb Republic engenders suspicion among Bosnians that NATO is not serious about prosecuting war criminals. Among Serbs, this perception supports the notion that a move toward secession will not prompt a serious response from the international community.

Croat Reaction: The Bishops

We believe Serb secession would be matched by the Croats. Tudjman will not sit by while Milosević [sic] pieces advance. The Croat-Muslim Federation already severely taxed by mutual distrust, will fall victim to Croat separatism. Taking their cue from the Serbs, the Croats will reinvigorate efforts for a rump Croat state, eventually to be subsumed into Croatia proper.

Queen's Gambit: Dayton II

The elections, although, vital to Bosnia, will not advance the peace process. The lack of will on all sides will not be miraculously reversed by the elections. The mistrust all parties feel toward the international community's commitment to regional peace will not evaporate when votes are cast.

We believe the Dayton agreement must be reaffirmed by all players. A Dayton II peace conference made up of those who took part in the last year's negotiations will be crucial to the establishment of joint institutions and to the future of Bosnia. The new Bosnian leaders must renew their commitment to Dayton and immediately implement its key components: freedom of movement and the return of refugees.

Pawn or Protectorate

As things stand now, Bosnia is a captured pawn. Its partition is certain. There is no will on the Serb side to remain within Bosnia's sovereign borders. When the Serbs go, the Croats will follow. Therefore, in the absence of Dayton II, we strongly believe that Bosnia must become a protectorate. [emphasis added]

A Bosnian protectorate must be safeguarded vigorously by a military force capable of implementing freedom of movement and the return of refugees. This is a long-term commitment--five years or more. The

United States would be required to lead this effort. Although such an undertaking entail massive commitments, we believe it is now one of the few options left if the Bosnian envisioned a year ago in Dayton is to be preserved.⁸²

The partition of Bosnia may provide temporary solution. It will also guarantee the return of conflict because of a failure to achieve lasting solution. Partition will divide displaced populations and culturally diverse communities, and destroy the very fabric that once made Yugoslavia so unique within Europe. These communities ought not to be separate forever. They lived peacefully together once and may, possibly, be able to do so again: "It is commonplace to hear stories of how indigenous Serbs in Banja Luka prefer their former Croat or Bosnia neighbors to their new Serb neighbors, or how Muslim Sarajevans or Mostarians long to see their old Serb friends return to properties now inhabited by rural peasants from Muslim villages in eastern Bosnia."⁸³

For the international community, the problem of prolonging the peace will prove as much a quandary as did ending the war. The parastate of Bosnia will depend on support. As James Schear notes, however, "Dayton on the installment plan is not, alas, what the international community had in mind."⁸⁴

THE DEATH OF THE NATION-STATE?

Why think about national states and ethnic purity at the end of the twentieth century? The main rule of the contemporary world is integration. Nationalism isolates people. It is crippling.
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIĆ, 1995⁸⁵

AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE: Bill Clinton, Steve WONDER, Johnnie CASH and Bob HOPE! SERBIAN PEOPLE HAVE: Slobodan Milošević. No WONDER, no CASH, and no HOPE!⁸⁶
BELGRADE STUDENT PROTEST PLACARD

Over a century ago Otto von Bismarck, the grand master of European balance of power relationships, was asked what might serve as a catalyst for general war in Europe. His response was simple: "some damned foolish thing in the Balkans."⁸⁷ Bismarck was right. The "damned foolish" thing happened when Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on St. Vitus Day, 28 June, a day "sacred" to all Serbs.⁸⁸ The assassination

unleashed chaotic forces and world war was the result. Bismarck, however, likely failed to realize that his brilliant European diplomacy also caused the events which made Balkan nationalism and fervor explode in violence.

The 1878 Congress of Berlin, of which Bismarck was the prime architect, effectively dismembered the possibility of a Greater Bulgaria and annexed territory (promised by the Treaty of San Stefano) meant to be Bulgarian, and created the parastate of Macedonia, placed under direct Turkish rule, and the parastate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, placed under Austro-Hungarian administration and military occupation.⁸⁹ Within Macedonia, the Treaty of Berlin (the result of the Berlin Congress)

sparked an orgy of violence overnight. The Sultan's Forces, rather than having to evacuate the area in accordance with the Treaty of San Stefano, could now act without restraint. In Ochrid, Turks raped young girls and then tortured them with boiling oil and hot irons. They stole cattle, broke into stores, and buried people in mud inside pigsties for not paying exorbitant taxes. In Skatsintsi, south of Skopje, Turkish soldiers gouged out the eyes and cut off the ears of one Petur Lazov, keeping him in agony for several days before cutting off his head.⁹⁰

The Bishop of Ochrid, Natanail, reacted by setting up a resistance organization which led eventually, by evolution, to the founding of the Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organization (still an active political force in Skopje). IMRO, as it came to be known, was the first guerrilla movement of the new, twentieth century, combining techniques of modern warfare and political struggle, religious fanaticism and pragmatic terrorism. As Dame Rebecca West describes it in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, Macedonia, by the outbreak of World War I, had effectively become a war zone cut off from Serbia and the rest of the Balkans.⁹¹

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, little more beyond the obvious need be said: its creation as a parastate proved the immediate cause for World War I. The Congress of Berlin, imminently practical for European nation-states who held the reins of power at the end of the nineteenth century, proved disastrous for European security at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, the single individual at fault for "some damned foolish thing in the Balkans" was none other than the original genius of the European security architecture--Otto von Bismarck himself.

With that in mind, one ought to react with a healthy dose of skepticism to suggestions that "another Congress of Berlin is needed for the Balkans....[that] would address all outstanding regional questions, applying to them the only equitable and workable solution to disputed Balkan lands--partition."⁹² Such a solution, nonetheless, is precisely what will come from the aftermath of the Dayton Accords. As S-FOR (Stabilization Forces) withdraw, diplomats and politicians will revert to the comfortable but preposterous belief that the Balkan peoples, now adrift in separate parastates, are doomed for all eternity to lock themselves into a Hobbesian conflict born of ancient hatreds. The only solution, many will proclaim, is that there is no solution.

Yet, as General Charles Boyd wrote several years ago, "the best we can hope for is to create the conditions for Bosnia to heal itself."⁹³ The problem of Dayton is that it created a creative initial approach. Dayton did not create, nor effectively envision (despite all its claims), an end state. Thus, in the absence of war, it remains unclear whether the parastate of Bosnia can find effective sponsorship to hold up its fragile beginnings as nation in a time of peace. Further, the rise of multiple Balkan parastates out of the death of Yugoslavia points to a critical truth: Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs and while their influence may be declining relative to the growing power of non-governmental forces, the nation-state will remain the essential actor and the essential prime mover.

The powerful nation-states, which the United States and Europe clearly represent, also possess the key to addressing the security environment and the permanence (or instability) of world order because only such a force as the nation-state "possesses this necessary sense of identity."⁹⁴ Couched in more elegant phrasing, "a civilized society cannot exist without the civilizing authority of the state."⁹⁵ While nation-state pessimists such as Yale Professor Paul Kennedy might proclaim with ample justification that the nation-state "appears not just to be losing its integrity, but [is] the wrong sort of unit to handle the newer circumstances," there equally remains no better alternative than the nation-state to handle these circumstances.⁹⁶ Even Professor Kennedy, despite his aversion to the nation-state concept, comes to admit that

"no adequate substitute has emerged to replace it as the key unit in responding to global change."⁹⁷

If such a construct is true, and I believe it to be so, then it should be plain how both the parastate of the future will seek to influence and manipulate or be guided and formed by the determined nation-state which must act both in its own interests and in the interest of the parastate. The time of the parastate is now and in the future. Recognizing that, there are some general and concluding principles that apply to the Balkan Enigma that should be kept in mind.

Peace or Revenge?

Serbia, the parastate pretender to the throne of the ruined Yugoslavia, is a nation that cannot be ignored in addressing the Balkan Enigma. Serbia has become "a truncated imperial nation, which overreached itself in the and then lost, perhaps even more than it deserved, in the cruel game of international politics."⁹⁸ Both the United States and Europe cannot continue the unwise policy of isolating Serbia forever. For all its sins, Serbia must be brought back within the fold of Europe. To fail at this would only guarantee the return of violence to many if not all of the parastates of former Yugoslavia. A comparative reading of two Foreign Policy pieces from the Fall of 1994, titled alternately "Rehabilitating Serbia" and "Punishing Serbia," show, in retrospect, how rehabilitation is the better option.⁹⁹ In the aftermath of conflict, you can either have peace or revenge--not both.

In Serbia itself a reckoning must come over Kosovo if Serbia is to harbor any hope of normalcy as a democratic nation-state within the community of Europe in this new century. While every political leader today in Belgrade recognizes that Serbian concessions on the Kosovo issue would be political suicide, a slow recognition is dawning that things cannot continue as they are. Dobrica Ćosić--intellectual, writer, president of the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992-1993 (until Milošević cast him aside, as he has cast aside so many others), indeed the spiritual father of modern Serbia--admitted that in 1997 that Serbia must reform or it will die. These reforms include parliamentary democracy, a

market economy, the rule of law, coöperative foreign policy. Above, Serbs must change themselves or they die: "We cannot live with the myth of Kosovo."¹⁰⁰ The Serbian nation was born on the fields of Kosovo, six centuries ago, and rose from the ruins of Ottoman domination. What began in Kosovo must end in Kosovo--by either blood or peace.

The Problem with the Familiar, the Problem with Dissidents

When Slobodan Milošević first rose to power in the 1980s, many American diplomats believed that his background in Yugoslav banking made him a more amenable and "Western" oriented figure to work with. A 1988 Newsweek article termed him the second most charismatic figure in Eastern Europe, after Mikhail Gorbachev.¹⁰¹

Formerly Tito's youngest three-star general and currently Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman was imprisoned by Tito in the 1970s and was jailed again in the 1980s for his involvement with Maspok, the Croatian nationalist movement. Tudjman has been variously described by Western media as a "democrat" and "statesman," and his republic a "Western-style democracy." Shortly before his election as independent Croatia's first president, he published a tract in which he described genocide as a "natural phenomenon" and posited the bizarre claim that the Holocaust occurred because "all preparations for a territorial solution of the Jewish question...fell through" when Soviet troops held up Hitler's forces in the East, along with the transport (according to Tudjman) meant to carry Jews from Europe to Madagascar.¹⁰²

Serbian political opposition leader Vuk Drašković, whose proclamations seem to swing in the winds of popular sentiment, speaks these days of "minority rights" and "regional coöperation"; he has also been known to spout a virulent Serbian nationalism far harsher than even the rhetoric of Milošević.

What seems extraordinary is that the most "honest" politician of all from the remnants of former Yugoslavia is the one who remained a part of Tito's inner circle for four decades: Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.

The lesson from these examples, if one can be drawn, is this: the façade of familiar "Western" personality may mask ruthless pragmatism that later manifests itself; today's political dissident may be tomorrow's problematic dictator.

Realism without Illusions

During a recent trip to the Balkans, I was genuinely surprised by how many different Balkan peoples were grateful for American intervention in former Yugoslavia and, simultaneously, by the lack of general faith these same people had in the European Union's ability or willingness to provide meaningful solutions. Even in Serbia, where American sanctions generally receive the fair share of blame for the ruined Serbian economy, there is an obvious respect for American power.

With a certain freshness that seemed variously naïve or wistful--likely both--I heard academics and writers throughout the Balkans refer to the foreign policy days of President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger as being the height of American influence and American effectiveness on the world stage. What struck me most about such Balkan admiration was its deep appreciation for American "realism" and the power it brought to bear in shaping the security environment. What I failed to mention to my Balkan colleagues is that a practitioner of the "realist" strategic perspective, such as Henry Kissinger, would likely have averted Balkan intervention at any cost because nothing in the Balkans represented, or represents, vital American interests.

At the same time, however, this desire for American influence ought to be taken as a welcome nod that American foreign policy has had some positive effect, after all, on the Balkan stage in the days since the Cold War ended. I have elsewhere advocated a global grand strategy of adaptive balance, one in which the United States should both recognize and weigh the variance of interests and strategic perspectives in balancing available resources to reach achievable ends.¹⁰³ Yet, in the Balkans, the most practical strategic perspective for moving beyond Dayton and remaining regionally engaged ought to be what I term "Realism without Illusions." In the twenty-first century, such a perspective might simply acknowledge that what

the United States says doesn't always "go"; on the other hand, an American voice in shaping, influencing, and leveraging of the security environment may, more often than not, guarantee that what we say does go.

The Great Powers, as they were known a century ago, are today known by the equally vague euphemism of "the international community." The precedent the Great Powers established by cutting the Balkans into spheres of dominance proved eventually a disaster. Today, in Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria the Congress of Berlin is present, eventually, in every conversation, as if it were an event that happened recently:

Talk of the frontiers and people immediately say "London Protocol!" The reference is to a secret treaty of 1915. "In the war," they say, and you don't know if we are in the first World War, the second World War, or the most recent war. The last 120 years exist synchronically, rather than diachronically in the political imagination--Dayton (1995) simultaneously with the Congress of Berlin (1878). For all its claimed union, "Europe" still means Britain, France, and Germany. Russia, the Orthodox brother-country, is seen as only on the margins of the game. For real solutions you look to America. That is the lesson they all draw from the agreement signed in Ohio, USA. But can Dayton seriously be described as a solution?¹⁰⁴

The Balkans does not need a Second Congress of Berlin. Neither Europe nor the U.S., nor indeed the Balkan peoples themselves, would agree on common policy. Both the parastates and the nation-states of the modern Balkans are far more sophisticated and self-determined. What they require is assistance on their behalf, not decisions to be made for them.

Europe, alone, cannot do it; Europe, alone, will not do it. Therein lie the burdens of American leadership and American responsibility. These are burdens from which we ought not to shrink.

¹Liddell and Scott: Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford University Press, 1966), 527.

²Gligorov, a seasoned Yugoslav political observer, provides what he intends as a caustic comment on various European solutions for the Balkan crisis in Bosnia, such as the Vance-Owen peace plan, which served to accelerate rather than terminate conflict and led the warring factions to intentionally create "ethnically cleansed" para-communities within Bosnia to legitimize territorial gains. Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," Foreign Policy, Fall 1993, 52-53.

³Note, for example, Misha Glenny's definition as it applies to what was the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The parastate emerges as the mutant offspring of an expiring failed state. If Tito's Yugoslavia could be compared to a normal human being, albeit a bit wobbly in the knees, its children are a bunch of youthful George Romero extras, in varying stages of decay--an arm lopped off here, an eye squeezed out of its socket there." Source: "Letter from Bosnia: The Age of the Parastate," The New Yorker, 8 May 1995, 45.

⁴The Dayton Agreement provided for a "one-state, two entities" formula, composed of "Bosniacs" (the invented term for Bosnian Muslims) and Croats of Bosnia, and the separate parastate of Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Federation came into being in March 1994 through a U.S.-brokered cease-fire agreement between Croats and Muslims. Between 1994 and 1996, the "West" used a variety of coercive measures to bring these two formerly warring factions together, and provided an opportunity for closer alignment under Dayton. Tensions remain, though the federation has some chance of survival; both sides find more benefit in interdependence than in mutual distrust.

⁵I capitalize both Western Slavonija and Eastern Slavonija in both this and the "Chaos" chapter because of their specific geographic identities as parastatic forces within Croatia. The Croatian army seized Western Slavonija (the most vulnerable of Serb-held lands within Croatia) in May 1995 during Operation Flash, the predecessor to Operation Storm (which "eliminated" the Krajina Republic). The fall of Western Slavonija, accomplished with overwhelming Croatian force superiority and brilliant tactical maneuvers, virtually guaranteed inevitable disaster for the Krajina Republic. The Krajina Serbs knew the end, which came in August 1995, was near.

⁶The return of Eastern Slavonija (an area rich in minerals and agriculture) to Croatia was addressed in the original Dayton Accords (Appendix B). For information on UNTAES activities, see <www.apc.org> or jan.oberg@mailbox.swipenet.se, representing the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, University of Lund, Sweden. The use of the term "enclave" does not, by any measure, suggest exclusivity. Eastern Slavonija represented one of the richest regions of ethnic diversity in Yugoslavia. Prior to the creation of the first Yugoslav kingdom, Serbs, Italians, Hungarian, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, and Germans had co-existed on this rim of the Austro-Hungarian empire for hundreds of years.

⁷The May 1997 assault on the Campanile in the Piazza San Marco by the "Most Serene Republic of Venice," a disavowed splinter group of Italy's Northern League, is but one extreme example of differences defining uniqueness. The Northern League has declared the region of Northern Italy to be the independent state of "Padania." Most observers (and most Italians) do not take the declaration seriously. This desire for difference, however, points to one potential conundrum: "Padania" is a parastate "wannabe."

⁸John Newhouse, "Europe's Rising Regionalism," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1997): 67.

⁹*Ibid.*, 69-71. Pujol is the prophet of the new regionalism. His so-called "banana" zones run through Europe's Sunbelt: the first stretches from southeastern England through the Benelux countries to the Rhine Valley in Switzerland; the second arcs up from the Italian Veneto through the Rhône-Alps, across France, and into Catalonia. If such parastatism is true (in this case, regional communities identifying themselves as distinct from the notional supracommunity--the

European Union), it portrays a general ambivalence on the part of Europeans toward the EU. If union provides more personal benefit, all for the better; if union, simply increases personal control over individual lives and individual choices, then best to ignore it.

¹⁰Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1997): 50.

¹¹James A. Schear, "Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas," Foreign Policy, Fall 1996, 88.

¹²Both Kosovo and Vojvodina gained the status of autonomous provinces after Marshal Josip Broz Tito's final constitutional reform of 1974. Both regions lost this status under the control of Milošević. By 1980--and some would claim also with the assistance of Tito and the Yugoslav League of Communists--ethnic Albanians reversed the tables of past Serbian repressions and began infringing on Serbian rights, demanding recognition as an independent Yugoslav republic, and nominally shifting alignment toward Albania. Thus, Serb nationalism was the torch that Milošević lit in his own rise to power; even his own brutal subsequent repressions against the Serbian people since the death of Yugoslavia have not damaged his popularity to the extent that he does not remain today a formidable and still very popular political figure.

¹³Janez Drnovšek, "Situation in Yugoslavia," Review of International Affairs, 20 February 1990, 8.

¹⁴Kenneth C. Danforth, Kenneth C. "Yugoslavia: A House Much Divided," National Geographic August 1990, 109.

¹⁵The United States continues its official position that Yugoslavia has dissolved and no single state or union of states represents its continuation. Thus, the U.S. does not recognize Serbia and Montenegro as Yugoslavia, and will likely be one of the last nations to offer diplomatic recognition as such.

¹⁶Bill Hewitt and Theodore Stanger, "A Balkan Power Play," Time 24 October 1988, 9-12. In the United States, there is a growing Albanian movement to protest ethnic abuse. In the 1980s, protests were staged in front of numerous Yugoslav consulates throughout the United States, as well as at the White House, urging official US sanctions against claimed Yugoslav abuse. The Albanian Home Page, claiming an Albanian nation that exists beyond the borders of the present state, can be found at <www.albanian.com>.

¹⁷Timothy Garton Ash, "In the Serbian Soup," The New York Review of Books, Volume XLIV, Number 7, 24 April 1997, 27.

¹⁸Illustrative reports include Marlise Simons, "Communist Session in Belgrade Split: Party Displays the Division in Its Ranks on Television," New York Times, 22 January 1990, A:8; "Yugoslav Police Deployed to Quiet Unrest," New York Times, 25 June 1990: I:13; New York Times, 11 March 1990, I:13; New York Times, 12 March 1990, A:11.

¹⁹Danforth, 106.

²⁰Ash, 27.

²¹Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995), 106.

²²Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 44.

²³Both the best and most concise overview of the Communist resistance and American involvement in the Greek Civil War is in Larry E. Cable, "The Greek Civil War," Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 9-32.

²⁴Among Greeks, the term "Alvanitis"--or "Arvanitis"--means a Christian of Albanian ancestry one who speaks both Greek and Albanian, but possesses Greek "consciousness." Numerous "Arvanites" live in Greece today, although the ability to speak both languages is shrinking as the differences (due to technology and information access and vastly different economic bases) between Greece and Albania increase. The Greek communities of Elefsis,

Marousi, Koropi, Keratea, and Markopoulo (all in the Attikan peninsula) once held significant "Arvanite" communities. "Arvanitis" is not necessarily a pejorative term; a recent Pan-Hellenic Socialist foreign minister spoke both Albanian and Greek (but not English). The current Greek foreign minister, Theodoros Pangalos, is an "Arvanite" from Elefsis.

²⁵Kaplan, xx.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷"Albanian Rebels Seek United Movement," Newport Daily News (8-9 March 1997): A:2. To claim that the revolt in Albania was exclusively a clash between ethnic Greeks and northern Albanians would be incorrect. The clash was also between the southern Albania Toska clan and the northern Geg clan (of which Albanian President Sali Berisha--and former personal physician of dictator Enver Hoxha--is a member).

²⁸Roger Cohen, "U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia after Winking at Its Buildup," The New York Times, 28 October 1995, A:13.

²⁹The figure that "more than 90 percent of the Serbs in western Slavonia [also known as the Krajina Republic] where ethnically cleansed when Croatian troops overran [the] U.N. protected area" is taken from General (retired) Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1995): 23. General Boyd was the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, from November 1992 to July 1995, and was directly involved in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

³⁰Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 283.

³¹Boyd, 25.

³²In a condescending rebuke of Misha Glenny's attempts in The Fall of Yugoslavia: the Third Balkan War (London: Penguin Books, 1993) to explain the presence of Serbs in Western and Eastern Slavonija as having "virtually nothing to do with each other," Yale Professor Ivo Banac seems to overlook the obvious in how Serbian peoples seeking refuge, cultural continuance, and opportunity came to live and prosper within the Austro-Hungarian empire for very similar reasons. See Ivo Banac, "Misreading the Balkans," Foreign Policy, Winter 1993-94, 177.

³³Knin was the nominal Krajina capital. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996), 134-139.

³⁴Boyd, 26.

³⁵"Letters to the Editor: Richard Holbrooke on Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997): 170.

³⁶Boyd, 28-29.

³⁷Ethnic Albanians, the fourth largest group in Yugoslavia, were never granted the status of a nation on the grounds that their "home-state" was in Albania, and were subsequently classified as a "nationality" (with fewer rights than a "nation"). Silber and Little, 208; 221.

³⁸Ibid., 209.

³⁹Kaplan, 24.

⁴⁰Silber and Little, 220.

⁴¹Anyone doubting this assertion need only reference numerous horrifying examples in The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993).

⁴²Ibid., 132. Tudjman is referring to an agreement, prior to the world war's outbreak, which would have ceded about 30 percent of Yugoslavia, and much of Bosnia, to Croatia. Tudjman, unlike Milošević, is truly driven by a nationalist dream. Often heard to proclaim prior to the last Balkan war that "We have waited nine hundred years for this"--the creation of a Croatian

state--Tudjman is widely believed to still harbor plans for the eventual "splitting" of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia after S-FOR troops and equipment depart the Balkans. The "nine hundred years" Tudjman refers to, in brief summary, is this: Croats freed themselves from Byzantine rule in 924 A.D. and established their own free state under King Tomislav. In 1089, Kreimir, the last of the line descended from Tomislav, died without a successor, and Croatia fell under the reign of Hungary. With the exception of the Ottoman "period," Croatia remained under Habsburg control until the death of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

⁴³Glenny, "The Age of the Parastate," 52.

⁴⁴Ash, 27.

⁴⁵A popular proverb in former Yugoslavia has taken hold recently: Slobodan dies and goes to Paradise. Shortly after entering Paradise, he finds himself surrounded by a thousand demons. "Who are you? What do you want?" he asks. "We're refugees, Comrade Slobodan. We're here so you can help us!"

⁴⁶"Meet the Press," NBC News, 22 November 1992.

⁴⁷The common assumption that the Macedonian language is simply a variant of Bulgarian is false. One hundred years ago, when Macedonians struggled to align with a Bulgarian state, there were indeed close similarities. Such similarities are far less close today. In the same way, the notion that Macedonia is little more than "South Serbia" is equally questionable. Serbs in Macedonia from only two percent of the population, a smaller group than Macedonian Gypsies.

⁴⁸This "hope" was passed to me second-hand by a senior diplomat in a confidential interview. I have no reason to doubt the claim and I believe it accurately reflects the expression of general animosity Greece held against Macedonia at the time. Macedonia, since then, has removed the Star of Vergina (or what was perceived by Greeks to be the Star of Vergina--symbol of the ancient kingdom of Macedonia) from its original flag and, in an amazing precedent, became the first independent post-Cold War state to actually change its constitution, under duress from the European Union, to present language that would not challenge Greek sovereignty in "Macedonia."

⁴⁹Silber and Little, 17; 212.

⁵⁰The presidents of the various republics who held (and still hold) presidencies of various former republics are Momir Bulatović (Montenegro), Milan Kučan (Slovenia), Franjo Tudjman (Croatia), Kiro Gligorov (Macedonia), Alija Izetbegović (Bosnia), and Slobodan Milošević (Serbia).

⁵¹Michael G. Roskin, "Macedonia and Albania: The Missing Alliance," Parameters, Winter 1993-94, 95.

⁵²Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," 106.

⁵³During a recent Balkan trip, I heard from a number of perspectives from members of various sides of the Macedonian political spectrum who are impressed with the unequivocal and "undiplomatic" message current Ambassador Chris Hill has sent regarding this issue.

⁵⁴Daniel N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective," Strategic Review, Winter 1993, 29.

⁵⁵The most common rumor in Skopje, which lacks any proof, is that Bulgarian mafiye attempted to eliminate Gligorov because he was an impediment to the "efficient" smuggling of arms and drugs through Macedonia.

⁵⁶Likely due to publication pressures, Silber and Little in Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation commit a rather serious error (366) by claiming that Kiro Gligorov's "long political career came to an abrupt and tragic end [following the October 1995 car bomb assassination attempt against him]. Gligorov's skillful stewardship helped save his republic from the ravages that had afflicted his neighbors to the north. Macedonia's tragedy was that it was the only one of the six republics not to have fought a war, and the only to lose its president." In 1997, Gligorov was still the president and still a political force. I last saw him on 8 May 1997 at the premiere

of the Macedonian play Happiness Is a New Idea in Europe at the Dramski Teatop (Drama Theater).

⁵⁷Extracted from private correspondence with the author.

⁵⁸Nelson, 29.

⁵⁹Ash, 25.

⁶⁰Chris Hedges, "Serbian Response to Tyranny: Take the Movement to the Web," The New York Times, <www.nytimes.com> (30 December 1996).

⁶¹Johanna Neuman, "Has CNN Replaced Envoys?" Foreign Service Journal, July 1995, 28.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Silber and Little, 92.

⁶⁴Neil King, Jr., "Balkan Baggage: Serbian Unrest Raises Unsettling Question: After Milosevic [sic], Who?" The Wall Street Journal, 3 February 1997, 1.

⁶⁵Protesters used stones to break windows and respond to police assaults at the beginning of the protests. Some protesters still use deep-frozen eggs which have the weight and heft of solid rock.

⁶⁶Hedges, <www.nytimes.com> (30 December 1996).

⁶⁷Bob Schmitt, "An Internet Answer to Repression," The Washington Post, 31 March 1997, A:21. Schmitt is information-systems manager at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

⁶⁸Hedges, <www.nytimes.com> (30 December 1996).

⁶⁹Bob Schmitt, A:21. Revolutions with technology, of course, spawn counter-revolutions: Raša Karapandea, a Belgrade University Physics student, views the Internet as little more than the modern-day capitalist tool by which dictatorships will control their citizens. His mission in life is to "save the world from the Internet. The Internet is a dehumanizing addiction and the greatest single threat to human civilization. Fortunately, the people who rule Serbia don't understand its danger; otherwise, they would help it to grow. We are working on making viruses for Unix, the system the Internet uses, but it is well protected." Hedges, <www.nytimes.com> (30 December 1996).

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ash, 25.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Admiral (retired) William A. Owens and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1996): 32; 34.

⁷⁴Quoted in Boyd, 22.

⁷⁵For evidence of Serbian-Slovenian collusion, see Silber and Little, Chapter 12, "'The Hour of Europe Has Dawned': Slovenia's Phoney War," June-July 1991, 154-168.

⁷⁶The New York Times, 15 August 1995, A:13, quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York; Simon & Schuster, 1996), 296.

⁷⁷Richard Holbrooke, "Annals of Diplomacy: The Road to Sarajevo," The New Yorker, 21 & 28 October 1996, 99.

⁷⁸General (retired) Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1995): 22-38.

⁷⁹Confidential interview with the author. Because of the current status this individual holds within the United States government, his identity must remain anonymous.

⁸⁰For evidence of American naïveté toward Yugoslavia in 1991, see Silber and Little, 150-152.

⁸¹Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," 106.

⁸²"Bosnia's Alternate Reality," Harper's, January 1997, 19-20.

⁸³Schear, 95.

⁸⁴Ibid., 101.

⁸⁵Karsten Prager, "Message from Serbia," Time, 17 July 1995, 24. Milošević clearly was singing an "integration" tune in 1995 quite different from the "nationalist" tune he first began chirping in 1987.

⁸⁶Ash, 25.

⁸⁷Quoted in Arthur L. Clark, Bosnia: What Every American Should Know (New York: Berkeley Books, 1996), xi.

⁸⁸On 28 June 1389, Ottoman forces defeated Serbian Prince Lazar at Kosovo Polje--the Field of the Black Birds--which led to five centuries of Ottoman occupation of the Balkans. The date is considered sacred because every Serb male child born, according to Serbian legend, was then called a "an avenger of Kosovo" meant to take back the land, by force, from Ottoman occupiers.

⁸⁹The Treaty of San Stefano of 1878 was a Russian-Ottoman agreement. The Ottomans ceded to Russia parts of Armenia and Dobruja (in the northeast along the Black Sea), agreed to pay Russia a large indemnity, and recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Bismarck and British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, however, feared that a Greater Bulgaria would inevitably lead to eventual conflict with Great Britain. Romania received Dobruja in exchange for Bessarabia (which went to Russia); Russia also received northeastern Anatolia (today part of modern Turkey).

⁹⁰Kaplan, 55.

⁹¹Rebecca West, "Macedonia," Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books, 1940), 631-832.

⁹²Vanni Cappelli, "The Bosnian Question and the Great Powers," Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1997), 114.

⁹³Boyd, 38.

⁹⁴"The Nation-State is Dead. Long Live the Nation-State," The Economist, 23 December 1995, 17.

⁹⁵John Lukacs, "Our Enemy, the State?" Wilson Quarterly Spring 1996, 108.

⁹⁶Paul Kennedy, "The Future of the Nation-State," Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993), 131.

⁹⁷Ibid., 134.

⁹⁸Ash, 30.

⁹⁹Marten van Heuven, "Rehabilitating Serbia," Foreign Policy, Fall 1994, 38-48; Hodding Carter, "Punishing Serbia," Foreign Policy, Fall 1994, 49-56.

¹⁰⁰Ash, 27.

¹⁰¹From a special report on Eastern Europe titled "Crack in the Bloc," 24 October 1988. The European Newsweek cover featured a photo of Yugoslavs brandishing the flag under a title of "War between the States"; the American cover version, apparently in the belief that few outside Europe would know or care about Yugoslavia, carried a very different cover: "Mr. Chips: Steve Jobs Puts the 'Wow' Back in Computers."

¹⁰²Franjo Tudjman, Bespuca-Povjesne Zbiljnosti [Wastelands: Historical Truth] (Zagreb: Nakladnistavod Matice Hrvatske, 1989), 152-153.

¹⁰³See, for example, P. H. Liotta, "No Man's Land: U.S. Grand Strategy in the Wake of Yugoslav Intervention," Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1997.

¹⁰⁴Ash, 27.

**U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island**

**THE WRECKAGE RECONSIDERED:
FIVE OXYMORONS FROM BALKAN DECONSTRUCTION**

As an Advanced Research Project


by

**P.H. Liotta
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF**

A paper submitted to the Director of the Advanced Research Department in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'P' followed by a series of loops and a final horizontal stroke, written over a solid horizontal line.

CHAOS¹

A strategy of chaos, one most antithetical to the traditional engagements of nation-states, will prove most effective for those forces involved in intrastate and among regional conflicts who seek to manipulate the advantage of the Chinese concept of luan, dislocating the effective resistance of opponents and the ability of stronger states, agencies, and international organizations to effectively intervene. Power predominance, which the United States best represents as the sole "superpower," will be most effectively targeted as the greatest weakness, asymmetrically, for power-disadvantaged adversaries to employ. The chaotic strategy, employed by all warring parties in the former Yugoslavia, served to variously discourage or provoke American intervention. Parastates of the future will almost certainly use the leverage of chaos as a strategy for gain.

Before there can be brilliant change,
there must be Chaos.
THE I CHING

The demons have been turned loose and go about,
grotesquely pretending to be honourable twentieth-
century men who do not believe in evil spirits.²
VÁCLAV HAVEL

THE ANAGENESIS OF CHAOS?³

In the nineteenth century in the region near the borders of what is today Herzegovina, a Serbian prophet, known as the Prophet of Kremna, predicted three Balkan wars in the coming century. All three conflicts would involve Serbia, and, by the end of each, Serbia would be consumed by the furies that war would unleash. The last conflict, however, which would begin in Kosovo, would bring the greatest misery. It would bring the greatest loss as well. According to the myth of the Prophet of Kremna, this third "Kosovo" war would eventually come to involve global conflict.

When I lived in Belgrade, nearly a decade ago, I often heard Serbs speak of the Kremna prophet with determined fatalism, based, I assumed, on the belief that Kosovo--today a region populated almost exclusively by ethnic Albanians--was a fabulous, ethereal place that Serbs would never relinquish.⁴ Kosovo is the birthplace of Serbian culture and Serbian religion. Yet it also a Balkan Palestine, a land Serbs are losing through demographics and through general condemnation by the international community for Serbian abuse of ethnic Kosovar Albanians.⁵

Such fatalism by Serbs seems to mask the recognition that an option other than war might exist. It is not gross cultural stereotype to claim that Serbs believe their common fate to be one in which they will be attacked at home, betrayed abroad, and will be abandoned by all allies. They will become the sole guardians of their destiny.⁶ The brilliant politician and ruthless dictator, Slobodan Milošević--and he is clearly both--rose to power by his electrifying 1987 speech given in Kosovo, in which he is claimed to have pledged to his mesmerized (Serb) audience: "No one should dare to beat you...Never again will anyone defeat you."⁷ Milošević, of course, has regularly beaten and brutalized the Serbian people since then, and he, more than anyone else, is singularly responsible for the defeat of the Serbian nation in the wake of Yugoslav disintegration. Yet by playing on the discontent of Kosovo

Serbs, essentially feeding on the cultural belief of the Serbian peoples, Milošević became the most powerful man in Yugoslavia.

Most analysts who remarked on the death of Yugoslavia have never heard of the Prophet of Kremna. Partly this can be explained by the immense weight of Balkan history; at times, there may appear simply too much to know.⁸ Partly such ignorance also stems from an unwillingness to apply historical examples to the contemporary crises, that "in an era of instantaneous communication, when actions and explanations are offered in the same breath, the role of history is omitted by policy makers."⁹ Partly such omission stems from the conviction that superstitious prophecies have absolutely nothing to do with Balkan events and the need for European and American intervention. Yet, often, most particularly during the Bosnian disaster, I could hear the Prophet of Kremna speaking. His medium's channel, who spoke in words of harsh defiance, was none other than Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić. Lurking in the background, the prophet must have beamed with pleasure whenever Karadžić threatened to widen the chaos, taunting the "West," claiming he would set the planet on fire in what he called "World War III"--an ever-widening conflict from which there could be no escape. When I heard him speak this way, I thought of how chaos had not only been re-born in the Balkans, it had mutated into a completely different species, one resistant to powerful potential adversaries and eager for some kind of fiery self-immolation.

The truth, of course, is that the Prophet of Kremna was wrong. There have been three Balkan wars and two world wars in which Yugoslavia, the pivotal Balkan state, was drawn into, largely destroyed, and then attempted to revive itself as a nation. Since World War I, there have been at least three attempts to form a nation-state named Yugoslavia; that is, if you consider the currently so-called "rump Yugoslavia" to be part of that effort. Kosovo was not the cause for any of these three Balkan wars, although the issue of Kosovo loomed largely at the edges of each.¹⁰

Why American policy makers should care about the Balkans or the myriad of conflicts and tensions is a matter of some debate. The pragmatic answer is that there were no immediate vital interests affected by the violent death of Yugoslavia that would, in turn, affect the security and prosperity of the United States in a new century. On one hand, American policy makers and various

commentators successfully demonized the Serbs as leading the Fourth Reich of the Balkans while tending to view opposing adversaries of the Serbs as being, variously, proponents of "Western-style democracy" or victims of "genocide." The principle of American morality, in other words, was invoked in order to provoke some kind of American interventionary response. On the other hand, the reluctance to intervene in such catastrophic events revealed an American pragmatism that recognized how Balkan self-destruction had no direct impact on vital interests and no significant importance within the larger framework of West European state-to-state interactions. The days of simple interactions based on interests and Realpolitik calculations are vanishing, even as Europe, ironically, is moving to shape itself through NATO enlargement and the overlapping various European institutions and mechanisms that model a Bismarckian vision for the European security architecture.

Increasingly, the United States believes it faces a tumultuous, complex, and unstable world. As Professor John Mueller (who makes quite clear his assertion that American "beliefs" in catastrophe escalation are false) frames this argument, the United States has responded by five coping "techniques": the past, and, quite often, the context of current problems with historical bases, have been simplified; essential definitions in the Cold War such as stability, major war, global conflict, weapons of mass destruction have taken on new and drastically different meanings; a Euro-centric bias has been introduced; the "West" now holds itself to higher standards than those that existed during the Cold War; and problems "previously considered to be comparatively minor have been elevated in perceived importance."¹¹

What Mueller implies but does not categorize as a "sixth technique" is equally possible: American principle, rather than acting as a moral counterweight to the bloodless pragmatism of American interest, has itself become an interest. This notion, that the tensions between Wilsonian liberalism and Teddy Roosevelt's hegemonic foreign policy have now blurred into one lukewarm atomic element that happens to form the core for American policy making, has not been addressed--or even considered--at the dawn of a new century. Yet this blurring of principle and interest might help explain why policy makers--and, indeed, the American people--"are being overwhelmed, even paralyzed" by the choices that confront them.¹² Given such a construct, American national security

decision making, which measures available means to reach achievable ends, now considers such a proposition via a rational calculus of interest, principle, resources, constraints, and net assessment of the existing and potential security environment. It is the decision making process that the strategist of chaos must target in "taking on America." To plan a strategy of direct engagement with American military force, as Iraq learned in Desert Storm, is lunacy. The strategist of chaos, by contrast, must manipulate the scenario to his best advantage while striving to prevent the introduction of American military force. The initial target of concern for the strategist of chaos is the decision to commit force, not the response to the employment of force.

Thus, adversaries who do not practice a similar process of decision making--balancing resources and constraints, means and ends--who value only the reaping of benefit in the most forceful way without the provocation of American military or American-led coalition force confrontation, look for innovative ways to "attack" without attacking directly the brick wall of American military predominance. A strategy of chaos, one most antithetical to the traditional engagements of nation-states, will prove most effective for those forces within intrastate and among regional conflicts. The chaotic strategy, employed by all warring parties in the former Yugoslavia, proved an effective manipulation to discourage or provoke American intervention. Thus, it seems equally logical to believe that parastates of the future will almost certainly use the leverage of chaos as a strategy for gain.

THE VALUE OF CHAOS?

Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind--such were the means which were employed and are still employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions.¹³

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
TO INQUIRE INTO THE CAUSES AND CONDUCT
OF THE BALKAN WARS, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, 1914

Andrew Krepenovich calls it "The Streetfighter Scenario."¹⁴ Framed in terms of the original national military planning "Bottom-Up Review" former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin developed in the first Clinton administration, the "Streetfighter Scenario" provides a schematic that could possibly

impact on the building block approach--planned for a military force structure that could respond nearly simultaneously to two major regional conflicts (MRCs). According to Krepenevich, a potential adversary--the "Streetfighter State"--will "accept a disproportionate amount of punishment, to include casualties, and collateral and environmental damage, and to wage a protracted struggle if necessary to accomplish its strategic objectives. Finally, assume that this state's leadership understands the American political and strategic culture, and is prepared to exploit it."¹⁵

While it remains true that American military force planning will move eventually beyond the "two MRC" scenario, it remains less certain how military force will be employed against adversaries who cannot--and plan not to--confront the United States directly.¹⁶ The lessons of Iraq and the lessons of Vietnam have some significance for the strategist of chaos: do not confront America or an American-led coalition force directly; seek to engage the United States in a protracted struggle in which the futility of America's Pyrrhic victory through the use of military force which cannot provide enduring political solutions becomes evident; isolate America from its allies; cripple American political will to continue the fight. Indeed, one other lesson--a comment attributed to India's military chief at the end of Desert Storm and widely circulated--bears even more ominous implication: "Do not fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."

The lessons of Iraq and Vietnam, however, are not the only paradigms available for the strategist of chaos. Indeed, the "Streetfighter Scenario" of Krepenevich is only a "planning document" for further innovation. Any adversary who risks American military force engagement must employ a method that "seeks to exploit the social dimensions of strategy to offset the disadvantages in the technical dimension."¹⁷ Such an adversary would be wisest to target the process of decision making with the policy (social dimension) sector rather than, as a first step, planning how to engage military force (the technical dimension) once the employment decision has been made. Seeking to wreak havoc to his strategic advantage in his sphere of influence, the strategist of chaos must avoid treading into the arena of "vital" American interests. The chaotic strategist works best in the shadows, behind the curtain, off stage.

Given the example of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the "success" of particular warring factions often fell on the side of those who could brutally apply force yet fell short of gross provocation of extra-Balkan states. Even after the first-ever use of NATO force against Bosnian Serbs, in the form of air strikes, that grew out of retaliatory response to the bombing of a Sarajevo marketplace on 5 February 1994, the waters grew muddied quickly when conflicting investigations showed that the mortar launched into the Sarajevo marketplace could have come from Bosnian Serb or Bosnian government positions.¹⁸ In 1995, Operation Deliberate Force rapidly escalated force application against Bosnian Serbs.¹⁹ Deliberate Force proved the critical element of coercive diplomacy that forced the Bosnian Serbs "to cease all offensive operations," remove all heavy weaponry from the area of Sarajevo, and, led, eventually, to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.²⁰

NATO military force in Bosnia sought to induce a paralysis of response. Inflicting both real and symbolic damage (which demonstrated the potential for even greater destruction) on Bosnian Serb military capabilities, while Bosnian Muslim-Croat forces simultaneously seized the advantage to seize as much territory as possible in a limited time, the Serb leadership had little choice but to capitulate. Such force application is emblematic of two not necessarily contradictory ideas: first, the notion popular among mid- and senior-level military officers that "you (the military strategist) can get inside his (the enemy's) decision cycle (often called "the loop"), cut him off, and kill him; second, the use of technology and American reliance (some would call an obsession) on firepower, allows for high enemy damages and low "friendly" casualties. Edward Luttwak has partially popularized this second idea with what he terms "Post-Heroic Warfare."²¹ Colonel Philip Meilinger of the U.S. Naval War College, likely the most intelligent and focused contemporary theorist of airpower, has suggested that warfare can be considered of four types: exhaustion, attrition, annihilation, and paralysis.²² The conflict in Southeast Asia, a protracted war from which America sought to extricate itself after three decades of involvement with no lasting goals achieved, is an example of the warfare of exhaustion; Desert Storm, through coalition employment of high-intensity strikes, high-technology weapons, and precise targeting, is an example of the warfare of paralysis.²³ The one instrument which allows a

strategist to escalate from one type of war to the next type is power. Airpower, through its use of advanced technology, the telescoping of time, and, paradoxically, its inability to hold enemy ground (which then could be fought over), is a--not necessarily the--critical element in seeking paralysis of response. What the strategist seeks through response paralysis, in other words, is to induce chaos.

The opposing strategist of chaos, by contrast is fully aware of America's asymmetric, unmatched power predominance. Thus, the correct "target," as it were, is the "social dimension" of the national-level policy decision making. The chaos strategist seeks to induce a paralysis of decision before force is applied. At his most successful, such a strategist could convince senior American political leaders that the situation in the strategist's sphere of dominance is too chaotic, and that, despite the noble idea of principle, no American interests would be served by the introduction of military force and many potential American casualties could result from engagement in an operation that falls short of war and seems to have no clear solution, end-state, or even political objective (other than the cessation of chaos) available. The strategist of chaos seeks to avoid force engagement.

Thus, Krepenevich's "Streetfighter Scenario" is possibly not the best chaos paradigm because of its reliance on the Vietnam experience. True, the chaos strategist should plan for the contingency of engagement with American forces, and be prepared to suffer withering punishment in the process; at the same time, the chaos strategist should risk terrorism, subversion, insurgency on a "sliding scale" of power that continues to fall just short of triggering American intervention. The strategist should attempt to "get inside" the decision maker's decision cycle and convince him of the negative cost benefits. If successful, the chaos strategist will "kill" his military opponent at the decision "root."

The Iraq example from Desert Storm, which so deeply influenced the Bottom-Up Review and force planning structure, is also not an appropriate paradigm. The problem of military predominance is that it is, ironically, a weakness most American defense planners consider a major strength. The immense advantage of American firepower, technology, and forces available requires clear and distinct application of means to reach ends. The Weinberger and Powell defense doctrines, which required clear definitions of political goals and American interests prior to intervention, worked precisely in Desert Storm because it "fit" Desert Storm. These same defense doctrines would have

prevented American intervention in Southeast Asia and did prevent, up to a point, American intervention in Bosnia.²⁴

During the White House debate on the question of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, then U.N. ambassador Madeleine Albright asked General Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in frustration, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"²⁵ What indeed, especially when the Bosnian Serbs, under the swaggering leadership of the miniature Napoleon, General Ratko Mladić, came to taunt American "cowardice" and firmly believed that American intervention in the rape of Bosnia would never happen.²⁶ "If you cannot succeed," Sun Tzu once wrote, "do not use troops."²⁷

The problem with Sun Tzu's aphorism is that how you achieve "success" is not always perceived correctly, or even as an achievable event, when you begin. The strategist of chaos wants to convince the strategist of "goals and interests" that success is impossible. Bosnian Serbs, despite their own bumbling reliance on firepower and massive destruction, came to employ elements of a successful paralysis of decision strategy. They may further refine this strategy after all S-FOR forces depart the region; the Serbs, in brief, may have learned their "lesson" from the September 1995 NATO strikes. In what is a remarkably prescient comment, General Charles Boyd noted in the summer of 1995, with specific reference to Bosnia, that "at the end of the day the United States must face the reality that it cannot produce an enduring solution with military force--air or ground--only one that lasts until it departs."²⁸ That truth, in the aftermath of Dayton, is a certain one. Using military force to "hunt down" war criminals such as Karadžić or Mladić in the Republika Srpska--a practice many current and former diplomats (including Richard Holbrooke) advocate but which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has wisely refused to practice--is but one example that obviates the obvious: In the aftermath of Dayton, there are no enduring solutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A strategy of chaos is not a novel concept. Within certain cultural contexts, it is the prevailing philosophic approach to the conduct of war. Among American military theorists, it is a strategic concept that has been adapted for the practice of targeting an enemy strength and not a concept

adapted for thinking--metaphorically and physically--about war. (The end state, nonetheless, both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz aim for with different strategies is the search for the same "comparative advantage"--in Chinese, shi.) Thus, while theorists may refer to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz with the same kind of reverence, it is Clausewitz, for American military theorists, who remains the God of War. In those instances when Sun Tzu presents a concept different from the constructs of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu often loses in the minds of theorists.²⁹ Sun Tzu's maxims to "subdue the enemy without fighting" and "to take a state intact" are notions that American theorists would reject as idealistic; the strategist of chaos, by contrast, would recognize Sun Tzu's advice as being wise stratagems to implement a paralysis of decision.³⁰

Sun Tzu, however, was not alone among ancient military strategists in recognizing the value of chaos. The use of chaos, both as an instrument of power and as a strategy, appears throughout the best available work of these "theorists," The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. And while it has become popular to believe that such ancient military texts have influenced twentieth century military thought, it remains largely true (through the application of examples from twentieth century wars), that the "West," conceptually, has employed chaos as it applies to force application (as an instrument of power) and not as a guiding strategic principle. In China today, by contrast, where a rapidly expanding economy and growing military arsenal present dual challenges to the "West," the work of ancient strategists may be experiencing a new vitality. But the essential recognition of these ancient strategic truths in Asia remains unchanged.³¹

In considering the "Essential Principles of War," one recognizes the importance of chaos as an approach to engagement. "Be deceptive"; "confuse the enemy"; "divide the enemy"; "avoid strong enemies"; "avoid the substantial"; "calculate chances"; "manipulate the enemy"; "gather intelligence" "employ surprise"; "avoid prolonged campaigns"; "vary tactics"; "be unexpected"; "employ the unorthodox."³² While American military warfighters strive to achieve many of these principles in the ideal, the problems of force predominance preclude their practice in reality. The issue is not exclusively the size of the military force; the issue is also the philosophic mind-set behind the practice and the application of the principles of war.

In American warfighter terminology, "deception" and "surprise" are standard checklist items in thinking about war. But are these two elements something more indefinite and less precise, elements that constantly shift by their own subtle, indeed chaotic, complexities? Even American intelligence assets, in terms of technology and capabilities the most superior in history, fall short when it comes to the unclear art of human intelligence and human unpredictability. Indeed, despite all our progress with conventional and unconventional war since the American experience in Southeast Asia, there still rings an identifiable empathy with how the debacle of Somalia was, in some respects, not different from the debacle of Vietnam: "If only the little bastards would just come out...and fight like men, we'd cream them."³³ Such comments make the strategist of chaos beam with pleasure.

One Asian expert has provided a description of war in the ideal type as three distinct phases: engagement; chaos; chopping of heads [jiaofeng; luan; zhan]. The master of this "Intellectual" approach to warfare, of course, is Sun Tzu, who employs jiaofeng, luan, and zhan through instantaneous, differential shock wave application. This same authority refers to Clausewitz's theory of warfare victory as an "Engineering" approach with equally distinct phases: battle; campaign; warfare termination--all occurring in cumulative, integral stages.³⁴ Thus, when American warfighters speak of "cutting off and killing" an enemy, they mean "to chop heads" in the metaphorical sense; when the chaotic warfighter speaks of zhan, or its linguistic equivalent in a different culture, he is being literal. The chaos strategist and the chaos warfighter prefer the removal of the enemy in the purest form. In Serbian, one would call this form etničko čišćenje: "ethnic cleansing."

Indeed, if one were to exchange names and geographies, it would not be particularly difficult to suggest that each of the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia drew, unwittingly, from the constructs of various ancient strategists. The "Six Secret Teachings of Tai Kung" suggest "inducing disloyalty among enemy officials and to cause consternation in the ranks...furnish the tools for self-destruction"; "one who does not have a penetrating understanding of order and chaos cannot be spoken with...."³⁵ Equally, "The Methods of the Ssu-ma" apply: one must be "able to be large or small or firm or weak, to change formations, and to use large numbers or small groups--in all

respects being a match [for the enemy]--[exploiting] the balance of power [ch'üan] in warfare."³⁶ The master himself, Sun Tzu, admits that creative combinations can both unseat the "conventional" opponent and create the best results: "What enables the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox [ch'i] and orthodox [cheng]. (Sun Tzu's The Art of War was known to earlier generations as either The Classic of Grasping the Unorthodox or The Classic of Grasping Subtle Change.³⁷) Ultimately, the best guarantee of success comes when the chaos strategist has brought chaos to his enemy without battlefield engagement. As L'i Ching, remarking on Sun Tzu's own warfare practices, noted: "From antiquity, the number of cases in which a chaotic army [that is, with chaos induced among its ranks] brought victory [to the enemy] can never be fully recorded."³⁸

Whether consciously or not, Balkan strategists of chaos in the last war sought the advantage of attacking policy decisions to either prevent war as consequence or to seek the intervention of military force on their behalf. Thus, Serbs and Croats denied certain military involvements or reneged on previous cease-fire agreements whenever possible while still seeking to prevent--or forestall--the wrath of the "West"; thus, the Bosnian government pleaded for NATO interventions even as Bosnian forces equally violated agreements and capitalized, whenever possible, on their military gains. In retrospect, all such strategists recognized an element that could be worked to individual comparative advantage: Chaos had been invoked.

THE MANIPULATION OF CHAOS?

There were tanks burning, there were engines blown out of vehicles sitting in the middle of the road. There were bodies, many of them in fact looked like they were sunning themselves.

There were people who had been placed on their back with their hands crossed on their chest and piled like firewood along the side of the road. So I mean, it was devastation and surrealistic with black clouds of oil, smoke and wires sparking on the street.³⁹

GENERAL LEWIS MACKENZIE, CANADIAN U.N. COMMANDER IN SARAJEVO,
2 MAY 1992, ON THE RETURN OF THE KIDNAPPED BOSNIAN PRESIDENT,
ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ, TO SARAJEVO

What is it going to take us
to get the United States and their allies
to intervene here?⁴⁰

REMARK MADE BY A LEADING (UNNAMED) CORRESPONDENT TO A COLLEAGUE
OVER BREAKFAST, SARAJEVO, AUGUST 1993

When the United States has a clear foreign policy that has anticipated contingencies and possesses a clear direction for the conduct of such policy, national security decision making processes proceed in a fairly straight direction forward. The strategist of chaos, recognizing this sequential American decision process, will attempt to "ratchet up" the timeline, induce pressure--real or imagined--and invoke (or avoid) media response with its instant global accessibility to benefit the strategist's ends and means. As a result of these pressures, intensified timelines, and media outbursts, the national security decision making process often becomes little more than crisis response. Former CIA Director Robert Gates has admitted that media pressure, of itself, most especially from CNN, is something policy makers ought to "discipline" themselves to avoid: "You can't think about what you were paid to do...[which is] to make policy."⁴¹ Stan Schrager, a career diplomat who was U.S. embassy spokesman during the most recent Haiti crisis, remarked that in times of such intense pressure, "the first [diplomatic response] draft on the table wins."⁴²

The first draft is almost always not the best response, let alone solution, to the crisis problem. Indeed, as the chaos in the former Yugoslavia came to increasingly outdistance European and American responses and solutions (or the lack of them), the international media entered a feeding frenzy that has been described as "blood lust...with more that a whiff of Baghdad Mark II."⁴³

Such concentration focused almost exclusively on the dismemberment of Bosnia, and within Bosnia with an ultimate fixation on the siege of Sarajevo, with little collateral focus on other important factors "at play" in the former Yugoslavia or any particular knowledge (or interest) in historical precedent.⁴⁴ "The greatest difficulty for west European politicians and commentators [when they first dealt with Yugoslavia]," wrote Slavko Ćuruvija in The European, "is that most knew next to nothing when they delved into its crisis. Now that everything has come loose, they are disgusted by the chaos and their powerlessness to change anything overnight."⁴⁵

A qualitative and quantitative analysis of news reporting from the former Yugoslavia over a three-month period in 1993 showed almost eighty-five percent of these reports included what constitutes simple hearsay evidence; for the same period, ninety percent of the stories published originated in Sarajevo while only five percent originated in Belgrade or came from Serbian sources.⁴⁶ News reporting failed to mention refugees in Serbia, despite the fact that up to six hundred thousand Bosnian Muslims sought refuge in "enemy territory"--that is, within Serbia.⁴⁷

News reports most often referred to Serbs as "orthodox Communist generals," "Eastern," "Byzantine," orthodox," "orthodox Communists"; Croatians, by contrast, were most frequently characterized as "Western," "nationalist," "wealthiest and most advanced," "most developed," and their "nationalist" system was one of "Western-style democracy."⁴⁸ This Croatian "Western-style democracy," with a self-determined parliament created by Marshal Tito in 1974, also intentionally deleted "Serbs" from Article I of its 1990 "nationalist" and revised constitution which guaranteed equality and rights for its citizenry (to which Serbs, apparently, no longer belonged); such an omission eventually convinced Serbs within Croatia that they would become increasingly marginalized in the newly independent state and that war could be the only inevitable result. Croatians, in effect, had subverted the notion of democratic self-determination and sought to create a self-determined state based on "monoethnicism."⁴⁹

Despite such media distortions, American foreign policy deserves some measure of credit for being able to break free, finally, from the "crisis stranglehold" that media tried to impose on the policy decision process. Eventually, the Clinton administration's decision to intervene, militarily

and diplomatically, led to the Dayton Agreement. Yet such intervention took several years; its necessity became evident only after it became manifest how U.N. peacekeepers, absent NATO force, could not keep the peace. Former Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann now admits: "I did not recommend [force] myself [earlier]--a major mistake."⁵⁰ In the interim between conflict outbreak and conflict cease-fire, the strategists of chaos (of which Slobodan Milošević was likely the prime practitioner in the former Yugoslavia) often found themselves, to their eventual surprise, victims of chaos and media misinformation.

What exactly happened in Bosnia--how many deaths, who was ultimately at greatest fault--will likely never be known. Media correspondents, nonetheless, were woefully unprepared for what they found. The power of television images carried the force of images, images often not backed by accuracy. Further, such images were often manipulated and exploited by public relations campaign. In one report, unnamed congressional sources reports that in eight months of warfare in Bosnia, approximately \$36 million were spent to shape American public opinion on the issue.⁵¹ The Serbs, of course, had no similar public relations campaign in the U.S.; the Serbs had only their fatalistic self-belief that they would be abandoned at home and by allies and that they were left, as always, to solve their own problems.

Such public relations may not have directly affected public opinion; such relations almost certainly affected those who attempt to shape opinion. The Serbs "lost the 'media war' almost at once and were demonized on the op-ed pages of leading American newspapers."⁵² Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, for example, stands out as one such opinion-shaper who vigorously advocated use of force against the Serbs from the start; hitting targets in both Serbia proper and in Bosnia; arming Bosnian Muslims as well as using airpower to strike Serb positions in what came to be called "lift and strike" options; destroying bridges, road, supply depots; bombing troop concentrations.⁵³ Eventually, Lewis came to declare that if the United States "cannot use [military] force to prevent disasters, then the world is truly condemned to chaos."⁵⁴

The most controversial article to claim media myopia in the last Balkan war is Peter Brock's "Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press."⁵⁵ While this article clearly raised the hackles of

media, it also raised integrity issues among journalists themselves. Brock quotes "one of America's most prominent journalists on America's most prominent newspaper [as saying], "I despair for my profession, and I despair for my newspaper."⁵⁶ The article also points to glaring errors in reporting:

- Street scenes of ravaged Vukovar in 1991 were later depicted as combat footage from minimally damaged Dubrovnik on Western television networks
- The August 17, 1992 [Newsweek] cover photo, taken from a British television report, showed a smiling, skeletal man who was described as being among "Muslim prisoners in a Serbian detention camp." In fact, the man was a Serb--Slobodan Konjević, 37, who along with his brother Zoran, 41, had been arrested and confined on charges of looting. Konjević, more dramatically emaciated than others who wore shirts in the picture, had suffered from tuberculosis for 10 years, said his sister in Vienna, who later identified her brothers in the picture.
- The 1992 BBC filming of an ailing, elderly "Bosnian Muslim prisoner-of-war, in a Serb concentration camp" resulted in his later identification by relatives as retired Yugoslav Army officer Branko Veleć, a Bosnian Serb held in a Muslim detention camp.
- Among wounded "Muslim toddlers and infants" aboard a Sarajevo bus hit by sniper fire in August 1992 were a number of Serb children--a fact revealed much later. One of the children who died in the incident was identified at the funeral as Muslim by television reporters. But the unmistakable Serbian Orthodox funeral ritual told a different story.
- In its January 4, 1993, issue, Newsweek published a photo of several bodies with an accompanying story that began: "Is there any way to stop Serbian atrocities in Bosnia?" The photo was actually of Serb victims, including one clearly recognizable man wearing a red coat. The photo, with the same man in his red coat, is identical to a scene in television footage from Vukovar a year earlier.
- CNN aired reports in March and May 1993 from the scenes of massacres of 14 Muslims and then 10 Muslims who were supposedly killed by Serbs. The victims later turned out to be Serbs. There was no correction.
- In early August, 1993, a photo caption in the New York Times described a Croat woman from Posusje [sic] grieving for a son killed in recent Serb attacks. In fact, the Croat village of Posusje, in Bosnia near the Dalmatian coast, had been the scene of bloody fighting between Muslims and Croats that had caused 34 Bosnian Croat deaths, including the son of the woman in the photo.⁵⁷

Granted, sloppy reporting does not necessarily prove collusion or favoritism toward one side or the other. Reporters, largely restricted to Sarajevo were forced to rely on second- and thirdhand information; ignoring the dynamics of Belgrade and Zagreb, media tended to directly observe and then report only what happened in Sarajevo. Extreme examples (as the above clearly are) demonstrate how, over a sustained period, media could change the impressions and opinions

of many. Given the statements of American policy makers, such change partially appears to have taken place.

As the chaos widened and followed its various paths in the last Balkan war, the true victims and the true assassins cannot be clearly sorted out. Among the many horrifying events, one single date stands out: 5 February 1994. This date marked the bombing of the Sarajevo Markale marketplace, in which as many as 68 died and 97 were wounded.⁵⁸

As David Binder points out in the best available analysis of this incident, the truth behind who--Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Muslims--launched the mortar that wreaked such havoc will never be known.⁵⁹ CNN immediately reported that Bosnian Serbs were responsible. Then Secretary of State Warren Christopher remarked, "We have very little doubt it was the Serbs....We do not rule out the use of NATO air strikes"⁶⁰ On 6 February, President Clinton "without physical evidence or any official reporting...that implicated Bosnian Serb forces in the shelling" announced, "Obviously, it seems highly likely that the Serbs are responsible."⁶¹ Yet as U.N. investigations progressed, reports leaked of alleged Muslim perpetrations against Muslim peoples--done apparently to cause outrage by Europe and the U.S. which would invoke NATO strikes against the Serbs.

On 9 January 1994, then UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] Commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, released a more definite indication: "In Sarajevo, the [Muslim-led] BiH army provoke the BSA [Serbs] on a daily basis. This is very easy for us to notice as the BiH mortars are generally located near UNPROFOR units."⁶² U.N. special envoy in Zagreb, Yasushi Akashi, eventually conveyed his impression on several occasions that Muslim had fired at fellow Muslims. Thus, diametrically opposed views came into play in international circles. Subsequent investigations came no closer to the truth.

The opinions of various media reporting on culprits and culpability, victims and victimizers in the last Balkan war came to mirror the opinions of many national decision makers. How

influential the media became in shaping the attitudes of those who made policy is non-demonstrable by specific proof. Yet the presence of "hyperbole, hypocrisy, and racism," as Charles Lane termed it in an introspective Newsweek, was ever-present.⁶³ A 1993 RAND report could claim with equanimity that "there are no predatory powers (with the exception of Serbia) bent on exploiting the current instability for territorial aggrandizement." Such a claim was false. First, it ignores the fact that two million Serbs were incorporated into states they had no wish to belong to when the borders of former Yugoslavia, with both the tacit and direct support of the "West," were redrawn. Second, how could Croatia not be equally termed "predatory" when Franjo Tudjman argued for (and many believe still harbors hope for) a Croatia that includes much of what is today known as western Bosnia?⁶⁴

What can these examples of the manipulation of chaos show the strategist of chaos? Perhaps they demonstrate how the American media, largely historically and culturally uniformed, tend to react to "instant" (and even prolonged) crises with a focus on the sensational and not the substantial. Such a practice tends to exploit, as well as cheapen, human suffering and human dignity. Yet the media is a powerful force; with its instant global accessibility, it has become an unacknowledged "fourth" instrument of national power, as powerful in some ways as the economic, military, and political instruments of power.

Balkan expert (and likely the most brilliant analyst of Yugoslav disintegration) Susan Woodward has acknowledged the media as "indisputably a weapon of war, and everybody knows it."⁶⁵ The true strategist of chaos knows "it" as well, and that this instrument of power can be manipulated to advantage: to make one's grievances against an adversary seem legitimate and the adversary's grievances barbaric. In the Balkan example, horrifying and heinous crimes, often committed against innocents, occurred on all sides. The perception was that largely only one side, the Serbs, committed these acts of brutality. This is the Balkan oxymoron of chaos. But in the Balkans, as evidently elsewhere, perceptions are more important than reality.

A CULTURE OF CHAOS?

It has been said ever since that the Brankoviches of Erdérly count in Tzintzar, lie in Walachian, are silent in Greek, sing hymns in Russian, are cleverest in Turkish, and speak their mother tongue--Serbian--only when they intend to kill.⁶⁶

Genocidal violence is a natural phenomenon, in harmony with societal and mythological divine nature.⁶⁷

FRANJO TUDJMAN, PRESIDENT OF CROATIA

Chairman Mao provided the nasty inspiration that in order for a revolution to be successful it must never end.⁶⁸ That truth, if indeed it is a truth, helps explain why many revolutions triumph in their insurrection but flounder in subsequent attempts at governance. With such a prescription, the twentieth century's role model for chaos would be Ayatollah Khomeini, who sponsored the only revolution in recent memory in which peoples actually fought to give up their individual rights, limited as many of them were.⁶⁹ Khomeini's revolution, according to a close associate, was built around a culture of chaos:

Khomeini's mental discipline was different from other people's. He was a man of the people. He understood the majority of the people. The majority were not educated. They wanted money and things. They didn't want revolution. They wanted money, and Khomeini knew that....So he made disorder in the country and let them loot. He did what they wanted....When Khomeini said, "Follow the law," it wasn't the law of the country. It was his law, the law in his own mind. He wanted complete chaos. That day in his house I realized this man is not a man of government. He was still a revolutionary. He couldn't control himself. Until the very last day, he was making disorder.⁷⁰

Such a prescription may also help explain why the chaotic model seems to have ultimately failed in the last Balkan war and why the architect of chaos, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, unleashed the forces of chaos, cut them loose, and eventually had to crush the very chaotic elements he created in order to maintain his firm control of an authoritarian government. Milošević may have learned what Tito always knew: one can have chaos or despotism in order to maintain control, not both.

Are Serbians more adaptable to a culture of war and chaos than other South Slav peoples? The answer, in reality, is no; the answer, from perception, is yes. Even Milošević himself seemed to believe this perception when, in a March 1991 private meeting with 200 Serbian

mayors, he made the statement (later leaked to the public) that "If we Serbs don't know how to work and do business, at least we know how to fight."⁷¹

Thus, from this perception, there is the belief in a culture of chaos, part of a cult of anarchic elements--"Skinhead Cossacks, Juju Warriors"; Arkan's Serbian paramilitary Tigers, Vojislav Šešelj and his self-proclaimed "Chetniks"⁷² and their political element, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS); Mirko Jović and his Vitezovi ("Knights") of Serbia; Dragsoslav Bokan and his Beli Orlovi ("White Eagles")--who fight for the sake of violence and the satisfaction violence brings.⁷³ War becomes not "the continuation not of politics but of sport."⁷⁴ Such warriors wreak havoc in the midst of chaos and then withdraw--as Bosnian Serb "forces" did in the presence of overwhelming, and more disciplined, NATO force. Such warriors of chaos either turn to Mafia-style illegal trafficking within the borders of their home states or hire their talents as "the dregs of humanity" for mercenary bloodshed and genocide in other lands.⁷⁵

Even the strategist of chaos denies culpability in the face of contradictory evidence. Yet the international community chooses to ignore the evidence in order to prevent the return of chaos. Čedomir Mihailović, for example, a former high-ranking official in the Serbian security forces, provided evidence in 1995 to the International Tribunal on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia which directly linked Slobodan Milošević to control of Bosnian Serb "death camps" and to passing written orders to paramilitary commander Željko Ražnatović, better known as Arkan, to execute Muslim leaders "in order to frighten the Moslem population."⁷⁶ To date, despite the evidence, Milošević has not been brought to trial. He will likely never be tried.

The cultural myth of the Serbian peoples is that they will be left alone and abandoned and thus remain the guardians of their destiny. This perceived truth, that the Serbian nation must save itself, helps explain the current nascent and simultaneous rise of fascism and democracy in Belgrade in 1997. The Belgrade student protest which began on 17 November 1996 receives popular support even as opinion polls show that the most popular candidate for the Serbian

presidency (should Milošević elect to step down from power and run for the "Yugoslav" presidency) is none other than Vojislav Šešelj, a blatant fascist.

Such contradictions do not, despite perceptions of the Serbs themselves, exclusively distinguish the Serbs from other South Slavs. Jovan Cvijić of Belgrade and Vladimir Dvorniković of Zagreb, leading ethnographers and anthropologists, have argued "that there is something inherently anarchic and violent in the character of [all--Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Montenegrins] the Dinaric Alpine peoples."⁷⁷ The "West," nonetheless, has both marginalized Serbia and largely characterized Serbs (and Montenegrins) as the exclusive villains in the last Balkan war. Thus, such contradictions within Serbia--which give the impression of a culture of chaos--will always work to Serbia's detriment. Even the Serbs' own strong cultural belief that they will survive chaos and prove triumphant served to hurt them in the ending of Yugoslavia.

In 1990, during the Knin Rebellion in Croatia, Yugoslav National Army (JNA) MiGs intercepted Interior Ministry helicopters (with police reservists on board) bound for the parastate that called itself the Serbian Krajina Republic, to quell the unrest. In the words of Croatian Deputy Interior Minister, Perica Jurić, in the lead helicopter:

The [JNA] jets threw us toward the ground. We barely managed to stay in the air. Then they blocked our radio connections and we couldn't even communicate with each other. After a few minutes the MiG pilot contacted us and his order was very simple: either we return directly to Zagreb, or they would shoot us down. We had one minute to do so.⁷⁸

Croatia never forgot this humiliation and the kind of panicked chaos it produced among government officials. As one result, the 1995 blitzkrieg success of Operation Storm succeeded with overwhelming force where the 1990 police response (with reactionary force) had failed. In crushing the Krajina Republic, Croatian forces "burned, looted, and devastated so that few Serbs will ever return to their historic settlement. The remaining Serbs in Bosnia, impoverished and brutalized, wander around the remnants of their tin-pot para-state."⁷⁹ Croatia had learned the value of chaos.

This Croatian operation was accomplished, we now know, with the tacit approval of the United State. The U.S. further "approved" (by refusing to object) to the violation of the international arms embargo by Iran's trans-shipment of weapons to Bosnia through Croatia. Croatia, however, withheld heavy weaponry from Bosnia in the perhaps true belief that such weaponry might one day be used against Croatia. Croatia, woefully unprepared for credible defensive forces at the time of its independence declaration in 1991, proceeded to build a formidable military in the next four years. Serbia, made a pariah state by the "West," found itself increasingly dependent on black market smuggling, sanctions busting, illegal arms transactions, and off-shore money laundering to perpetuate the Balkan war. Serbia, failing to learn the dangers of chaos, became dependent on chaos.

One wonders if the Serbian myths of paranoia--attacked at home, betrayed by all, left alone--have not proven true after all.

Against the Balkan strategic culture of chaos stands the American strategic culture--the antipathy of chaos. Indeed, our strategy and force planning processes are laborious, methodical, and infinitely complex because they are planned for and fought with extraordinary precision and detail. (The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is but one example of such precise detail institutionalized. In truth, operation plans and contingency plans, while justifying forces in regional areas of concern, have never been directly employed in time of war or crisis response.) Even, the strategic theory which plans for force application as a paralysis of response does so because it wants--according to American strategic culture--fast, precise, and overwhelming conflict resolution. Such strategy and theory seek to eliminate chaos in order not to directly confront chaos.

Thus, the debacle of Southeast Asia still haunts us. America reluctantly accepts the truths that strategic constraints, conflicting cultural (political and military) mind-sets, and the Government of [South] Vietnam's terminal weakness explain why no American strategy could possibly achieve objectives in Vietnam at acceptable costs in the years 1965-1972.

It may well be that prolonged, equivocal, and constrained warfare is inimical to our strategic culture. The American Way of War began, not with the strategic tradition of U.S. Grant, but with the destruction of Wampanoag and Narragansett tribes in King Philip's War (1675-1676), and with the execution of King Philip himself in Bristol, Rhode Island. (Philip was drawn and quartered and his head exposed on a pole in Plymouth.)⁸⁰ Our culture of war differs from the eighteenth century (Clausewitzian) tradition of European powers who sought possession of territory for comparative advantage. The American tradition best represents a struggle for worthwhile values, if not survival, and resembles nothing so much as Old Testament Warfare: preferably quick, decisive, clear objectives, often brutal but for just cause.

Both the Weinberger and Powell doctrines reflect this tradition. Vietnam did not "fit" this framework, and neither does Bosnia, Somalia, or many future battlegrounds. Nearly four decades ago, Roger Trinquier claimed in Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency that modern war is an interlocking system of political, economic, psychological, military actions and conflicts. Trinquier argues that armies tend to fight traditional warfare and, in modern war, are doomed to failure, despite overwhelming firepower.⁸¹

Desert Storm did not "fix" our Vietnam "mistakes." Desert Storm "fit" the American Way of War. Vietnam and--had we become more involved earlier--Bosnia represent an entirely different theater in the arena of conflict. The real conundrum lies in whether we are willing to sacrifice the morale, skill, unity, and integrity of U.S. forces for wars with unclear objectives, of questionable "value," and for ambiguous victory. While Congress can legislate a Joint Special Operations Command, "culture" itself is not so easily subject to legislation. Whether we have reached an aerial Verdun or an attritional ground stalemate in "unconventional" modern warfare--characterized by prolonged engagement, precarious outcomes, mutual exhaustion, subsequent withdrawal--remains to be answered in the war that is still to come.

A RESPONSE TO CHAOS?

I have always felt that what glows from nature over this privileged city [of Mostar], what permeates everything in it, is a special light, extraordinary in strength and quality. I have always thought that it must imbue man with a love of life, with courage and cheer, with a sense of measure and creative endeavor.⁸²

IVO ANDRIĆ

What the diplomats often failed to realize is that despite the appearance of chaos, the [most recent Balkan] wars have been prosecuted with terrifying rationality by protagonists playing long-term power games.⁸³

LAURA SILBER AND ALLAN LITTLE, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation

In an essay review of three books which examine the most recent Balkan crisis, Marten van Heuven accurately presents the truth that no single cause or perspective in isolation can adequately address all the chaotic aspects of Yugoslavia's violent disintegration.⁸⁴ In Balkan Tragedy, Susan Woodward, formerly a senior adviser to U.N. envoy Yasushi Akashi, indicts the "West" for gross misjudgments as Yugoslavia was coming apart. Her analysis, often brilliant, draws on the thesis that the breakup of Yugoslavia by political disintegration was inseparable from the processes of larger European fragmentation in the wake of the Cold War. Woodward, unlike many others (in particular, Yale Professor Ivo Banac), contends that Yugoslavia was not an artificial creation but rather a nation with a social, cultural, and economic fabric that was more than what Tito held together. Her central thesis is a disturbing one: "If economic decline in a condition of weak state authority and uncertain borders leads to conflict, then what are we to expect for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina or for most other parts of the former Yugoslavia?"⁸⁵

The two other works van Heuven considers draw on different explanations. Former Fulbright scholar and current Balkan correspondent Laura Silber and BBC correspondent Allan Little argue in Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation that Serbian expansionism under the brutal manipulations of Slobodan Milošević is the central source for explaining Yugoslav disintegration. Lord David Owen, who as European Union mediator came to develop a warm relationship with Milošević and was a prime architect of the EU-U.N. Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, believes that ethnic strife is to blame.⁸⁶ (Owen also does not hide his distaste

for Balkan personalities and portrays the three leading figures in the debacle--Alija Izetbegović, Milošević, Franjo Tudjman--as duplicitous liars.)

Each of these works holds a link between them that is key to understanding the process: personalities matter. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, for example, may appear little more than a strutting braggadocio with a manipulative, right-wing nationalist dream; Tudjman, nonetheless, proved able to achieve that dream. Milošević, according to former American Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, was driven by power; Tudjman was "obsessed by nationalism."⁸⁷ Tudjman believed in his myths; Milošević used myths as they suited his purposes and then discarded them, just as he variously embraced or jailed political allies and opponents. In 1987, Milošević could say to the Serbs in Kosovo, "No one dares to beat you"; in 1997, Milošević would not hesitate "to beat" the Serbian people if it suited his advantage.

In perhaps the most clearheaded statement made in the final days of Yugoslavia, Belgrade University student Nebojša Milikić told Milošević directly: "You have to understand there is only one national interest, that Serbia and Yugoslavia become democratic states....If you resign tomorrow, Franjo Tudjman would lose all support within 15 days. He built his myth on you."⁸⁸ Warren Zimmermann expressed a more pragmatic and cold-blooded solution during a meeting I attended in 1992: "It would have been better for Yugoslavia if Milošević's parents had both killed themselves before he was born."⁸⁹

A strategist of chaos has much to learn from the death of Yugoslavia. One could make the observation, for example, that peaceful coöperation could be used as a simple ruse for domination with allowance for violence to be unleashed at any time. Take the example of Josip Reihl-Kir, the police chief (of German and Slovene descent) in the region of Borovo Selo, in Eastern Slavonija. Reihl-Kir, unflagging in the face of adversity, worked to remove barricades and restore mutual trust between Croats and Serbs in the days before and after war erupted; Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) fascists murdered him, for collaboration, on 1 July 1991. By contrast, Gojko Šušak, an extreme Croatian nationalist who amassed a personal fortune

from his Ottawa pizza company (and was one of Tudjman's closest advisors and largest financiers of Tudjman's 1990 election campaign), entered the village of Borovo Selo, a Serb-populated village near the town of Vukovar on the banks of the Danube, and fired three shoulder-launched Ambrust missiles into the village, attempting to provoke Serbs into violent action; Šušak, who boasted of his feat on Croatian television, subsequently became independent Croatia's Minister of Defense.⁹⁰

In 1994, senior U.N. official could remark, "What the Contact Group countries [the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and Germany] want their diplomats to do is not solve Bosnia but to make it go away as an issue."⁹¹ In 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated flatly that the United States would not be swayed by future humanitarian concerns in the Balkans: If the three warring parties "go back to slaughtering each other, [that is] going to be up to them."⁹² Whether or not Bosnia is simply passing through a "false peace" and preparing again for war is far from clear. Yet increasingly, evidence from the seizure of arms caches in violation of the Dayton Agreement, along with the sudden flashes of violence between ethnic communities, do not bode well for a peaceful future.⁹³ From an international security perspective, "Western failure to palliate the brutal consequences of war in Yugoslavia...illustrates the fact that, rather than address new threats to security, policy makers have simply reconfigured models from the cold [sic] war."⁹⁴ The international community is not prepared to face the lethal mixes of ethnic tension, nationalism, transnationalist crime, and the inflammation of religious differences--all factors that surface almost immediately when intrastate conflict erupts.⁹⁵

Yet it was largely through the efforts of one diplomat (Richard Holbrooke) and one admiral (Leighton Smith) to provide the synergy of coercive diplomacy necessary to end the fighting in Bosnia. Both the admiral and diplomat have left public service; the diplomat has reluctantly resigned himself to the fate of Bosnia as being one of partition and intentions of the Dayton Agreement remaining unfulfilled.⁹⁶

The strategist of chaos will draw from the last Balkan war the truth that no previous historic case--Vietnam, Iraq, Lebanon--and no "Streetfighter" scenario can be grafted onto to the Balkan Enigma to completely explain the causes of conflict. Such a strategist will learn, however, how to manipulate chaos to advantage. As Tai Kung wrote in his "secret" teachings: "Success and defeat in all cases proceeds from the spiritual employment of strategic power [shih]. Those who attained it flourished; those who lost it perished."⁹⁷

To achieve the comparative advantage of shih, one must employ and be empowered by luan--chaos. Perhaps the failure to recognize this continuous exploitation of chaos for continual advantage helps explain why Serbia lost more than it deserved to lose (and why, as consequence, Croatia "won" more than it deserved) and why Bosnia-Herzegovina held on, by any means possible under seemingly impossible conditions, to become the parastate it is today. Such disparity may also explain why war will return to the Balkans.

Whether or not the United States will risk future involvement in the miasma of chaos is another issue altogether. Yet Balkan strategists of chaos may have already helped move the U.S. in a direction policy and decision makers may not want to be headed for. Chaos may have placed both the New Moralists and the Old Realists together on the same road to Hell.

The twenty-first century may be one of evolving new world order and disorder; if so, reality will eclipse the pragmatic Realpolitik of realist perspective. Cold warrior Henry Kissinger could proclaim that the United States cannot and must not use its military force in areas that are not essential to American interests: "It was precisely the inability to differentiate threats to Europe from threats to Southeast Asia that produced the Vietnam tragedy."⁹⁸ While Kissinger's cold-blooded pragmatism may have faded from the stage of American decision making, it ought not to be allowed to stray much farther lest its antithesis--a New Moralism--comes to dominate completely the processes of national security decision making.

Indeed, not until the administration of Jimmy Carter would the notions of morality in foreign policy and the question of human rights bear much relevancy in state-to-state interactions. (Even President Kennedy, according to Robert S. McNamara in a clearly biased

memoir, was in turmoil over the question of American presence--for moral or pragmatic reasons--in Southeast Asia.⁹⁹) Yet in the wake of the post-Cold War era, we have seen what Professor Alvin Rubinstein terms the "New Moralists," who variously define themselves as converted doves, humanitarian interventionists, or Pax Americanists.¹⁰⁰ Such New Moralists, marked by differences of approach, appear to share a central belief that America, as the world's only superpower, bears the basic responsibility to assume the role of global leadership and thus must seek to control ethnic conflict (before such conflict leads to global war), to defend the oppressed, spread democracy, and set precedent by which the international community will follow.¹⁰¹ If we lead, the argument proceeds, they will follow.

Such new moralism does have a place in the balancing of strategic ends and means. At its core, it represents the classically American tension that is the conflict between American interests and American principles. Such new moralism, nonetheless, rests on four tenuous and faulty premises which the strategist of chaos will seek to manipulate to advantage whenever possible.

1. What is the "International Community"?

First, the "international community" does not truly exist. Such a "community," in truth is an exclusive and largely privileged membership, which includes hegemons and imperialists who came to dominate the global landscape over the last two centuries or who will dominate the landscape in this new century: the United States, Japan, the prosperous nations of Asia, Australia, Canada, and Europe.¹⁰² Whether China will enter this exclusive community within the next decade is debatable; whether Russia will even exist a decade from now is equally open to the same debate. Thus, the "False Promise of International Institutions," as Professor John Mearsheimer terms it, is measured by how strongly the tiny "international community" feels about an issue.¹⁰³ The United Nations, the one mechanism that purports to represent the euphemism of a real international community, appears only to continue the struggle in search of itself.

2. The Media as Propagandist Tool

The second false premise of the new moralism is too great a reliance on both publicity (for interest promotion and information) and the international media. Indeed, the firepower the media, in particular, provides can appear often to drive the exclusive directions toward which the international community appears to be heading. At the same time, the media cannot be all places at all times. (Thus, the media myth goes, Bosnia is a tragedy of ethnic hatred exploding out of ancient Balkan tendencies. At the same, Tajikistan is a nation cut in half by the same so-called ethnic and cultural divisions, occupied by Russian troops who nominally "protect" the Afghan border, and remains an unknown entity largely ignored by media and the international community. As far as Afghanistan, the skewed logic might go, well "those people" always kill each other--that's what they do best; we, the international community, can do nothing about that.)

Media attention and mis-attention helps explain why we hear and see the horrors of post-Cold War Yugoslavia but know largely nothing of genocidal violence in Sudan; we know about Haiti these days, but not much about Liberia; North Korea, but not Cambodia; Cuba, but not Rwanda; and almost nothing of the seven hundred thousand refugees of Nagorno-Karabakh left to wander in the absence of world attention. (Policy makers, of course, do know about these problems but may elect not to react in the absence of media focus on a particular area--or choose to react to another area, with similar problems, which is receiving intense media focus.) In the subsumed Serbian province of Kosovo, where media and international monitors are no longer allowed, brutal repression of ethnic Albanians has entered its third decade, and we remain unaware.

Yet such skewed attention can also help explain why and how the strategist of chaos portrays himself as victim and his adversary as aggressor. Croatia could falsely portray itself as protecting its own vital interests from Serbian incursion while "ethnically cleansing" Serbs who had lived in these Croatian regions for centuries. Media, however, would come to portray the Serbs alone of committing "genocidal" violence, casting Serbs as post-Cold War Nazis.

No less a figure than former (Carter administration) national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski would accuse the Serbs--and not Croatians, or, for that matter, Bosnian Muslims--of "mass murder," "ethnic cleansing," "mass rape," and even goes so far as to reveal his ignorance of the etymology of the word "Holocaust" by staking the false claim that such is the intention of Serbs in former Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁴ This is not to say horrible abuses did not occur; they did--but on and by all sides. To categorize the last Balkan war as one of a single evil "Fourth Reich" is both a fraudulent manipulation of the truth and a dishonor to the millions of Jews who died by the hands of Nazi criminals in World War II. No less a personage than George Kenney, former Yugoslav desk officer who resigned from the State Department in protest over his perception that American policy had failed in the Balkans, eventually came to admit--and protest vigorously--how the Bosnian government was not telling the complete truth to the American people, that, for self-protection purposes, "the chorus warning of genocide gradually [was] taken over by those who sought to stampede the United States into unilaterally lifting the arms embargo against the Muslims."¹⁰⁵ "Distinguishing between murder and genocide," as Rubinstein points out, "is difficult but necessary."

3. Problems with Power

Third, there is the issue of military and diplomatic power. As Eliot Cohen has cleverly noted, we have witnessed in the post-Cold War era "the ornithological miracle of doves becoming hawks" with sudden converts who now view the application of overwhelming technological military power--particularly airpower--as the instrument of coercive diplomacy to achieve policy goals (ends) through "minimum risk" (best available means).¹⁰⁶ Whether or not such military force will "break the will" of future adversaries, as it appears to have partially succeeded in breaking Iraqi resistance (which is not necessarily the more elusive attribute of "will") yet did not break the "will" of North Vietnam (despite the U.S. and GVN air forces having dropped the equivalent of more than 400 Hiroshima bombs), leaves a rather large "if" hanging in mid-air:¹⁰⁷

In many cases, war means bringing power, particularly air power [sic], to bear against civil society. Those who hope for too much from air

power desire to return to a mode of warfare reminiscent of the mid-eighteenth century in western Europe--war waged by mercenary armies isolated from society; war with (by modern standards, at any rate) remarkable efforts to insulate civilians from its effects.¹⁰⁸

Airpower is also brutal and lethal; when best applied against enemy weakness, it seeks the paralysis of enemy response. Equally, airpower as a subordinate element of military power must remain subordinate to policy. Clausewitz's dictum that "war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy" is no less true today than it was two centuries ago.¹⁰⁹ [Emphases in the original] Airpower, indeed all aspects of military force, cannot of themselves replace effective policy. We cannot bomb an adversary into peace.

4. The Rape of Democracy

The Rape of Democracy is simple to describe but difficult to solve. It occurs when the "appearance" of democracy will masquerade itself even as fierce manipulation occurs. It occurs when "monoethnicism" within a multi-ethnic state is considered synonymous with the majority's right to self-determination. It occurred in former Yugoslavia when the western European nations pushed for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia along borders that were the same lines that existed twice before of dubious parentage: Hitler's Balkan dismemberment of 1941 and the Comintern's 1927 moves to carve up the Balkans, reduce Serbian influence, and pave the way for Communist revolution throughout the Balkans. European euphoria to recognize Croatia, Slovenia, and later Bosnia occurred with little thought as to the consequence for or rights of ethnic groups within these new states. Such euphoria did not consider the problematic fact that over two million Serbs were then living in newly independent states they had no wish to be a part of.

The most pertinent recent example of the Rape of Democracy occurred in January 1997, when the Milošević regime reversed its stranglehold and allowed the original regional election results of November 1996 (in which, throughout Serbia, opposition parties scored overwhelming victories) to be restored. Such reversal of decision, of course, would seem to be a triumph of democracy. In truth, the Serbian regime handed the opposition victors little more than a poisoned chalice.

Western diplomats now believe the Milošević government will "use every trick in the book to discredit the opposition."¹¹⁰ The central government will likely impose crippling economic pressures to highlight inevitable opposition failures. In those cities where opposition leaders have assumed control, it has been standard to find the city coffers already empty. Thus, the opposition leaders have no financial resources to battle decaying infrastructure. Increasingly, the central government has become the sole authority for all aspects of local governance; the local leaders are now left with little more than maintenance for waterworks, sewerage, water disposal. The local police now report to Belgrade; the electricity network is under government control; the state-controlled media, meanwhile, spouts forth vicious propaganda which promotes opposition failures as proof of an inability to govern.¹¹¹ Even in the capital of Skopje, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the newly elected city mayor (a member of the opposition Demokratska Partija) took over his new offices only to learn, inexplicably, of how the city coffers were in debt to the amount of eight million Deutsche marks.¹¹²

The quickest fix for the Rape of Democracy is through foreign support and aid, along with guaranteed assurance that such support and aid reaches its intended recipient. One must first be able to recognize what is going on before one commits to support, nonetheless. Often, such recognition occurs too late. Democracy itself is the first--silent--victim.

AN END TO CHAOS, OR CHAOS AS THE END ITSELF?

In concluding remarks to an essay that falls one note short of hysteria, Ralph Peters claims, "You cannot, cannot, cannot play by textbook rules when your opponent either hasn't read the book or has thrown it away. Attempts to bring our wonderful, comfortable, painstakingly humane laws and rules to bear on broken countries drunk with blood and anarchy constitute the ass end of imperialism."¹¹³ Colonel Peters seems unaware that there is a new textbook available now, in use wherever blood, anarchy, and the ass end of imperialism might meet. The book is named The Book of Chaos. It requires playing by the rules only as it suits your purposes and allows breaking any--or all--of the rules when it proves to your advantage.

Already, the strategist of chaos is preparing his revisions to this textbook. The strategist has learned from the Balkan experience how to make it too painful for the "West"--with all its predominant military force and diplomatic power--to become involved. Democracy has been supplanted by corruption, nationalist authoritarianism confused for nationalist self-determination and individual rights. In the new order of things, driven by chaos, we see "individual practitioners of power, attracted by their prospective emoluments, feeding their personal vanities, the perquisites of high state officialdom: the unexpected obeisances and comforts suddenly at their behest, bloated staffs, salutations, official travel."¹¹⁴

"Toga dana mi ćemo reći paklu: 'Jesi li se napunio?'" Meša Selimović wrote in Derviš i Smrt (The Dervish and Death). "A pakao će odgovoriti: 'Ima li još?'"¹¹⁵ Such a chilling proverb seems a fitting way to end this consideration of the Balkan debacle. Translated, the proverb reads: "And on that day we'll say to Hell: 'Have you had enough?' And Hell will answer: 'Is there more?'"

Only those who can stand the chaos will endure long enough to learn that truth.

¹Since this essay's completion, I have learned of the book A Strategy of Chaos by Hido Bišćević, currently undersecretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Croatia. I would like to thank Vladimir Čupevski, special advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of Macedonia, for this information. A number of essays and two books help frame my general argument toward a strategy of chaos as well as support my thesis that no single perspective or cause, of itself, is sufficient to explain the last Balkan war. These works are: Duško Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, 3-23; Alex N. Dragnich (former Cultural Attaché and Public Affairs Officer in Belgrade and former Chester Nimitz Professor at the U.S. Naval War College), "Serbia's and the West's Miscalculations," Mediterranean Quarterly, Summer 1995, 74-90; Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," Foreign Policy, Fall 1993, 52-74; Daniel L. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective," Strategic Review, Winter 1993, 26-39; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996); Nikolaos A. Stavrou, "The Balkan Quagmire and the West's Response," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1993, 24-45; Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). The Woodward and Silber/Little books, although significantly different in their examinations of the root causes for the last Balkan war, are the best works available for both general reference and exhaustive analysis of the death of Yugoslavia.

²From Havel's essay "Thriller," in Living in Truth, translated by Jan Vladislav, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1986), quoted in P.H. Liotta, The Ruins of Athens: A Balkan Memoir (Truro, Massachusetts: Garden Street Press, 1997), 66.

³Anagenesis: rebirth or renaissance; progressive evolutionary change within a species; the reproduction or regeneration of tissue. From the Greek ἀναγέννησις (ana--upward; génesis--creation, genesis). Liddell and Scott: Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford University Press, 1966), 42.

⁴The racist assumption here is that "ethnic Albanians" (of whom Mother Teresa--born in Skopje, Macedonia in 1910 under the name Agnes Goxha Bojaxhiu--is the most famous "ethnic Albanian" of former Yugoslavia) were somehow not part of the former Yugoslav state, or of the new rump Yugoslav state of which Serbia is the master. Such assumptions, allowed to continue, will only guarantee the continuation of violence.

⁵Kosovar "Albanians" have the highest birthrates, highest infant mortality rates, highest unemployment rates, and lowest literacy in Europe. In 1989, a ban on public gatherings was imposed on Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo lost its status as an autonomous province (granted by Marshal Tito in the 1974 constitution) and was reincorporated within Serbia proper. The May 1997 United States National Security Strategy for a New Century, in its "Balkan" (21) paragraph of Section III, "Regional Integrated Approaches," emphasizes the requirement for Serbian repression against Kosovars to end before U.S.-Serbian relations can improve. The U.S. continues to refuse to recognize Serbia and Montenegro as "Yugoslavia." (Of further note: Greece and Turkey are apparently not considered "Balkan" states but part of "Southeastern Europe" (22). This is consistent with the approach taken by recent Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic (and Richard Holbrooke's predecessor as former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs) M.T. Niles, who insisted that Greece be referred to as part of "Southeast Europe" and not as a "Balkan" nation.)

⁶Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996), 92.

⁷Silber and Little, 37; Robert D. Kaplan in Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 39. Kaplan plays somewhat loosely with the facts by claiming that Milošević made his speech on 28 June, the "holiest" of Serb anniversaries, commemorating the date in 1389 when Ottoman forces crushed the Serbian Prince Lazar in Kosovo. (On 28 June 1914, St. Vitus Day, Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. On 28 June 1992, former French President Francois Mitterrand, cognizant of the powerful resonances

of the date, elected to visit the war-torn city of Sarajevo in a move that was bold, romantic, and self-aggrandizing) The actual date of the Milošević speech, marking his meteoric rise to power was 24 April 1987. Milošević did make a 28 June speech--in 1989, on the six hundredth anniversary of the Serbian defeat. By then, he was the most intimidating political figure in Yugoslavia and had gathered over one million Serbs on the plain of Kosovo Polje--the Field of the Black Birds--to hear him speak.

⁸Analysts, of course, should not be singled for their ignorance of the Balkans. Silber and Little (337) provide the example from June 1994 in which members of the Contact Group [the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain], including foreign ministers, were abysmally unaware of the both the crisis and where the centers of critical value lay. Ejup Ganić, Bosnia's de facto Vice President, spoke of his amazement at witnessing new Contact Group members "[pouring] over the map...trying to find Banja Luka [the Serb stronghold in northern Bosnia] in Romania." Further, as former national security adviser (and former assistant air attaché in Belgrade) Brent Scowcroft tells it, in 1991-1992, as Yugoslavia was tearing itself into separate states, President Bush would regularly say each week, "Tell me again what this is all about..."

⁹Stavrou, 29.

¹⁰Marshal Tito helped in the de-Serbianization of Kosovo. The Yugoslav League of Communists, determined to weaken Serbian strength in the second Yugoslavia, invited up to three hundred thousand Albanians to immigrate to Kosovo, allowed Kosovar Albanian abuse of Serbs, and, under Tito's explicit orders, forbade those Serbs who fled Kosovo during World War II (to escape Bulgarian occupation) to return. Dragnich, 77.

¹¹John Mueller, "The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble after the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1994, 355-375.

¹²Ibid., 371.

¹³Job, 61.

¹⁴Andrew F. Krepenovich, Jr., "Major Regional Conflicts: The Streetfighter Scenario," The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, February 1994), part V, 41-44.

¹⁵Ibid., 41.

¹⁶The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), however, did not move beyond the building block approach.

¹⁷Ibid., 42.

¹⁸The first NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs were a consequence, not the direct result, of the Markale mortar attack. NATO issued an ultimatum to the Serbs following the 5 February attack for Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their artillery from around Sarajevo. At the same time, international pressure on Croatia to withdraw forces from Bosnia led to a new realignment between Croatia and the United States. The first use of NATO air strikes was in April 1994 in an attempt, which largely failed, to halt the Bosnian Serb destruction of the enclave of Gorazde within what was exclusively Serb-held territory.

¹⁹A number of sources question the evidence that was used to implicate Bosnian Serbs in the Sarajevo bombings on 28 August 1995, which led to approval of Operation Deliberate Force. The actual use of force against targets was also manipulated for media purposes; during Deliberate Force, strike fighters regularly hit what was called "the CNN target"--one with no military purpose other than being in clear view of media coverage.

²⁰Former Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs Richard Holbrooke reports that NATO strikes had an obvious effect on the ongoing negotiations with Milošević and Karadžić, even admitting "that our chances for a viable peace would improve if the bombing continued." "The Road to Sarajevo," The New Yorker, 21 & 28 October 1996, 100-102.

²¹Luttwak might also argue that the significance of "Post-Heroic Warfare" lies in how it proposes a "careful, purposeful patience" in the application of predominant American and American-led military force, as well as a return to the "casualty-avoiding methods of eighteenth century warfare"--supposedly based on ancient Roman economically conscious war. Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995): 109-122. Economic embargoes and sanctions against adversary states may also prove more worthwhile than the traditional battlefield engagements that characterized previous wars. If so, they remain unpopular instruments of power (in contrast to the swift application of the military instrument) for policy makers. Economic sanctions against Serbia, for example, brought the Milošević regime to its knees; inflation, at one point during the last Balkan war, according to some reports, ran as high as nine billion percent. The regime, nonetheless, stayed in place (as did the two regimes of Iraq and Iran under the policy of "dual containment" despite attempted economic isolation). Further, the individual prosperity of the average Serb plummeted while the vitality of Mafia elements, black market smuggling, and "sanction busting" practices soared. One other aspect of economic sanctions points to American selectivity: the May 1997 embargo against the military dictatorship of Burma (which calls itself Myanmar) proved less than effective because other nations, particularly ASEAN nations, continue to invest in Burma. The standards applied by the United States as justification for sanctions against Burma could also have been applied against China--which did not and will not be "punished" with economic sanctions. Burma does not represent a vital national interest for the United States; China does.

²²Colonel Meilinger kindly provided me with his significant theoretical piece titled "Air Targeting Strategies," in which he considers these "types" of war as well as the "Strategic Helix" theory at striking at enemy centers of gravity. This work is forthcoming in The Journal of Military History.

²³I would also argue that it remains quite possible that the Bosnian conflict came to end simply because the Serbs, suffering from "Yugo Fatigue" after more than four years of fighting, recognized their territory losses as well as the hard reality that, this time (September 1995) NATO was "not kidding around." A strategist of chaos equally would have recognized this truth and planned for the "appearance" of a lasting cease-fire--one that lasted until after all NATO IFOR/S-FOR troops had left the Balkans.

²⁴The best critique of the Weinberger doctrine, with examples of its applicability to various interventions, can be found in Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2nd edition (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 185-203.

²⁵Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 576.

²⁶Mladić, according to eyewitness reports passed to me, believed himself to be nothing less than a modern Napoleon. He paraded in front of his troops, bragging of how he was invincible, praising his troops' "Serbian warrior spirit." Mladić seems to have ignored, or have been unaware of, the truth that Napoleon's troops actually engaged in brilliant tactical maneuvers in engaging enemy forces. Serb forces, by contrast, consistently lacking in manpower yet possessing a surfeit of artillery, regularly practiced the "tactical" maneuver of demolishing villages with firepower and then turning them to rubble before invading them.

²⁷Handel, 185.

²⁸General (retired) Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1995): 38.

²⁹Michael Handel suggests that the differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu (of which he admits there are a number) can "often be attributed to differences in emphasis, not substance." Thus, Sun Tzu's recommendation to both "take a state intact" and "subdue the enemy without fighting" is a difference between the Clausewitzian notion of war in the ideal and war in reality. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2nd edition (London: Frank

Cass, 1996), 24. The strategist of chaos would not agree with Handel. Such a strategist seeks to transform emphasis into substance, to make the ideal real.

³⁰Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

³¹The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, translation and commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer, with Mei-chün Sawyer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993). xii.

³²The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 545-546.

³³Remarks made by a frustrated military officer to journalists; drawn from a January 1996 lecture by Professor William J. Duicker, Pennsylvania State University.

³⁴Based on lecture notes and drawn from discussions with Professor Arthur Waldron, Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College. Indeed, the "Engineering" approach bears remarkable similarity with the thought process and implementation of the "Bottom-Up Review."

³⁵The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 33; 71.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 135.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 326.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 333.

³⁹Silber and Little, 239-240.

⁴⁰Nik Gowing, "Instant TV and Foreign Policy," The World Today: Published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, October 1994, 189.

⁴¹Johanna Neuman, "Has CNN Replaced Envoys?" Foreign Service Journal, July 1995, 30-31.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 31.

⁴³Gowing, 189.

⁴⁴Intelligent media contributors recognize such failings in their own particular elegies for the foreign correspondent as "endangered species." The most germane recent observation on such media distortions, failures, and perfidy in international reporting is found in Garrick Utley, "The Shrinking of Foreign News: From Broadcast to Narrowcast," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997): 2-10. Utley, former chief correspondent for NBC News and ABC News, is a current CNN contributor, as well as Chairman of the Board of Advisers for Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁵Quoted in Peter Brock, "Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press," Foreign Policy, Winter 1993-1994, 159.

⁴⁶Stavrou, 28.

⁴⁷Lois B. McHugh, "Yugoslavia: Refugee Assistance," Congressional Research Service Report, 22 September 1992, 3.

⁴⁸Stavrou, 28.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 35. Post-Cold War Croatian laws included "ethnic criteria" for government service, restricted property rights for non-Croatians, and dismissal of Serbs from Croatian research institutions, universities, and public offices.

⁵⁰Bob Nordland and Joel Brand, "Dealing with the Devil," Newsweek, 24 April 1993, 44.

⁵¹Stavrou, 42.

⁵²Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The New Moralists on a Road to Hell," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Spring 1996, 281.

⁵³Anthony Lewis, "Humanity Won't Wait," The New York Times, 13 November 1992, op-ed; Anthony Lewis, "What We Should Do in Bosnia," The New York Times, 7 December 1992, op-ed. What Lewis and many foreign correspondents did not realize is that there were pockets of calm in the midst of the chaos that was the Bosnian conflict. Granted, one of the reasons Sarajevo became a "safe haven" for journalists was because of travel restrictions

imposed by the Bosnian government. Thus, Sarajevo became the most frequent byline and much of the information passed on by journalists was not directly observed. If one were left to obtain information on the Bosnian war exclusively from the international media, the impression would likely be that the country was one part firestorm, one part smoking rubble, and one part concentration camp--with all the parts split and scattered in the countryside. Bosnia, however, was also one part relative calm. I first learned this in 1994 on the flight deck of the U.S. aircraft carrier George Washington. A number of F-18 pilots told me how, during patrol operations in Deny Flight (which monitored NATO-forbidden flight operations in Bosnia and which led to the shootdown of two former Yugoslav jet trainers in 1994), they observed that much of the territory over which they flew appeared to be the landscape of a "normal country," one largely agricultural and relatively calm.

⁵⁴ Anthony Lewis, "World without Power," The New York Times, 25 July 1994, op-ed.

⁵⁵ Peter Brock, Foreign Policy, Winter 1993-1994, 152-172. A later Brock piece about media attitude against the Serbs in the last Balkan war is "'Greater Serbia' vs. the Greater Western Media," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1995, 49-68.

⁵⁶ Brock, "Dateline Yugoslavia, 152. In the Spring 1994 "Letters to the Editor" of Foreign Policy, journalist Roy Gutman (who shared a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on alleged Serbian "death camps") essentially accuses Brock of sloppy, inaccurate writing; Brock, on the other hand, questions a number of journalists for accuracy, interest, and the truth since a number of reports (including some of Gutman's) were obtained thirdhand. Brock's overall evidence in both articles is fairly strong. Stavrou (43) provides further well-documented proof of numerous Muslim-run camps that practiced atrocities against Serbian men, women, children, and older people--the same abuse practiced in alleged Serb camps--but received little attention, or belief, from the international community or media. Even Mujahadeen barbarism against Serbs, in which the heads of civilians were cut off and mounted on posts in Banja Luka, was ignored.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 153-154.

⁵⁸ The exact casualty figures will never be known because of the method and speed (approximately 25 minutes) with which Muslim policemen evacuated the bodies.

⁵⁹ David Binder, "Anatomy of a Massacre," Foreign Policy, Winter 1994-1995, 70-78.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 73.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Brock, 161-162. Such hyperbole was not, of course, confined to the American media alone. Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, was reported to have told members of the Security Council (according to a 15 March 1993 cover story) that "women, children and old people are being killed, usually by having their throats cut." Ogata claimed this information came from uncorroborated broadcasts from unidentified ham radio sources in eastern Bosnia. UN troops arriving in the region, nonetheless, often disproved such reports.

⁶⁴ For one proof of Tudjman's predatory behavior and his "secret" meetings to achieve his ambitions for a Greater Croatia, see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996), 132.

⁶⁵ "Making Sense out of Chaos: Reporting the War in Bosnia," panel discussion, School of Communication, American University, Washington, D.C., 5 October 1993.

⁶⁶ Milorad Pavić The Dictionary of the Khazars: A Lexicon Novel in 100,000 Words (Male Edition), translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Christina Pribičević Zorić (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 252.

⁶⁷ Franjo Tudjman, Bespuca-Povjesne Zbiljnosti [Wastelands: Historical Truth] (Zagreb: Nakladništvo Matice Hrvatske, 1989), 152.

⁶⁸ Jonathan Franzen, "Anti-Climax," The New Yorker, 21 April 1997, 92.

⁶⁹The overthrow of the Soviet puppet-state in Kabul by the Taliban militia (which the Islamic Republic of Iran opposes) does not constitute a popular revolution. Most of the government soldiers who opposed the Taliban were mercenaries, ethnic Tajiks, many of whom had fled the chaos in Tajikistan. The strict Islamic laws imposed by the Taliban were done so often under the threat of death as consequence for violation. Further, pockets of active military resistance still exist in western Afghanistan.

⁷⁰V. S. Naipul, "After the Revolution," The New Yorker, 26 May 1997, 52-54.

⁷¹Silber and Little, 129.

⁷²The use of the term "Chetnik" roughly translates in cultural contexts (that is, non-Serb Yugoslavs referring to Serbs) as "fascist"--as does the term "Ustasha" applied by non-Croatian Yugoslavs to Croatians. The origin of the phrase, however, is not so narrow. Chetniks were a Serbian guerrilla force, in the first two Balkan wars (1912-1913) and in World War I. After the Nazi conquest of Yugoslavia in 1941, Dragoljub Mihailović headed the revived Chetnik forces which came to be identified with Yugoslav monarchism (supporting the royal government-in-exile) and Serbian nationalism. Chetnik forces soon came into conflict with Tito's "Partizan" forces. Mihailović, evidence suggests, considered Communists a greater threat than the Axis Powers; in 1946, after Tito's successful grab for power, Mihailović was tried for treason and Nazi collaboration and executed. Many Serbs, as consequence, blame Tito for treason against so-called Serbian heroes. Allied support for the Chetniks vanished in 1944 and switched to support for Tito's partisans, largely because they were a more effective guerrilla force. Winston Churchill, ever the pragmatist, when challenged by one of his brigadiers who expressed concern that the partisans were Communists, is said to have responded, "Do you plan on moving to Yugoslavia after the war?" The brigadier responded that he did not. Churchill then settled the issue by answering, "Good, neither am I." For an informative though biased work on the Chetniks in World War II, see Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990).

⁷³See, for example, Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, 44-76. A less satisfying though more extensive "Super Chaos" model of this coming anarchy is Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996). Kaplan does provide a number of powerful metaphors and images in his work, such as descriptions of "Skinhead Cossacks" and "Juju Warriors." In his "Anarchy" article ("anarchy" here applied in the sense of chaos, and with a quite different meaning from the implication of "anarchic institutions" which classical political science theorist referred to his in 1954 work, Man, the State, and War), Kaplan describes (46) how in the civil fighting in Sierra Leone, rebels would have "a young woman with them who would go to the front naked, always walking backwards and looking into a mirror to see where she was going. This made her invisible, so that she could cross to the army's positions and there bury charms...to improve the rebel's chances of success." I received an equally powerful example via e-mail in April 1995, during the evacuation of non-essential embassy personnel from Monrovia, which demonstrates both the bizarre power of chaos and the new technology available to transmit information under adverse circumstances:

I'm still in Liberia in the midst of the turmoil that's going on. What a life! I remember us covering vaguely crisis situations [in training], but rally didn't expect to find myself involved in the middle of one. The fighting has been going on here for over six weeks now, and I don't think things are going to get any better, soon. I join the mass of "displaced" people in Liberia, as the small embassy housing compound I used to live on is now home to over 25,000 refugees. So far no one has broken into the houses, but nonetheless, living like a gypsy in Liberia isn't fun. Have no idea how long this will continue because

even if the refugees left today, clean up in the complex will take a couple of months. I visited my house two weeks ago just in time to watch them bury a couple of bodies in the backyard. All of us that live there have had similar things occur around our houses. What used to be a nice garden is now nothing more than a large area of hard packed dirt, as is the lawn. All the trees have been cut for firewood; it almost looks like a deserted planet in the area. Guess I'm really earning my \$150 a month hazardous duty pay, right?????

Actually things are pretty gruesome. I've had my fill of seeing chopped up people, and other unique aspects of this war. The fighters are running around in womens' nightgowns, wigs, and what have you. I saw a young chap just the other week wearing nothing but a pair of lace panties, a Little Richard wig, and some necklaces. This is typical for these guys: I think I'm living in a bizarre dream world around here. The USMC has already had to kill 5 [sic] of the fighters who were making hostile gestures at the embassy. Early on, before the special ops folks arrived, we had a close call when several of the fighters scaled the embassy walls. Oh well, we [sic] the MEU here to protect us, and three USN ships off shore, what more could I ask for, right? How about, wishing you were here too!!!!

⁷⁴Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 191. Van Creveld, who published his book just prior to the outbreak of Desert Storm, suggests a future war radically different from the Clausewitzian model, one characterized by warfare between ethnic and religious groups in various (to use the euphemism) "low-intensity conflicts." This future world will be inhabited by thugs, mercenaries, insurgent revolutionaries, and guerrillas who all want nuclear weapons for the common man. (His publisher also provides the cover subtitle for the book, describing it as "The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz.") The Transformation of War is hardly a "radical" book, though its author does provide heavy doses of opinion and acerbic wit. The future of war, it may be logical to project, will be based on both the Creveld and Clausewitzian types--types of war radically different from each other. The oxymoron of future war will be a nightmare for American strategists and force planners.

⁷⁵The phrase "dregs of humanity," applied to Serb mercenaries in Zaire, is taken from Phil Gourevitch, "Kabila's March," The New Yorker, 19 May 1997, 8. See also Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," The New York Times, 1 May 1996, A:8; Cindy Elmore, "Ethnic Hatred Runs Deep in Battered Town of Brcko [sic]," European Stars & Stripes, 1; Jonathan C. Randal, "Serb Troops Paid to Go to War--in Zaire," The Washington Post, 18 March 1997, A:13; Howard W. French, "In Zaire's Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for Combat," The New York Times, 12 February 1997, A:1. Whereas Khomeini may have been the model chaotic leader for the latter part of the twentieth century, Zaire may have been the model chaotic state. Zaire, a "client" state of the U.S. during the Cold War and soon dismissed in the Cold War's aftermath, subsequently, and for bizarre reasons of logic, became a client state of France until its final demise in May 1997. The leader of Zaire, Joseph Mobutu, ruled over a vast chaotic network of chaos, corruption, greed, and influence from 1965-1997; he changed both the name of his country (formerly known as the Belgian Congo) and his own name when he assumed power. His new name, Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, literally meant: "The All-Powerful Warrior, who, by his endurance and will to win, goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake." Both the U.S. and France held no illusions about Mobutu. Yet, preferring a state held together by chaos, they allowed brutal abuse and oppression against the people of Zaire and ethnic refugees from Rwanda--the ultimate victims. As Gourevitch rightly notes, "liberation" in Africa once meant

freedom from European empires; in the twenty-first century, "liberation" will mean escaping the client dictatorships that thrived during Cold War neocolonialism. How chaotic states will fare, absent significant external support, leaves a rather large question mark. Zaire was doomed from the beginning, just as its stepchild, the Democratic Republic of Congo, may well be.

⁷⁶Facts on File World News Digest, 20 April 1995, 278: E3. Further evidence (Silber and Little, 290) indicates that Bosnian Serb journalist Risto Djogo had collected documents implicating the Milošević regime's active cooperation with Bosnian Serb leadership in all aspects of the Bosnian war's prosecution. In 1994, following Belgrade's imposition of a blockade against Bosnian Serbs, Djogo was murdered by members of Arkan's paramilitary in Zvornik while attending a concert of Ceca, the Serbian "turbo-folk" star. Ceca, once known as Svetlana Veličković, married Arkan in 1995.

⁷⁷Job, 55.

⁷⁸Silber and Little, 101.

⁷⁹Timothy Garton Ash, "In the Serbian Soup," The New York Review of Books, Volume XLIV, Number 7, 24 April 1997, 29.

⁸⁰One could argue, and many multi-culturalists of the future likely will argue, that such brutality reflects only an Anglo-American strategic culture. My thanks to Professor Andrew Ross of the Naval War College for pointing out this incongruity.

⁸¹Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger, 1964).

⁸²From "Light of Mostar" by Ivo Andrić (1961 Nobel Laureate in Literature), a fragment provided by colleagues in the Balkans, translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Christina Pribičević Zorić. Mostar, once the ultimate symbol of ethnic integration and inter-communal harmony, now represents the ultimate symbol for the death of Yugoslavia. (The Serbo-Croatian word for bridge is most; thus, the keepers of the bridge were known as mostari.) As Silber and Little note (291), it was a community in which Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim peoples lived distinctively, but together, and in mutual tolerance. Mostar today is divided by its famous bridge into western (Croatian, dominated by organized crime elements) and eastern (Muslim) sectors. The Neretva river, which marks the edge of western Herzegovina, runs between the divided communities. (Herzegovina Croats consider Mostar their "capital.") Mostar's bridge, which once served as a link between cultures, was bombed in the last Balkan war--on 9 November 1993, four years to the day after the tearing down of the Berlin Wall.

⁸³Silber and Little, 29.

⁸⁴Marten van Heuven, "Understanding the Balkan Breakup," Foreign Policy, Summer 1996, 175-188.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 177-178.

⁸⁶David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996). I have elsewhere recommended the Woodward and Silber/Little works.

⁸⁷Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1995): 3-7.

⁸⁸Silber and Little, 131.

⁸⁹Milošević's father was a native Montenegrin who studied to be an Orthodox priest in the Faculty of Theology at Belgrade University. He returned to Montenegro as a school teacher and left his wife and two children in Požarevac, Serbia. Milošević's mother, Stanislava, tried to shield her husband's suicide from her children while simultaneously instilling Communist ideology in them. Stanislava would commit suicide a decade after her husband. Slavoljub Djukić, Između slave i anateme: politička biografija Slobodna Miloševića (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1994), 13-17.

⁹⁰Silber and Little, 140-146.

⁹¹Nordland and Brand, 44.

⁹²Duško Doder, "Bosnia's False Peace," The Washington Post, 16 March 1997, C:7.

⁹³See, for example, Cindy Elmore, "Serbians Ordered to Return Tank," European Stars & Stripes, 14 February 1997, 4; Cindy Elmore, "Blast Hits Three Muslim Homes in Tense Gajevi," European Stars & Stripes, 9 February 1997, 1; Tracy Wilkinson, "Bosnian City of Brcko [sic]: Bridge to Stability or Barrier to Peace?" The Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition), 30 April 1996, 3; Jonathan C. Randal, "In Serb City [Banja Luka], Anxiety for the Future," The Washington Post, 10 March 1997, 13; Bradley Graham, "Bosnian City's [Brčko's] Future Opens Old Wounds," The Washington Post, 3 February 1997, 11; Bradley Graham, "U.S. Tries to Build Togetherness in Bosnia," The Washington Post, 5 February 1997, 22; AP article, "Bosnian Muslims Angry at U.S. in City [Brčko] Deal," The Baltimore Sun, 14 February 1997, 1/12; Jonathan C. Randal, "Last Serb Outpost [Vukovar] in Croatia is Skeptical Reintegration Will Succeed," The Washington Post, 11 February 1997, 17.

⁹⁴Alex Rondos, "The Collapsing State and International Security," Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, James Nolan editor (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute), 481.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 496.

⁹⁶"Letters to the Editor: Richard Holbrooke on Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997): 170-172. Holbrooke in 1995 was Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs. Admiral Smith was Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, as well as NATO Strike Force South commander and responsible for all NATO operations regarding Yugoslavia.

⁹⁷The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 70.

⁹⁸Henry Kissinger, "Towards a Moment of Truth in Bosnia," The Washington Post, 11 June 1995, op-ed. Dr. Kissinger, of course, fails to acknowledge that he was a key architect in the failure of such differentiation. Kissinger distanced himself from mentor Hans Morgenthau by insisting that American prestige--much like NATO's future viability as justification for Bosnian intervention--was at stake in Southeast Asia. Thus, American prestige was an American vital interest. Morgenthau, rightfully so, considered such a construct absurd.

⁹⁹Robert S. McNamara, with Brian Van DeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books).

¹⁰⁰Rubinstein, 278-286.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 277-278.

¹⁰²China is not a member of this exclusive club, which is why the "international community" gets so nervous about China. See, for example, the recent Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997): 17-44, "The China Threat: A Debate."

¹⁰³John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Winter 1994-1995, 5-49. An effective counter to Mearsheimer's piece is Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Summer 1995, 71-81.

¹⁰⁴Rubinstein, 288. "Holocaust" is from the Greek, ολοκαύτωμα, meaning, literally, "all burnt," from the Ancient Greek for "burnt-offering" made in sacrifice. D. N. Stavropoulos, Oxford Greek-English Learner's Dictionary (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 621.

¹⁰⁵George Kenney, "The Bosnia Calculation," The New York Times Magazine, 23 April 1995, 42-43.

¹⁰⁶Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1994): 110.

¹⁰⁷Extracted from remarks made by Professor William J. Duicker, Pennsylvania State University, at the Naval War College, January 1996.

¹⁰⁸As Rubinstein notes in his essay "The New Moralists on a Road to Hell" (his fn. 15), Cohen's remarks are a "telling counter" to Luttwak's "Post-Heroic Warfare" (reference fn. 17 in this chapter).

¹⁰⁹Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

¹¹⁰Reuters Report, "Belgrade Panel Removes Last Obstacle to Opposition's Taking Control of City," The Baltimore Sun, 14 February 1997, 1/15

¹¹¹See, for example, the Reuters Report, "Belgrade Protests Continue; Coalition May Call Them Off," The Washington Post, 7 February 1997, 32; Chris Hedges, "Milosevic [sic] Foes Discover a Serbian City Hall [in Kragujevac, Serbia] Is Hardly a Stronghold," The New York Times, A:13.

¹¹²Information provided to me by a leading politician on the condition of anonymity.

¹¹³Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution," Parameters, Summer 1995, 13.


¹¹⁴John Lukacs, "The End of the Twentieth Century," Harper's, January 1993, 39-58. Reprinted in Harper's Folio 1995, 89.

¹¹⁵Quoted in Silber and Little, 25.

THE WAR IN RELIGION? CULTURAL FAULT LINES IN THE BALKAN ENIGMA

The attention given Samuel P. Huntington's proposed post-Cold War "Clash of Civilizations" paradigm tends to overlook how, during the five decades of the Cold War, cultural tensions and contradictions between Balkan peoples existed as parallel archetypes in the clash of identities. As such, focused post-Cold War concentration solely on cultural differences as fault line dynamic for future conflict may prove little more than the self-fulfillment of pessimistic prophecies. Yugoslavia, as the most pertinent and violent example of a state's disintegration in the wake of the Cold War, died a gradual, methodical, and ineluctable death. Religion, as a component of culture, provided an occasion, but was not the cause for the death of Yugoslavia. The train wreck was announced long before impact, yet no one and certainly no extra-Balkan state acted in advance to avert catastrophe.

Listen, then, to what you do not know. The three rivers of the ancient world of the dead --the Acheron, the Phlegethon, and the Cocytus--today belong to the underworlds of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity; their flow divides the three hells--Gehenna, Hades, and the icy hell of the Mohammedans--beneath the one-time Khazar lands. And there, at the junction of these three borders, are confronted the three worlds of the dead: Satan's fiery state, with the nine circles of the Christian Hades, with Lucifer's throne...the Moslem underworld...kingdom of icy torment; and Geburah's territory, to the left of the Temple, where the Hebrew gods of evil, greed, and hunger sit in Gehenna....In the Jewish hell, in the state of Belial, the angel of darkness and sin, it is not Jews who burn, as you think. Those like yourself, all Arabs or Christians, burn there. Similarly, there are no Christians in the Christian hell--those who reach the fires are Mohammedans or of David's faith, whereas in Iblis' Moslem torture chamber they are all Christians and Jews, not a single Turk or Arab.'

In 1995 a series of video tapes were submitted as evidence to the International Tribunal on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, the Hague, which included interviews and "battle" footage from a number of Serbian paramilitary organizations operating in the ethnically Serb-dominated Krajina region of Croatia or in support of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most prominent among these paramilitary groups were "The Tigers" of Željko Ražnatović--more popularly known as Arkan--whose militia began the "ethnic cleansing" of the Bijeljina region of Eastern Slavonija in 1992.² Although the Tribunal did not indict Arkan or his Tigers as a result of these tapes, some noteworthy symbolism appeared in the footage. The expected symbols of Serbian unity (which came to be a marker of death in Bosnia), of course, appear in the opening credits:  the four Cyrillic S's, the abbreviation for the Serbian slogan "Only Unity Saves the Serbs."³ Of at least equal significance, however, was that the opening sequences of these videos, inflamed with Serbian nationalism as almost all "cultural" information warfare was in the final years of Yugoslavia's violent dismemberment, took place not on a battlefield but in a Serbian Orthodox church.

The video opens with a voice-over in the reverent intonations of a Serbian renaissance hymn during a ritual ceremony in which a Serbian priest blesses all of Arkan's Tigers. Thus, this image acts as potent symbol for Serbs as holy warriors, an icon that references Serbian resistance to centuries of Ottoman occupation, a resistance that had returned in a new age in which Serbs had turned on their fellow South ("Yugo") Slavs in permanently destroying the Yugoslav ideal and the Yugoslav nation-state.

Against this intimate linking of Serbian violence performed in the name of orthodoxy, stands an equally powerful series of Catholic images. A decade ago, while I was studying Serbo-Croatian at the East European Language Institute in Pittsburgh as a Fulbright fellow, I learned of a Croatian Catholic Church named St. Mary's, rumored to hold a unique series of frescoes and murals.⁴ I telephoned the pastor, introduced myself, and before adding anything further, received his immediate response: "You want to see the pictures, don't you?" And, indeed I did. Arriving at the church several hours later, I entered a magnificent domed cathedral, one that more closely resembled an Orthodox basilica than a more traditional "Western" church. St. Mary's is listed on the National Register of Historic Places, and deserves that recognition, although some of the images contained within its walls are not by any means aesthetically pleasing.

On the far wall of the church there is a massive mosaic of Mary, Queen of Peace, cradling the Christ child--work of both skillful precision and serene grace. But in the entranceway and along the outer walls that line the pews there exist a series of images no less powerful and far more disturbing: one mural depicts scenes from the Austro-Hungarian front of World War I. Amidst the trenches of mass slaughter and gas warfare, Christ hangs crucified; beneath, dressed in a World War I uniform and resembling nothing so much as a U.S. doughboy of the period, a Serb infantryman (as ersatz Roman legionnaire of the New Testament) taunts Christ on the cross, probing his wounds with the tip of a bayonet affixed to a rifle. In the far distance, Serb soldiers swarm down from the hills, and, in the foreground, inexplicably, the Virgin Mary, wearing a gas mask, is framed in an extraordinary Pietà: she holds the crucified Christ in her arms, as an unseen Serb, stands looming behind with a raised axe ready to execute her.

Against the clear enmity between Serb and Croatian, a kind of East-West tension marked by religious difference I did not forget when I subsequently left Pittsburgh to live in Yugoslavia, there exists a third religious element. In 1970, in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, a devout Muslim was imprisoned by the Communist

regime for his Islamic activism and, partly, for his book, The Islamic Declaration: A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, which argued for "the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems. There can neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions."⁵ Izetbegović advocated that an Islamic movement within a state should consolidate power and create a purely Islamic republic when the opportunity becomes present; almost a decade later, he expressed praise for Ayatollah Khomeini when such opportunities presented themselves during the overthrow of the Shah by revolution and in the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In his own words, Izetbegović argued that education, media, government authority--in effect, an Islamicized version of the Yugoslav Communist model of "Social Management"--"should be in the hands of people whose Islamic moral and intellectual authority is indisputable."⁶ Following the 1990 elections (which Bosnian Serbs boycotted), Izetbegović, as leader of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), became the first president of the independent and internationally recognized nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina a year later; in 1996, he received a majority of votes and became the first to preside over a three-man presidency of the joint Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska within the parastate today known as Bosnia. This nation receives training and military supplies from the United States, and although Secretary of Defense William Cohen has publicly declared that Stabilization Forces (SFOR) will withdraw by 1998, President Clinton equally has expressed concern about Bosnia's "stability," stating obliquely that "things we knew from the beginning would be difficult have been difficult."⁷ Although Izetbegović has promoted a multi-ethnic state in public declarations, any variety of sources will confirm that positions of authority within the Bosnian armed forces are almost exclusively Muslim today, as indeed similar positions within the nominally "Yugoslav" army (Vojska Jugoslovenska) are almost exclusively Serb.⁸ The United States, as NATO partner, is a security guarantor under the Dayton Peace Agreement. To date, Izetbegović has never publicly repudiated his Islamic Declaration.

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Yugoslavia as a nation of roughly twenty-three million in its final days directly affected the course of European and world history in the twentieth century with its agonizing process of self-destruction.⁹ Even now, in Yugoslavia's wake, elements that comprise the "Balkan Enigma"--of which the South Slavs will remain at the core of the oxymoron--will continue to influence and shape the direction, purpose, and effectiveness for European security in this next century and next millennium. Any correct analysis of this enigma cannot divorce the significance of religion from the culture in which it lives, just as culture cannot be divorced from politics. As one seasoned observer has correctly noted, "Without an understanding of the culture and religion one can never understand the politics."¹⁰ The limits of theory are bounded by the real, yet the real practice of making effective policy decisions and reaching strategic goals should rely on theoretical framework in the face of contrary choices. Religion, as a cultural component in the forces that help dismember the Yugoslav "Experiment" (as it was known in the Cold War years with an odd fondness), was a factor that helps deconstruct Yugoslavia. It is not the only factor.

Yet clearly, cultural contradiction stemming from religious orientation, and the conflicts that arise when religious entities marked by cultural difference live in close proximity to each other, potentially portend a bleak future for Balkan and European security. Deep cultural rifts, marred by history and violence and never reconciled on terms with which all sides can find peace, seem to mark the perfect illustration of the "dynamics" that create, in Samuel P. Huntington's terms, "fault line wars"--wars that are the inevitable consequence when cultures, if not civilizations, collide.¹¹ Indeed, Huntington defers to journalist Misha Glenny's cautionary note that the wars of the last days of Yugoslavia "increasingly assimilated the characteristics of religious struggle, defined by three great European faiths--Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, the confessional detritus of the empires whose frontiers collided in Bosnia."¹²

On the surface, of course, such an analysis seems perfectly reasonable, just as Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" paradigm--which claims that in the post-Cold War the "fundamental source of conflict...will be cultural"--seems largely true in application, even as its implications appear inherently racist.¹³ Such an assertion, of religious and cultural "holy war," fails, nonetheless, by numerous exceptions to the paradigm. As such, the arguments against Huntington have been often used to justify circumstances when conflict either does not occur or provide examples when cultures within civilizations have been able to solve differences other than through violent means to reconcilable ends.

Huntington's paradigm, I would argue, is sufficient only to provide one explanation for conflict and thus remains far from being the paradigm of exegesis for all post-Cold War realities in the manner perhaps that George Kennan's essay "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" provided a justification for the policy of containment during nearly five decades of Communist versus the "West" in ideological clashes.¹⁴ On solely cultural terms, Yugoslavia, as the most pertinent and violent example of a state's disintegration in the wake of the Cold War, died a gradual, methodical, and ineluctable death.

Yugoslavia--if I might be permitted to still use the phrase--represented an extraordinary tapestry of national differences among nationalities. Among the South Slavs themselves, those who trace their origins to the mythic "Wandering of the Peoples" in the Dark Ages and who came to settle in the region, there emerged cultural differences so acute that it seems, in retrospect, only acts of violence against each other could be the natural result. Nowhere is that difference more culturally marked than in religion.¹⁵ Religion, as a component of culture, provided an occasion but was not the cause for the death of Yugoslavia. A brief examination of religious elements within the former Yugoslavia that still exist today would prove helpful to correct analysis, one that considers politics, culture, and religion as inextricably linked.

CATHOLICISM

I know of Saint George's church.
We shall break the door of the Holy Church.
We shall burn fire in it,
So that God will send us luck.¹⁶

CROATIAN EPIC OF THE USKOKS
OF SENJ, 16th Century

The above epigraph is but one historical reference to illustrate how too much attention to religious difference alone in the Balkans fails to distinguish the often misunderstood "practicality of the usually practical South Slavs."¹⁷ In this particular example, a war party of Uskoks, faced with freezing to death from exposure to a winter storm or breaking into a Catholic church and essentially defiling it, choose the practical solution. Their faith in their Church, associated with a national spirit, and their own sense of reverence, even as they sin, do not prevent them from taking action. Yet in more recent times, the manipulation of Catholicism and its identity with variously a Yugoslav identity or Croatian nationalism has been the rule of practice. In 1991, in the last days of the Yugoslav republics, sociological studies suggest there were approximately 3 million practicing Catholics, 1.5 million practicing Muslims, and 1.2 million practicing Serbian Orthodox (in contrast to various religious officials in the country who claimed 7.3 million Catholics, 3.8 million Muslims, and 10 million Orthodox.)¹⁸ Marshal Tito recognized these figures as representing significant forces within Yugoslavia; under his regime and in the decade following his death, various experiments were made to manipulate religion as a cultural component of revolutionary identity, as part of a central national identity, or a target of control within the various stages of federalist experiment. Finally, in the last years of the Socialist Federal Republics of Yugoslavia, and within the confederalist idea that spelled doom for the nation itself, the state itself was undone partially by religious identities that aligned with nationalist claims--Catholicism within Slovenia and Croatia; Orthodoxy within Serbia and throughout Macedonia; Islam within Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western Macedonia, and the Kosovo province of Serbia.

Various attempts by the Yugoslav Communist governments to build a coherent socialist structure recognized that seemingly irreconcilable cultural differences could not be erased sim-

ply by the stroke of a revolutionary pen (on, in some cases, the sword as well). In a similar vein of manipulation, one fueled by nationalism, newly elected Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in 1990 quickly identified the Catholic Church as both a force that had resisted Communist oppression and had nurtured Croatian national consciousness.¹⁹

Yet the cultural tensions that existed for Catholicism in the former Yugoslavia, and the wounds they opened, can be generally be attributed to two figures and one event: Bishop Juri Josaj Strossmayer (1815-1905), who predated the ideal type of Yugoslavia by promoting the cultural unity of the South Slavs--the Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and "Bulgarians"--(all of whom Strossmayer referred to as "Illyrians"); the controversial Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (1898-1960), symbol of Croatian nationalism and spirited defiance; and finally, the significance of the Vatican II Council (1962-1965), in which the "Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in [other religions]...and urges her sons to enter with prudence and charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions."²⁰

At first glance, it would appear that the Vatican would have held Bishop Strossmayer in highest regard for his progressive social programs, his charitable acts, and his refusal to take "any hand in the movement to persecute the Orthodox Church which set the Croat against the Serb."²¹ In reality, it was Cardinal Stepinac, who came to be seen as a guardian of the "Church of the poor" of Vatican II.²² Pope John Paul II, whose own cultural heritage springs from Poland in the years before World War II (where he was known prior to his ordination as a priest as Karol Wojtyla) and in the Cold War itself, was all too well aware of the oppressions in Central and Eastern Europe that characterized the twentieth century's last half. As such, Cardinal Stepinac, for Pope John Paul, came to symbolize the essential responsibility of the religious leader to resist communist oppression.

Further, Stepinac was imprisoned by the Tito regime for his essential refusal to break ties with Rome after World War II. If he had "modified" his position on breaking from Rome and advocated the creation of "a Croatian Church, separate from Rome," in the words of once prominent Tito establishment politician (and eventual imprisoned dissident himself) Milovan

Djilas, he would have been "raised to the clouds!"²³ Stepinac refused such compromise and became a political martyr. His noble act, nonetheless, tends to obscure his own involvement and at least partial support in World War II for the quisling Croatian regime of Ustasha (literally, "Insurrectionist") leader Ante Pavelić. Pavelić was a devout Catholic and a demon at the same time. Indeed, some might best remember him for his regular "tribute" made to Nazi leaders in St. Mark's square during the years of occupation: a basketful of human eyes taken from Usatha death camps.

Alojzije Stepinac, as both symbol and human, represented (and represents) for Serbs and other former Yugoslavs Nazi collaboration flagged under a Croatian mantle of support for the brutal Ustasha fascist regime, which murdered 700,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies at the Jesenovac concentration cam in World War II.²⁴ For Croatians and other former Yugoslavs, Stepinac is a hero, the symbol of resistance both to Nazi oppression and Ustasha brutality. He is no less controversial a figure today, regarded--depending on your cultural point of view--as either a "beloved saint" or "a murderer." In what may be an apocryphal description, a former representative of the Belgrade Communist regime claimed that in World War II priests under Stepinac's direction "officiated at mass conversions of Orthodox Serbs minutes before their execution by Croatian Ustasha, just so they could go to heaven."²⁵

Thus, Stepinac's ghost serves as a fundamental symbol of the cultural tensions that drove Serbia and Croatia into conflict, what would appear now to have been an inevitable struggle in which, as Robert Kaplan, frames it, "the battle between Communism and capitalism [was] merely one dimension of a struggle that pits Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Rome against Constantinople, the legacy of the Habsburg Austria-Hungary against that of Ottoman Turkey--in other words, West against East, the ultimate cultural conflict."²⁶ As a consequence of that same cultural tension, then, the Pope emphasized Stepinac's eventual noble resistance to an oppressive regime and overlooked the human frailties that confront anyone who lives and has influence during times of immense historical significance. This oversight also forced the Vatican, for some, to become immersed at the very heart "of a Croatian nationalism that saw

itself as culturally superior to Serbs--the very nationalist tradition that had inspired Stepinac's original desire to see the Serbs converted to Catholicism...."²⁷

For some then, the Vatican's "complicity" has been active in the clash between cultures: "the Vatican became a partisan in the conflict [declaring] Croatia a 'a rampart of [Western] Christianity.'"²⁸ In practice, the Vatican diplomatically recognized Slovenia and Croatia before the European Union, thus hardening the perception that religious identity was a crucial marker for cultural distinction.²⁹

In retrospect, one could say that the Pope acted exclusively in the interest of his religious flock rather than to simply to defend Croatian or Slovenian nationalism. At the same time, he is not singularly guilty of defending Croatia and accusing Serbia. (The "West" itself tended to often betray its own cultural myopia on frequent occasions, most often in condemning Serbian human rights violations and ignoring similar Croatian violations. As one example, the revamped Croatian army's attack on the Serbs of Krajina in 1995, Serbs who had lived in the region for centuries, received an essentially silent response from the "West."³⁰) By taking such a defense, however, the Pope helped place an imprimatur on the perception that many Croats themselves believed: Croatia "as the gallant frontier guardians of the West against Orthodoxy and Islam."³¹ For some--most especially Orthodox Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies--then, the Pope's refusal to set foot in Yugoslavia until he could pray at the tomb of Stepinac in Zagreb Cathedral, displayed a myopic stance of anti-Communism while ignoring the Church's "wider historical role and attitudes in this part of the world."³²

The Pope did not to come to Yugoslavia until 1994--by then coming to a place that no longer existed--and seemed to be reacting more to Tito and Communism (which had made Stepinac a symbolic martyr in the struggle between communism and religion in the post-World War II Yugoslav state) and less to post-Cold War realities. His visit had taken 20 years of Vatican efforts to secure permission for. Yet when he did arrive on 10 September 1994, the Pope appeared to have been well aware of the symbolism of his presence and the dangers of too close an affiliation with Croatian nationalism. Speaking the next day in fluent Croatian

before a crowd of one million people in Zagreb, the Pope warned of "the risk of idolizing a nation, a race, [or] a party and justifying in their name hatred, discrimination, and violence."³³

Thus, his visit represented in one sense the triumph of faith in the Cold War's aftermath in a region torn by nationalism and self-inflicted violence; in the Pope's own words, he sent "a kiss of peace" to the Serbian Orthodox leadership and urged Croatian Catholics to become "apostles of a new concord between peoples."³⁴ Yet, in another sense, his Zagreb pronouncements produced shock waves when he openly praised the late Croatian Cardinal Stepinac.

It should come as no surprise then two destinations on his itinerary would soon become lost opportunities: Pope John Paul's planned "pilgrimage for peace" to former Yugoslavia, included both a visit to war-torn Sarajevo and reconciliation with Serbian Patriarch Pavle.³⁵ The patriarch, nonetheless, refused the Pope's offer of peace, terming his visit "inopportune"; Bosnian Serbs soon after refused to guarantee the pope's security and even made "vague threats, implying that they were prepared to blame the Muslims for any mishaps."³⁶ Although both Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman enthusiastically supported the pope's visit, the United Nations succeeded in dissuading a papal visit to Sarajevo on the grounds that security guarantees were impossible, and bowing to the inevitable, Pope John Paul canceled his Bosnian "pilgrimage." Pope John Paul, whose papacy has marked the "coming of the world church," would not visit Sarajevo until April 1997, and then at the invitation of the three member joint Bosnian presidency--a Croatian, a Muslim, and a Serb--and under more secure circumstances though still in a landscape lacking clear resolution.³⁷ By then, his visit had lost the interest of media and he became less a target and more a self-proclaimed "messenger of peace."³⁸

Thus, the tensions and the symbolism that existed in Yugoslavia, and Catholicism's place within the current of those tensions, still exist today. (Such tensions can manifest themselves in strange ways: in Medjugorje, Herzegovina, the Virgin Mary is reported to have appeared on a regular basis since 24 June 1981 to six Catholic youths; during the war in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, witnesses "claim that Serbian missiles fired at Medjugorje simply disappear into thin air, leaving the village...uniquely unharmed."³⁹) Cardinal Stepinac may well represent the most appropriate symbol of Balkan fault lines, fault lines that have existed for centuries, and will exist for centuries to come, among the people of the South Slavs. The true genius of unity and advocate for religious tolerance and spiritual unity long before the Vatican II Council, Bishop Strossmayer, is largely forgotten. The tensions created between Tito's Yugoslavia and the Vatican's concern for the care of its Catholic flock seem to have assured his erasure from history. Strossmayer's monument, sculpted by the famed Ivan Mestrovic stands in a small park behind the Art Pavilion in Zagreb; by contrast, within the walls of Zagreb's cathedral stands another Mestrovic monument, the tomb of Alojzije Stepinac.

On the back wall of the cathedral, however, there stands an impressive memorial, one that many have chosen to ignore, or simply have not been able to recognize: The Ten Commandments, written in stone nearly twenty meters high, and in the Glagolitic alphabet of Saints Cyril and Methodius, a reminder that the same language (Old Church Slavonic) and the same alphabet were once the same liturgical language for both Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches in the Balkans.

ISLAM

Land of Albania! let me bend mine eyes
On thee, thou rugged nurse of savage men!
The cross descends, thy minarets arise,
And the pale crescent sparkles in the glen...
LORD BYRON, Childe Harold's Pilgrimage⁴⁰

The mythical Byron, who came to champion the cause of Greek independence and died in 1824 after serving only three months as Commander-in-Chief of (the perpetually squabbling) Greek forces who sought to throw off their Ottoman rulers, seems an appropriate figure for the West's romantic notion of Islam as mysterious, barbaric, and "foreign" culture--even within the Balkans. Byron (whose heart--not his body--is buried outside the small, coastal village of Messolónghi) represented a figurehead in how, in struggling for Greek independence, the

"West" came to champion both freedom and cultural values in casting off the dark forces of the "East."

Odd as these romantic notions seem today, they still cast a cultural view for how Europe views its own boundaries and its own cultural identities. Recently, a senior member of the Greek military stated bluntly: "The only reason you Americans were involved in Bosnia is because of Saudi Arabia."⁴¹ Indeed, Professor Huntington's "cultural" paradigm reveals a perception of Islam, and Islam in the Balkans, that is particularly troubling: "Europeans...expressed concern that the establishment of a Muslim state in the former Yugoslavia would create a base for the spread of Muslim immigrants and Islamic fundamentalism, reinforcing what [French President] Jacques Chirac referred to as "les odeurs d'Islam" in Europe."⁴²

Here, of course, is where Huntington, in presenting the core tenets of his cultural paradigm, proves most irritating: he draws on gross (and common) "Western" perceptions perceived as fundamental truths.⁴³ Nowhere are such gross misperceptions so consistently applied than with to regard to Islam in the Balkan conflict. Further, it proved to be the United States, not Europe, who acted more out of principle than in "the vital interest" of preserving the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) as a viable entity, to aid Bosnians--that is, largely Bosnian Muslims--who portrayed themselves, and often were, the victims of genocide and Serbian aggression.⁴⁴ Thus, a paradoxical development may have occurred: the United States acted on "the [European] source--the unique source" (in the words of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.) of the ideas of "individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom."⁴⁵

Beyond such myopic European perspective, the thoughts of two observers who lived with the culture of Islam within their borders (rather than those who have viewed Islam, from a intolerant perspective, as "encroaching" upon their borders) prove useful in addressing the place of Islam as a cultural fault. The first thought comes from a Greek, Theodoros Couloumbis, Director of the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy and a

member of the American University faculty: "Our real problems will never be solved if we continue to frame our relationships in a Byzantine versus Ottoman struggle, rather than a relationship between the modern Greek state and the modern Turkish one."⁴⁶ The place of Islam will hold a central cultural reference point within the center of any evolving relationship; as such, the "ideal" of evolving state-to-state relationships must recognize and base relationships on the recognition of difference as much as similarity. (By contrast, many within Europe, and within NATO for that matter, many will, based on myopic perspective, view both Greece and Turkey as troublemakers, and their long-term Aegean dispute as troublesome for the alliance; indeed, according to Huntington, Greece and Turkey will see their "ties to their NATO [and European] states [as] likely to attenuate."⁴⁷

The second observation is by Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov (and former key figure within the Russian intelligence apparatus): "In regards to fundamental [emphasis added] Islam, one must not confuse it with Islamic extremism. Extremism is those forms through which are exposed this or that social group or this or that movement, which attempts to export and impose the Islamic form of life, the Islamic model, sometimes with the use of armed force."⁴⁸

In the Balkan example, the non-Muslim perception persistently remains that Islamic "fundamentalism" and "extremism" are synonymous. Radovan Karadžić, ersatz leader of the Republika Srpska, spoke with passionate belief "about having a mission to eradicate the last traces of the Ottoman Turkish empire in Europe."⁴⁹ Within U.S. domestic policy circles, the issue came to the forefront in 1995 when Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith and then National Security Adviser Anthony Lake provided a means (by simply stating the United States had "no position" on the issue) for Iran to ship arms to Bosnia via a Croatian transport conduit. Iran, a target (along with Iraq) under the U.S. National Security Strategy of a "policy of dual containment" is regularly associated with being an "extremist" state by American, though not necessarily West European, standards.

By implication, then, Bosnia-Herzegovina aided and abetted by Iran, was on its way-- through arms supplies and Muslim "freedom fighters" in the military "advisers" from Iran, Afghanistan Mujahadeen, liberal funding from Saudi Arabia, moral support from Turkey--to establishing an fundamentalist Islamic regime (with extremist elements). Huntington, argues that Bosnia employed a strategy that "convincingly portray[ed] itself as the victim of genocide" while receiving "significant assistance from civilizational kin," those Muslim brethren with whom Bosnia shares cultural religious ties.⁵⁰

Yet the strength of Huntington's argument becomes rapidly blurry with the insertion of the intentionally explosive adjective "extremist" in describing the government of Alija Izetbegovic as making extreme efforts, going beyond the more multiculturally oriented faction of Haris Silajđić in efforts to establish a fundamental Muslim government, even ignoring the essential truth that a fundamentalist Islamic regime, while not a theocracy per se, is one in which the religious and political cultural link are, in the ideal type, synonymous.⁵¹ This is not true of "Western" states, where the role of the church is separate and distinct from the role of secular government. Huntington knows this, of course, but ignores it because it is contrary to his civilizational paradigm. Instead, he suggests that Izetbegovic may not have fully secured his policy/religious goals in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accords: "The victory of the extremists [emphasis mine] is not necessarily permanent."⁵²

By contrast, the reasoned argument of a European, Igor' Sevostinav, deputy director for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia, a nation that has lived with Islam within its borders for centuries (not always peacefully, as Chechnya is but one recent example), takes a significantly contrasting view: "One must not reduce the diverse ranges of expression of the Islamic factor down to extremism, [or] limit the strategies of approaching the Moslem world to the opposition of extremism....[In] Russia, more than anywhere else, there [exists] the synthesis of various civilizations, uniting in one community the East and the West. The role of 'defender of the West against the Islamic East' for us is organically impossible."⁵³ (Indeed, even within the nodes of extremism, there are degrees of difference. It may come as some

surprise for many to learn that within the "extremist" Islamic Republic of Iran, "the imams [literally, 'Islamic teachers'] have derided the ruling Taliban [literally, 'religious student'] of Afghanistan's militia regime [for its] rigid belief."⁵⁴)

Thus, the fundamental difference between extremes in Islam (with puns definitely intended) may simply lump together in the Western weltanschauung of Islam as a cultural component of religion, particularly one regarded as non-Western, into a category exempt from the process of inculturation within Western civilization(s). Such perception, as Huntington rightly notes, disregards the truth that Westernization is not a process of universal appeal. Consider the examples of language, religion, and Western values:

In 1958, roughly 9.8 percent of human beings spoke English; in 1992, 7.6 percent did. A language foreign to 92 percent of the world's population is not a world language....[Regarding religion] at some point in the next decade or so the number of Muslims [the fastest growing religion even in the United States] will exceed the number of Christians....The West--and especially the United States, which has always been a missionary nation--believes that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions....What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest....Imperialism is the necessary, logical consequence of universalism, yet few proponents of universalism support the militarization and brutal coercion that would be necessary to achieve their goal. Furthermore...the West no longer has...the dynamism to impose its will on other societies....Westerners will come to appreciate the connection between universalism and imperialism and to see the virtues of a pluralistic world.⁵⁵

While Huntington may not have sounded the call for a new crusade against contrary cultures, he seems to advocate the alignment of similarities into blocs that are linked by cultural identities (often in which religion is a crucial cultural component). Under such a rubric, neither globalism nor isolationism, multilateralism nor unilateralism will best serve American interests in working with its "European" partners.⁵⁶ Cultural diversity within Europe, such as Izetbegovic's desire to create a fundamentalist Islamic state within Bosnia, creates problems; in extremis, such diversity shocks conflict out of latent dormancy. Such cultural alignment equally rejects the notion that Bosnia, within the Balkans, is even part of Europe--an approach

Europe itself has done its best to practice over centuries of neglect, often with disastrous results.

With regard to Islam itself within the culture of Europe, we may record with horror (or should) Dame Rebecca West's assertion that "[the Slavs] knew that Christianity was better for man than Islam, because it denounced the prime human fault, cruelty, which the military mind of Mohammed had not even identified."⁵⁷ Such broad generalization, of course, finds numerous exceptions in the practice and fallibility of both ancient and modern Christian cultures. It also points to the essential paradox that retired Foreign Service Officer Michael Menard pointed to, with some emotion, in Foreign Policy:

The U.S. Department of State [has] been unable to accept the fact that neither the Serbs nor the Croats can possibly feel safe in a state with a 44 percent Muslim plurality that by the end of this century is likely to become an absolute majority....The strong evidence of fundamentalism among the Muslim leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been largely withheld from the American public. As a result, Izetbegović has been made to appear a martyr instead of someone who belongs in a courtroom dock with the rest of the war criminals...⁵⁸

Thus, the latent or suppressed fear of Islam as the cultural core of the nation-state--within Bosnia, within Europe--represents a threat, as it were, to the existing order. "Albanian Muslims and Bosnians Muslim are in this together," two "Yugoslav" journalist told Professor Sabrina Ramet in a Belgrade café in 1989. "They want to see a Khomeini in charge here....They will continue to advance until they have taken...all the great cities of Europe."⁵⁹ Such beliefs, prior to and in the wake of Yugoslav implosion, can betray curious forms: In September 1989, Psychiatrist Jovan Rašković told Intervju magazine that Muslims were fixated in the anal phase of their psychosocial development, with tendencies toward general aggressiveness, while Croats suffer from a castration complex.⁶⁰ Such beliefs mask (as do broad "Western" cultural characterizations) the positive cultural aspects that Islam brought to the Balkans, a rich literary and religious heritage, among other developments, unique to the region.⁶¹

Islamic communities, keenly aware of their perceptions held against them by other cultures within Yugoslavia, remained far more silent than either the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church within the former Yugoslavia. Thus, in some way perhaps, the more vocal and obvious advocacy of Islam--both in Bosnia and Albania--is the process of more liberal religious policy within states that maintain fragile political structure. The process of linking religious culture within political structure, or at least the attempt to establish the process, ought to be viewed as a natural force within Islam, much as (within the "West") economic, political, and social pluralism are prime movers.⁶²

Further, with all the debate over extremism and fundamentalism, little attention has been paid to the particular identity in the Balkans that Islamic practice within cultural context has taken on. Women, in particular have assumed an integral role with the religious communities that would seem unthinkable in other regions. As early as 1986, female imams were educated and delivering sermons within mosques, despite the objections of more (fundamentalist) male Muslims.⁶³ Indeed, the Islamic Central Board in Skopje (then part of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) viewed the issue of women within mosques as one of simple "equality."⁶⁴ Although Huntington might find such cultural identities jarring, he would assert that, with the outbreak of war, Islam within former Yugoslavia "identified...with its broader cultural community and defined itself in religious terms."⁶⁵ Thus, according to Huntington, Bosnian Muslims, perhaps the strongest supporters of multiculturalism prior to war's outbreak (if only because they suffered the greatest abuse under Tito's oppression), became ardent Islamic "hard-liners" in the face of cultural conflict. It remains unclear if, the wake of conflict and the aftermath that remains from cultural tensions, whether Muslims will increasingly isolate themselves along religious lines.

Against such assertions, of course, lie the exceptions that example proves. I recall with some amazement even now how, after years of living in pre-revolutionary Iran--where I soon learned that the mosque was both a scared place and a forbidden one, most especially during prayers--that my first visit inside a mosque was in former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In 1989 I was invited into mosque during prayer time--and my wife accompanied me. In the years since, as Yugoslavia violently deconstructed itself, my interest in Islam, despite some cautious consideration on the part of prudent believers, was met with open and frank generosity, wherever I visited in the former "state." The coming of war had aligned cultural identities, but not, I believe, permanently destroyed differences whereby communities could coëxist and grow.

ORTHODOXY

So tear down minarets and mosques
and kindle the Serbian Yule logs...
I swear to you by the creed of Miloš Obilić
and by the trusty weapons I carry,
our faiths will be submerged in blood.⁶⁶

PETAR II, PETROVIĆ-NJEGOS

Petar II, the Prince-Bishop (both religious and political Orthodox leader), is often misrepresented by history. Ruler of Montenegro from 1830-1851, Njegoš, as he is most commonly named, writes in his epic work, "The Mountain Wreath," of the mass genocide of Islamic converts as a justified action to sustain a battle against Ottoman military forces--who had occupied the Balkans since the fourteenth century.⁶⁷ What appears to be, and was, a brutal action taken by a people who believed they were struggling for their own survival.

Yet both myth and battlefield success tend to often obscure the frustrations Njegoš himself experienced with his brethren Slavs. Indeed, if it were not for "ethnic cleansing," there may have been little to nothing that would have united the Montenegrins against the Muslim Turks. (Sadly, this broad generalization has particular relevance in the most recent Balkan crisis.) In the Montenegrin example, as Duško Doder notes, there is "a thin line between freedom and anarchy, as there is between the heroic and the bizarre."⁶⁸ In practice, the Montenegrins united only when fighting Turks; otherwise, one's true allegiance was to clan and not to the prince-bishop. The appetite for violence was also appalling: the Turkish practice of impaling victims was returned in kind by Montenegrins who often competed for carrying home the heads of Turkish warriors to be displayed as trophies in villages and in the capital.⁶⁹

In theory and in legend, at least, such linking of religion and political authority seemed perfectly suitable for Montenegro, the only state in the Balkans to successfully fend off Ottoman advances and maintain centuries of fierce independence, in a place Tennyson named the "rough rock-throne of Freedom." Yet Njegoš came to experience a bitter frustration with his fellow Montenegrins, a frustration observers of the Balkan enigma tend to often ignore: "One may expect anything from such a people. Woe unto him who is their ruler. This is the saddest fate in the world...I curse the hour when this spark rose up from the ashes of Dušan's greatness and into these mountains of ours."⁷⁰

The lament of Njegoš can be taken as well as the general archetype for the Serbian Orthodox Church, which came to represent the cause of Serbian nationalism under Ottoman occupation. Much as the Catholic Church came to represent the rallying point for Croatian nationalism in World War II, under Marshal Tito's tight socialist control, and in the last Balkan war, so Serbian orthodoxy represented a spiritual, cultural force that could not be de-linked from the notion of a Serbian national identity over the past six centuries.⁷¹ This linkage has been both the saving grace and the damnation for the Serbian Orthodox Church, an institution that cannot separate its identity from the Serbian nation because it remains so closely aligned with Serbian cultural identity.

For "Western" nations that have forged a secular identity, the linking of state and religious culture may not be viewed as important a connection as it truly is in the Balkans. Policy analysts may tend too frequently to associate the Serbian Church with the "Chetnik" movement (the Serbian partisans, monarchists, and nationalist guerrillas of World War II--"eliminated" by Tito in the war's aftermath) while overlooking efforts by the church to act independently when the patriarch and his ecclesiastical synod believed such action necessary.

The church is a powerful force, yet its power and influence vary. Slobodan Milošević clearly manipulated the Serbian Church in 1989, insuring the patriarch was at his side during the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (where the Ottoman Empire crushed Serbia and destroyed its empire).⁷² In 1937, the Serbian Church effectively blocked approval

in the Yugoslav parliament of a Vatican Concordat that would have allowed Catholicism greater freedoms within Yugoslavia; this action only returned to haunt the Serbian people four years later in the wake of Nazi invasion and the establishment of death camps for orthodox Serbs, Jews, homosexuals, and gypsies, with the full coöperation of Croatian Ustasha.⁷³ As early as 1943, strained relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Communist regime in Yugoslavia led directly to the Macedonian Orthodox Church declaring itself autocephalous; to this date, the Serbian Church has refused to recognize the schismatic Macedonian Church (and indeed the hierarchs of the church--as do a number of Serbians--consider Macedonians to be nothing less than "south Serbs.") Yet in 1997, despite numerous favors and privileges granted by the regime of Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian Orthodox Church turned against the Milošević regime and declared that local elections of late 1996 had been "rigged," and proved instrumental in the eventual reversal of the voting results (initially declared "invalid" by the Belgrade government when opposition parties had won overwhelmingly large majorities). The reasons for this decision are simple: "The Serbian Church views itself as identical with the Serbian nation since it considers that religion is the foundation of nationality."⁷⁴ In the case of the voting "fraud" of 1996-1997, the Serbian Church believed itself to be defending the nation in turning against the state.

The links the Serbian Church bears with the Serbian nation then are unique, and their origins lie in a familiar tale, often told for explaining how Serbia takes its greatest pride in its defeat. Such an explanation--that Serbia takes its greatest pride in failure--is, of course, an incorrect leap of logic. Indeed, the myth of "defeat" at Kosovo has little importance or connection with fact. Even the "history" surrounding Serbia's defeat at Kosovo Polje in 1389 takes on mythical status. There were, after all, no eyewitness accounts, and Serbia did not actually succumb to the Ottomans for fully another seventy years.⁷⁵ Yet the messianic myth, roughly cast, tells as follows:

After the death of King Stefan Dušan in 1354, the Serbian Empire, the main Christian obstacle in Europe to the Muslim advance of the Ottoman Empire, fell into chaos. The empire of Dušan--whose name was a cog-

nomen for "soul"--had extended as far as the Croatian border to the north, the Adriatic Sea to the west, the Aegean to the south, and the gates of Constantinople to the east. Serbian lords came to elect Prince Lazar, a figure about whom almost nothing is known.

Among Serbs the legend has grown that the prophet Elijah visited Lazar in the shape of a grey falcon and offered him the choice of an earthly or heavenly kingdom. The falcon, speaking on behalf of the Mother of God, received Lazar's response:

"Kind God, what shall I do, how shall I do it?
What is the empire of my choice?
Is it the empire of heaven?
Is it the empire of earth?
And if I shall choose the empire,
and choose the empire of the earth,
the empire of earth is brief,
heaven lasts for eternity and its centuries."
And the Emperor chose the empire of heaven
above the empire of the earth.

Thus, on 28 June 1389, directed by God's mother to prepare himself and his "seven and seventy thousand soldiers" for destruction, Prince Lazar entered the field of battle. Serbian knights, arrayed in armor and heavy mail, marched onto the plain of Kosovo Polje. They were met by Turks riding Mongolian ponies, who tore through their ranks. The field of conflict turned to one of slaughter and defeat. The bodies of the Serbian knights were left for carrion birds to devour.

Six hundred years to the day after the defeat of Prince Lazar and the day which began the third Balkan war, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević stood before a wave of his countrymen on the plain of Kosovo. Slobodan--whose name is a cognomen for "freedom"--pointed one finger to the distance and said, "No one, now or in the future, will ever defeat you again. Look with what ease I have gathered one million Serbs." Where he pointed to was in the heart of the crowd that roared its approval, the place where the knights had been left to rot and the carrion scavengers to feast--the place named Kosovo Polje, in Serbian "The Field of the Black Birds."⁷⁶

In a real and dramatic way, the defeat at Kossovo represented a badge of honor, not shame, for Serbs. The defeat of Lazar represented a call-to-arms for six centuries for Serbs to avenge the defeat of Lazar at Kosovo; in World War I, John Reed noted how with the birth of every Serb peasant male came the greeting: "Hail, little avenger of Kossovo!"⁷⁷ Indeed, for Slavophiles such as Dame Rebecca West, the empire of Serbia sacrificed itself for the greater benefit of Europe, essentially living under the yoke of an Ottoman occupation that destroyed both culture and growth, and nurtured the status of both myth and legend. Even cursory study

of Balkan history reveals such a claim to be not far from the truth. Ancient Serbia was among the most civilized of European states; Emperor Stefan Nemanja was able to sign his name, while his contemporary Frederick I Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor in Germany, could manage only a thumbprint.⁷⁸

Stefan Nemanja's son, Sava, today the most revered of Serbian Orthodox saints, founded the faith of the church--by no accident of chance--in Kossovo. Today, in a region dominated by a population of roughly 93 percent ethnic Albanians, Kossovo truly represents a Balkan Palestine. (The sacred church of Gračanica lies only a few kilometers from "The Field of the Black Birds.") Equally, the sharp divisions within Orthodox sects point to a significant difference in the cultural context which religion plays in the Balkans.

Orthodoxy is a religion that rose in the East; Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism (as a result of the Diaspora) developed in the West. Western religions, "even Catholicism, the most baroque of western religions...[are] austere and intellectual"; Orthodoxy, by contrast, emphasizes beauty and magic, a "physical re-creation of heaven on earth." [emphasis added]⁷⁹ One need only reference the works of Orthodox clergy to note how such difference of perspective is manifest in the thought, cultural orientation, and attitude of church leaders. Poet and priest, Father Stefan Sandjakoski, writes in his work Bogomislie (The Contemplation of God) of the monasteries of Macedonia, sacred sites embraced by the Holy Spirit for the purposes of contemplation, are places where "mysterious spiritual process occurs," where the purpose of monastic life is to Δόσε αίμα, λάθε πνεύμα ("Give blood, take spirit").⁸⁰

Yet with such similarities of religious perspective within Orthodox sects, it seems all the more surprising how such deep rifts remain within various Orthodox communities. In the Balkans, "regional differences are profound," as former Undersecretary of State Matthew Nimetz remarks, "not only between Muslims and Christians, but also between Orthodox and Catholic Christians and among the Orthodox communities themselves."⁸¹ Nowhere is this more true than in Macedonia, where the Orthodox church itself is neither recognized by the Bulgarian, Serbian, or Greek patriarchs.

Given such perspective, it is incorrect to claim Orthodoxy as the exclusive prime mover within the forces of nationalism and violence. To some degree, the church has been a stabilizing element, a cultural touchstone for identity. To a very real degree, the Serbian Orthodox Church should be seen as a victim--both of Titoist and Milošević-ist machinations--as much as it is often portrayed as the aggressor. Because the Serbian Orthodox Church has attempted to act, and portrayed itself, "as the most constant defender of the Serbian people and their culture," so it has come to be viewed as responsible for actions it could not control.⁸² From another perspective, that taken when cultural fault lines are drawn, it should not be surprising to witness a ritual ceremony in which a Serbian priest blesses all of Arkan's Tigers. The church, as institutional force, symbolically endorsed the notion of Serbs as holy warriors, defending not only a nation but a faith as well.

THE "OTHER" RELIGIOUS CULTURAL ELEMENTS

In the midst of the claim that the last Balkan war increasingly took on "characteristics of religious struggle, defined by three great European faiths--Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam--are the contradictions at the heart of the cultural struggle itself. It was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after all, torn under the various regimes of Ottomans or Austro-Hungarian occupation, or subsumed within the federation of either Yugoslav monarchy or later Tito's Yugoslav "Experiment," where Islam actually thrived and came to represent a religious cultural heartland for an "Eastern" religion in Europe. The Balkans, in truth, have always represented a cultural crossroads where religions have clashed, mingled, and come to interrelate.⁸³ The Balkans have also given birth, as it were, to unique religious cultural elements found nowhere else.

One such element, largely forgotten outside the region, is the sect of the Bogomils (literally, meaning "One who is dear to God.") The origin of this religion dates to the 3rd century A.D., in the syncretic religious teachings of the Persian Manichæus, combining Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism and various other elements of Christianity. Although Manichæus was executed, his ideas spread throughout Mesopotamia and a Bulgarian priest named Bogomil

in the tenth century began to preach the basic tenets of his religion: the Devil, not God, created the world, and only mankind could redeem itself through overcoming the darkness of the Devil-made world and achieve redemption. In its day, Bogomilism spread as far as southern France, and the Pope is claimed to have sent an army into Bosnia against the heretics. The sect, partially as the result of Ottoman occupation after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, disappeared in the 16th century. The Bogomil tombs can be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina today; as proof that religion plays a role in cultural conflict (though likely not the central role), many of the Bogomil sites are not far from the mass graves used in the aftermath of various recent "ethnic cleansings" in the region.

Yet Bogomilism did not pave the way, as it were, for the rise of Islam in the Balkans. While true that this religion "reflected an inherent tendency towards heterodoxy or towards eclecticism," its "dualistic beliefs" also clashed with fundamental tenets of Islam.⁸⁴ Thus, the common assumption that Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are direct descendants of the Bogomil sect is one worthy of serious challenge.⁸⁵

One religious group that exists today in every Balkan nation, however, and remains--to use the euphemism--"problematic" for various governments are the Pomaks. Most scholars categorize Pomaks as "Slav Bulgarians who speak Bulgarian as their mother tongue and do not understand Turkish," though their religion and customs are Islamic.⁸⁶ In Bulgaria, where Muslims comprise about 15 percent of the population, the Pomaks suffered a fate quite different than the relative tolerance Pomaks enjoyed in Yugoslavia: "Bulgarianization" caused government pillaging of Muslim villages, forced the burning of the Koran, and forced Pomaks into detention camps. By 1985, as Sabrina Ramet notes, Muslim culture (Turkish, Pomak, and Tartar populations) was "shattered."⁸⁷

The Pomaks, largely ignored in the last Balkan war by "Western" media, number roughly 200,000 in Bulgaria, 40,000 in Macedonia, 36,000 in Greece, and 120,000 in Albania.⁸⁸ The exact count of these figures are controversial, as is the cultural identity of the Pomaks themselves. In Greece, Pomaks are called simply "Muslims," the only recognized minority in the

Hellenic Republic under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne; in Albania, no reliable data exists, though periodically various governments have referred to Pomaks as the "Macedonian [that is, a Slavic Macedonian] minority" within Albanian borders; within Turkey, Pomaks have largely assimilated Turkish culture; within Bulgaria, Pomaks are split by a Turkish reluctance to accept them because of their Bulgarian language and a Bulgarian reluctance to accept them because of their Islamic faith.⁸⁹

What stands as significant for groups such as the Pomaks--trapped both within and across cultures by the "fault" of religion and language--is how their significance rises or falls on the play of Balkan tensions. Indeed, as actors and policies outside the Balkans set the conditions for involvement or disengagement from Balkan turmoil, such minority groups tend to fall by the cultural wayside. Yet close study of such groups can prove useful, not only for human rights concerns, but for interest in predicting with accuracy the outbreak of tension--or the potential for conflict.

One of the most useful sources for learning about such tension is the Congressionally mandated annual Country Report on Rights Practices. These reports contain information gathered by American embassies worldwide and are published by the Department of State⁹⁰. Each reports practices and abuses within nations the United States has diplomatic relations with; often, such information is sensitive and host governments respond quickly in protest over reports of human rights abuse. From personal experience, however, I can report that such information can prove vitally useful. In December 1992, I attended a working group which nominally welcomed alternate perspectives on the Balkan crisis. I noted that despite the apparent side-by-side ease with which Islamic and Orthodox communities lived in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (as it was then known), I had noted from recent Country Reports the potential for conflict based on religious and cultural identities. Specifically, the Macedonian government had placed education and health support restrictions on families with more than three children (Albanians are traditionally Islamic and have both the highest birth and infant mortality rates in Europe).⁹¹ Further, Macedonian authorities had manipulated building

codes regarding the height of walls in individual structures, thus allowing the bulldozing of traditional Albanian homes.⁹² Among the members of the group, my concerns were dismissed almost as soon as they were brought forth. The senior State Department representative, who had served previously in Yugoslavia, noted how Macedonia had always been and would remain a model of ethnic harmony within the Balkans. My swift response was that almost precisely the same thing could have been said of Bosnia prior to the 1991 elections.

Almost eight months to the day after that meeting, 500 American peacekeepers deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the United Nations operation known as Able Sentry. One of the purposes of this observation force was to send a signal, to at least symbolically dissuade elements in the Balkans from attempting to bring to Macedonia what had by that time already destroyed Bosnia. At the time of this writing, American and Nordic peacekeepers remain in Macedonia as U.N. observers.

THE WAR IN RELIGION?

In late 1993 Samuel P. Huntington provided his first defense of his essay "The Clash of Civilizations?" as "an effort to lay out elements of a post-Cold War paradigm" in an essay titled "If Not Civilizations, What?--Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World."⁹³ While predictably drawing on Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, suggesting that those who could not understand the "shift" of paradigms were trapped by the structure of previous understandings; his civilizational paradigm, by contrast, provided a theoretical model "better than any alternative" for explaining future behavior and conflict. Arguing for simplicity, Huntington notes that a "paradigm is disproved only by the creation of an alternative paradigm that accounts for more crucial facts in equally simple or simpler terms...the civilizational paradigm...either accords with reality as people see it or it comes close enough so that people who do not accept have to attack it."⁹⁴

In late 1996, Huntington published his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. In the intervening years between his first publishing his essay and then the completion of a work that draws on the multitude of events in history since the end of the Cold

War, Huntington, in the view of some, has only hardened his views. (Indeed, in some ways his views have turned inward. A literary deconstructionist would have a field day noting how the civilizational paradigms Huntington writes of are actually cautionary tales about the dangers of multiculturalism in America--the bombing of the World Trade Center by Muslim extremists or the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City by alleged disaffected militia sympathizers are only the first of many internal conflicts brought about by the clash within and among American cultures. Such clashes between identities are on the rise; the shoot-out with Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge seems to echo in the tragedy at Waco, Texas or emphasize the need for caution against the latest disaffected element--as, for example, the stand-off with the so-called "Republic of Texas" members who confronted state and federal authorities in April-May 1997 ⁹⁵) According to Huntington, religion, as a critical cultural component, will take on significant meaning in the post-Cold world. Indeed, under the civilizational paradigm, the global religious revival is "a return to the scared" and the potential nesting ground for future wars.⁹⁶

What Huntington fails to do, even in his most recent work, is to provide precise definitions for both civilizations and cultures; to the contrary, he often seems more effective at gatherings toward meanings of such terms and more comfortable blurring distinctions between "culture" and "civilization" as opposed to more precise and unrealistic 19th century German thought which attempted to isolate culture and civilization as separate identities.⁹⁷ Such blurring of distinctions work again to the advantage of the civilizations paradigm, allowing gross generalizations that have largely proven true in this post-Cold War yet pre-epithet new age we find ourselves in. Yet definitions are essential necessities, even in their imprecisions.

First, on the issue of culture itself, one which even Huntington would agree with: "a set of meanings and values informing a common way of life"; "the values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society in a given society have attached primary importance."⁹⁸ Second, the sense of "what" civilizations are: "a space, a 'cultural' area...collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena"; "a particular....world-

view [sic], customs, structures, and culture...[that] forms some kind of historical whole"; a "particular original process of cultural creativity which is the work of a particular people"; "a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole."⁹⁹ Finally, the aspect of religion as a cultural component that acts within civilizational forces as "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."¹⁰⁰

Working from such general understandings, Huntington has cast a wide net indeed for explaining the causes for conflict and the cultural biases on actors on the world stage. With the Balkan example, in particular, Huntington's paradigm may well explain why conflict occurs, but the "remaking of world order," as he terms it, proves unsatisfactory for the prevention of conflict. To the contrary, the remaking of civilization along nine civilizational alignments, may prove, as his latest critics have observed, little more than self-fulfilling prophecy for disaster. As G. John Ikenberry notes in a Foreign Affairs piece, "intercivilizational conflict is by no means inevitable--but it is probably more likely if our leaders take Huntington's thesis to heart."¹⁰¹

In the Balkans, the death of Yugoslavia, serves as the most pertinent recent example of a state's disintegration in the wake of the Cold War, and Huntington relies heavily on "fault line dynamics"--particularly in religious differences to articulate his paradigm. Often, Huntington's generalisms die a swift death at the altar of the particular, such as when he practices information overstretch by claiming that in the post-Cold War, "Serbs now call their language Serbian, not Serbo-Croatian, and write it in the Cyrillic script of their Russian kinsmen, not in the Western kinsmen, not in the Western script of their Catholic enemies."¹⁰² This "sudden" shift in Serbian cultural alignment has been in practice for over 200 years.

Yugoslavia died a gradual, methodical, and ineluctable death; it took 11 years following Tito's death for the Federal Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia to implode. Religion, as a com-

ponent of culture, provided an occasion, but was not the cause for the death of Yugoslavia; in the tradition of sound Jesuit logic, religion as cultural component proved "sufficient but not necessary" for the outbreak of war.¹⁰³ Indeed, the train wreck was announced long before impact, yet no one and certainly no extra-Balkan state acted in advance to avert catastrophe. One could argue more forcefully that it was Europe's reluctance (particularly in the absence of American diplomacy and military cooperation) to commit early to preventing the outbreak of conflict that allowed the inevitable collision. Now, we are left to reconsider the wreckage, and to mis-interpret the reasons for its cause.

One such mis-interpretation, working from the general definitions of culture, civilization, and religion as a cultural component, involves the notion that a Balkan "holy war" --of itself--caused the death of Yugoslavia. This claim seems a far flung leap of faith indeed. The Yugoslav "Experiment," as it should be remembered, formed a recipe for disaster according to Huntington's civilizations paradigm. Yet Yugoslavia held more than three major religions within its borders (Catholicism, Islam, Orthodoxy, as well as Judaism, various Protestant sects, Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare Krishnas); its people spoke as many as twenty-six official languages, of which Albanian was clearly the major tongue in some regions (yet Ruthenian, in some places, could be spoken more often than Serbo-Croatian). They were marked by culture, and at times proud of their differences. Such distinctions also often kept them at a permanent distance. (The differences between Serbs and Slovenes, as one example, and the numerous instances of misunderstandings between them, were largely due to difference in their respective cultures.)

Even within so-called "aligned" cultures of the former Yugoslavia, there existed difference. A Serb geographer, Jovan Cvijić, noted in the late nineteenth century the existence of "cultural" types not only between the disciplined "imperial sons" of the Habsburg Military Frontier, but among the urban Byzantine Orthodox of Southern Serbia and the patriarchal Orthodox highlanders of Herzegovina and Montenegro, the latitudinarian clergy and burghers of Vojvodina and their kinsmen in the Montenegrin littoral, a Central European belt (Slovenia,

northern Croatia, Vojvodina), a Mediterranean belt (the littorals of Albania, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia), and a Muslim belt and Orthodox belt inseparably intertwined.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the calls for Serbian "Unity" and the once fervent appeals of Milošević to Serbian nationalism drew on the recognition that cultural diversity within a specific "Serb" culture could quickly lead to cultural fragmentation among those "cultures" Huntington would tend to cluster together as one homogenous and categorized "culture."¹⁰⁵

The Balkans lie at the crossroads of history. This claim falls short of cliché because it stands as a truth consistently forgotten or denied. The continental "crust" of Rome and Byzantium, East and West, meet in a unique way here. Cultures lived with, tolerated each other--even in some ways embraced. In Moštar, Herzegovina, "before the warlords destroyed it, one was able not too long ago to sip Viennese coffee and read newspapers mounted on wooden frames, listening all along to a muezzin's call in the shadow of a Franciscan church (where the chant was Latin), and then wander into a fig grove that surrounds a Byzantine-style church (where the chant was Slavonic)."¹⁰⁶ Yet the common belief persists that the Balkans are uniquely dangerous, in some ways barbaric, and a region we should avoid for strategic and foreign policy concerns. What is unique about the Balkans is that Slavs--the largest ethnic majority in Europe, a fact that Europe consistently struggles to forget--came to the Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. and slowly separated from each other by their physical presence in situ at the crossroads of history.

The extraordinary oxymoron of the Balkan Enigma is this: The Balkan Slavs are one civilization separated by multiple cultural overlays. I have made, been challenged on, and defended (and hold firm to) this assertion: Yugoslavia was a European nation with an identifiable geography and ethnic composition. Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians--all violent denials to the contrary acknowledged--are an ethnos; they are one "ethnos". Yet it is this very oxymoron--a civilization split by cultures--that most would choose to deny. George Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1961-1963, with clear cultural bias can claim that Slovenes are not Yugoslavs but "really an alpine

people" and Montenegrins have been "effectively subsumed by the Serbian state."¹⁰⁷

Slovenes would agree; Montenegrins would not.

Further, there is the even more dangerous assumption, one more prominent and privately held in policy circles, that involvement in the Balkans is simply not worth the effort, that "the United States runs the risk of its policy being controlled by, rather than controlling events."¹⁰⁸ The specter of the Vietnam debacle in many way lies behind this fear--perhaps rightly so. The failure of policy makers to ask the right questions should haunt us, just as the words "in retrospect" of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's should: "Over and over again...we failed to address the fundamental issues; our failure to identify them was not recognized; and deep-seated disagreement among the president's advisers about how to proceed were neither surfaced nor resolved."¹⁰⁹ Indeed, what are the right questions? Will we recognize them when we see them?

Politics in the Balkans cannot in the future exist independently of religion and other cultural influences, just as in the past such factors proved critical to history as it unfolded--or erupted. Without understanding both culture and religion, one can never understand the politics of the so-called "Balkan Enigma." In truth and practice, though, the only "Enigma" that exists is present in the almost overwhelming dynamics that shape this region of Europe: politics, culture, and religion present daunting though not insurmountable challenges which the "West" has chosen, most often at its own peril, to ignore.

Religious difference, cultural diversity, or uneven economic development did not fuel the hostilities of the last Balkan War. Simply put, conflict stemmed from "dissimilar structure and goals of various national ideologies that have emerged within the political culture of each of Eastern Europe's national groups."¹¹⁰ These multiple factors existed as parallel archetypes during the Cold War, affected tangentially by the clash of ideologies but not unleashed by the failures of ideology (name it Communism, Socialism, or the Yugoslav Experiment) in the wake of the Cold War's aftermath. The rise of nationalist ideology found fertile ground in the post-

Cold War era, and attached to it culture, politics, religion, and beliefs in a complex array that reaped a whirlwind of destruction.

Thus, there was, and is, no exclusive "War in Religion" in the Balkans. Religion, as a cultural component, contributed to the political culture that saw war as a necessary outcome. Religion, nonetheless, is essential to understanding Balkan culture. At its very least, it serves both structure and understanding (both for the "West" and for the Balkan peoples) as "symbols of intuition and action--that means myth and rites within a social group--[and] has lasting necessity for...even the most secularized culture and the most demythologized theology."¹¹¹ Thus, despite a score of anti-tank mines laid as an assassination attempt on the road to Sarajevo on 13 April 1997, it seems no small event that Pope John Paul II's visit to war-torn Bosnia was met with welcome by Orthodox Serbs, Roman Catholics, and Bosnian Muslims alike. In a visit largely ignored by Western media, the Pope delivered a clear message to a people, separated by cultural difference but linked by geographic and "civilizational" intimacy: "Let us forgive, and let us ask for forgiveness. We cannot fail to undertake the difficult but necessary pilgrimage of forgiveness, which leads to a profound reconciliation."¹¹² In the end, the Balkan people may have come to realize as the "West" withdraws from their shattered borders, according to set deadlines and firm ultimatums, that only the Balkan peoples themselves, those who destroyed each other, can now heal each other.

Of itself, religion was not the fault line dynamic for the last Balkan war. "Religion," as Kennan himself admits, "was not the strongest motivating factor...but aggressive nationalism...inherited...from a distant tribal past."¹¹³ Further, nationalistic ideology clearly manipulated religion to influence political culture in choosing conflict. Religion was an occasion but not the cause for articulating difference among peoples and in choosing violence between peoples to culturally divide them.

History, there can be little doubt, suffers processes of death and renewal in the story of civilization. Some, such as the poet W.B. Yeats, believed these processes of cyclical "gyres"

formed the integral core of human evolution. Others, particularly historians such as the skeptical Oswald Spengler in The Decline of the West, contend that both cultures and civilizations decline at the moment when both appear to reach apparent peaks. Yet "world history," as Spengler reminds us, "is the history of large cultures."¹¹⁴ Both large cultures and civilizations impacted in the Balkans, leaving in their wake what Dame Rebecca West called "the stench of empires, they stink as nothing else."¹¹⁵

Huntington's civilizational paradigm, especially as it applies to the last Balkan war and the influence of religion on shaping the dynamic for conflict, proves useful for explaining why conflict occurs and far less worthwhile for formulating strategies to prevent future cultural tensions to erupt in conflict. On reflection, the civilizations paradigm falls far short of the claim to be "a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes going on in the world."¹¹⁶ To the contrary, Huntington's paradigm, falls back to the mistake of alignment based solely on cultural identities. Why should it come as a surprise that peoples in times of tension and conflict should do anything less than identify with "faith and family, blood and belief"¹¹⁷--and allow themselves to be so ruthlessly manipulated by nationalistic ideologues who only insured their own destruction? In Yugoslavia, everyone--everyone who had a voice at least--was guilty. Such guilt, of course, was not equally proportionate among the guilty.

How people act in times of conflict is hardly an adequate paradigm for planning how to interact between nations and cultures in times of peace. The ill-logic of Huntington's paradigm, especially as it applies to religion, appears in one sense as a call "To Insure War, One Must Prepare for War"--hardly an adequate paradigm for analysis or practice in a new millennium. In short, too close a focus on such a narrow paradigm may prove to be little more than self-fulfilling of the consequences such a paradigm would claim to prevent. Indeed, Huntington dangerously suggests in his paradigm a return to past convictions that will only insure future conflicts, suggestions as extreme as "Croatia's border is, in effect, Europe's"; "Practically speaking, NATO membership would be open to...Slovenia and Croatia, but not countries that have historically been Muslim or Orthodox...Turkish and Greek ties to NATO

will weaken and their membership could either come to an end or become meaningless...Greece is becoming as much an ally of Russia as it is a member of NATO."¹¹⁸ With claims like these, any reasonable observer ought to ask, are we truly insuring our future prosperity or resurrecting cultural paleoliths at our own peril?

"The would-be savior of a disintegrating society is necessarily a savior with a sword," Arnold Toynbee claimed. Sadly, we remain unsure if intervention by the "West"--"the savior with a sword"--in attempting to solve the Balkan Enigma has really prevented any resolution of the underlying causes for Balkan conflict. The Yugoslav Experiment is dead; the ideals of that experiment, nonetheless, of which religion remains a critical cultural component, are not. In retrospect, we should remember how the layers of history are both deep and interdependent, and have existed long before and will thrive long after most have forgotten the significance of the time known as the Cold War.

Among ancient Greeks, there was no word for culture.¹¹⁹ There were concepts and ideas which deconstructed gave the sense of an identity:--"civic" and "civility," "polis" and "politic"--but there was no clear distinction, if only because the very understanding of being Greek meant to be cultured. The uncultured, the non-Greek, was by definition a barbarian. (Alexander I of Macedonia, for example, was given the title "Philhellene"--friend of the Greek--a title that suggested Alexander was not Greek.¹²⁰) Such distinction between the insider and the outsider is not possible, nor should it be, in the multicultural and multicivilizational world we live in. Yet it remains equally true that elements within civilizations can have quite distinct tribal cultural identifies: the distinction in the lifestyles and even modes of seeing the world between, for example, Northern and Southern Italians, or between Italians and Germans; the differences in the practice of Islam in Kabul versus its identity in Teheran or in Sarajevo. Culture is subject to tribal affiliation. Civilization, most likely, is not.

Yet among the ancient Greeks there also existed the sense that a civilization defined itself when a people planted trees knowing that they themselves would never rest in the shadow of its branches. The tensions between culture and civilization, of course, are locked in a constant

battle. In the end, or, here, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it seems more relevant than ever to realize how the history of civilization is a palimpsest, not a tabula rosa.

¹Milorad Pavić The Dictionary of the Khazars: A Lexicon Novel in 100,000 Words (Male Edition), translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Christina Pribičević Zorić (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 51-52.

²The author was allowed to view portions of these tapes, largely propaganda and recruiting films, through a confidential interview. A Balkan colleague has pointed out in correspondence that "Bijeljina is the first town in northeast Bosnia, called Semberija, in the corner between the Sava and the Drina, its tributary."

³Samo Sloga Srbina Spašava. The slogan itself came to be a perversion of Marshal Tito's own manipulative slogan from the days of Socialist Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (SFRY): "Да Нам Братство и Јединство Вечно Траје--So that Brotherhood and Unity May Forever Continue."

⁴One of the many odd significances that lie beyond the scope of this essay, but one which any cultural anthropologist would find fascination with, is in the emigration patterns of cultural groups from the Balkans who found enmity with similar cultural groups in the "old" country and then settle almost side-by-side in the "new" to take up similar disputes. Thus, the violent images in a Croatian Catholic Church in America may reflect only ossified beliefs towards Serbs, who are their neighbors in Pittsburgh, beliefs that themselves surfaced during the most recent Balkan wars. In Melbourne, Australia, for another example, Slavic Macedonians and Greek Macedonians live within the same ethnic communities; during the Greek-FYROM disputes of 1991-1995, various attacks took place on cultural symbols. Macedonian Orthodox churches were bombed, windows broken, and disputes erupted over a largely political conflict taking place 10,000 miles away from Melbourne. In Gary, Indiana, one of the more radical ethnic bases of Slavic Macedonians, immigrants today speak a language more closely linked to Bulgarian than to modern Macedonian and advocate the notion of a "Greater Bulgaria." Perhaps one explanation for such hardened cultural attitudes is found in the etymology of the Greek word for "expatriate"--ομογενής; that is, the "same race," something from which you can never escape. Huntington identifies these groups as "Diaspora communities who intensely identify with the cause of their kin and become 'more Catholic than the Pope.'" Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 273. Huntington overlooks, or perhaps is not aware of the odd phenomenon that cause such Diaspora peoples of the "same race" to settle in new countries and resume, on varying levels at different times, patterns of enmity against the "other race," now become neighbors in an entirely new environment, and locked into the same oppositions that existed in the "other" country. Demographic patterns of immigration for work could partially, though not fully, explain this phenomenon. America is, after all, a transitory society; families are constantly uprooted, careers change. Somehow, these cultural enmities still exist, nonetheless.

⁵Alija Izetbegović, The Islamic Declaration: A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, (Sarajevo, 1970--published 1991), 22.

⁶Ibid., 33.

⁷Slobodan Lekić, "Clinton Reassures Bosnia Leader," <www.washingtonpost.com> (26 March 1997); John Diamond, "Bosnian Leader Visits Pentagon," <www.washingtonpost.com> (26 March 1997). For other Clinton declarations of commitment to Bosnia, see Elaine Sciolino, "Bosnia Policy: Shaped by U.S. Military Role," <www.washingtonpost.com> (29 July 1996).

⁸In the new Bosnia, Muslims who are also SDA party members hold almost exclusively all positions in Bosnia's civil services and public enterprises. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 270.

⁹The 1981 census reported Yugoslavia's population as 22.4 million, of which Serbs were the largest group--8.1 million.

¹⁰Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Civil War, 2nd edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 2.

¹¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 207-208.

¹²Misha Glenny, "Carnage in Bosnia, for Starters," The New York Times, 29 July 1993, A23.

¹³Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, 22.

¹⁴George Kennan, under the pseudonym "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Volume 65, Number 4, Spring 1987, 853-868, originally published in Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

¹⁵The places once named Yugoslavia contain far more than just the South Slavs themselves; I will address these unique diversities in this essay's final section. I would note, however, that religious difference sadly became a marker for differentiation in the recent conflict. The difference between spoken Serbian and Croatian is only the matter of several hundred words. The written language is marked by a Latin alphabet (Croatian) and a Cyrillic (Serbian), a difference, again, marked by religion--Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The traditionally ascribed creator of the Cyrillic alphabet, Saint Cyril, if nothing else, was considered little more than a renegade by the Catholic church. Cyril died, behind bars, a prisoner of the Pope; his brother and fellow Orthodox apostle, Methodius, however, was consecrated by the pope and made archbishop of Sirmium in Moravia.

¹⁶From the foreword to Balkan Babel by Ivo Banac, xiv-xv.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, xiv.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 1-2.

¹⁹Keston News Service, Number 357 (30 August 1990), 11, quoted in Ramet, Balkan Babel, 135.

²⁰"Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions." Vatican II, Nostra Aetate, 28 October 1965, 739. My thanks to Bogomil Gjuzel for pointing out Bishop Strossmayer's terms and beliefs in promoting the unity of the South Slavs as Illyrians. I refer to "Macedonians" as "Bulgarians" in this context because that is precisely what Macedonians believed themselves to be. As one colleague pointed out in private correspondence: "Ethnically, we thought we were Bulgarians. We had no other choice. The Brothers Miladinov's collection of Folk Poetry, published with Strossmayer's sponsorship in Zagreb in 1870 is titled Bugarske narodne pesme [Bulgarian Folk Poems] from Macedonia. Our national renaissance did not begin until the late 19th c. and by then the common danger of Hellenization was mutual. Bulgaria and Macedonia existed under the unique name "Vzraždane" (which we now translate as "prerodba" and then under the Bulgarian Exarchate (founded in 1870).

²¹Dame Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia (London: Clarendon Books, 1942), 109.

²²Ramet, Balkan Babel, 136.

²³Quoted in A. Alesksa Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac: Hrvatski Kardinal (Rome: Ziral, 1974), 492.

²⁴The figure of 700,000 is reported by Robert D. Kaplan in Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 5-6. This figure is controversial. I have seen numbers as low as 10,000 reported in Croatian sources for Serb deaths resulting from internment at Jesenovac; conversely, Serbian estimates have exceeded one million deaths. These figures should not obscure the hatreds such death camps engendered, hatreds repeated most recently in various and horrific ways in the last Balkan war. One small example rises from my experience in Yugoslavia as a Fulbright Scholar (Slobodan Umjetnik) from 1988-1989. In Belgrade, the capital city, one of the most prominent books sold in many stores was a horrific photographic depiction of Ustasha atrocities during World War II, a war in which

one in eight Yugoslavs died and half of these "Yugoslav" deaths were at the hands of other "Yugoslavs." More recently, while serving in a diplomatic position in the Balkans, I noticed new genealogies of horror that depicted new and particularly gruesome atrocities committed by Serbs or against Serbs in this "third" Balkan war.

²⁵Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, 12.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 7. Kaplan's first four chapters of Balkan Ghosts are a useful introduction to the tensions that destroyed Yugoslavia. While he attempts balance in his overview of the region, he seems to realize that no perfect balance that weighs the contrary and violent opinions of opposing sides is possible. Kaplan's book proved influential in the Clinton administration's decision to intervene militarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As far as the case of Stepinac himself, his own naïveté betrayed him. Midway through the Holocaust, he turned against the Ustasha and preached for the rights of all peoples, regardless of religion; by mid-1943, of course, the fate of countless Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews had been sealed. After 1945, in the new Communist Yugoslavia, Tito (ever the pragmatist) met twice with Stepinac and chose to ignore Stepinac's Ustasha collaboration, advocating instead the creation of a national Catholic Church independent of Rome. Stepinac refused, was eventually imprisoned, and became a political and religious, and therefore cultural, martyr.

²⁷Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, 23.

²⁸Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 282; the actual quote by John Paul II is from Misha Glenny, "Yugoslavia: The Great Fall," The New York Review of Books, 23 March 1993, 61.

²⁹Pierre Behar, "Central Europe: The New Lines of Fracture," Geopolitique, Autumn 1994, 44.

³⁰Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 283.

³¹*Ibid.*, 273.

³²Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, 27-28.

³³The National Catholic Reporter, 23 September 1994, 7. This "fluency" may be less impressive than it appears. Pope John Paul, whose native tongue is Polish, has the ability to draw on the affiliation all Slavic languages have. In his Christmas messages, for example, or on numerous visits he tends to address his separate flocks in their local "tongues." He has sent messages to his Macedonian flock as well--in Macedonian--to which the Greek Orthodox Church has objected.

³⁴Ramet, Balkan Babel, 281.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷The phrase, the "coming of the world church," is from the Jesuit, Gerald O'Collins, in James Carroll's recent piece, "The Silence," in The New Yorker, 7 April 1997, 54. Carroll suggests that the legacy of Pope John Paul II may well be marred by two jarringly distinct oppositions: John Paul has forged a new relationship between Catholicism and Judaism, yet has maintained a firm silence over the Church and the Holocaust. This "Silence," Carroll suggests, may be the contradiction that will serve least to honor the papacy of John Paul. In terms of influence and symbolism, of course, Pope John Paul has indeed had an extraordinary impact: in Africa alone, there are now 90 million Catholics, as opposed to two million Catholics at the turn of the century. Yet in failing to address cultural tensions that underlie all cultural borders--between Judaism and Catholicism, within the former Yugoslavia--there are troubling undertones that remain.

³⁸"Pope Confirms Bosnia Visit," <www.washingtonpost.com> (31 January 1997). In 1994, following his failed attempt to visit Bosnia, Pope John Paul II named Vinko Puljić, the archbishop of Sarajevo, to become the youngest member of the College of Cardinals. Cardinal Puljić, to no surprise, rejoiced at the Pope's 1997 visit.

³⁹Ramet, Balkan Babel, 156-157.

⁴⁰"Childe Harold's Pilgrimage," Lord Byron--The Collected Works in Verse and Prose (New York: George Dearborn Publishers, 1835), 27. Private collection of the author.

⁴¹Private interview by the author.

⁴²Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 271

⁴³This statement is by no means direct criticism of Professor Huntington. If anything, he should be thanked for developing a cultural paradigm that admits what seem to be inherently racist attitudes by the West towards the East, attitudes that will--if left unresolved or allowed to fester--only insure conflict along cultural lines as the future's only certainty. Professor Huntington has helped articulate reality as some see it. In his own words, for example, "Muslims...have seen 'the clash' as providing recognition and, in some degree, legitimation for the distinctiveness of their own civilization and its independence from the West. That civilizations are meaningful entities accords with the way in which people see and experience reality." Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?--Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World," The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 66.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*; Duško Doder, "Letters," Foreign Policy, Winter 1994.

⁴⁵Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1995): 49.

⁴⁶Based on remarks made to the visiting students and faculty of the Air War College to the Hellenic Republic, February 1995. As Professor Bradford Lee of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College has quipped in lecture, "The Balkans has so much history, it doesn't need a future." Yet Professor Couloumbis' remarks draw, I believe, on the notion that those who suffer the weight of history most, as the Balkan peoples clearly do, recognize the immense difficulty of change in perception and the immense necessity for change.

⁴⁷Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 128.

⁴⁸Izvestia, 6 March 1996.

⁴⁹The New York Times, 6 December 1994, A3, quoted in Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 271. Karadžić is a particularly odd case, and perhaps a worthy one for later study on how the influence of one distorted personality results in the thousands of deaths of innocent peoples. Psychiatrist and failed poet, his proclamations during the Bosnian conflict remained steadfast in his professed belief that he was the last line of defense for Europe against the Islamic onslaught. There is some evidence, however, that his own obsession to destroy Sarajevo was the result of a personal vendetta in which his own artistic abilities as poet proved limited and his publishing efforts produced meager results. Thus, he sought to destroy Sarajevo--a city that thrived on cultural diversity and yet rejected him--to erase such triumph of diversity. (See, for example, Misha Glenny, "Letter from Bosnia: The Age of the Parastate," The New Yorker, 8 May 1995, 52.) For perhaps the same bizarre reasons, Serbia may have attacked Dubrovnik--which had existed for 1,000 years as the independent Republic of Ragusa and had never been conquered--for the non-military perception that, symbolically, at least Dubrovnik could be conquered.

⁵⁰Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 268.

⁵¹Further, the "West" has never been comfortable with where the lines of distinction between religion and political cultures meet, if only because such lines do not exist but are mandated within the social, political, and religious cultures of each state. Sometimes, often, such tensions reach boiling stage. A brief, intelligent address of this state of order/disorder can be found in the essay by David R. Gress, "Is 'the West' Religious or Secular?" Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Summer 1996, 415-427. An equally worthwhile, though somewhat dated,

work is Robert N. Bellah's The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Larger surveys of the place of religion within the cultural context of societies can be found in Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History: Volumes 7-11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946-1958), as well as in the particular examination of religion and history in An Historian's Approach to Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956). Another brief work which considers the "encounters" between cultural differences (often religiously based) is Toynbee's The World and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1953). Toynbee, who in some ways was undone by his later tendency to generalize historic patterns and "preach" humanitarian ideology, is particularly interesting for examination because of the debt Huntington clearly owes Toynbee for his earlier work, a debt acknowledged through multiple reference in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

⁵²Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 267.

⁵³Igor' Sevostianov, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Extremism are Not the Same," International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy, and International Relations, Volume 42, Number 3, 1996, 179; 181. Andrew Ross, professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, has rightly pointed out that this assertion does not squarely fit the "Russification" of Central Asia, particularly in those areas--such as Tajikistan--where Islam is at war with authoritarian regimes.

⁵⁴Michael Ignatieff, "Unarmed Warriors," The New Yorker, 24 March 1997, 68.

⁵⁵Samuel P. Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs (November-December 1996): 40-41.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 46.

⁵⁷West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, 915. Dame Rebecca, for whom I must admit I bear enduring affection, should not be forgiven so quickly in this instance for such a generality. Note, for comparison, the philosopher William James's consideration of all religion as "cruelty" in "The Value of Saintliness," Lectures XIV and XV of the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature (New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1902), 326-378. One interesting contrast is Toynbee's assertion of Islam as Christian heresy: "Islam, like Communism, won its way as a programme of reform for dealing with abuses in the contemporary practice of Christianity. And the success of Islam in the early days shows how powerful the appeal of a reforming heresy can be when the orthodoxy that this heresy is attacking is reluctant to mend its ways." The World and the West, 18-19.

⁵⁸Michael Menard, "Letters," Foreign Policy, Winter 1994.

⁵⁹Ramet, Balkan Babel, 185.

⁶⁰Intervju (Belgrade), Number 216, 15 September 1989, 15-16, quoted in *Ibid.*

⁶¹The most thorough and representative work I have found that illustrates such immense cultural contributions is H.T. Norris's Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).

⁶²Gress, "Is 'the West' Religious or Secular?" 421.

⁶³Ramet, Balkan Babel, 192.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 269.

⁶⁶Taken from "The Mountain Wreath," considered the epic of Serbia and Serbian culture. The text of the Горски Вијенац can be found in the original Serbian (with the dialect of 19th century Crna Gora) on the Internet at <www.fron.net/nebojsa/njegov/gvijenac.htm>. Miloš Obilić was an early practitioner (if not strategist) of chaos. During the Battle of Kosovo, he attempted to influence the outcome by defecting to the Ottoman camp. Brought

before the Sultan Murad, he extracted a hidden dagger and plunged it deep in the Sultan's chest. While fatally wounding the Sultan, Obilić himself was executed on the spot. According to Dame Rebecca West, "His name was Milosh Obilitch...but to tell you the truth, it was not. It was Kobilitch, which means Brood-mare, for in those days our people, even in the nobility did not have surnames but only Christian names and nicknames. But in the eighteenth century when all the world became refined [sic] it seemed to us that it was shameful to have a hero that was called Brood-mare, so we dropped the K, and poor Milosh was left with a name that nothing at all and was never his." Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, 907-908.

⁶⁷Montenegro--known in Serbian as Crna Gora, the Black Mountain--lies between Serbia and the Adriatic Sea, and forms the nominal state today known as Yugoslavia, which remains shunned diplomatically by the United States. The genocide Njegoš writes of took place in 1702 under the warriors of Metropolitan Danilo Petrović.

⁶⁸Duško Doder, The Yugoslavs (Random House: New York, 1978), 182.

⁶⁹As Doder notes, the order given by Prince Nikola in the late nineteenth century to abandon this practice went ignored. In later battles, Montenegrins chose the cutting of ears and noses of Turks rather than decapitation.

⁷⁰Quoted in Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia (New York: Pantheon, 1992), 153.

⁷¹William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 1995), 28.

⁷²Slobodan Milošević always attempted to manipulate the Serbian Orthodox Church to his advantage. Long disgruntled by the various ways in which the Yugoslav Communist regime has shunned it, the church immediately warmed to Milošević's tactical overtures, such as his praising the church in the regime-controlled Politika newspaper or replacing Marxism with religious instruction in school curricula.

⁷³William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma, 29.

⁷⁴Ramet, Balkan Babel, 181.

⁷⁵The Byzantine Empire of Constantinople fell in 1453.

⁷⁶This is the common "myth"--or basis--of Serbian religious culture. Thompson's A Paper House, Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts, and West's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon all refer to it. Kaplan (39-40) describes the 1987 gathering at Kossovo of Serbs under the then unknown figure named Slobodan Milošević; by 1989, no longer unknown and a powerful figure, Milošević manipulated religion, Serbian folk culture, and nationalism as synonymous tropes on the fields of Kossovo.

⁷⁷John Reed, The War in Eastern Europe (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), quoted in Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, 38. Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies, Foreign Policy, Fall 1993, 65-66, draws from a rough translation of the inscription on the Gazimestan Memorial Monument, which commemorates the Battle of Kosovo on the Field of the Black Birds:

Whoever is a Serbs, and of Serbian seed,
And doesn't come to fight the Battle of Kosovo,
Let him never father a child,
Neither male nor female,
Let whatever he grows never yield fruit,
Neither red wine nor white wheat,
Let him rot in evil shame till his last progeny.

⁷⁸Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, 31.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 25. Two worthwhile texts, ecclesiastically based, which clearly articulate the differences of church and culture within a "Christian" context are Ernest Benz's The Eastern Orthodox Church, translated from the German by Richard and Clara Winston (Chicago:

Aldine Publishing, 1963), as well as the work of Methodios Fouyas, Ph.D., Hon. D.D., Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Anglicanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). Fouyas distinguishes the differences between faith, as well as distinguishing the "heresy" (2) that led to the divisions between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy: the fierce debate within the earlier Christian Church over the homioöusis (Christ as the similar substance of God) versus homoöusis (Christ as the same substance of God). A more general though no less useful work on Orthodoxy is Kyriacos C. Markides' Riding with the Lion: In Search of Mystical Christianity (New York: Penguin Arkana, 1995).

⁸⁰Отец Стефан Санџакоски, Богомислие, (Скопје: Метафорум, 1993), 198.

⁸¹Matthew Nimetz, "Security in the Balkans," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1996, 6.

⁸²Ramet, Balkan Babel, 165.

⁸³One of the most extraordinary works to show the influence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism on the Balkans is, not surprisingly, a work a fiction, a "lexicon" novel that shows the incredible mosaic these religions represent for this region of Europe. The work is Milorad Pavić's The Dictionary of the Khazars: A Lexicon Novel in 100,000 Words (Male Edition), translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Christina Pribičević Zorić (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), from which the opening epigraph for this essay is taken.

⁸⁴Norris, Islam in the Balkans, 43-44.

⁸⁵Note, for example, the generally authoritative source that claims Bosnian Muslims are direct descendants of the Bogomils: Kalman Sass, "Les bogomils," Dictionnaire des religions, 2nd edition (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1985).

⁸⁶Hugh Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, Minority Rights Group Report Number 87 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1988), 7; Alezandre Popović, L'Islam balkanique, Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen, Band 11 (Berlin: Osteuropa Institut an der Freien Universität, 1986), 172. The etymology of "Pomak" is unclear; one possible explanation is that it derives from the Bulgarian pomagam, after the belief that Pomaks provided aid to the Ottomans during the occupation of Bulgaria. Mario Apostolov, "The Pomaks: A Religious Minority in the Balkans," Nationalities Papers, Volume 24, Number 4, 1996, 727, suggests that Pomak conversions to Islam took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a means to escape the devshirme tax (that took young boys from their families and recruited them into the Ottoman janizary) as well to escape the raya, the practice of cruelty toward non-Muslims.

⁸⁷Sabrina Ramet (under the name Pedro Ramet), Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987), 35.

⁸⁸Apostolov, "The Pomaks," 728.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 732-739. Pomaks are not the only Macedonian religious minority in Albania, as Apostolov's essay might suggest. Those who live in the village Dolna Prespa are entirely Christian Orthodox. Macedonians refer to Pomaks derogatorily as torbeshi--Muslim Macedonian Slavs.

⁹⁰Among the least popular duty for foreign service officers to complete, these Country Reports, nonetheless, prove quite useful, if paid attention to.

⁹¹Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, 1264.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 1264-1265.

⁹³Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" 56-57.

⁹⁴Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" 57; 67.

⁹⁵Huntington is not alone in these concerns. Historian John Lukacs has expressed similar concerns in his writings, and Stanley Hoffmann has also written about phobias in Western

cultures "based on genuine cultural clashes and worries about national identity." "The Case for Leadership," Foreign Policy (Winter 1990-91), 30.

⁹⁶Ronald Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civilizational Analysis," Comparative Civilizations Review (Fall 1987), 22, quoted in Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 68.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 41. In the index of Huntington's work (356), cultures are identified at best only as "means to definitions of--".

⁹⁸Bernard Lonergan, quoted in E. Hillman, C.S.Sp., Many Paths: A Catholic Approach to Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989), 5. Adda B. Bozeman, "Civilizations under Stress," Virginia Quarterly Review, 1.

⁹⁹Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 177, 202; Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-system (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 215; Christopher Dawson, Dynamics of World History (LaSalle, Illinois: Sheed and Ward, 1959), 51, 402; Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, "Notes on the Notion of Civilization," Social Research (1971), 811. Other useful works include the classic pessimistic assessment of Oswald Spengler in Decline of the West (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926-1928), as well as the previously cited twelve volumes of Toynbee's A Study of History.

¹⁰⁰Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 90.

¹⁰¹G. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997), 163. In the piece titled "Dangerous Conjecture," Tony Smith echoes much the same thought in warning against Huntington's cultural paradigm as little more than self-fulfilling prophecy that insures disaster. Huntington's nine civilizations in the post-Cold War are Western (Europe and North America), Latin America, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. Of these civilizations, only Buddhism is a major religion not associated with a major civilization. Judaism, by contrast, though a major cultural force among its people is, neither a major religion or a distinct civilization. This claim, of course, most especially when it is appended by Huntington's reliance on Toynbee that Judaism is "an arrested civilization which evolved out of the earlier Syriac civilization," is open to much heated debate. The Clash of Civilizations, 47, 48n.

¹⁰²Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" 66. Serbs have been writing in Serbian, distinct from Russian Cyrillic, for centuries, ever since Vuk Stefanović Karadžić standardized the alphabet and grammar of the South Slavic--not Croatian, not Serbian--language. Further, Yugoslavs had always practiced the habit of, depending on where you were in Yugoslavia, speaking (in rough translation) "Serbo-Croatian" or "Croatian-Serbian." Despite Huntington's hyperbole, these tensions have always been in place, perhaps even from the time when the South Slavs began to fall under the civilizational influences of different empires in the tenth century. I personally became aware of these tensions when I first studied Serbo-Croatian at the East European language Institute in 1988 on a Fulbright fellowship. My teacher in the mornings, a Croatian, would allow only the Latin use of the alphabet in the classroom, stating that "Cyrillic is not used in Yugoslavia" (a blatant mis-truth I learned immediately on landing in Belgrade, where all signs and newspapers and public announcements were and remain written in Serbian Cyrillic). In these morning sessions, I was allowed only to use Croatian-specific words. In the afternoons, I studied under a Bosnian Serb, and was encouraged, though not forced, to use Serbian-specific words. Thus, the word for bread, "hleb" in Serbian and "kruh" in Croatian, came into my use as dialectical variants of cultural difference. True, such difference was significant, one marked by different alphabets; nonetheless, the difference between the languages today known as Serbian and Croatian are really only several hundred words. (The notable exception to the rule of separate alphabets is found in the Serb Krajina parastate within Croatia, where ethnic Serbs claim that the Latin alphabet had been forced on them by Austro-Hungarian masters centuries ago. In the "capital" of Knin, the signs are

written in Cyrillic; the graffiti, nonetheless--the true measure of a culture's less attractive identity--appears mostly in Latin.) If one were to have forgotten the 1990's, and spoken the forgotten language known as Serbo-Croatian, one could get by, albeit as the target of some suspicion, in both Croatia and Serbia.

¹⁰³My thanks to Professor Steven Ross, Strategy and Policy Professor at the Naval War College, for this Jesuit insight.

¹⁰⁴From the foreword to Balkan Babel by Ivo Banac, xiv-xv..

¹⁰⁵Arguably, the root causes of what I term "Yugo Fatigue" which led to the signing of the Dayton Accords might stem partially from the perceptions of cultural indifference; that is, Serbian culture fragmented in the face of Western NATO intervention in Bosnia and the "West" allowing Croatia to violate United Nations agreements and invade the Krajina "Republic" (and thus create the belief for many Serbs that Milšević had abandoned both them and Serbian nationalism in order to save himself). Such fragmentation might serve as both explanation and reminder that the causes for the last Balkan war have not yet been resolved.

¹⁰⁶From the introduction to Balkan Babel by Ivo Banac, xiv-xv.

¹⁰⁷George Kennan, "Introduction--The Balkan Crises: 1913 and 1993," The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), 14.

¹⁰⁸William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy, 91.

¹⁰⁹Robert S. McNamara, with Brian Van DeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books), 331-332.

¹¹⁰Ramet, Balkan Babel, xv.

¹¹¹Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 82.

¹¹²Paul Homes, "Pope Appeals for Toleration in Bosnia" Reuters News Service <www.washingtonpost.com> (14 April 1997); Tracy Wilkinson and Richard Boudreaux, "Pope Unfazed by Threats in Sarajevo: Powerful Explosives Fould along Route of Pontiff's Motorcade," The Los Angeles Times <www.washingtonpost.com> (13 April 1997).

¹¹³George Kennan, "Introduction," 11.

¹¹⁴Decline of the West, II, 170.

¹¹⁵Quoted in Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, 5.

¹¹⁶Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" 67.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 271; Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," 45.

¹¹⁹John Lukacs, "Our Enemy, the State?" Wilson Quarterly, Spring 1996, 115. The blurred distinction between culture and civilization exists even today in spoken Greek: the word most commonly used to signify "culture" is πολιτισμός, which is also synonymous with "civilization."

¹²⁰Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon: 356-323 B.C. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 6-7.

AFTER THE LOST WAR: THE END OF NATO

Although the justifications for NATO expansion have been articulate, the inevitable consequence of such expansion has received far less consideration. In the search for NATO's plausibility in a new millennium, some possible effects could be set in place by the very actions that the potentials represented by the Cold War's demise should have prevented from occurring: a splintering of Central and Eastern Europe into the "Haves" and "Have Nots"; the eventual maneuvering of Russia into an aggressive counter-posturing, and the "Balkanization" of former Soviet States who cannot practice non-alignment yet founder in the wake of no effective alliance in a post-Cold War environment. Strategies that emerge must realize the pitfalls of responsibility and the imperative for a broad spectrum of engagement. The current conundrum is this: NATO expansion or non-expansion will bear consequence that may be both unintended and unwelcome.

Καί τώρα τί θά γένουμε χωρίς βαρβάρους.
Οί άνθρωποι αὐτοί ἦσαν μία χάποια λύσις.¹

Κ. Π. ΚΑΒΑΦΗΣ
4th Century, A.D.

NEIGHBORING NATIONS are naturally enemies of each other,
unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATIVE
REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood
occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to
aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."²

ALEXANDER HAMILTON (under the pseudonym PUBLIUS), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 1787

When you come to a fork in the road, take it.

YOGI BERRA, MID-20TH CENTURY

By the time this essay appears in print, one of the actions against which it cautions will already have happened: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will have been invited into, and will have accepted, full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Membership will not be immediate, not likely even to occur before the millennium's end. But the process itself, and the consequence this process brings, will be set in place. The aim of this essay, then, is not argue against past actions but to articulate the numerous trip-wires that will unfold along the path the European security environment has chosen to follow. The United States, in particular, must remain both sensitive to and keenly aware of all nations who exist in a Europe that, for all useful purposes, extends from Washington to Vladivostok. Both as honest broker and interested partner, America must remain committed and engaged. Failure to honor real commitment or to offer anything less than total United States engagement should require a critical reëxamination of national security interests and our strategy for securing such interests exclusive of serious European partnership.

Expanding NATO membership and extending new guarantees for the alliance, of course, represent extraordinary achievements. Such opportunity places a marker on one century's end and another's beginning, on the death of a colossal ideological conflict, and on the potential for refining European alliances between neighboring states into new and potentially far more secure and enduring relationships. Equally, such action may embroil both the United States and other NATO partners in a widening net of entanglements that reach far beyond the purposes of the original collective defense charter, even to suggest that the alliance will

continue to transform toward a collective security regime.³ Indeed, one argument worth pursuing is whether NATO does not already exist--in form if not official declaration--as a collective security regime, and, by its deterrent mechanism, has not already supplanted the Organization for Security and Coöperation in Europe (OSCE) as a pan-European collective security organization.

Yugoslavia, and what remains of its shattered ruins, represents the origins of NATO expansion and the justification for its existence in the post-Cold War yet pre-epithet new era.⁴ It was in the Balkans, after all, and not across the Fulda Gap, where NATO witnessed its first combat employment and its first out-of-area operations in history. On 10 September 1995--after NATO involvement in the Balkan arena since February 1994--thirteen Tomahawk cruise missile launched from an American destroyer on station in the Adriatic Sea. This action was in concert with the more than 3,500 NATO air strikes flown in a ten-day period in retaliation for a claimed Serb mortar attack on a Sarajevo market on 30 August 1995.⁵

And it was under the banner of American leadership that NATO forces proved far more effective than U.N. peacekeepers in separating the warring parties, employing a coercive diplomacy that led to a negotiated settlement and the tenuous peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1994, President Clinton could declare that former Yugoslavia was a problem for which "Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving"; yet, one year later, the President could declare that former Yugoslavia, within Central Europe, was "a region of the world that is vital to our national interests."⁶ But such "vital interests" do not imply a permanent presence. NATO and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) must eventually withdraw, and the tenuous peace may dissolve to bitter war.

The tensions of the Europe's "Southern Region," nevertheless--the area where conflicts and entanglements will likely continue--will thoroughly challenge the alliance's enduring purposes. Indeed, this region provides a geographic focus for exploring the benefits and opportunities that expansion could provide. The future's arc of crisis is not in Central Europe--

the region where expansion will occur--but in the south, in Russia, in the Transcaucasians, and Central Asia--the region where NATO forces may be committed to.⁷

Balkan intervention has changed forever the original collective security identity of the North Atlantic charter. If NATO is to survive and contribute meaningfully in a new century, it must find a means to integrate itself within the European security architecture and grow beyond the basis of its original 1949 charter as a purely military defensive alliance. It must re-consider its original focus as a complement to the charter of the United Nations and more closely complement, or one day become a part of, mechanisms such as the OSCE, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), or the European Union (EU) that today consist of disparate elements and disparate interests (not the least of which is defensive cohesion--which NATO represents--and economic competition--which European Union and American business realize all too well). Therein lie the opportunities for future success--and future dangers.

The expansion of NATO bears consequence; such consequence must not be taken lightly. Yet in the search for NATO's plausibility in a new millennium, the very actions that the positive potentials represented by the Cold War's demise should have prevented from occurring might still transpire: a splintering of Central and Eastern Europe into the "Haves" and "Have Nots," the eventual maneuvering of Russia into an aggressive counter-posturing, and the "Balkanization" of former Soviet States who cannot practice non-alignment yet founder in the wake of no effective alliance. Strategies that emerge must realize the pitfalls of responsibility and the imperative for a broad spectrum of engagement. The current conundrum is this: NATO expansion or non-expansion will bear consequence that may be both unintended and unwelcome.

LIMITS OF PARTNERSHIP, LIMITS OF CHOICE

The new NATO can do for Europe's East what the old NATO did for Europe's West: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the Cold War began.⁸

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, 15 February 1997

No one should easily dismiss the significance of NATO enlargement. In the Balkans, for example, despite the recent horrors that seemed so abhorrent and foreign (yet were emblematic of the most violent century in history), we should recognize that European integration along with the mutual enhancement of international and inter-national relationships among Europe states are processes that must predominate. They should also occur simultaneously. NATO expansion, in the best sense, is part of that process. Yet, as former Undersecretary of State and White House Envoy (during the Greek-FYROM negotiations) Matthew Nimetz notes, the issue of NATO membership ought to be "less important than the process of gradual harmonization of strategic goals and security coöperation with the alliance's broad framework."⁹ Such an ideal must not be forgotten in the face of harsh realities, both in the wake of NATO enlargement and in the face of newly erupting conflicts. The recent revolt--and no other term would be as accurate--in Albania reveals how "The Land of the Eagles" (an active PfP member and support base for American military operations in the Balkans) was cast as a "foreign" land, a place with little relation to the rest of Europe. In the words of one "Western" diplomat, "Albania is going to be in a prolonged crisis. The Mad Max appearance of the violence is not going to be very helpful. It's not Europe. We're into an Eastern Zaire situation."¹⁰

The problem, of course, is that Albania is Europe, as much a Balkan economic and political victim of a "century of myopic Western policy in the region" as Bosnia--or, for the sake of argument, Serbia.¹¹ NATO enlargement has the possibility to influence and even eradicate such myopic indifference; conversely, inattention to such basic problems may well necessitate "out-of-area" as standard operating policy for the alliance. Our new century could be one of

differentiated fragmentation: an allied and prospering Europe seeking to "contain" the fractured and chaotic "Other Europe." A Well of Lost Opportunities could well replace the Iron Curtain.

To Have and To Have Not?

With the integration of new members into the NATO security architecture, there will be the questions of the "Haves" and the "Have Nots," the "Runners-Up" and the unofficially acknowledged parties who are "Those Who Never Stood a Chance." Membership in each of these particular cliques is not insignificant. It may largely determine whether NATO expansion will create a more viable security system for Europe, one that will permit nations and peoples to decide their destinies, through peaceful process, or it may merely determine a process of Balkanization for those in the "Other Europe"--whose fate is determined largely outside their own borders. (The July 1995 London conference on Bosnia seems reminiscent of the 1913 London conference that settled borders in the wake of the First Balkan war; similarly, "European" powers granted Greece its independence in 1832 and imposed on Greece a Bavarian, Otto I, as King of the Hellenes.)

Although Matthew Nimetz, for example, considers the Balkans specifically in proposing seven broad security policies that would lead to a wider regional stability, any member of this "Other Europe" would fit his specific goal of securing a "commitment from each... state to refrain from forming alliances or security arrangements with one or more of its...neighbors."¹² Such commitment and restraint, of course, are unlikely if this Balkanization process is perceived as taking place for those for whom NATO membership will remain little more than joint coöperative ventures. Further, the process of NATO enlargement, may seem a codification that solidifies security arrangements for only those partners who appear most stable. The others, the "Have Nots" who are left outside such process, or may believe themselves left outside despite all assurances to the contrary, may draw on the perception they lack sufficient stability. Thus, perceptually marginalized, they will find relatively little "protection" from European agencies such as the OSCE, the NACC, and can only actively participate-without explicit security guarantees--in the Partnership for Peace (PfP)

regime. This perception, allowed to foster, would reap division in the New Europe. Indeed, with the process of alliance enlargement, we may need to worry far less about new states--Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary--invited into membership and far more about those states, the close contenders--Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia--who were not.

Old Alliances, New Boundaries

The nature of the NATO alliance, in the future, both in form and content will differ from its Cold War origins. It may equally be questionable if NATO can remain, despite all contemporary assurances to the contrary, a feasible guarantor of security for all members and under bound agreements by which all members will abide. The by now infamous remark made by the Czech ambassador at a Washington luncheon in 1995 that he wondered if his country would really want to go war for Turkey, fails to consider the reverse: Would Turkey really want to go to war for the Czech Republic?¹³ Turkey, a steadfast NATO member during not only the Cold War but during the Gulf War as well, has had its share of problems internally (with various periods of military dictatorship) and externally with the alliance (its 1974 invasion of Cyprus and Greece's six-year withdrawal from NATO in protest, and the tensions that continue with Greece over Aegean issues). Yet Turkey may reap no benefits from its long-term NATO membership; indeed, it may find itself increasingly at the periphery, distanced from a more "Euro-centric" (and no other ethnically oriented moniker may be as accurate) version of the NATO alliance in which interests and concerns in Europe's Southern region will be regarded most commonly as "problem areas."

Whether he is accurate or not, Samuel Huntington has managed to raise the hackles of various policy makers by addressing such cultural bias or alignment (depending on your point of view) in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. In NATO's Southern region, he suggests that while Greece and Turkey will retain formal NATO membership status, their "ties to their NATO states are likely to attenuate."¹⁴ In the same vein, both Greece and Turkey could chose to opt out or slow the processes of new NATO memberships in the belief that expansion will divert not only resources but attention from their

own continuing inter-regional conflicts.¹⁵ Huntington, of course, likely goes too far with his "civilizational" paradigm: he is far less correct, for example, in his overarching claim that Greece, "an anomaly...not part of Western civilization," is acting almost exclusively out of cultural Orthodox ties, and "evolving into the post-Cold War ally of Russia."¹⁶ The Hellenic Republic is acting partially out of such cultural links, true, yet the perception in Southeast Europe, most often the perceptions privately held and sometimes publicly proclaimed by Greeks themselves, is that Greece will become increasingly marginalized in the New Europe and the New NATO. This perception is not necessarily incorrect or a recent revelation. In 1991, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell visited the Balkans for orientation, personal contact, and personal appraisal of the security environment. Prior to touching down in Athens, he asked his regional briefer, "What do these people want to hear from me?" The response was significant: "They want to be told that they still matter."¹⁷

Those concerns are no less true today, whether in Greek-Serbian relations, Greek-Russian defense coöperation, or Greek-Turkish tensions. Thus, in response to regional security concerns, Greece is expanding joint weapons production with Moscow and increasing Russian technical assistance for Athens. In deciding whether to buy American F-15s or Russian SU-27s, the Chief of the Hellenic Air Force recently visited Moscow and flew a "Soviet" fighter jet, afterwards remarking that the flight was "the experience of his entire career."¹⁸ Such alliances and increased coöperation, nonetheless, should not be taken alignment within the "new" Europe along exclusively cultural affiliations. To the contrary, Greece's actions seem more a pragmatic response to shifting realities. Recently, during the Albanian revolt, Greece--the only NATO member situated completely in the Balkans--showed great reluctance to intervene, particularly with a NATO peacekeeping force in the belief that such actions would have little influence on the final outcome of the crisis. An official government noted that while Greece would support such intervention, it would be an option "we do not wish to see materialize."¹⁹

Such clearheaded Hellenic pragmatism stands in stark contrast to American policy observers who assert that military intervention in Albania is mandatory because, "the United States, as guarantor of the Dayton peace agreements, has a direct interest in preserving the fragile Balkan peace. It also has a longer-term interest in seeing Europe learn how to manage regional crises on its own."²⁰ Such bold assertion amounts to little more than folly that, much like Voltaire's naïve optimist, *Candide*, who sees the best of all possible solutions in the best of all possible worlds. By contrast, the Hellenic Republic, largely because it has suffered the sad misfortune of "living" in the Balkans, yet is "not European," realizes the contradiction: Albania is not subject, by any measure, to the security guarantees under the Dayton peace accord; further, Europe cannot manage regional crises, now or in any foreseeable future, without American military strength.²¹

Further north, yet still within the Balkans, the Hungarian "question" remains unsolved. Numerous intelligence analysts have pointed with concern to the potential for ethnic conflict involving Hungarian minorities. Much of the trouble stems from the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which left over 3 million Hungarians outside Hungary's present borders--in Slovakia, in Transylvania, in Vojvodina within Serbia, and in western half of Ukraine. Indeed, the Hungarian minority example is but one of many explosive problems that display the potential for conflicts to still ignite in Eastern Europe, conflicts into which NATO will almost certainly be drawn. Sabrina Ramet, among the most seasoned and accurate observers of Central and Eastern Europe, has described nine zones "afflicted by ethnic hatred and intolerance." These zones, which NATO expansion has now positioned itself within, move alliance "partners" closer to front lines and cultural chasms that include Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Albania.²²

The Price of the Ticket

The "cost" of NATO expansion remains a different issue entirely. A recent RAND study estimates that NATO expansion will cost \$42 billion, with approximately \$8 billion to be contributed by each member.²³ By contrast, an earlier Congressional Budget Office

calculation placed the cost of expansion (for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland) at between \$60 billion and \$124 billion.²⁴ The real cost figures remain undetermined and as yet unclear as to how they might impact the alliance. What remains startling, however, is that the price of this expansion may be bounded by the willingness of "old" members to support "new" ones as much as by the concessions the Russian Federation is willing to allow, such as with the transfer of excess defense equipment to Central European NATO allies. The costs of enlargement, then, may significantly rise.

THE BALKAN ENIGMA

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity.

ARTICLE 3,
The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949²⁵

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist...to restore and and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

ARTICLE 5,
The North Atlantic Treaty²⁶

For the moment at least, NATO's purpose appears to have "one central and compelling purpose: to insure that it...[prevents] the reimposition of Russian and military control in Central Europe."²⁷ Membership in NATO is essentially open to those nations who meet basic competence in military forces, political democracy, and civilian control of the armed forces. Such a focus, nonetheless, risks ignoring clashes that will result by all too narrowly defining the boundaries of West as lying along the "Eastern Boundary of Western Civilization," which runs by no accident of history straight through the heart of the Balkans--the fault line, as it were, between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.²⁸ Thus, according to Professor Huntington, Slovenia and Croatia, are both "culturally Western...and economically more developed" than the nations of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, and appropriate candidates for EU membership and NATO expansion.²⁹ Such a construct, nonetheless, ignores how cultural fault lines, nowhere more so than in the Balkans, are indistinct. Further, the borders that exist today in the former Federal Socialist Republics of

Yugoslavia are not bounded by historical precedent. Both Slovenia and Croatia, never exclusively independent states, experienced tenuous and evolving relations with an imperial Austro-Hungarian master that, symbolically and physically, died in Sarajevo in 1914.³⁰ Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia never existed as nations until 1991, and today even their borders--bounded by the Dayton agreement--are subject to volatile and uncertain issues.

Slovenia, before all other former Yugoslav republics the potentially strongest NATO candidate, portrays itself as a nation that, according to Foreign Minister Davorin Kračun, is "politically and mentally far away from the Balkans." Indeed, on the surface, Slovenia seems impressively immersed in a wide array of European participations, perhaps the one ex-Yugoslav nation to have emerged virtually unscathed from the Cold War and to have produced impressive credentials: \$10,000 per capita income; potential net contributor to the EU, ahead of Greece and Portugal, with all the marks of a parliamentary democracy; 68% of its current trade is with the EU; a stable currency; balanced budget; low public debt.³¹ In 1995, perhaps in response to such impressive achievements, former Secretary of Defense William Perry opened the possibility of NATO membership for Slovenia on a visit to that nation.³² Yet such achievements cannot mask recent truths of Slovenia's dropping production rates, unemployment hanging stubbornly at 13%, and continuing stresses over territory and shipping rights with Italy and Hungary.³³ Even with these setbacks, though, a larger question as to how Slovenia could so easily "escape" from the Yugoslav federation and remain relatively unscathed has a fairly ominous answer, one that has little to do with "Civilization Models" and much to do with brutal force, personal interests, and spheres of influence. In an off-record comment made to journalist Misha Glenny in late 1991, Slobodan Milošević admitted that he had no interest in keeping Slovenia within the Yugoslav federation, and that the "ten day war" (during which international media actually "filmed scenes" from in Osijek, in neighboring Croatia) had little significance. "Pah," Milošević remarked, "the Slovenes can go whenever they like. There's nothing to stop them now."³⁴

An uncomfortable truth seems present in this casual dismissal. Despite Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's assertion that "NATO faces no immediate threat," Europe does face such a threat, one that will not vanish through NATO expansion.³⁵ In some not so exceptional cases, NATO expansion might well exacerbate these problems. One need only review the recent rhetoric in media reporting and editorials of the "new" Yugoslavia to realize an immense and dangerous consequence: Serbia did not suffer defeat at the hands of Balkan rivals; rather, Serbia capitulated because of aggressive NATO intervention. Thus, intervention by the European "outsider" has not settled differences among adversaries. Indeed, in some measure, NATO intervention has served to forestall the inevitable showdown³⁶ One need not extrapolate much farther to realize how reciprocal attitudes could develop along similar lines in the future Russian Federation unless clear articulation of NATO purposes, engagement, and coöperation remain paramount concerns.

The Balkans may well be the mirror that reflects a larger dissolution and chaos that is yet to come, or only now beginning to present itself, in the various independent republics of the former USSR. (Indeed, the very argument former Secretary of State James Baker made in the last year of the Bush administration was that Yugoslavia's disintegration could reproduce itself on a larger, more destructive scale in South Central Europe, the Transcaucasians, and Central Asia, with consequences that would involve the entire world.) Albania and the recent government failure to democratically address the fomenting revolt, as one example, should not be taken as a surprise. The political mechanisms of Europe, most particularly the OSCE, while not completely ineffective, have failed to divert the torrent that unleashed itself. NATO, in contrast to other European mechanisms, seemed unwilling to influence or even leverage a less violent outcome. (The Secretary General made no trips to Albania during the crises of 1996 or 1997; by contrast, he made several trips to the Baltic states and incurred the wrath of Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the prospect of NATO's expansion to his doorstep).

NATO, in truth, continues to limit itself, from the wider promise of a coöperative security regime.³⁷ Thus, NATO remains reactive and not proactive. Despite the changed vocabulary of recent NATO official documents, this response limitation will bring significant consequence in the

New Europe.³⁸ NATO seems unprepared to meet the European "threats" before conflict actually occurring. NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, after all, was largely justified as a collective security response (and not collective defense) to conflict outbreak, yet drew on articles of the original defense charter of 1949. The Balkans, part of and critical to Europe despite all denials to the contrary, are not subject to such upheaval because of clichéd belief that "the incorrigible nature of Balkan peoples and their politicians...corrupt, ready to manipulate and indefatigably violent...[are acting on] the theory of 'ancient Balkan hatreds.'"³⁹

The continued "Balkanization" of the "Other Europe," which NATO expansion will serve by an official delineation, will not erase the inevitability of regional conflict and the prospect of future NATO interventions. Yet the peoples, of this "Other Europe," ironically, are more intimately aware of the West than of their most immediate neighbors. As Matthew Nimetz has noted:

I have found quite astonishing the lack of concrete knowledge among the people of the region about each other...National groups differ dramatically in language, culture, and historical perspective...Balkan intellectual life is largely localized and then directed outwards towards to cosmopolitan centers--Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, or New York...the relationships between Turkey and its European neighbors are too often viewed both inside and outside Turkey as a continuation of their Ottoman antecedents rather than considered in the spirit of creating a new framework....The Cold War...[has] left two generations of intellectual and economic separation that must now be bridged.⁴⁰

These problems indeed present a threat that NATO can only respond to, and can "solve" only in concert with other European mechanisms. The problems will remain, nonetheless, as will the threats. Only clear-headed "Western" European influence, interest, and involvement can author a different outcome.

In the Balkans, the issue of centuries of Ottoman domination is a matter of how cultures and nations define themselves. Further, while the issue of territory and the fault lines of empires in Central and Eastern Europe simmer, one distinguishing characteristic is that nations perceived as more "Western" European and more traditionally aligned (such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) appear the most stable democracies. Such a fault line distinction is, of course, false.

Again, using the Balkan region as example--a region that given its current and future volatility--will likely remain a testing ground for NATO out-of-area operations--it seems extraordinary that more attention is not being paid to the areas in which future conflict may most likely occur. Albania, a region where, as Michael Roskin has rightly noted, the United States military is as popular as anywhere in the world.⁴¹ Yet our emphases on military exercise programs and active Albanian PfP participation did little to thwart the influence of elaborate pyramid money schemes that were bound to fail, bound to produce subsequent economic and social chaos. Such chaos led to revolt among the more affluent (and largely ethnically Greek) citizens of Southern Albania.

In 1993, the military budget in Albania was \$3 million; in 1995, the budget, largely with American assistance, was \$49 million.⁴² In Albania, an active PfP member and a nation at one time eager for NATO membership, the American military was wildly popular from the first days when troops began operations there. Despite all such positive aspects in place, little real political influence could be leveraged against the reparations that came in the wake of 1996 elections and the subsequent revolt, in the wake of economic collapse, in 1997. Chaos was real, and NATO--perhaps wisely so--refused to intervene; NATO spokesmen spoke most often of Albania's problem as an "internal" one. Jamie Shea, one such official representative, rejected Berisha's call for NATO troops in March 1997 by saying simply, "The main problem is that there is lack of trust in the [Albanian] government."⁴³ Granted NATO and American policy had distanced itself after mid-1996 from President Berisha's authoritarian-style "democracy," yet by then a great deal of support and basing had already been given by the Albania to NATO operations in the Balkans. The loud, resounding "No" from NATO surely took the tottering regime by surprise. More bluntly, perhaps more accurately, international media resolved this calculation "With Bosnia now quiet, our man in Tirana is expendable."⁴⁴ In the New Europe, the differences between internal "problems" and external "threats" will become far less clear or certain than in the Cold War. In March 1997, the "threat," for

example, for NATO member Greece, which borders Albania and has often expressed concern for the ethnically Greek population in Southern Albania, received a direct appeal from President Sali Berisha for the Greek military to help re-constitute the Albanian armed forces. At the same time, Greek special forces had massed along the border checkpoints, even as customs officers had abandoned the Albanian-Greek border crossing of Kakavia and Albanian "rebels," in a kind of defiant flaunting, were tossing corpses over the fences at border outposts.⁴⁵ Clearly, this is an example of internal problems and potential NATO threats, a trip-wire, as it were, on a small scale.

The Balkan Enigma may well be the trip-wire for NATO in the New Europe. One thing is certain: the Balkans cannot be ignored; in some ways, it remains a region that has been ignored too long. The battle lines are in place already in Tirana, Skopje, Novi Sad, and Tîrgu Mureş; the faults of culture, the currents of history, and the inability--or indifference--of the "West" to address the Balkan Enigma may well lead to explosive conflict. The indifference of the West must not continue; the inability of the West to solve the Balkan's problems (which the people of the Balkans clearly cannot solve themselves) remains a thorny problem, but a problem nonetheless that can be worked toward resolution by nations who are at their best in finding solutions and answers. (The most certain oxymoron may well be that a "permanent solution" does not exist for the Balkans.) Yet NATO, as a policy mechanism in the security architecture of contemporary Europe, has a role to play, a role that we neither fully understand nor appreciate.

To draw on Huntington's clever pun that the "peoples of the West must hang together or they will hang separately,"⁴⁶ the same logic can be applied perversely to the Balkans: "We"--the West, of which the Balkans is a member--"must all hang together," or "They" will most certainly "hang themselves."

RUSSOPHOBIA, OR MANAGED RISK?

Russia is in, but not of, Europe; it borders Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and it pursues policies along these borders that are difficult to reconcile with NATO objectives.⁴⁷

HENRY KISSINGER, 14 January 1997

Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era...Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the Cold War, should East-West relations centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, be against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable future military conflict?⁴⁸

GEORGE F. KENNAN, 5 February 1997

Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, made the most pertinent justification for the alliance in the Cold War: "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, the Germans down."⁴⁹ From a Russian perspective, history should have observed this truism in the wake of Soviet collapse to secure a future Europe that would "keep the Russian Federation in, the Americans out, and the Germans--in voice and vote, at least--on our side." Thus, the mild discussion of issues between President Clinton and President Yeltsin at the March 1997 Helsinki summit skated over a surface tension that strayed little from this reversal of historic precedent.⁵⁰ The Russian insistence on "not conflict but compromise," seemed perfectly reasonable; yet insistence, from an American perspective, on the inevitability of NATO expansion seemed firm. No happy medium seemed to exist.

Further, even after the negotiations between Secretary-General Javier Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov that reached a compromise on 14 May 1997, much of the details remained sketchy as to how the three new NATO partners will or will not be the target of new European tensions, where troops and weapons will be stationed, or even if (as far as Russia is concerned) the three new members of NATO will be the last to join the alliance (and thus preëempting membership for former Soviet states). NATO insists it will have no "second class" members; Russia insists on making its voice, and opinion, known.

The Issue of Consequence & the Four Hypotheses

Secretary of State Albright articulated "Western" interests for NATO expansion in an article sub-titled "Why Bigger Is Better" in The Economist.⁵¹ Her justifications provide a valid framework for why expansion can be viewed from the perspective of the Russian

Federation, and even for some current PfP members, as establishing new "dividing lines" for security concerns.⁵²

NATO FACES NO IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT: George Kennan, the architect of containment who came to view with loudly proclaimed horror the militarization of his Cold War views that the Soviet system was bound to implode, questions the "why now" for NATO expansion and "against what" NATO seeks to protect itself. With Russia, especially, there exists the "disadvantage" of American "predominance" in military power--a "disadvantage" that, naturally, American policy makers today view as an immense advantage. NATO expansion would, it would seem, only add to such predominant advantage. Yet, if we admit as Secretary Albright does, that there is no immediate threat in the Cold War's aftermath, and "that massive aggression is not the primary problem, then it seems to follow that imposing these choices [such as NATO expansion] on the Russian military establishment is not the desirable answer."⁵³

NATO'S ENDURING PURPOSE MEANS IT NEEDS NO ENEMY: Alexei Pushkov, director for public and foreign affairs at Russian Public Television, has noted the paradox that Russia's image of NATO "did not undergo the same changes in the Russian psyche as did the general picture of the West between 1987 and 1991"⁵⁴ NATO was viewed as a destructive adversary and today, despite clear and direct overtones by NATO to remove such impression, the image itself may be permanently fixed in place. Thus, while the United States and a united Germany could be viewed as no longer being enemies, "NATO was still viewed as potentially an anti-Russian enemy. It was also seen as a collective enemy."⁵⁵ That perception remains, particularly among the Russian power elite. The commonly reported indifference of the Russian people in public opinion polls to NATO expansion obviates the larger obstacle of daily survival in an economically tenuous landscape. For the Russian people, NATO is a "foreign" issue;⁵⁶ for the Russian leadership, NATO enlargement serves as rhetorical device for parliamentary debate--the "West" as looming threat.

EU CAN REÜNITE EUROPE: Neither "stocks and bonds" nor "stockpiles and bombs," of themselves, can provide security or prosperity for a New Europe.⁵⁷ Secretary Albright addresses the most pertinent question of all in asserting that EU, a European institution, and NATO, a transatlantic one, are best served by strong linkage. As she notes, "The question is not which institutions strong democracies should join, but when and how they are prepared to join each."⁵⁸ NATO expansion, unless it proceeds with a careful, purposeful resolve may well impede the growth of Russian democracy, and there is ample evidence already that expansion has fueled the fires of nationalist fury in Moscow. Indeed, former Foreign Minister Andrei Kosyrev lost favor with the Duma parliament, with public opinion, and with President Yeltsin when his support for NATO expansion led to him being "suspected of playing too often into the hands of the West, thereby neglecting Russia's national interests."⁵⁹

Russia must not be locked out of Europe as much as the nations of Central and Eastern Europe must not be denied the choice for membership in a newly evolving Europe. Equally, it must not be impossible to think of Russia as a valid future candidate for European Union membership. (Hard core realists, such as Henry Kissinger, of course, would find such suggestion untenable.) Two of the most reasoned European countries who have recognized this truth are Turkey and Bulgaria, perhaps partially because (for different reasons) they have little hope of attaining EU membership in any immediate future and yet desire real and enduring coöperation, involvement, and growth with both NATO and the Russian Federation. Former Turkish Prime Minister and current Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller has warned against NATO creating a new "dividing line" with eastward expansion, going so far as to proclaim that "Turkey will not allow NATO to become a threat to Russia."⁶⁰ In Bulgaria, despite the recent change in government and the continuing efforts by President Petar Stoyanov to fend off economic implosion, the attitude toward "division" of Europe remains clear: "Russia has been our ally for centuries."⁶¹ It remains pertinent to remember, in sowing the seeds of the New Europe, that the roots of the Old Europe did not begin with the Cold War.

NATO WILL SOMEHOW RE-DIVIDE POST-COLD WAR EUROPE: NATO enlargement has produced a consequence it could not prevent: the "division" of Europe. The issue is not, nor has it ever been, one as simple as "arguing over the number of tanks that can be stationed in Europe."⁶² Democracy building and security architectures, ideally, should be simultaneous processes. Too rapid expansion of democracy support without security assurances, or its reverse, will lead to a *Realpolitik* of a cold calculus that Kissinger's assertion that "Russia is in, but not of Europe" reveal:⁶³ that Europe, in truth or practice, actually ends at Poland's eastern borders, that PfP members such as Armenia, Azerbaijan Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will have no chance of NATO membership, that they will remain permanent members of the "other alliance"--the one without security guarantees.

The Dangers of Hedging

Henry Kissinger, an "outsider" highly critical of inside maneuvering in the process of NATO expansion, has civilly proclaimed that "I will hold my nose and support enlargement even though the conditions may be extremely dangerous."⁶⁴ His reluctance stems from his belief that the Clinton administration has already made too many concessions toward the Russian Federation, even as Russia believes, and as President Yeltsin declared it, "To concede further is no longer possible."⁶⁵ The concessions to which Kissinger objects--and, for that matter, so does former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski--are a Russian seat at the NATO decision making table as consultative partner without the formal power of vetoes on security decisions, and guarantees not to station "foreign" NATO troops or nuclear weapons eastward into partner states.

The issue, of course, was never weapons or troops. It was, and remains, the perception that these weapons and troops bring to the New Europe. As such, the need for clarity and the most accurate possible alignment of perceptions by all sides remain paramount, and not always possible. The evidence, to date, is not encouraging. The 1995 NATO Enlargement study (the basis for the current enlargement action), as one example of differing perceptions, while conceptually balanced and focused toward Central and Eastern Europe, "is weak and

unconvincing...[with] an evident lack of clarity on what to offer Russia as counterweight to enlargement."⁶⁶

Russian objections to expansion will not vanish now that the invitation has been extended for new membership. Should new member states become actively militant in advocating new policies that are perceived by Russia as anti-Russian, or should new moves take place too quickly to engage other nations that Russia--rightly or wrongly--still perceives as within its influence sphere, that can be no doubt that Russia will react.⁶⁷ Russia's objections arise partly from the view that an encirclement of Russia is taking place even as it staggers back from the abyss of dissolution (from which it has never strayed very far since 1991). Thus, despite the claims by many Americans that President Yeltsin's loud and persistent objections were performances made for Russian domestic consumption, it was performance backed by firm personal conviction. While Yeltsin could easily dismiss fears of NATO attack, he could speak with real "fear [of] a western blockade of Russia."⁶⁸ This is not blatant paranoia. Poland has always made it clear that it sought NATO membership as a means to escape Russian dominance. The Baltic states, though not as vocal officially, share the same conviction. Further, Russia now believes with equal conviction that both the United States and Germany (as "compensation," as it were, for German unification) pledged in the early 1990s not to expand NATO eastward.⁶⁹ From any perspective, Russian beliefs that "Russophobia" is a factor in NATO enlargement may not seem so odd, and the consequence may be significant:

A second Yalta, a second partition of central Europe between NATO and an excluded, hostile Russia would likely inspire the very Russian revanchism its proponents [of enlargement] purport to fear. Even worse, allowing only a few central European countries to join NATO would encourage bitterness or panic in the neighboring countries that were left out of the Western alliance.⁷⁰

Compromise, nonetheless, is necessary. The conundrum that current national security adviser Samuel Berger metaphorically describes as "the Scylla and Charybdis of NATO enlargement"--the concern that NATO enlargement will prevent Russia from a role in the New Europe balanced by equal concern that an appeasing Russia will weaken the alliance--is, sadly, a weak comparison.⁷¹ In myth, at least, Odysseus was able to navigate between the two

dangers and return (albeit the sole survivor) to Ithaka. In the "new" Europe, we must make sacrifices that are painful; in essence, we must avoid the horrors of Scylla while navigating perilously close to Charybdis, the whirlpool from which there is no return. In more prosaic terms, NATO expansion has proceeded by following a "hedging" strategy.

Such managed risk has its dangers, too. The dangers of a hedging strategy in a force planning scenario (which NATO expansion, in its "pure" sense, represents) is that it "tends to understate friendly strengths, exaggerate the capabilities and hostility of potential rivals, and thus drive planners toward worst-case scenarios."⁷² European political tensions (and, some would insist, American domestic policy) further impact this force planning scenario process against no clearly identifiable rival, no reasonable immediate need to extend security guarantees, and the real possibility that too rapid NATO enlargement may well hamper the democratic process taking root in, not only in Russia, but in the nations of the "Have Nots" of Central Europe, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.⁷³

NATO enlargement, both at its best and worst, is a classic hedging strategy, and follows its classic fault: "its recommendations are very costly."⁷⁴ If Russia had evolved into a fully democratic state, with all its internal problems magically resolved and the economic miracle of the marketplace taking deep root throughout its vast empire, NATO expansion would never have been considered. But the miracle of '89 and the Soviet collapse in 1991, represented the most rapid acceleration of historic process in the last half of the twentieth century. Such acceleration could not last forever; if it had, it would have brought more chaos than promise. In its stead, we have the hard reality of the New Europe, not so vastly different than the old one. Theorists and practitioners as vastly differing in perspective as John Mearsheimer and former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger can speak with the same almost certain and nostalgic wistfulness of the "good old days" of the Cold War. Note, for example, the eerie contemporary resonance of Mearsheimer's remarks in 1990:

The West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It therefore has an interest in maintaining the Cold War order, and hence has an interest in the continuation of the Cold War confrontation; developments that threaten to end it are dangerous. The Cold War antagonism could be continued at lower levels of

East-West tension than have prevailed in the past; hence the West is not injured by relaxing East-West tension, but a complete end to the Cold War would create more problems than it would solve.⁷⁵

Even such skillful an observer as Henry Kissinger (who, in his long career, has served both as theorist and practitioner) can seem oddly ahistorical in perspective when he claims, "Whoever heard of a military alliance begging with a weakened adversary? NATO should not be turned into an instrument to conciliate Russia...."⁷⁶ Kissinger, once the ultimate advocate of balance of power ratios, seems to have forgotten that this "weakened adversary" still has thousands of nuclear warheads that, while not currently pointed in our general direction, could be made to do so with little effort.

Perhaps, as the process of change takes place within the alliance, Kissinger and other Cold Warriors will have little place in planning the security architecture of the New Europe; or, if such perspectives as his are in fact and deed valid, there is a second possibility almost impossible to consider: the Cold War isn't over.

AFTER THE LOST WAR

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Toward the door we never opened...

T.S. ELIOT⁷⁸

Alliances also die when they win.⁷⁷
JOSEF JOFFE

The "Lost War," of course, has many meanings. It suggests that the Cold War may have been both a process thought through with strict adherence to differences so vast no single integration could occur. It may have been a conflict, fought for nearly five decades, that left such indelible impressions on the souls of decision makers that change, to any effective degree, cannot take place. Failing the complete refusal of adversarial positions to find a middle ground, the future may be made as equally uncertain by the lack of general consensus about directions and motivation for change. The Soviet Union certainly lost the Cold War, but, in the absence of consensus, the will to purpose, and through the mapping of our course through the general gyrations of the compass, have we ever really proven that "We" have won it?

The Lost War, then, or saving ourselves from ourselves, can be won by a war of purpose and resolve. Only through waging a struggle, with considerations of threats as real as any Cold War confrontation and understanding the implications of consequence that decisions brings, will we make progress or hope to achieve anything of lasting worth. It is a war we must understand and immerse ourselves within. The question of NATO enlargement, and the end toward which the alliance seeks to find its more permanent state, one that enhances stability not only for a region but for the world, has not been marked by impressive accomplishment in the last days of this millennium. We have been sidetracked by single arguments which, though important, distract us from the larger questions that implicate us all. With the case of NATO expansion, consequences will unfold that will bring some nasty surprises. In some ways, of course, surprise should be expected. But we should be thinking in the future, as well, and we are not.

The issue itself is larger than the narrow focus of enlargement. The issue is really how and into what, for what end purposes and by what reasonable means, within the real constraints of partnership and against an accurate assessment of the security environment, will NATO evolve? Indeed, the issue, in the end, is evolution, not enlargement.

The Origins of Change in the Balkan Intervention

It may well be that we have entered, as Jacques Attali coined the phrase, "An Age of Yugoslavias," as much as it may be that the Balkan crisis was a freak "blip" on the scope of our strategic vision.⁷⁹ While the North Atlantic Alliance may be shaping its forces, as Jonathan Clarke recently claimed, toward a wide-ranging set of commitments in Europe, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia that mirror a Balkan-style intervention model, it remains unclear what conceivable tasking the alliance believes most it is heading for.⁸⁰ Thus, NATO seeks the wide umbrella of both balance and flexibility--a hedging strategy--even as the demands and expectations placed upon it may dramatically increase.

While the alliance has clearly attempted to move beyond--or around--the Cold War strictures of its original charter, there remains an uneasiness on which direction must be taken.

In 1991, then Secretary General Manfred Woerner could speak of peacekeeping forces serving in places of ethnic conflict or between border disputes that ranged from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.⁸¹ Yet, in 1991, the future of NATO seemed destined for the ash heap of history and NATO itself was casting about for a new mission. In 1995, only a few short months before the NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia which led directly to peace talks in Geneva, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott could speak with frustration of how Bosnia and its multiple dilemmas made it "hard to feel immensely confident or self-congratulatory about the post-Cold War millennium."⁸² Here, at the end of the 1990's, the path that NATO will follow seems far less certain than this declaration of 1994:

In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defense of its members, which remains a core function. We affirm our readiness to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE [today known as the OSCE], including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.⁸³

NATO, today, has reached the metaphysical conundrum Yogi Berra so well articulated decades ago: We have come to the fork in the road, and must take it.

The Question of Alliance

Which direction we will take seems less certain today than ever. The expansion of NATO, while offering new opportunities and at least the promise of a more secure Europe, brings with it the major consequence which all major decisions set in place. In the Balkans, for example, it remains to be seen whether the application of force and the aftermath of the Dayton accords have truly settled anything in the long term. Further, NATO's role in Europe's future must be carefully considered. The massive application of firepower, of itself, is a guarantee of nothing; only such force as a subordinate element of policy with clear direction and determination will bring success.

In the late 1930's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain could speak dismissively of "a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing," in handing Czechoslovakia over to its certain fate at the hands of Nazi Germany. Today, such equivocation from a not so distant past seems jarringly unthinkable as the Czech Republic enters into partnership with the most successful alliance relationship in history, a member of equal status both with a united Germany and a more European-looking Britain under Labor leadership. Increasingly, however, the complexities of the New Europe will present ambiguities that force application, of itself, will do little to solve.

The example of Bosnia provides little encouragement; nor does the future potentialities of ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of their believed "homeland" to ignite conflict between those who do not recognize diplomatic agreements between nations. Nor do the potentials for conflict among ethnic Albanians who live outside the nominal borders of a nation seemingly on the verge of imminent collapse within the borders of other nations, or the aftershocks almost a century later of Stalin's machinations in Moldova--or Bessarabia--and the coming conflict within the ethnically Russian Transdniester Republic, provide much reason for optimism.⁸⁴ These problems have no clear solutions, even as some of them, such as Hungarian minorities in Eastern Europe, present "the gravest and least understood problem confronting policy makers in Europe."⁸⁵ Where will the consequence of NATO expansion, particularly in support of a new member state, lead us then?

The hard truth is that NATO is the only security mechanism that has the power of persuasion to leverage force when force must be applied. The demonstrated application of force in the Balkans crisis is one example. An alternate example is when NATO, perhaps wisely, refuses to intervene with force when the means do not satisfy reasonable ends. The problem, one that must be agonizingly thought through, is when to use force, most especially in those instances when force will have little impact in producing permanent solutions or securing policy goals. The use of NATO in such instances will not be for war; rather, it will be force applied yet staying "short" of war.⁸⁶

The System of Systems?

In 1993, retired Air Force General James McCarthy published an article in Strategic Review that advocated bringing Central and Eastern Europe into concert with both NATO and the NACC.⁸⁷ General McCarthy accurately foresaw the process that NATO, Europe and America, were working toward: to extend Europe's security environment and provide a catalyst for democratic values.⁸⁸ General McCarthy's focus also largely ignores the implications and the consequence for the Russian Federation, as some critics might suggest the focus of NATO's enlargement study obscured as well.

Yet NATO enlargement seems to have taken place within an interlocking systems of institutions that overlap as a means to enhance both stability and cooperation. As former Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke of it, such a system would create "a framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing institutions....through interlocking structures, each with complementary roles and strengths."⁸⁹ This prototype for this model, perhaps curiously, does not stem from what Richard Holbrooke would term "the first architectural moment" in modern Europe's history--the 1815 Congress of Vienna and the subsequent Concert of Europe--but from the balance of power relationships and essential stability that emerged in the wake of the wars of German re-unification after 1870.⁹⁰

The architect of such an overlapping system is none other than Otto von Bismarck, and using the prototype and architect as influence, Kissinger writes more eloquently (and reverently) than any other writer in advocating

creative solutions [that will] build overlapping structures, some based on common political and economic principles as in the Western Hemisphere; some combining shared principles as in the Western hemisphere; some combining shared principles and security concerns as in the Atlantic area and Northeast Asia; others based largely on economic ties as in the relations in Southeast Asia.⁹¹

It may well be that Bismarck (or, for that matter, Metternich) is not the proper genius for invention in the New Europe. Bismarck, after all, was brilliant at balance of power ratios as they related most to his own newly created nation--the German state.⁹² If, on the one hand, his approach may seem contemporaneously "attuned to the traditional approach to American

international relations,"⁹³ he also viewed such relations with a kind of cold-blooded calculus. On the other hand, "Bismarck was inclined more than [John Stuart] Mill," as Kenneth Waltz comments, "to keep his eye on the map of Europe, the chessboard; Mill more than Bismarck to focus upon the qualities of people and their governments, the chessmen."⁹⁴ In the New Europe, and the evidence is clear, we need a focus on both the chessmen and the chess board.

Europe, for some then, represents a "testing ground" for the future international model of international relations. As such, Europe may have already flunked the test; unique, dominant, and integrated as Europe is, the vicious disagreements among states, among the "Haves" and "Have Nots" with the enlargement of NATO as but one example, does not bode well for areas, such as Southeast or Southwest Asia or the Far East, where the United States is linked by economic, political, or defense relationships, but not interlinked as in Europe. Further, I would argue, the Bismarck prototype, is neither appropriate for the world or for Europe. While Europe saw no major wars between 1815-1853 (the period from the Concert of Europe and Russian "aggression" in the Crimean War) and between 1870-1914 (the period from the end of the Franco-Prussian War until World War I), there can be little doubt that, in the latter period, too much reliance rested on the personality of Bismarck and the brilliant overlapping structures that he had set in place, and that in the wake of Bismarck's dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm in 1890, relations (at first slowly) deteriorated in the years before conflict erupted, once again, on the map of Europe. In the absence of Bismarck, the peace of Europe lasted only 24 years--hardly an encouraging precedent. (One is tempted, almost, to rush by contrast toward Mearsheimer's mercenary net assessment that prolonging Cold War tensions may prolong the "long peace."⁹⁵) In the New Europe, we may well be better served by the absence of personalities driving the process of integration and more by the needs of states and forces within states to achieve stability.

Further, the interlinking (or "overlapping") of so many institutions in Europe may be prove detrimental to the final purposes of stable integration. Various agencies, institutions, and treaties of odd "acronym-ism," memberships in which denote exclusivity, such as the OECD,

NACC, NATO, WEU, EU, OSCE, CFE, as well as the Council of Europe and Open Skies exist already in Europe. Often, such agencies cannot address problems independently and indeed some of these mechanisms will soon be overcome by history.⁹⁶ The question remains open if, in an age of interconnected complexities and power shifts, such overlapping systems of systems will prevent the very integrative stability they seek to provide.⁹⁷

"What I most fear," a senior member of the North Atlantic Alliance recently confided, "is seeing NATO become more like the OSCE."⁹⁸ The implication, backed by recent evidence, is that OSCE, as an exclusively political mechanism, leverages little real influence in promoting stability and in preventing conflict. The irony is that this change is precisely what is needed. OSCE should be more like NATO; NATO should be more like the OSCE. Indeed, there is little reason why they should not be the same organization. Such suggestion is far more practical than frivolous: the integration of mechanisms within a more identifiable whole may prove the final and best solution for both Europe and the future basis for integrating such mechanisms for the world.

NATO has moved far beyond its original charter, and far beyond its identity of a regime dominated by United Nations mandate and direction. Granted the potential for such change is small, given the increasingly complex bureaucracies that act like purposeless leviathans when systems collide--as they will in the New Europe--the necessity for such evolution is made no less pressing. The question, by any analysis, should not have been whether NATO should "expand or die"; it should be for understanding how NATO will evolve or cease to have any significant meaning.

NATO is no longer a military alliance. NATO has become a venue for building enduring relationships, conducting business, responding to conflict, "binding the democracies together and reinforcing political communities."⁹⁹ NATO, beyond all its subordinate aspects, is a political alliance.

America, a European Power?

NATO is the only pan-European security mechanism backed by armed force. This can be both burden and benefit, an instrument of persuasion or the demonstration of continued purpose and resolve. All other security mechanisms and instruments to integrate Europe have largely remained impotent in the face change.¹⁰⁰

Further, while the Western European Union may well serve to supplant NATO's more enduring purpose in Europe, and while common integration of French and German defense brigades (as well as recent initiatives by the United States to incorporate joint NATO and Russian forces), the real issue of NATO's own evolving purpose in future Europe remains to be answered since the question itself has yet to be directly asked: Is NATO evolving from its present incarnation as a political-military alliance (as it evolved from a strictly military alliance in its first charter) to a political alliance that should replace less powerful and therefore less effective mechanisms such as the OSCE, the NACC, the and WEU? Is America truly a "European Power," and, if so, should the United States vie for membership as the next European power?

Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke has suggested that we are now ripe for the "fourth architectural moment" in European history.¹⁰¹ While shaping Europe, nonetheless, we are shaping ourselves, commitments, involvements, and interests. Indeed if, as Secretary Albright maintains, "the question is not which institutions strong democracies should join, but when and how they are prepared to join each," the United States should recognize Europe clearly as a region of common defense and economic interests.¹⁰² Thus, the question which diplomats, politicians, and economists would scoff at, may not seem so senseless, after all: Is the issue not one only of the consequence of NATO expansion in the East but equally whether the United States should vie for membership as a future member of the European Union, a union partially created to offset the "power" of American economic might? NATO has moved far beyond its original purpose. Perhaps Europe and the EU--and the United States as part of this process--should as well.

The answer is that there is no clear answer, even as agonizingly complicated problems proliferate at Europe's doorstep. If the fork in the road meant simply that "NATO must expand or die," then NATO should be allowed to die."¹⁰³ We are, of course, beyond that point, beyond even the "when and how" of NATO expansion, and should take some action more considerate of consequence than waiting to react as consequence unfolds.

If NATO is to survive and contribute meaningfully in a new century, it must find a means to integrate itself within the European security architecture and grow beyond the basis of its original 1949 charter. It must be more than a complement the U.N. charter and more aligned with common European interests. Therein lie the opportunities for future success--and future dangers.

"Eternal peace lasts until the next war," the Russian proverb goes. If we act now, we may be able to prolong eternity. But, by acting, we should forget the kind of courage it took to "fight" the Cold War, and the courage it takes to admit defeat. Writing of a different time and of a different conflict, George Kennan observed in his 1947 essay, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," that it should be the American people, and not just American policy makers, who must pull "themselves together and [accept] the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear."¹⁰⁴ Such imperative is no less true today, even as all expectations, based on historical precedent, are that American interests (and the people themselves) turn domestically inward in times of relative calm.

So here, at the fork in the road, we face the basic conundrum: Bounded by the complexities that NATO enlargement represents, yet made possibly more secure by the assurance such enlargement might provide, there remains a multitude of problems that, while lacking definite or final answers, must not wait to be addressed. In the end, the one imperative lies in how we cannot wait until such problems that NATO enlargements poses will then represent themselves as nightmares fully blossomed in a war that is still to come.

¹Constantine Cavafy, who ranks among the most important poets of the twentieth century, reflects in his poem "Waiting for the Barbarians" on the tension created as senators of the Roman Empire await their new conquerors, the Goths, who remain absent; equally, however, Cavafy has commented on future consequences for European security. My translation reads: "And now what will become of us, without the barbarians?/ Those people were a kind of a solution." ΤΑ ΑΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ ΤΟΥ Κ. Π. ΚΑΒΑΦΗ. Αθήνα: ύψιλον/βιβλία, 1990), 35.

²Hamilton quotes from "Principes des Négociations" par l'Abbé de Mably in "Dangers from War between the States," 33.

³The notion of the utility of a collective security regime as a mechanism to prevent conflict is controversial. A brief review of various perspectives, from both practitioners and theorists, should include Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Security after the Cold War," in Gary L. Guertner, ed., Collective Security in Europe and Asia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 7-27; Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes for War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security, Volume 17, Number 1, Summer 1992, 5-43; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Survival, Volume 34, Number 1, Spring 1992, 36-50; Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," International Security, Volume 17, Number 1, Summer 1993, 1-37; "Interlocking Institutions: The Conference on Security and Coöperation in Europe (CSCE)," NATO Basic Fact Sheet, Number 6 (Brussels: June 1994); Robert Keohane, "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies," in America and Europe in an Era of Change, Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschoff, editors (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993); as well as the views of the optimist, Warren Christopher, "Toward a More Integrated World," Statement at the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Meeting, Paris, 8 June 1994, and the pessimist, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/1995, 5-49.

⁴Perhaps the most thorough examination of these origins can be found in Gregory L. Schulte's "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," Survival, Spring 1997, 19-42. Schulte, Director of the NATO Bosnia Task Force under the direction of the Secretary General, was involved with NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia from 1992.

⁵While the issue of culpability for the marketplace attack remains a volatile issue, the NATO operation named "Deliberate Force," under the command of Admiral Leighton W. Smith, left a clear impression and sent a definite signal. NATO, a cornerstone of deterrence in Europe for five decades where a single bullet had never been fired, had entered a new age in which, for better or worse, "NATO fingers have never been far from the trigger." Jonathan Clarke, "The Future of European Security: Waiting for New Bosnias?" Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1996), 26.

⁶"In Clinton's Words: What U.S. Interests Are," The New York Times, 20 February 1994, pg. 10:3-4; "Implementing the Bonsai Peace Agreement: Let Us Lead," Vital Speeches of the Day, Volume LXII, Number 5, 15 December 1995, 130.

⁷W. Bruce Weinrod notes that the primary focus has never shifted far from the south as the "critical center of gravity" for alliance interests. Concerns over the Persian Gulf, as well as the concerns of NATO members bordering North Africa or in the Mediterranean, will continue to demand NATO's focus. Further, Weinrod notes that in the case of Yugoslav intervention, NATO circumvented Article 5 of its original charter--what had been regarded as the touchstone for alliance intervention in the case of attacks on another NATO member's territory--and instead relied on Article 3, which references broader security implications without geographic limitation. NATO's out-of-area intervention in former Yugoslavia has established a precedent

whose unintended consequence and its implication for future alliance actions has yet to be played out. "The Southern Region and NATO's Future," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1996, 12.

⁸"Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, 15 February 1997, 21.

⁹Matthew Nimetz, "Security in the Balkans," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1996, 10.

¹⁰Jane Perlez, "Albanians Arm Themselves as Crisis Widens," The New York Times Home Page, <www.nytimes.com> (14 March 1997).

¹¹Misha Glenny, "Will the West Fail Again," The New York Times, 31 January 1997, op-ed.

¹²Nimetz, 5.

¹³Josef Joffe, "Is there Life after Victory?: What NATO Can and Cannot Do," The National Interest, Fall 1995, 23. The ambassador's remark has been attributed in a number of other sources as well.

¹⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 128.

¹⁵W. Bruce Weinrod, "The Southern Region and NATO's Future," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1996, 21.

¹⁶Huntington, 162; 163.

¹⁷Confidential interview by the author.

¹⁸Confidential interview by the author.

¹⁹Extracted from United States Information Service "Press Briefing Notes," American Embassy Athens, 7 March 1997.

²⁰Editorial, "Europe's Role in Albania," The New York Times, 14 March 1997, A32..

²¹Samuel Huntington is not the only one to "isolate" Greece as being in, but not of, Europe. Journalist Robert Kaplan, among others, has argued that Greece is locked into looking eastward--toward Byzantium and away from Brussels. Such observations are markedly dated, and fail to reflect the enormous influence European Union membership has had on Greek political process and thought.

²²Sabrina Ramet, "Eastern Europe's Painful Transition," Current History, March 1996, 98. Note also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," Foreign Affairs (November-December 1989): 1-13; Mark Kramer, "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in Soviet-East European Relations?" International Security, Volume 14, Number 3, Winter 1989/1990, 51-54; Tad Szulc, "Unpleasant Truths about Eastern Europe," Foreign Policy, Spring 1996, 52-65; Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Winter 1990, 51-65; Jonathan Clarke, "Beckoning Quagmires: NATO in Eastern Europe," The Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1994, 42-60; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, Spring 116-129. Mr. Kamp, I should note, is a clear advocate of NATO expansion that is carefully considered. For separate discussions that consider the Hungarian "problem," which NATO enlargement may help bring to resolution or help ignite, see Witness to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports on Romania's Minority Policies Today (New York: American Transylvanian Federation and the Committee for Human Rights in Romania, 1979). Granted, Romania is a transformed nation and a NATO "contender," having made dramatic and democratic changes since the days of past presidents Nicolae Ceaușescu and Ion Iliescu; the underlying ethnic tensions, nonetheless, remain.

²³Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Paying for NATO Expansion," The Christian Science Monitor, 7 March 1997, 20. The actual RAND study, titled "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" and written by Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, frames enlargement under various paths (Evolutionary, Promote Stability, Strategic Response) and costs which range from \$10 billion to as high as \$110 billion over a 10-15 year period appears

in Survival, Autumn 1996, 5-26. Note also the Spring 1996 issue of Survival, devoted exclusively to the issues of "NATO, European Security and Transatlantic Relations," with particular reference to Philip H. Gordon's "Recasting the Atlantic Alliance" and Nick Williams' "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?"

24"Summary: The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance," CBO Papers, March 1996, xiv.

25"The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO Home Page, <www.vm.ee/nato/docu/basictxt/-treaty.htm> (5 March 1997), 1.

26Ibid., 1-2.

27Huntington, 161.

28Ibid., 159.

29Ibid., 161.

30Various elements within these states retained independent status. Dubrovnik (once known as Ragusa), within Dalmatija, had such independence under Byzantium and nominally recognized the Ottoman and Venetian empires, finally losing its "special status" in 1808 with Napoleon's incorporating it within the Illyrian Provinces.

31"Slovenia: Much to Do," The Economist, 2 November 1996, 52.

32Weinrod, 19.

33Ibid.

34Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: the Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 127. The misrepresentation by media in televising the war in Slovenia (98) was allowed to occur because independent television networks "reasoned that trying to differentiate between the two conflict would be beyond the viewer's comprehension." This seems merely an affirmation of H.L. Mencken's brutal aphorism that, "You can never underestimate the intelligence of the American public"; or, for that matter, the perfidy of the media for accuracy.

35"Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, 15 February 1997, 22.

36For the best review of articles that reflect current thought in Yugoslavia, reference the "Balkan Media & Policy Monitor Home Page," <www.mediafilter.org>. While the "Monitor" remains untainted by any particular perspective, it accurately reports writings from Nin, Vreme, Tanjung, Arkzin, Feral Tribune, Nasha Borba, Nezavisnost, Nezavisna Svetlost, and Monitor, both in Serbian and in English translation. Much of the Serbian media is under the control of Milošević and so reports the "party line"--one worth paying attention to. Not surprisingly, this Home Page came under cyber-space "attack" and remained "frozen" for several months following, during a time when numerous significant events unfolded, at Issue 45, Volume 3, 10 January 1997.

37Coöperative security, in its best sense, acts as a refinement of the collective security concept--alliances seeking to prevent the conditions that precipitate conflict rather than alliances reacting collectively to terminate conflict once it breaks out. The greatest drawback to the coöperative argument, however, is more demonstrative proof of its refinement.

38The use of the term coöperative security is in common use today. Note, for example, in the Study on NATO Enlargement how frequently the term is used to supplant the original collective security intent of the North Atlantic Charter of five decades previous. The aim is ambitious; its achievement is uncertain. NATO Home Page, <www.vm.ee/nato/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm> (5 March 1997).

39Misha Glenny, "Will the West Fail Again?" The New York Times, 31 January 1997, op-ed.

40Matthew Nimetz, 6.

41The \$3 million figure is found in Michael G. Roskin, "Macedonia and Albania: The Missing Alliance," Parameters, Winter 1993-94, pg. 98; I obtained the \$49 million figure from a former member of the National Security Council. Confidential interviews with other sources

have suggested that a \$49 million figure may be too high but admit a sharp escalation, with American assistance, in the Albanian defense budget.

⁴²The \$3 million figure is found in Michael G. Roskin, "Macedonia and Albania: The Missing Alliance," Parameters, Winter 1993-94, pg. 94; I obtained the \$149 million figure from a former member of the National Security Council.

⁴³Jane Perlez, "Albania Chief's Associates Flee; Gunfire Halts U.S. Evacuation," The New York Times Home Page, <www.nytimes.com> (15 March 1997).

⁴⁴Jane Perlez, "Albania Is Cast Adrift," The New York Times, 23 March 1997, E3.

⁴⁵Confidential interview by the author. Aspects of Berisha's request were reported in various Balkan media.

⁴⁶Samuel P. Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs (November-December 1996): 45.

⁴⁷Henry Kissinger, "NATO: Make It Stronger, Make It Larger," The New York Times, 14 January 1997, op-ed.

⁴⁸George F. Kennan, The Washington Post, "A Fateful Error," 5 February 1997, op-ed.

⁴⁹Josef Joffe, "Is there Life after Victory?" 25.

⁵⁰From a Russian perspective, Moscow's pressure and promise of economic reprisals against the Czech Republic, Finland and the Baltics may have seemed part of a reasonable bargaining tactic but was taken by former satellites as intimidation. By contrast, Slovenia noted that Russia had voiced no objections to its desire for membership, as if the absence of objection were itself a prime criterion for selection. "Czechs Scold Russian Envoy for Threat over Joining NATO," The Baltimore Sun, 18 March 1997, 10; "Yeltsin Warns Finland against Joining NATO," The Washington Times, 17 March 1997, 13; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Home Page, <www.rferl.com> (25 March 1997); James Morrison, "Why Not Slovenia?" The Washington Times, 21 March 1997, 17.

⁵¹"Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, 15 February 1997, 21-23.

⁵²Secretary Albright, it should be noted, has made some valiant efforts to entice both Russia and former Soviet states in cooperative ventures, which include expanding the positive aspects Russian-NATO Combined Joint Task Forces and building a separate NATO-Ukraine relationship, hoping to "cement Ukraine's place in the central European mainstream." Sources: Albright, 23; "Ukraine, NATO Pact Due," The Washington Post, 8 March 1997, 24.

⁵³John Steinbruner, "Problems of Predominance: Implications of the U.S. Military Advantage," The Brookings Review, Fall 1996, 16. Mr. Steinbruner refers in his essay to the larger context of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the alternative arrangements available to accommodate international security agreements. I have inserted the NATO expansion case with brackets because his larger general argument is applicable to the specific case of this essay's argument.

⁵⁴Pushkov, 14.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Secretary Albright (23) notes "that poll after poll has shown that few ordinary Russians express concern about an alliance that many of their leaders concede poses no actual military threat." It may be an oversimplification to acknowledge that Russian leaders have conceded that NATO poses no military threat; indeed, as happened with some U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations in the past, the Russians likely attempted to draw the best possible outcome from the losing proposition that NATO expansion represents.

⁵⁷Albright, 22.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Alexei Pushkov, "Russia and NATO," Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1996, 17.

⁶⁰Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Home Page, <www.rferl.com> (19 December 1996).

⁶¹Former Defense Minister Dmitur Pavlov, in Weinrod, 22.

⁶²Editorial, "Play it Again, Boris," The New York Times, 20 March 1997, A38.

⁶³Kissinger, 14 January 1997, op-ed.

⁶⁴William Drozdiak, "Poland Urges NATO Not to Appease Russia: 'The Smell of Yalta is Always with Us'," The Washington Post, 17 March 1997, 1.

⁶⁵Thomas W. Lippman and David Hoffman, "Major Issues Left Unresolved on Brink of [Helsinki] Summit," The Washington Post, 18 March 1997, 1.

⁶⁶Pushkov, 29.

⁶⁷Ibid., 16-17.

⁶⁸Lippman, 8.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Michael Lind, "The Rise of Russophobia: Why Does the West Make Moscow Jump through More Hoops to Gain Acceptance?" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 6-12 May 1996, 21.

⁷¹Samuel R. Berger, "Europe, Russia and the Fulcrum of Power," The Washington Post, 17 March 1997, 17.

⁷²Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," Naval War College Review, Spring 1995, 114-126, quoted in Strategy and Force Planning (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1995), Chapter 2, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, editors, 24.

⁷³For proof that domestic policy and policies have directly impacted and influenced NATO enlargement, read Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's advice to President Clinton, noting how the president "should keep four basic principles in mind as his administration's policy on NATO expansion continues to evolve." These principles are: The time for ambiguity is over; the United States and NATO must provide for initial "Have Nots" and commit to future expansion; Do not go too far with Russia; the U.S. Senate needs to be involved in the NATO enlargement process now. The Washington Post, 21 March 1997, 27.

⁷⁴Bartlett, Holman, and Somes, 24.

⁷⁵John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Volume 15, Number 1, Summer 1990, 52.

⁷⁶Drozdiak, 17.

⁷⁷"Is there Life after Victory?: What NATO Can and Cannot Do," 19.

⁷⁸"Burnt Norton," from Four Quartets, The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World), 117.

⁷⁹Jacques Attali, "An Age of Yugoslavias," Harper's, January 1993, 20-22.

⁸⁰Clarke, 27.

⁸¹William Drozdiak, "NATO Seeks New Identity in Europe," The Washington Post, A19, quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1992), 16.

⁸²Strobe Talbott, "American Engagement in the Post-Cold War World," Dispatch 6, Number 32 (7 August 1995): 209, quoted in Clarke, 33.

⁸³"Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994," NATO Press Service M-1(94), 3.

⁸⁴The Albanian Home Page, clearly biased yet nevertheless portraying ethnic conviction, recognizes not one state but many "regions" where Albanians live outside the borders of Albania: Kosovo, within Serbia; Montenegro; in the western half of Macedonia. Noticeably absent on this Home Page is the Greek region of Epiros; some Greeks, particularly those with

a more irredentist bent, would of course claim Southern Albania to be simply Northern Epiros; <www.albanian.com> (24 March 1997).

⁸⁵Based on remarks by a Western intelligence officer, confidential interview, March 1995, Clarke, 38.

⁸⁶This by no means suggests that policy makers will shy from using NATO forces as the first, most lethal option in situations that beg solutions during crises. One example of such "saber rattling" came during the evacuation of American citizens from Albania in March 1997. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is reported to have advocated sending in a larger and more heavily armed NATO forces to seize and occupy the Tirana airport as well as the harbor of Durres. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen rejected this concept quickly. Another NATO nation, Greece, evacuated both Greek and Palestinian citizens from Durres using special forces; the evacuation went smoothly, encountered little hostile fire, and so went largely unreported by media. Sources: Steven Lee Myers, "In Talks on an Airlift out of Albania, Albright Rattles Her Saber," The New York Times, 21 March 1997, A1:8; confidential interview by the author. I am reminded, nonetheless, in considering Secretary Albright's swift leaning toward overwhelming force application of an earlier incident that occurred during the first year of the first Clinton administration. Retired General Colin Powell, at the time of the incident serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and principal military advisor to President Clinton, records in his memoirs, that, during the White House debate on the question of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then "Madeleine Albright, [at the time] our ambassador to the UN, asked me in frustration, 'What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?'" Powell, who largely authored both the Weinberger defense doctrine and his own later Powell doctrine, favored not committing military forces in the absence of a "a clear political objective." Such clear objectives, at the time and today, do not exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of note, however, was Powell's unvoiced reaction to Albright's frustration: "I thought I would have an aneurysm." Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 576.

⁸⁷The PfP has effectively supplanted the NACC and will likely become an enduring element of the European security architecture.

⁸⁸General (retired) James P. McCarthy, USAF, "Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe: New Opportunities for NATO," Strategic Review, Winter 1993, 54-60.

⁸⁹Warren Christopher, "Toward a More Integrated World," Statement at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Meeting, Paris 8 June 1994; "The CSCE Vision: European Security Rooted in Shared Values," Statement to the Plenary Session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Rome, 30 November, 1993.

⁹⁰Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1995): 38-51. At the time this article was published, Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. The other architectural moments in Europe, according to Holbrooke, were the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the failed Wilsonian vision from Versailles in 1919, and the shared achievements rising in 1947 from the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the NATO partnership.

⁹¹Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster), 835.

⁹²Bismarck was not without his share of ethno-centric tendencies, either. That he was trying to be clever aside, his own well-known comment that "an Austrian is a cross between a Bavarian and a human being" does not bode well for a future Europe, where many Europeans still fear "the barbarians."

⁹³Kissinger, 835.

⁹⁴Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 226.

⁹⁵John Lewis Gaddis first coined the term, in his work The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

⁹⁶A practical comparison of European nations that belong to these various agencies, institutions, and treaty agreements can be found under the section titled "New Architecture, New Processes," in the chapter titled "Coöperative Security in Europe," Global Engagement: Coöperation and Security in the 21st Century, James Nolan editor (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute), 311-312.

⁹⁷For one examination of these influences and disruptions to the nation-state, see Jessica T. Mathews' "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1997): 50-66.

⁹⁸Confidential interview by the author.

⁹⁹G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1996): 88.

¹⁰⁰NATO realized early on that the North Atlantic Coöperation Council, established at the Rome summit in 1991, would not succeed in bringing Russia and her central European former "allies" into a broad political framework that would encourage dialogue and consultation on issues of mutual concern and common interest. Weinrod, 13.

¹⁰¹Holbrooke, 39.

¹⁰²Albright, 22.

¹⁰³Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: Expand or Die?" The New York Times, 28 December 1994; "A Plan for Europe" Foreign Affairs (January-February 1995), 26-42.

¹⁰⁴George Kennan, under the pseudonym "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Volume 65, Number 4, Spring 1987, 868, originally published in Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

CONCLUSION

If we remember the past, we are condemned to misread it!¹

The future ain't what it used to be.

YOGI BERRA

When you judge decisions, you have to judge them
in the light of what there was available to do it.

SECRETARY OF STATE G. MARSHALL²

In May 1997 I returned to the Balkans to conduct final interviews and solicit comments for this work, as well as to personally witness what had transpired in the ten months since I last served as a military attaché in the region. The trip, it almost goes without saying, proved astounding in its revelation of new and various Balkan contradictions--even a few oxymorons.

Some of these include the surprise that Slovenia is beginning to "miss" its association with Serbia and some of its former Yugoslav partner-republics; the wealth of Slovenia depended on the production and labor support of these partners, and independent Slovenia is facing up to the hard realities of both independence and economic growth. Thus, the differences that Serbs and Slovenes had in understanding each other, "in part a function of the vast differences separating their respective cultures," could well decline as the prospects for economic interdependence and potential benefit ameliorate.³

In Slovenia's capital, Ljubljana, there have sprung up various Balkan Youth Clubs, promoting the idea of cultural exchanges and harmonious relations, if not coöperation, among Yugo ("South") Slavs. "When the real is no longer what it used to be," as the philosopher Jean Baudrillard suggests, "nostalgia assumes its full meaning."⁴ In Slovenia, nonetheless, as elsewhere in the Balkans, "Yugo Nostalgia" is real and has returned with a kind of vengeance among youth who believe an older generation was at fault and responsible for the death of Yugoslavia.

Serbia, by contrast, is obsessed with its own problems and has little time for improving or even entering into relations with Slovenia. And, despite the claims of Professor Samuel

Huntington's provocative though often incorrect "Civilizations" paradigm (in which Slovenia and Croatia, as "Western" states, would grow not only into closer relations but also enfold themselves within the European flock of "Western" nations), Slovenia's greatest source of near-term tension appears to be with Croatia. Some Slovenians believe, as do many former Yugoslavs, that Croatia (having "won" more than it "deserved" in the last Balkan war and having developed--in violation of an international arms embargo--an impressive military force) will become a problematic Balkan neighbor in the not so distant future.

In Serbia, the seeds of both democracy and fascism have been planted and seem to be growing in parallel tracks as a reeling nation struggles to recover from its own self-destruction. Such parallel tracks must one day converge. Whether democracy or fascism remains the dominant strain is unclear. One Balkan official made the extraordinary remark, however, that "Serbia has succeeded in doing to itself what the international communists [in reference to the 1927 Comintern plans to carve up Serbia and reduce Serbian influence] proved unable to do." The Serbian people, now left in both continued isolation and continued desolation, may have lost more than they deserved to lose in the last Balkan war. The Serbian state, likely to continue its ruthless manipulation under the hand of Milošević and his eventual successor, may become an even more problematic Balkan neighbor in the not so distant future.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, villagers--separated by boundaries that partition once harmonious communities--drink too much, become enflamed with passion for revenge, and murder each other from time to time. S-FOR troops will leave in the summer of 1998. America, committed to beyond the horizon involvement, will support Europe in "monitoring" the situation. In Sarajevo, both a detached gloom and a wishful optimism hover over the heads of government leaders.

In Macedonia, there exist improving though tenuous relations with Greece. In the spring of 1997, a Greek millionaire opened an impressive supermarket in Skopje with all the modern convenience and freshest produce to be found in Europe, even as Macedonia itself lingers at the brink of bankruptcy. Between Greece and Macedonia, there exist two borders. On board the

Yugoslav-Russian train I traveled on--aptly named "The Balkan Express"--I passed through the Greek customs and passport checks at the border of Eidomeni and then proceeded several hundred meters into Macedonia to clear, yet again, through the Техничка прегледна служба--Technical Inspection Post--in the village of Yevyelija. Going south, Macedonian students were flocking into the Greek port city of Thessaloniki. Going north, the train was virtually empty. During my first border crossing in Greece, I witnessed a police officer casually draw his weapon from a holster and point it at a young Slav, questioning him in Greek, "Are you an 'Alvanitis' [roughly, Albanian speaker of Greek origins]?" Both I and the young Slav thought the police officer was trying to make some strange kind of joke. He wasn't.

Yet the greatest surprise of all, in the midst of these extraordinary oppositions, was an admiration and even deep appreciation for American diplomatic and military intervention in the last Balkan crisis. Such admiration did not hide the knowledge that what was agreed to at Dayton was largely made possible by what the warring parties had done to each other and made the subsequent work of diplomats easier to accomplish. The murderous elimination through "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnian Serbs of the Muslim-populated enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa, as well as the Croatian storming of the Krajina Republic, made the maps and territories at Dayton less difficult for all parties to accept. (Indeed, the territory grab to split Bosnia in half, discussed between Milošević and Tudjman at Karadjordjevo in 1991, may have moved one stepped closer to fruition.) Milošević, who had both continued military support for Bosnian Serbs even as he had imposed an economic embargo on them since June 1994, had eliminated Radovan Karadžić as a rival and maintained his hold on power. Tudjman, despite clear evidence of having supported "ethnic cleansing" both in Croatia and in Bosnia, avoided ostracism from the "West" and remained a patron of Germany. Izetbegović, left to sift among the ruins of his multi-ethnic state, was left with no clear direction at all.

Even despite the contradictions that this knowledge brought, numerous Balkan colleagues insisted that if America had not become involved, the warring parties could well have passed

through furious fits and starts in the process of destroying each other until there was nothing left. I was told, constantly, "Europe could not solve this. You had to become involved." Often at the end of such discussions I also heard the claim: "And you Americans, we know, will abandon us one day, too."

Prescriptive solutions are, by nature, problematic. There is, after all, something inherently fraudulent about imposing narrative order on crisis situations and then offering lessons or solutions from a, largely, false order which never existed.

Yet, as I see the current situation, after more than a decade of observation, reflection on, as well as involvement with the Balkan Enigma, there are only two options available. Neither alternative is particularly attractive; both bear extraordinary costs for different reasons. My opinions, I must admit, have changed over this past decade. While I opposed lifting of the arms embargo, I equally opposed American military intervention in the former Yugoslavia because the situations, which lacked clear definitions of political goals and did not represent vital American interests, could easily prove--to use the phrase repeated constantly in the "West"--a Balkan Quagmire. I now realize that effective, concerted use of the military and diplomatic instruments of American power proved to be the critical elements to offer any form of solution. I admit that my earlier thinking and my opinions were wrong.

I have named these options not to be frivolous, but to find a way of making sure they stick in the reader's mind as well as the reader's craw. These options are:

1. Play Now, Pay Later

Admit that the Dayton agreement proved insufficient "to create the conditions for [former Yugoslavia] to heal itself."⁵ Withdraw S-FOR troops from Bosnia on schedule by the summer of 1998; if the opportunity presents itself to withdraw earlier, do so. Find an acceptable way to extract American peacekeeping troops in Macedonia as part of the UNPREDEP deployment under Able Sentry. Avoid hunting down "war criminals" in order to deflect future ethnic antagonisms. Consider the Balkan intervention, while a noble cause which reflected the

strength of American principle, did not sufficiently constitute a lasting commitment. The Balkan intervention, in other words, represents a "sunk cost," one that is "non-recoverable, and [with] no economic bearing on decisions concerning the future expenditure of resources."⁶ Recognize that in the absence of lasting solution in the Balkans, conflict and war will return that will inevitably involve regional partners and European allies. Such conflict, for various reasons, may not return for years and will thus be the "problem" of another administration to consider. Adopt a pragmatic and realist perspective toward regional engagements. Return to the strengths of state-to-state interactions and avoid direct contact with parastatic forces claiming to represent human rights abuses, legitimate grievances, or causes which might undermine the larger state with which America, by this perspective, has larger interests. Recognize that America has only two vital interests--survival and prosperity in the global environment--and base all future decisions on how such vital interests will be affected. Recognize the right of a people's self-determination to be valid only as it does not contradict the principles of the inviolability of accepted borders, unless such "violation" would better reflect the interests of the United States. Accept as doctrine the following fundamental objectives of American foreign policy to be:

1. to protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers; and
2. to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which the nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development of other nations and derive maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities.⁷

Finally, admit and adhere to the principle that America has a responsibility only to (with use Cold War terminology) "first world" partners. Acknowledge that the American people will have the "inner strength" to sustain the belief that they are not the model for all the peoples of the planet, that American "civilization is different not from the so-called Old World but from the so-called Third World."⁸

2. Pay Now, Play Later

Remain involved in former Yugoslavia as a "European" partner. Recognize and accept the tasks ahead; equally recognize that failure to work toward further resolution will bring inevitable conflict back to the Balkans, one that will involve enlarged NATO membership. Acknowledge to the American people and to the American Congress that the costs of such involvement will be immense, in terms of dollar amounts if not in terms of committed forces. General principles, which would support this alternative, should also be implemented for more rapid and more decisive response to future regional crises. These principles include:

a. Reform the Interagency Process

Recognize the extraordinary impact which the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (authored by former Georgia Senator Sam Nunn) has had on American military forces. The ability of such military forces to integrate and achieve military security in Bosnia was due, partially, to the truth that American sister services were forced to learn to live rather than compete with each other.⁹ Create a similar reform process for government interagency cooperation that would better support national security decision directives. Aside from an immense (and needlessly redundant) intelligence community which still lags in human intelligence collection efforts, the single government agency in need of radical transformation is the State Department. Interagency competition, confusion, and cross-purposes in the Balkans led to a "sometimes opaque American strategy...that generally [suffered] from agency overkill":¹⁰

The White House, the State and Defense Departments, and the local embassies [were] all running apparently separate programs that [seemed] to be heading generally in the same direction but along different paths. In addition, there [were] sharp differences of interpretation among the U.S. diplomatic missions in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje, Sofia, Tirana, Athens, and Ankara.¹¹

There exists an example from the past of such attempts to improve interagency deficiencies: the integration of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary [later renamed "Rural"] Development Support (CORDS) group within the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Various perspectives differ on the effectiveness of both CORDS and the CORDS-MACV integration; the precedent, nevertheless, exists.¹²

b. Foreign Policy by Posse?

Future NATO commitments cannot be circumvented. U.N. coalition support requests may be declined or accepted by choice, not commitment. Between these extremes, the United States has the latitude to which foreign interventions are appropriate--rather than be simply subject to the eventual crisis demands that necessitate intervention. The U.S., even in the absence of international institutional support, can subject states to meeting basic standards for human and ethnic rights, condemn and boycott politicians, promote abuses, and form its own coalition forces as necessary to deal with dangerous trends before they explode.¹³ Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's U.N. initiative to deploy observers into Macedonia before the outbreak of conflict may well explain why Macedonia was the only one of six former Yugoslav republics to escape the outbreak of war within its borders.

c. Accept Partition Not as First Solution but as Last Resort

Such a principle is easier to accept than implement. The inevitable outcome of the Dayton Agreement will be one of partition and not as Richard Holbrooke once envisioned one in which "the warring parties agreed to accept a single state....a freely elected national assembly; a central bank and a single currency; compliance with the International War Crimes Tribunal; a "Supreme Court"; and joint commissions for such matters as railroads, national monuments, and even human rights."¹⁴ Such "paper" agreements, other than an election which codified the Bosnian parastates, seem not to have been agreements at all. In a prescient remark made in 1993, veteran Yugoslav diplomat Cvijeto Job asked: "Even if an agreement on partition (behind the flimsy fig leaf of a spectral Bosnian "confederation") could be imposed on the Bosnian Muslims, would Serbs and Croats beat swords into plowshares and start peacefully coexisting?"¹⁵ Equally, if Milošević were to abandon Serbs outside Serbia (as he eventually did), would that solve the tensions between communities or simply create the conditions for one day igniting a larger war?¹⁶

d. Recognize that Dayton was not an End State

"No one," as James Schear has remarked, "at the Dayton talks really believed that the accord would instantly tear down barriers erected over 42 months of warfare and brutal atrocities."¹⁷ Further, Dayton itself should have been viewed as a beginning and not an end. Since Dayton, the International War Crimes Tribunal has failed to bring any significant political figures to trial, although a number perpetrators of violence and abuse have been offered up in their sacrificial stead; the Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons has made no progress--and seemingly no effort--toward the settlement of displaced populations; the U.S.-led training and assistance program continues for Bosnian government force, though its effect toward thwarting the spread (or continued existence) of smaller armed units through the region may be negligible.

e. Make Peace with the Guilty

Easier said than done. Yet the imbalance that exists today in the Balkans, if allowed to continue, will lead to certain catastrophes even if we have no idea where or how in the Balkans such catastrophes might manifest themselves. The issue is far larger than employing S-FOR forces to "hunt down" war criminals. The real issue is how to incorporate Serbia, stabilize Albania (and the tensions of the Albanian peoples who exist outside the borders of the current state), and solve the Kosovo "problem" in a manner both Serbia and Albania can live with. Seemingly absurd suggestions, such as a condominium agreement (in which Albania and Serbia would control, jointly, the government of Kosovo), a division of Kosovo, or trusteeship leading to a new kind of state at an agreed point in time also happen to be the only productive solutions thus far offered.¹⁸

f. Recognize the Rape of Democracy

The United States may have already learned this lesson, though not perhaps well enough for future involvements. In an age when we recognize the value of moral principle as having sufficient weight to be considered alongside the value of national interests, we must not compromise and deal with dictators--or, even worse, brutal manipulators who masquerade as

"promoters of democracy"--when it suits a larger purpose and allow repressions in one "friendly" nation to continue (and which we overlook), even as we condemn similar repressions in a neighboring, adversarial state. Such duplicity reveals itself rather quickly.

g. Create a Marshall Plan for the East and Support a Reconstruction Plan for the Balkans

The Marshall Plan, which recently celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, represented in the words of President Clinton, "a hand up and not a handout" for Europe.¹⁹ It was originally offered to both East and West Europe; Stalin, out of paranoia and fear of external forces within his eastern sphere of domination, rejected the offer outright. The common accusation of "incredible naïveté" toward those who suggest a Marshall Plan today for Eastern Europe is a correct complaint. Unfortunately, the suggestion itself proves to be the most certain solution--and also the most expensive one. In Bosnia alone, where estimates have no assurances of accuracy, reconstruction costs would be enormous. Peacekeeping forces, at 1996 levels, would run in the range of \$3 billion annually.²⁰ French President Jacques Chirac has estimated Bosnia's economic reconstruction cost at upwards of \$10 billion dollars; other estimates have run five times higher than that.²¹ The cost of the destruction of Yugoslavia itself may run higher than \$100 billion. The will to commit can overcome the impossible obstacle, or one seemingly so. S-FOR forces should be stabilized at reduced but sufficient levels until economic infrastructure and reconstruction benefits take hold. How long that will take is impossible to answer. Equally, how certain economic stability (and perhaps even growth) will ameliorate divisions and tensions among Yugoslavs themselves is uncertain. Yet declaring the intervention in former Yugoslavia as being simply "sunk costs" and exiting as fast as possible ignores how emotional factors, in the Balkans as almost everywhere else, are far more significant, in the end, than pragmatic factors.

h. Recognize the Dangers of Predominance

America's predominance, especially in the military arena, will be a target for potential future chaos strategists. We may be most vulnerable where we now appear most strong.

Further, as John Lewis Gaddis points out in We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, the greatest mistake the U.S. and Soviet Unions made during the Cold War was to define the contest between them (with its potential for the greatest devastation in history) as one of military might, when the struggle itself was economic, cultural, ideological, and moral.²² Unless our considerations of our moral, cultural, and ideological strengths--our value as a people--gain further influence, we may indeed lock ourselves into further confrontations when such "values" might have found solution more efficiently and effectively than through the military instrument alone.

i. American Leadership

This is the most dangerous alternative of all, as well as the most necessary one. Dangerous because, particularly in election years, "rhetorical overkill at home may seriously damage American interests abroad."²³ Such terms as "leadership," "credibility," "moral ascendancy," and "American values" indeed have taken on a life of their own which promotes "a virtual reality that prompts policy decisions separate from any calculations of American interests."²⁴ Such balance and tensions between often intangible principles and almost always pragmatic interests are nothing new. American leadership must recognize the tensions and seek the balance.²⁵ The ghosts of Woodrow Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt, it seems, are still with us after all these years. And they ought to be.

* * * * *

The post-Cold War yet pre epithet new era I have referred to throughout this work actually does have a name: the 21st Century. If we fail to recognize our entry into this new century, which began in 1989, then we have condemned ourselves to living in a past that does not exist. This simple recognition is also an essential one. "What happens in the future," as Professor Alexander Wendt notes in his essay "Constructing International Politics," "depends on what actors do with the structures they have made in the past."²⁶

Thus, in reconsidering the wreckage of what once was known as Yugoslavia, I have attempted both to not mis-read the past (even as I recognize that such misreading might be

unavoidable) and to follow General Marshalls' admonition to judge decisions "in the light of what there was available to do it."

Decisions made in times of crisis are never easy ones; indeed, those made in the last Balkan war follow a pattern of decision-tensions that bear remarkable similarity with past events. I have tried to keep specific remarks (written about the Korean War) uppermost in my own thoughts as I re-considered the death of Yugoslavia and the birth of six new states. These remarks have caused me to limit my criticism of some decisions that seem faulty in the light of available hindsight:

Crises studies need to temper their preoccupation with rationality by developing a greater sensitivity to policy makers' lack of clairvoyance, their cultural blinders, and their extreme vulnerability to contingency. These studies need to recognize in turn the degree to which this debilitating trio introduces a dynamic element to crisis as each side rushes to keep its estimate of the situation, the adequacy of its will and resources, and the nature of its overall goals current with the gyrations of equally agitated policy makers on the other side. Under stress the multiple, perhaps divergent goals of policy makers become exposed and the ambiguities of calculations are revealed. Viewed in international terms, crisis management...ceases to be a simple exercise in cool ends-means analysis (or a failure to match up to that standard) and becomes instead a kind of psychological St. Vitus dance that two rivals induce in each other and that ends only after exhaustion sets in.²⁷

"War," as Chairman Mao proclaimed it, "is politics with bloodshed. Politics is war without bloodshed."²⁸ In the Balkans, sometimes the differences between war and politics too quickly blur. When this happens, as it happened with such devastating force in recent history, the wreckage of lives, states, and peoples follow in the wake of conflict. Yet in war, as Clausewitz reminds us, the end result is never final.²⁹ Similarly, in peace--that "transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date"--the dialectic of unresolved tensions may lead back again to war.³⁰ That oxymoronic truth alone should be emphasis enough for why we need to learn--or at least attempt to learn--the lessons of the last Balkan conflict in order to perhaps prevent the next.

¹George Santayana's famous warning inverted by a participant in reference to the Southeast Asia conflict at the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, Chicago, June 1968, quoted in Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 113. Professor Samuel P. Huntington, also attending the conference, suggested "the subversive idea that this conference may well mark the formal beginning of the misreading of the Vietnam experience. It is conceivable that our policymakers may best meet future crises and dilemmas if they simply blot out of their minds any recollection of this one."

²Testimony to the Senate Committee on the Armed Services and Foreign Relations, May 1951, quoted in Ernest R. May's The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949 (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1975), pg. xi.

³The quotation reference is from Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Civil War, 2nd edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 2.

⁴Jean Baudrillard, "Simulacra and Simulations," Selected Writings, edited and with an introduction by Mark Poster (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), 171.

⁵General (retired) Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1995): 38.

⁶Colonel Raymond G. Baker, USAF, "Dealing with Cost," developed for course curriculum for the Department of National Security Decision Making, Naval War College, 2.

⁷Written in the summer of 1948 by George F. Kennan, the "chief architect" of America's Cold War Containment Strategy, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 27. Kennan, by his own admission, acknowledged that "complete security or perfection of [the] international environment will never be achieved." Similarly, he failed to articulate what was necessary to "enhance the security" of the nation and to increase harmony within the international environment.

⁸John Lukacs, "The End of the Twentieth Century," Harper's, January 1993, 39-58. Reprinted in Harper's Folio 1995, 96. An extended version of this essay, both brilliant and irritating, can be found in John Lukacs, The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1993).

⁹It seems indeed extraordinary how far sister services have come in the last four decades. The anecdote attributed to Air Force General Curtis LeMay, first chief of the Strategic Air Command, seems today somewhat mis-aligned, despite its humor. LeMay, receiving a brief on the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, is reputed to have interrupted the briefing officer after he referred to the Soviet Union as "the enemy." "Son, let me make one thing clear," LeMay interjected. "The Soviet Union is our adversary. The United States Navy is our enemy."

¹⁰Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995), 104.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²For a generally positive CORDS assessment, see Andrew F. Krepenovich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); for a less enthusiastic assessment, see Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991). Bergerud's work may well come to represent the definitive consideration of the contradictions in Vietnam which made defeat inevitable.

¹³Adapted from Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," Foreign Policy, Fall 1993, 70-71.

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- 14"Letters to the Editor: Richard Holbrooke on Bosnia," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997): 170.
- 15Job, 72.
- 16Ibid., 72-73.
- 17James A. Schear, "Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas," Foreign Policy, Fall 1996, 97.
- 18Preventing War in Kosovo, executive monograph (Lund, Sweden: Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, 1992), 12-15.
- 19Drawn from remarks made at the Marshall Plan commemoration, Washington, D.C., 28 May 1997.
- 20Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The New Moralists on a Road to Hell," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Spring 1996, 290.
- 21Alison Mitchell, "Warmth, but Little Substance at Hyde Park Summit," The New York Times, 24 October 1995, A:1.
- 22See, in particular, Chapter 10, "The New Cold War History," We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 281-295. Two other worthwhile earlier pieces, which illustrates how Gaddis came to re-think his own knowledge of Cold War History, are the monograph How Relevant Was U.S. Strategy in Winning the Cold War? (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992) and the essay, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History, Summer 1992, 234-246.
- 23Rubinstein, 292.
- 24Jonathan Clarke, "Rhetoric before Reality," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1995): 3.
- 25A number of worthwhile articles which reflect both values/interests tension and the need for balance are Peter J. Schraeder, "'It's the Third World [sic] stupid!' Why the Third World Should Be the Priority of the Clinton Administration," Third World Quarterly, Volume 14, Number 2, 1993, 215-237; Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," Foreign Policy, Summer 1994, 3-18; Richard N. Haass, "Military Force: A User's Guide," Foreign Policy, Fall 1994, 21-37; Larry Diamond, "Beyond the Unipolar Moment: Why the United States Must Remain Engaged," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Summer 1996, 405-413.
- 26Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Summer 1995, fn. 28.
- 27Michael H. Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1982, 478.
- 28Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung [sic] (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 227.
- 29Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 80.
- 30Ibid: "Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."

APPENDIX A NATIONALISM [†]

Nationalism is first and foremost paranoia. Collective and individual paranoia. As collective paranoia it results from envy and fear, and most of all from the loss of individual consciousness; this collective paranoia is therefore simply an accumulation of individual paranoias at the pitch of paroxysm. If, in the framework of a social order, an individual is not able to "express himself," because the order in question is not congenial and does not stimulate him as an individual, or because it thwarts him as an individual, in other words does not allow him to assume an entity of his own, he is obliged to search for this entity outside identity and outside the so-called social structure. Thus he becomes a member of a pseudo-masonic group which seems to pose problems of epochal importance as its goals and objectives; the survival and prestige of a nation or nations, the preservation of tradition and the nation's sacrosanct values--folkloric, philosophical, ethical, literary, et cetera. Invested with such a secret, semi-public, or public mission, A. N. Other becomes a man of action, a tribune of the people, a semblance of an individual. Once we have him cut down to size, isolated from the herd, and out of the pseudo-masonic lodge where he has installed himself or been installed by others, we are faced with an individual without individuality, a nationalist, Cousin Jules. This is the Jules that Sartre wrote about, a zero in his family, a man whose only distinction is that he can blanch at the mere mention of a single topic: the English. This pallor, this trembling, this "secret"--to be able to blanch at the mention of the English--constitute a social being and make him important, existent: do not mention English tea in front of him, or the others will start winking and signaling, kicking you under the table, because Jules is touchy about the English, good

[†]Written in 1973 by Danilo Kiš and later published in The Anatomy Lesson (1978) with a translation by Ivana Djordjević; quoted in Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia (New York: Pantheon, 1992). Kiš was one of the last "Yugoslav" writers, who emphasized a Central European identity over fixation on ethnic dissimilarities. Though he lived in Paris (some might claim he "fled" to Paris from Belgrade), he returned in 1992 to Yugoslavia, then called Serbia, in death--receiving an Orthodox funeral with all the pomp and praise bestowed on him by the very individuals who, in life, had reviled him.

God, everybody knows that, Jules detests the English (and loves his own folk, the French), in a word, Jules is a personality, becomes a personality, thanks to English tea. This kind of profile, which fits all nationalists, can be freely elaborated to its conclusion: the nationalist is, as a rule, equally piffling as a social being and as an individual. Outside the commitment he has made, he is a nonentity.

He neglects his family, his job (usually in an office), literature (if he is a writer), his social responsibilities, since these are all petty compared with his messianism. Needless to say, he is by choice an ascetic, a potential fighter biding his time. Paraphrasing Sartre on anti-Semitism, nationalism is a comprehensive and free choice, a global attitude not only toward other nations but toward people in general, toward history and society; it is at once a passion and a world-view. The nationalist is by definition an ignoramus. Nationalism is the line of least resistance, the easy way. The nationalist is untroubled, he knows or thinks he knows what his values are, his, that's to say national, that's to say the values of the nation he belongs to, ethical and political; he is not interested in others, they are no concern of his, hell--it's other people (other nations, other tribes). They don't even need investigating. The nationalist sees other people in his own image--as nationalists. A comfortable standpoint, as we noted. Fear and envy. A commitment and engagement needing no effort. Not only is hell other people, in a national key of course, but also: whatever is not mine (Serbian, Croatian, French . . .) is alien to me. Nationalism is an ideology of banality. As such, nationalism is a totalitarian ideology. Nationalism is moreover, and not only in the etymological sense, the people. Writers know this best. That's why every writer who declares that he writes "about the people and for the people," who claims to surrender his individual voice to the higher interests of the nation, should be suspected of nationalism. Nationalism is also kitsch: in its Serbo-Croatian variant it takes the form of squabbling over the national origins of those traditional gingerbread hearts topped with colored sugar--are they from Serbia proper or from Vojvodina exclusively? As a rule the nationalist doesn't know a single foreign language or any variant of his own, nor is he familiar with other cultures (they are no concern of his). But there is more to it than this. If he

does know foreign languages, which means that as an intellectual he has an insight into the cultural heritage of other nations, great or small, they serve only to let him draw analogies, to the detriment of those others, naturally. Kitsch and folklore, folkloric kitsch if you prefer, are nothing but camouflaged nationalism, a fertile field for nationalist ideology. The upsurge of folklore studies, both in this country and in the world at large, is due to nationalism, not anthropology. Insisting on the famous couleur locale is likewise, outside an artistic context (that is, unless in the service of artistic truth), a covert form of nationalism. Nationalism is thus, in the first place, negativity; nationalism is a negative spiritual category because it thrives on denial and by denial. We are not what they are. We are the positive pole, they the negative. Our values, national, nationalist, have no function except in relation to the nationalism of those others: we are nationalist, but they are even more so; we slit throats (when we must) but they do too and even more; we are drunkards, they are alcoholics; our history is proper only in relation to theirs; our language is pure only in relation to theirs. Nationalism lives by relativism. There are no general values--aesthetic, ethical, et cetera. Only relative ones. And it is principally in this sense that nationalism is reactionary. All that matters is to be better than my brother or half-brother, the rest is no concern of mine. To jump not very high but higher than him; the others do not count. This is what we have defined as fear. Others are allowed to catch us up, even to overtake us; that is no concern of ours. The goals of nationalism are always attainable, attainable because modest, modest because mean. You don't go jumping or shot-putting to reach your own best but to beat the only others who matter, so similar and so different, on whose account you took the field. The nationalist, as we noted, fears no one but his brother. But him he fears with an existential, pathological dread; for the chosen enemy's victory is his own total defeat, the annihilation of his very being. As a shirker and a nonentity the nationalist does not aim high. Victory over the chosen enemy, the other, is total victory. This is why nationalism is the ideology of hopelessness, the ideology of feasible victory, victory that is guaranteed and defeat that is never final. The nationalist fears no one, "no one save God," but his God is made to his own measure, it is his double sitting at the next table,

his own brother, as impotent as himself, "the pride of his family," a family entity, the conscious and organized section of the family and the nation--pale Cousin Jim. To be a nationalist is therefore to be an individual with no obligations. It is to be a "coward who will not admit his cowardice; a murderer who represses his murderous proclivities without being able to master them, yet who dares not kill except in effigy, or in the anonymity of a crowd; a malcontent who, fearing the consequences of rebellion, dares not rebel"--the spitting image of Sartre's anti-Semite. Whence, we wonder, such cowardice, such an attitude, such an upsurge of nationalism, in this day and age? Oppressed by ideologies, on the margin of social changes, cramped and lost between antagonistic ideologies, unequal to individual rebellion because it is denied to him, the individual finds himself in a quandary, a vacuum; although he is a social being, he takes no part in social life; although an individualist, individuality has been refused him in the name of ideology; what is left but to seek his being elsewhere? The nationalist is a frustrated individualist, nationalism is the frustrated (collective) expression of this kind of individualism, at once ideology and anti-ideology. . . .

APPENDIX B
THE DAYTON GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

U.S. Department of State
Fact Sheet Released by the Office of the Spokesman, November 30, 1995.

The Dayton Proximity Talks culminated in the initialing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was initialed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The Agreement was witnessed by representatives of the Contact Group nations -- the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia -- and the European Union Special Negotiator.

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Text of the Dayton Peace Agreement documents initialed in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "Parties"),

Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region,

Desiring to contribute toward that end and to promote an enduring peace and stability,

Affirming their commitment to the Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 8, 1995, the Further Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 26, 1995, and the cease-fire agreements of September 14 and October 5, 1995,

Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, behalf of the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly and consequently,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State.

Article II

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the military aspects of the peace settlement and aspects of regional stabilization, as set forth in the Agreements at Annex 1-A and Annex 1-B. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made in Annex 1-A, and shall comply fully with their commitments as set forth in Annex 1-B.

Article III

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the boundary demarcation between the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 2. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article IV

The Parties welcome and endorse the elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina as set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of that program.

Article V

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article VI

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, as set forth in the Agreements at Annexes 5-9. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article VII

Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, the Parties agree to and shall comply fully with the provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 6, as well as the provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 7.

Article VIII

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the implementation of this peace settlement, including in particular those pertaining to the civilian (non-military) implementation, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 10, and the international police task force, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 11. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article IX

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

Article X

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other as sovereign independent States within their international borders. Further aspects of their mutual recognition will be subject to subsequent discussions.

Article XI

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

DONE at Paris, this [21st] day of [November], 1995, in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally authentic.

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the Republic of Croatia
For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Witnessed by:

European Union Special Negotiator
For the French Republic
For the Federal Republic of Germany
For the Russian Federation
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
For the United States of America

Annex 1-A: Military Aspects

The cease-fire that began with the agreement of October 5, 1995 will continue.

Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn within 30 days.

The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special provisions relate to Sarajevo and Gorazde [sic].

As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and to demobilize forces which cannot be accommodated in those areas.

The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN.

The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection.

A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR Commander. Persons under indictment by the International War Crimes Tribunal cannot participate.

Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry and other items must be provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed periods.

All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without delay in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Annex 1-B: Regional Stabilization

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic must begin negotiations within 7 days, under Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) auspices, with the objective of agreeing on confidence-building measures within 45 days. These could include, for example, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, notification of military activities and exchange of data.

These three parties, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, agree not to import arms for 90 days and not to import any heavy weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters for 180 days or until an arms control agreement takes effect.

All five parties must begin negotiations within 30 days, under OSCE auspices, to agree on numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

If the parties fail to establish limits on these categories within 180 days, the agreement provides for specified limits to come into force for the parties.

The OSCE will organize and conduct negotiations to establish a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.

Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary

An Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic is agreed.

Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation and will be open to all people of the country.

Gorazde will remain secure and accessible, linked to the Federation by a land corridor.

The status of Brcko [sic] will be determined by arbitration within one year.

Annex 3: Elections

Free and fair, internationally supervised elections will be conducted within six to nine months for the Presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the House of Representatives of the Federation and the National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, if feasible, for local offices.

Refugees and persons displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote (including by absentee ballot) in their original place of residence if they choose to do so.

The parties must create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held by protecting the right to vote in secret and ensuring freedom of expression and the press.

The OSCE is requested to supervise the preparation and conduct of these elections.

All citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older listed on the 1991 Bosnian census are eligible to vote.

Annex 4: Constitution

A new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will be known as "Bosnia and Herzegovina", will be adopted upon signature at Paris.

Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a sovereign state within its present internationally-recognized borders. It will consist of two entities: the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.

The Constitution provides for the protection of human rights and the free movement of people, goods, capital and services throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The central government will have a Presidency, a two chamber legislature, and a constitutional court. Direct elections will be held for the Presidency and one of the legislative chambers.

There will be a central bank and monetary system, and the central government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy, law enforcement, air traffic control, communications and other areas to be agreed.

Military coordination will take place through a committee including members of the Presidency.

No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Annex 5: Arbitration

The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to enter into reciprocal commitments to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them, and they agree to design and implement a system of arbitration.

Annex 6: Human Rights

The agreement guarantees internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A Commission on Human Rights, composed of a Human Rights Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber (court), is established.

The Ombudsman is authorized to investigate human rights violations, issue findings, and bring and participate in proceedings before the Human Rights Chamber.

The Human Rights Chamber is authorized to hear and decide human rights claims and to issue binding decisions.

The parties agree to grant UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, the International Tribunal and other organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation.

Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons

The agreement grants refugees and displaced persons the right to safely return home and regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation.

A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will decide on return of real property or compensation, with the authority to issue final decisions.

All persons are granted the right to move freely throughout the country, without harassment or discrimination.

The parties commit to cooperate with the ICRC in finding all missing persons.

Annex 8: Commission to Preserve National Monuments

A Commission to Preserve National Monuments is established.

The Commission is authorized to receive and act upon petitions to designate as National Monuments movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic heritage.

When property is designated as a National Monument, the Entities will make every effort to take appropriate legal, technical, financial and other measures to protect and conserve the National Monument and refrain from taking deliberate actions which might damage it.

Annex 9: Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations

A Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation is established to organize and operate transportation facilities, such as roads, railways and ports.

A Commission on Public Corporations is created to examine establishing other Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations to operate joint public facilities, such as utilities and postal service facilities.

Annex 10: Civilian Implementation

The parties request that a High Representative be designated, consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to coordinate and facilitate civilian aspects of the peace settlement, such as humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections.

The High Representative will chair a Joint Civilian Commission comprised of senior political representatives of the parties, the IFOR Commander and representatives of civilian organizations.

The High Representative has no authority over the IFOR.

Annex 11: International Police Task Force

The UN is requested to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out various tasks, including training and advising local law enforcement personnel, as well as monitoring and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities.

The IPTF will be headed by a Commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary General.

IPTF personnel must report any credible information on human rights violations to the Human Rights Commission, the International Tribunal or other appropriate organizations.

Agreement on Initialing the General Framework Agreement

In this agreement, which was signed at Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agree that the negotiations have been completed. They, and the Entities they represent, commit themselves to signature of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes in Paris.

They also agree that the initialing of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes in Dayton expresses their consent to be bound by these agreements.

APPENDIX C INTERNET RESOURCES

Below are Internet sites that provide information pertinent to the Balkans. This list is merely a sampling of available resources, which--as with all information obtained from the Internet--are clearly not free of bias. As NATO S-FOR troops and various support agencies withdraw from the Balkans, a number of these sites will likely close; similarly, as various Hydra parastates grow and multiply, the number of Balkan home pages will follow suit in promulgating specific causes in an age of information.

General Search Engine for NATO and U.N. documents, reports, and resolutions from 1993: <gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/11/yugo/>

Acta Diurna: <http://www.magma.com/~dcosic/protest97/>

Albanian Home Page: <http://www.albanian.com/main/>

U.S. Army Area Handbook for Yugoslavia:
<gopher://umslvma.umsl.edu:70/11/library/govdocs/armyahbs/aabh2/>

U.S. Army 434th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic):
<http://www.tiac.net/users/jardines/434mid.html/>

B-92 News (RealAudio): <http://www.xs4all.nl/~opennet/audio.html/>

Balkan Media & Policy Monitor: <http://mediafilter.org/MFF/Mon.45.html/>

Bosnia Homepage: <http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/bosnia.html/>

Bosnia Homepage: <http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/bosnia.html/>

Official Press Releases from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina:
<http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/embassy/embassy.html/>

Bosnia--Status and Maps: <http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/status/status.html/>

The Brookings Institution: <http://www.brook.edu/>

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence: <http://www.odci.gov/>

CIA 1997 World Factbook: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/pubs.html/>

CNN Interactive: <http://www.cnn.com/>

Dayton Peace Accords: <http://www.state.gov/www/current/bosnia/bosagree.html/>

Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement:

<http://www.state.gov/www/current/bosnia/bossumm.html/>

U.S. Department of Defense BosniaLINK: <http://www.dtic.dla.mil/bosnia/index.html/>

Deutsche Welle Radio (English): <http://www-dw.gmd.de/n-english/Welcome.html/>

DOLnet On Line Services: <http://www.dolnet.gr/>

Nasa Borba: <http://www.yurope.com/zines/nasa-borba/>

National Public Radio: <http://www.npr.org/>

The NATO Official Homepage: <http://www.nato.int/>

The New York Times: <http://www.nytimes.com/>

Nezavisna Svetlost: <http://www.yurope.com/zines/svetlost/>

Novine - List Srba u Kanadi: <http://www.serbia.front.net/novine/>

Serbia Now: <http://www.webcom.com/kamenko/SerbiaNow/>

Odras B92 vesti: <http://www.siicom.com/odrazb/>

Opennet/XS4ALL: <http://www.xs4all.nl/~opennet/>

Petar II Petrovic Njegos: Gorski Vijenac:

<http://www.front.net/nebojsa/njegos/gvijenac.html/>

PointCast: <http://www.pointcast.com/>

Press Now: <http://www.dds.nl/~pressnow/>

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: <http://www.rferl.org/>

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Crisis in Serbia):

<http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/serbia/index.html/>

Serbian Unity Congress: <http://www.suc.org/>

Serbian Unity Congress: <http://www.suc.org/news/>

Sezam Pro vesti: <http://www.sezampro.yu/vesti/>

U.S. Department of State Home Page: <http://www.state.gov/>

Students' Protest '97 Home Page: <http://galeb.etf.bg.ac.yu/~protest97/>

Students' Protest '97 Alternate Page: <http://www.mi.sanu.ac.yu/~prot/>

Students' Protest '97 in Nis: <http://www.yurope.com/mirrors/protest97/ni/>

VOA (Voice of America) Serbian Crisis Coverage Page:
<http://www.voa.gov/misc1/serbia/>

Vreme Net: <http://www.beograd.com/vreme/>

Vreme News Digest: <http://www.siicom.com/vreme/>

The Washington Post.com: International:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/front.htm#search/>

The Washington Post.com: World Reference--Serbia and Montenegro:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/worldref/country/serbia.htm/>

The White House: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>

APPENDIX D REPRESENTATIVE MEDIA VIEWS FROM SERBIA

NIN NO. 2397 DEC 13, 1996

NOVO SMINKANJE SLOBE

Da stari Heraklit nije bio previše mudar kada je govorio da jedan čovek u istu reku ne ulazi dva puta, govori novo kadrovsko rešenje ovdašnje vlasti koja je za novog predsednika Veka građana SR Jugoslavije u utorak 10. decembra imenovala bivšeg generalnog sekretara Socijalističke partije Srbije Milomira Minica.

PRED OGLEDALOM

U državnim i paradržavnim novinama i televizijama "može se videti afrički gnu, saznati čime se hrani komorski varan i saznati recept kuhinje musketara za prepelicu punjenu dagnjama, ali ne i ono što se stvarno desava oko nas"

NEMA POVLACENJA, NEMA PREDAJE

Katarina Kostić: "Nama su i roditelji rekli - izdržite. Ne pitamo vas ni za izgubljenu godinu, ako bude izgubljena. Bolje je izgubiti i jednu studentsku godinu, nego ceo život".

BUDJENJE JE POCELO

Kada se pojavio prvi ozbiljniji nagovestaj promena, videlo se i to da su ljudi na vlasti losi i sad kada su se našli u ulozi gubitnika.

PRIPADNIK POSEBNIH JEDINICA MILICIJE

Slusamo B 92 zbog direktnog prenosa, iako nisu uvek objektivni... A dnevnici RTS ne obećavaju, kao da pozivaju na akciju - bilo nas, bilo građane jedno protiv drugih.

TRENIRANJE DRŽAVNOG TERORA

"Vidno uznemiren, sa podlivima ispod jednog oka, dva slomljena zuba, hematomom na temenu, Dejan se tresao tokom razgovora, rekavši da ne može sve da nam priča", kaže advokat Vuković.

MI NECEMO SANKCIJE

Konačno smo shvatili da kada se na ulicama pojavljujemo kao građani da se istovremeno pojavljujemo i kao Srbi, kao što se to desava i u celom demokratskom svetu.

IZMEDJU OSTAVKE I VANREDNOG STANJA

Ne prodje gotovo ni dan a da zgusnuta istorija, koja već tri nedelje teče ulicama Beograda i drugih velikih srpskih gradova, ne dobije novo, još dramatičnije ubrzanje. Izraz ubrzanje ovde treba shvatiti kao eufemizam za grube, gotovo katastrofalne greske vlasti.

SLUDJENI LJUDI

Radnici znaju da žive loše, da ne rade, ali im je režim omogućio "sigurno", makar i fiktivno radno mesto.

NA MESTU - VOLJNO

Generali Ojđanić i Kovacević, koji su se pojavili na prošlom kongresu SPS-a, pomaknuli su sa svojih pozicija.

NIN No. 2401, DEC 31 1996

1996--Januar - Decembar

KAKO SE SACUVATI OD CUVARA

Ono sto je uradjeno Dejanu Bulatovicu je ne samo tortura, vec prelazi u patologiju. Posle batinjanja jedan policajac mu je nabio palicu u anus uz reci "sad ces ti da vidis kako izgleda ono sto si ti radio predsedniku", kaze Natasa Kandic

GLASAM CRVENO, GLEDAM BELO, RADIM NA CRNO

Sta 200 telefonskih pretplatnika iz Srbije misli - po kojim dogadjajima ce se ova godina pamtiti i koje licnosti su je obelezile

NASLEDNICA BEZ TESTAMENTA

Nema tog horoskopa ili kristalne kugle u kojima se moze videti srpska novogodisnja sudbina. Neizvesnost je ono sto definise sva ocekivanja, pocev od noci u kojoj ce poceti novo leto. A ocekivanja su usijana jer pripreme traju vec vise od mesec dana, jos od trenutka kada je protestna setnja pocela da privlaci sve vise ucesnika najrazlicitijih godina i opredeljenja.

DANI OPASNOG ZIVLJENJA

Vlast je u isturila policiju kao najjaci adut u odbrani od opozicionih gradjana. Gradjani, tako, dolaze u poziciju da se ljute na policiju, koja tu ljutnju shvata licno. Za vlast idealna situacija u kojoj jaka policija mlati demonstrante ne znajuci ni sama zasto to radi

GLAS JE SVETINJA

Po logici vlasti, sledeca mera mogla bi biti zavodjenje policijskog casa ili uvodjenje vanrednog stanja. To bi "doslo glave" ili narodu ili rezimu

NULTE VARIJANTE

Jugoslovenskoj privredi ostaju opcije da krene putem Cilea pod Pinoceom, da bude stabilna i recesiona, ili da bude inflatorna i haoticka

ABDULAH SIDRAN. TRAGEDIJA PROVINCISKOG GIGANTA

Hiljadu devetsto cetdeset osme jedan lik iz literature je stradao zbog ljubavi. Rekao je: " Vise volim rusko govno nego americku tortu. " Bio je to Vlado Petrovic i zbog toga je iz Sarajeva deportovan na Goli otok. Da je to rekao danas, ubili bi ga odmah....

INTERVJU No. 398 DEC 27 1996

BOSNA MORA BITI PODELJENA!

Ja mislim da odredjeni deo Bosne koji se zeli prikljuciti Hrvatskoj treba da dobije odobrenje da to i ucini. Isto vredi i za bosanske Srbe i SR Jugoslaviju.

TUDJMAN NE ZELI SRBE

Ja znam da hrvatska Vlada ne zeli da ovde ima srpsku vecinu, jer to moze dovesti do koncepta slicnog Kosovu za Srbe. To nije ni u cijem interesu. Cini mi se da hrvatska ministarstva pokatkad nisu spremna da se suoce s opseznim problemima koji su ovde prisutni

NIJE OVO NI '68. NI '92!

Dusan Vasiljevic, portparol Studentskog protesta - 96. i Nemanja Djordjevic, vodja Nezavisnog studentskog pokreta odgovaraju na pet pitanja vezanih za studentske demonstracije u Beogradu i ostalim gradovima Srbije

CECA SLEDI BILA KLINTONA

Mlada Beogradjanka, miljenica porodice Brusa Dejvisa iz Kemdena, pohadja Dzordztaun univerzitet na kome se susrela i sa americkim predsednikom. Kao predstavnik svoje klase uestvovala je na tribini "Slobodna Evropa " u Pragu zajedno sa Lehom Valensom

TITO SE ZALJUBIO U MASERKU DARIJANU GRBIC

Zagrebacki magazin je dosao u posed senzacionalnih " zapisa " Dare Janekovic, poznate novinarke 'Vjesnika', koja je zahvaljujuci svojoj partizanskoj proslosti stekla naklonost Josipa Broza Tita i poslednjih godina njegovog zivota izbliza pratila dramaticnu borbu i intrige oko njegovog nasledstva. U delu dnevnika gde je zabelezila razgovor s Miroslavom Krlezom otkriva se i istina o Darijani Grbic...

Serbian Unity Congress

Web Page Announcement No: 79

(1) Protest '96 Photo Gallery

Magazines Nin and Duga contributed to this gallery.

<http://www.suc.org/exhibitions/protest96/>

(2) SERBIAN NATIONALISM, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND THE ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV WAR

Dr. Veljko Vujacic, Harvard University

<http://www.suc.org/politics/research/vujacic.html>

(3) BALKAN CRISIS AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN: 1878

Excerpts from "The Balkans Since 1453" by L. S. Stavrianos, Professor of History

Serbian Unity Congress

Web Page Announcement No: 84

Happy New Year to everyone. We are happy to announce that HRH Crown Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic has his homepage on the Internet. Please take a look:

<http://www.suc.org/royal/>

BULLETIN NO 115 JAN 01 1997

PRESIDENT'S QUARTERLY REPORT

SUC ESTABLISHES FUND FOR FAMILIES OF SLAIN VICTIMS OF MILOSEVIC/MARKOVIC TERROR IN BELGRADE

WITH ALBRIGHT, WILL PRINCIPLE RETURN TO POLICY?

Each year brings new tests and new tarnishing of America's reputation for standing tall.

SERBIA'S CONJUGAL DESPOTS

In all the Belgrade demonstrations of the recent days, the climatic moment came when the words Slobodan Milosevic were yelled through a microphone.

THUS SPOKE DAVID H. HACKWORTH

Americas most decorated living soldier, Col. David H. Hackworth (US Army Ret.) recently wrote another book.

BALKAN DICTATORS

What this means for peace in the Balkans is all too obvious -- there will be even more bloodshed before there is any chance of lasting peace.

FAX TO: LEONARD DOWNIE. EDITOR IN CHIEF, WASHINGTON POST

It is simply false, and a grave injustice, for John Pomfret to say that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been supportive of the Communist regime of Yugoslavia during and since the Tito era

NIN No. 2402 JAN 03 97

POSLEDNJA ODBRANA

"Golub u ruci ili kundak na grani", predstava je koja se igra na politickoj pozornici Srbije, a njeni su "simbolicki likovi" Nebojsa Covic i "cetvoroclana grupa iz JUL-a"

VLADIKE PROTIV REZIMA

Kako je episkopska konferencija SPC, sazvana za drugi januar, i bez odluke Svetog arhijerejskog sinoda o sazivanju vanrednog Sabora prerasla u vanrednu "crkvenu skupstinu"

PARALELNI SVETОВИ

Dok se urednici koji potpisuju najgledaniju informativnu emisiju drzavno-partijske televizije ne mesaju u sopstveni posao, sve je vise ljudi kojima je lupanje u serpe dovoljno za sreću

DA LI CE IMPLODIRATI VJ

Za koga navijaju 63. padobranska iz Nisa i 1. gardijska iz Beograda

OPERACIJA PUZ

Pita italijanski novinar: da li ce srpski rezim uci u istoriju kao prvi koji je srusen sprdnjom

GLAVU DAJEM, BRCKO NE DAJEM

Arbitraza za gradic na Savi nece ubiti ideju ni Dejtona, ni srpske drzave, ni integralne Bosne, ali nicemu od to troje nece obecati ni dug zivot

DUGA No. 1658 JAN 03 1997

MISKO DOVEZAO AUTOBUSE NA TERAZIJE

Bauk gradjanskog rata nadvio se nad Beogradom i Srbijom. Opet je Srbin pucao u Srbina. Hoce li se ispuniti zloslutno prorocanstvo Stipe Mesica da ce rat na Balkanu završiti sukobom Srba i Srba. Opet smo glavna roba na CNN-u, kao druga strans veta, nasuprot svecarskoj atmosferi Badnje veceri. Svako normalan se oseca skruseno. Ima li kraja ovom ludilu?

OVO JE DNEVNIK!

Kada je pre vise od deset godina Goran Milic pocео najvazniju informativnu tv emisiju recenicom "Ovo je dnevnik!" niko nije ni slutio da ce se taj uzvik, nekoliko godina kasnije, - pretvoriti u ozbiljnu pretnju ne samo istini i zdravoj logici, nego mentalnoj i fizickoj bezbednosti gradjana.

FERVOR DE BEOGRAD

Svojoj prvoj zbirci pesama koja je objavljena jos 1923. Borhes je dao ime "Fervor de Buenos Aires" sto u prevodu znaci "Obozavanje, B. Airesa"; Ona sedmorica "naj Beogradjana pevaju"; gde god da krenem taj grad me prati, Beograd moj sebi me vrati, gde god da

NOVINARKI DUGE IMA KO DA PIŠE

Naravno da stizu pisma i iz nasih gradova, pa i iz Beograda, ali je ovo prica o onima koji dolaze izdaleka. Jedno od neobicnijih stiglo je od gospodina A.M.M., svestenika u crkvi Sveti Prohor Pcinjski u Pertu, Australija.

Magazine NIN No. 2403 JAN 17 1997

NOVO SMINKANJE SLOBE

Reciklaza ideja i kadrova govori i da se u vidokrugu vlasti nalaze samo dva putica, od kojih nijedan nije dovoljno dobar.

PRED OGLEDALOM<

U drzavnim i paradrzavnim novinama i televizijama "moze se videti africki gnu, saznati cime se hrani komorski varan i saznati recept kuhinje musketara za prepelicu punjenu dagnjama, ali ne i ono sto se stvarno desava oko nas"

NEMA POVLACENJA, NEMA PREDAJE

Katarina Kostic: "Nama su i roditelji rekli - izdrzite. Ne pitamo vas ni za izgubljenu godinu, ako bude izgubljena. Bolje je izgubiti i jednu studentsku godinu, nego ceo zivot".

BUDJENJE JE POCELO

Kada se pojavio prvi ozbiljniji nagovestaj promena, videlo se i to da su ljudi na vlasti losi i sad kada su se nasli u ulozi gubitnika.

PRIPADNIK POSEBNIH JEDINICA MILICIJE

Slusamo B 92 zbog direktnog prenosa, iako nisu uvek objektivni... A dnevници RTS ne obecavaju, kao da pozivaju na akciju - bilo nas, bilo gradjane jedno protiv drugih.

TRENIRANJE DRZAVNOG TERORA

"Vidno uznemiren, sa podlivima ispod jednog oka, dva slomljena zuba, hematomom na temenu, Dejan se tresao tokom razgovora, rekavsi da ne moze sve da nam prica", kaze advokat Vukovic.

MI NECEMO SANKCIJE

Konacno smo shvatili da kada se na ulicama pojavljujemo kao gradjani da se istovremeno pojavljujemo i kao Srbi, kao sto se to desava i u celom demokratskom svetu.

IZMEDJU OSTAVKE I VANREDNOG STANJA

Ne prodje gotovo ni dan a da zgusnuta istorija, koja vec tri nedelje tece ulicama Beograda i drugih velikih srpskih gradova, ne dobije novo, jos dramaticnije ubrzanje. Izraz ubrzanje ovde treba shvatiti kao eufemizam za grube, gotovo katastrofalne greske vlasti.

SLUDJENI LJUDI

Radnici znaju da zive lose, da ne rade, ali im je rezim omogucio "sigurno", makar i fiktivno radno mesto.

NA MESTU - VOLJNO

Generali Ojdanic i Kovacevic, koji su se pojavili na proslom kongresu SPS-a, pomaknuti su sa svojih pozicija.

Magazin Intervju No. 399, 17 JAN 1997

ZATVOR ZA RADOVANA I ALIJU

Munir Alibabic, zvani Munja, nacelnik SDB u Sarajevu u svojoj knjizi "Bosna u kandzama KOS-a" opisuje kako je hapsio i saslusavao srpske i muslimanske lidere. A potom je, kao covek zaduzen za progon muslimanskih kriminalaca i funkcionera stradao licno od Alije Izetbegovica

NEZELJENA JUGOSLAVIJA

Sadasnja Jugoslavija nije zeljena Jugoslavija. Srbija i Crna Gora pokusavaju da nadju onaj put koji oznacava i opste procese u samoj Evropi. Smatramo da niko ne moze da zivi samo za sebe. Ali istovremeno niko nema pravo da ponisti rezultate prethodnih generacija

POBEDIO DROGU

Posle petnaest meseci egzila po sopstvenom izboru, u Beograd je na nedelju dana dosao Igor Pervic. Neki su ga vec nekoliko puta sahranjivali, neki pravili spiskove devojaka koje je

zarazio sidom, neki oklevetali i proglasili nepoželjnim u gradu u kome je rođen. Dosao je tiho, ne zelevi publicitet

MUSKARCINE

Da su i lideri država i narodnih pokreta obični smrtnici najsurovije govori činjenica da većina njih pati ili od bolesti srca ili od bolesti prostate. Boris Jeljcin je preziveo infarkt, a Franji Tuđmanu se već po Zagrebu traži nasljednik

SPAKUJU KOFERE

Poređeci studentske proteste '78, '91, '92. i '96. godine, prof. dr RATKO BOZOVIC govori o političkom i kulturnom sazrevanju jedne generacije koja kroz želju za promenom traži svoj ljudski identitet, i događaje pretvara u svoje doživljaje

DUGA 1659, 17 JAN 1997

JESU LI, POSLE SVEGA, SRPSKI RADIKALI OPOZICIJA

Seselj kao da ne primećuje da su ulični događaji u Srbiji zajedno sa SPS, JUL-om i ND isterali na cistinu i njegovu stranku. Neutralnost u podjednako netoleranciji prema dželatima i žrtvi svrstava radikale na stranu onoga koji zamahuje sekirom.

HLADNI RAT JE ZAVRŠEN

"Moramo se suočiti sa činjenicom da za Jugoslaviju postoje velike mogućnosti samo u diplomatiji niskog i intenziteta, u okviru regija i pojedinih međunarodnih organizacija.

NAJVISI DEMOKRATSKI CIN

Mogu li koalicija "Zajedno" i probudjena građanska i svetski legitimisana Srbija uspešno i do kraja izvesti toliko dugo čekanu demokratizaciju i osloboditi snage i rezerve društva bez kojih je apsurdno planirati bilo kakvo kretanje, a ne razvoj?

NIN 2404, 24 JAN 1997

SNOVI MIRE MARKOVIC

U izdanju Radija B 92 stampana je nova knjiga Slavoljuba Djukica: "On, Ona i mi" u kojoj je opisan životni i politički put Slobodana Milosevica i Mire Markovic.

KRATAK PREGLED RASPADANJA

Da li je uopšte moguće da bilo ko od sadašnjih ili bivših socijalističkih funkcionera resi da opšte nerasploženje odnosom na levičari pretoci u pravljenje nove stranke

KUCA NA PUTU

Studentska akcija "Kordonom protiv kordona" prerasla je u operaciju "Stajanjem do padanja"

PUT KOJIM SE CESCE IDE

DPS je zajednica ravnopravnih, ozbiljnih i odgovornih ljudi, u kojoj se razvija timski rad, i u kojoj sve ne zavisi od jednog čoveka, jer onda drugi postaju suvisni ili lako zamjenjivi. Nas interesuju jaka demokratska pravila, a ne jak predsjednik

PRISTINSKI ATENTAT

Da li napad na rektora Radivoja Papovica daje za pravo ovom radikalnom protivniku promena u sadašnjem političkom kursu, pojačavajući strepnju da su jednostranost i nasilje jedina perspektiva južne pokrajine

URUSAVANJE MILETOVOG DAHILUKA

U gradu u kome živi manje od 300 000 ljudi, oko 150 000 se okupilo na proslavi "julijanske" Nove godine

ZASTO AKADEMIJA CUTI

Prva ravan odgovora: oni koji ocekuju da Akademija zauzme stav time pokazuju da ne znaju kakvi su njeni zadaci, njene statutarne osnove i njena prava. Druga ravan: oglasavanje kolektiva, fabrika, ustanova, organizacija, slanje pisama, telegrama podrške i slicno nasledje je komunisticke proslosti i totalitarne svesti

PROFESOROVE MUKE

U odbranu od onih koji su ga napadali, sekspirolog je posezao za Dostojevskim: "Najkrivlji si coveku kome si najvise dobra ucinio"

NEMA BOLA BEZ PATNJE

Briga JUL-a za subverzivno delovanje stranih sila bila bi mnogo logicnija da je usmerena na SANU. Ako je nesto doprinelo propadanju Srbije, pored komunistickih partija, onda je to Akademija nauka i umetnosti

BULLETINS 116, JAN 15 1997

DIPLOMATS DIAGNOSE INSANITY AFTER TUDJMAN OUTBURST

Franjo Tudjman, the president and former war-leader of Croatia, is going mad, according to Western diplomats in the Croatian capital.

DIPLOMAT'S ROLE IN ARMS DEAL

Peter Galbraith, the United States ambassador to Croatia, probably couldn't have done a better job at playing his role even if the novelist Graham Greene had invented it for him.

MAJOR FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Two of the major factors which impact on foreign policy decisionmaking in most countries.

FACTORS DOMINATING US FOREIGN POLICY

For the Clinton White House, two subjects dominate US "foreign policy": cheap oil and cheap consumer goods for the average American.

STVAR SAMOPOSTOVANJA

Govor prof. dr Vladete Jankovica studentima odrzan na platou pred Filozofskim fakultetom.

PORUKA SABORA SPRSKOG UJEDINJENJA STUDENTIMA SRBIJE

Povodom nastupajucih Bozicnih Praznika i Nove 1997 godine.

See our latest exhibition "Serbian Military Uniforms 1808-1918"

<http://www.suc.org/exhibitions/Uniforms/>

A uniformed Serbian militia is mentioned at the end of the seventeenth century after the siege of Vienna in 1683, but no details are known of its dress. It can be supposed that it derived from national costumes like the uniform introduced at the end of the first half of the eighteenth century. In the thirties on the initiative of the metropolitan Vikentije Jovanovic, a Serbian Hussar Regiment (1735) was formed which did not survive long. Nevertheless there are references to their dress: sabre, carbine and two pistols with green dolman and red breeches. Frontier regiments were uniformed in 1744 and this uniform had certain Hungarian traits until 1767, when it was tailored in the style of the Austrian infantry. This it retained until the Military frontier was abolished in 1873.

Author: Pavle Vasic

NIN NO. 2405, 31 JAN 1997

ODE SLOBA U JUGOSLAVIJU?

"Beta " je uznemirila javnost vescu o Milosevicu kao nasledniku Lilica i Momiru Bulatovicu kao novom Konticu, a od svega je najizvesnije da zaljuljana vlast pokusava da pronadje najbezbolnije nacine za opstanak

PIROMAN I VATROGASAC

O Slobodanu Milosevicu, njegovim uverenjima i metodu vladavine, o njegovoj privatnosti i ljudskim osobinama

DEMACI "PROTIV " RUGOVE

Dugogodisnje tvrdnje SPS-a da kosmetski Albanci ne sacinjavaju monolitan blok ovih dana dobile su potvrdu, samo sto su se umesto "postenih i lojalnih " organizovali jos radikalniji Albanci

OSUDJENI NA POBEDU

Nigde niko nikad nije uspeo silom da odbrani ono sto oni sad pokusavaju da odbrane. Oni su se oslonili na pendrek, a pendrek nema kicmu, a pritom nema ni mozak. Zaista se ponasaju kao ljudi koji vise mogu da izdrze pod vodom nego sto mogu da razmisljaju

POBEDA DEMONSTRANATA

Sta 200 telefonskih pretplatnika iz Srbije misli o ucescu vojske i policije u okoncanju protesta po gradovima Srbije, trajnosti koalicija SPS-JUL i "Zajedno ", saradnji Seselja sa socijalistima...

U REFORMU - ZAJEDNO

O vraćanju devizne stednje, smanjenju inflacije i nezaposlenosti, penzijama, zastiti poljoprivrede, finansijskoj podrsci iz inostranstva, privatizaciji

GENERALI PRAZNIH DZEPOVA

Uprava javnih prihoda blokirala je racun Vojske Jugoslavije zato sto nije platila porez na plate koje su kasnile

TEMISVAR -ZAMALO

Danas bih se bolje osecao u Zagrebu, priznao je Danilo Vukovic, urednik drzavne "Svetlosti "

MOZDANA KOSAVA

Ispoveda se policajac: "Svi koji nesto vrede u ovoj zemlji podrzali su studente pred nasim ocima. A mi treba da ih bijemo, zato sto je neko krao izbore. Na kraju ce sve to priznati, ali nama nista nece zaboraviti "

LUKAVSTVO "VERSACE " DEMOKRATA

("Put kojim se cesce ide ", NIN br. 2404)

MANTIJE

Na Dan svetog Save - 27. januara - delegacija Srpske pravoslavne crkve trebalo je da u sedistu udruzenja Srba i Crnogoraca u Srpskoj kuci u Skoplju, obavi obred secenja slavskog kolaca. Trebalo je, ali nije.

IMA LI ZIVOTA PRE SMRTI

Kao manifestacija od ekstra sjaja, festival je znacajna potvrda da je ovo vreme kao i svako drugo. Pa i lepse, veselije. U tome je problem ovogodisnjeg Festa: sto nudi taj privid, taj direktni raskorak sa stvarnoscu

INTERVJU No. 400, 31 JANU 1997

PREDSTAVA BEZ KRAJA

Neko je pitao kada ce se sve ovo završiti, misleći na demonstracije, na tu želju za demokratskim promenama. Odgovor koji je usledio bio je više nego jasan: "Nikad!".

POSTOJI SAMO JEDAN COVEK

Cinjenica je da vladajuća stranka, osim Slobodana Milosevica, nema nekog drugog coveka, koji bi mogao da na predsednickim izborima zastiti vladajuću stranku od nekih prevelikih kradja kao sto su bile ove na lokalnim izborima. Ocito toga radi na sledecim izborima hoće po svaku cenu da istakne Slobodana Milosevica kao svog kandidata

SRBIJA SE OSLOBADJA SAMA!

Ja mislim da će do raspleta krize doći ove nedelje ali sam uverena da je ovaj rezim do kraja istrošen i da će probudjen i hrabar narod iduci za programom koalicije "Zajedno" uskoro dovesti do preokreta u Srbiji. U protivnom, čeka nas strasna budućnost

KO VLADA KOSOVOM

Vlast u Srbiji nije nasla adekvatan odgovor na opasnu separatisticku politiku. Ovo sestogodisnje stanje ni rata ni mira, pokazuje se, bilo je na štetu srpskih interesa. Ovde nisu Srbi na vlasti, već grupa ljudi koja je, ustvari, proizvedena ruka SPS-a u Srbiji

DUGA No. 1660, 01 FEB 1997

OVAJ NAROD LETOVACE NA TRGOVIMA

Kako će se ovo završiti? Možda to neko zna, ali je sigurno da ne živi u Srbiji. Sukob je dobio razmere iracionalnosti i kaprica i kao da sezaboravilo na početni povod: narodu su ukradeni glasovi na izborima, ono poslednje sto mu već nije pokradeno. Ovi ljudi sto se već dva meseca ulicama Srbije izvesno je neće da budu krpe. Vlast izgleda misli da će se predomisli i, da će pristati. Ishod sukoba se odlaze, jer se mora utvrditi ko je lopov, ili, ko je krpa. Narod nema više šta da izgubi, izuzev - vlasti. A vlast može da izgubi sve, sem naroda, koga je već izgubila.

AMERIKA NIJE ZEMLJA PROLETERSKA

"Amerika neće objaviti rat Srbiji. Ona želi da srpski narod odredi sopstvenu budućnost bez americkog mešanja. Danas americki narod ima sasvim drugacije mišljenje o srpskom narodu." To i mnogo više rekla je Ket Morton u ekskluzivnom razgovoru sa urednikom Duge u Njujorku.

KOSOVO ODLUCUJE KO VLADA U SRBIJI

"Pitanje Kosova može se postaviti isključivo demokratski, u okviru rešenja našeg ustavnog problema. Nas čeka ustavno-pravni prekid sa ukupnim dosadašnjim stanjem za ovih pedeset godina. Novoizabrana ustavotvorna skupština, neograničeno nijednom institucijom iznad nje, otvorice demokratski sva pitanja, pa i kosovsko, i doneće najviši politički i pravni akt naše države. Drugog puta tu nema. Sve ostalo je jalovo nagodbarenje koje samo privremeno gasi vatru i zbog koga se kasnije sve plaća skuplje."

NIN No. 2406, 07 FEB 1997

PIPANJE U MRAKU

Milosevic je uvideo da vreme radi protiv njega. Čekao je i ispitivao stotinu mogućnosti za izlazak iz krize, ali je na kraju shvatio da nije u stanju da izdrži sve udare i učvrsti poziciju.

DESPOT JE NAREDIO JURIS

Obimnu akciju policije "pokvarila" je jedinica koja je krenula u razbijanje demonstranata na Brankovom mostu

SRBIJA JE UMORNA OD HAVELA

Ova zemlja vec sada izgleda isuvise mala za onoliko Havela koliko se pominje po kafanama i novinama

ZBRKA U REZIJI

Dalji tok pregovora sa Londonskim klubom zavisi od jugoslovenske vlade, a privatizacija PTT-a u pocetnoj je fazi

NEMACKA NEMA NISTA PROTIV SRBIJE

Helmut Kol, nemacki kancelar, bio je iznenadjen prisustvom vise od 200 novinara na pres konferenciji - "Kancelar sam punih 14 godina i vec sam pomislio da sam pomalo dosadio novinarima."

OPREZAN SAUCESNIK

Crnogorska vlast kalkulisuje. Pokusava da sebe predstavi ne samo nevoljnim saucenikom , vec i pravim taocem srpskog rezima. Price o gubicima koje trpi crnogorska privreda mirisu na takve politicke kalkulacije DPS-a

MITEVIC I KARIC

Jedan je nezamenljiv politicki kombinatorik, a drugi je najbogatiji privatnik u Srbiji. Obojica su u blizini vlasti, a nisu daleko od opozicije

SILA NE ZAUSTAVLJA PREPOROD

Onaj ko ne dozivi Veliki petak, ne moze da se nada ni Vaskrsu jer bez stradanja nema ni spasenja, kaze monah Vasilije, zamenik igumana Hilandara

VELIKA JUL-SKA RASPRODAJA

Zasto je Zoran Todorovic Kundak kupovao naftu u Kini, da li je krenuo opsti napad na bracu Karic , kako je poskupeo telefonski impuls a da to nigde nije objavljeno

DA LI SLIKA LAZE?

Ugledni svajcarski list Die Njeltjnjoche (9.1.1997) objavio je tekst Tomasa Dajhmana koji baca drugaciju svetlost na fotografiju koja je bila jedan od simbola rata u Bosni. Tekst objavljujemo neznatno skracen

NE ZELIM KRVOPROLICE

Prestolonaslednik Aleksandar Karadjordjevic bio je gost u programu Global Vienj americke televizijske mreze CNN i razgovarao je tom prilikom sa urednikom programa Ralfom Beglajterom.

PROFIL No. 8 FEB 1997

ZLO JE SKRIVENO U NAMA

Srpski patrijarh Pavle nalazio se u dramaticnim prilikama, cesto na vetrometini, ali je, ipak, uspeo da sacuva oreol zivog sveca, kako je to objasnio u razgovoru sa LJILJANOM STOJKOVIC

KAKO JE ZABORAVILA SRPSKI

Novi americki senator za spoljne poslove i doskorasnji ambasador u Ujedinjenim nacijama MADLEN OLBRAJT odavno se nametnula kao vodja antisrpskih "jastrebova" u Klintonovoj administraciji, iako je odrasla u Beogradu.

MILIONI DOLARA SE NIKAD NE BACAJU U KOS

Najbolji jugoslovenski kosarkas Predrag Danilovic u ispovesti SVETLANI POPOVIC kaze da ga ni presadjivanje kosti iz noge u ruku nije moglo spreciti da ostvari svoje snove u najboljoj kosarkaskoj ligi na svetu

SUC BULLETIN NO. 117 FEB 1, 1997.
S.U.C. 1997 PROJECTS - APPEAL FOR HELP

HOUSE REPUBLICANS HAVE ASKED FOR AN INVESTIGATION
into whether U.S. officials lied to Congress about the Clinton Administration's position on
Iran's 1994 arming of Bosnian forces

US SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, JANUARY 16, 1997
Extended Bosnia mission endangers US Troops

BOSNIA'S ALTERNATIVE REALITY
From an official cable sent on September 1996, from the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo to the
State Department and later distributed to the White House and the Defense department.

LEADERSHIP PROFILES, ANTHONY LAKE
Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs.

INTERVJU No. 401 , 14 FEB 1997
PENDRECIMA PROTIV MLADOSTI
Tesko je reci da li postoji neka veza izmedju poziva Stejt dipartmenta i demonstracije sile nad
gradjanima. U Americi su svi svesni da Milosevic nece mnogo prezati od upotrebe sile.

SAMO SLOGA SRBINA SPASAVA!
Dzordz Vojnovic, prvi covek americke drzave Ohajo, rodjeni Amerikanac srpskog porekla
uputio je nasoj redakciji i srpskoj javnosti posebnu poruku.

SRBIJI NE TREBA TATA
Sta je koalicija "Zajedno" dobila pobedom u velikim gradovima? Kako ce se postojeci drzavni
aparatus poslati za sopstvene politicke i ekonomske reforme? Ko ce biti novi predsednik Srbije?

EVROPA U SRBIJI
Nema partizanske Srbije i nema cetnicke Srbije. Ako u necijoj svesti ima, to mora biti pomireno
i sklonjeno u proslost da bismo mogli da idemo u buducnost

NIN No. 2407, 14 FEB 1997
PONOVO PROTIV MILOSEVICA?
Vest koja je prosle nedelje najvise zagolicala politicku carsiju bila je da su se sreli i razgovarali
dva ljuta protivnika s kraja 1992. godine: Slobodan Milosevic i Milan Panic.

OSMI ZIVOT
Posto je priznala da opozicija postoji, vlast sada mora da poradi na razbijanju koalicije
"Zajedno " ili promociji radikala u vodeceg protivnika

CUDA ZECICE ANDJELKE
O studentima koji izdaju drzavu u Americi, "lidere programima ", Fulbrajtovim stipendistima,
zaradama "obavestajaca "

KAD JE VODJA NA MUKAMA
Kako je doslo do pregovora sa Amerikancima u leto 1992. godine o dobrovoljnom povlacenju
Slobodana Milosevica sa predsednickog položaja

OJ ,ZUPANIJO, IZ DVA DELA...

Dok Goran Hadzic tvrdi da ostaje iako je bio vrhovni komandant Vojske, Slobodan Popovic kaze da insistiranje na uzimanju hrvatskih dokumenata znaci teranje na egzodus

ZBUNJUJUCE AKCIONARSTVO

U drugim preduzecima ce radnici moci da otkupe celokupni drustveni kapital, a ovde im se to ogranicava samo na jednu trecinu

DUGA No.1661, 15 FEB 1997

BICEMO KONKRETNI, A NE SAMO MORALNI POBEDNICI

"Svesni smo da smo generacija na cija ce ledja teret vodjenja ove drzave pasti mnogo ranije nego sto bi trebalo. Na samo zato sto smo ambiciozni i zelimo da se po svaku cenu docepamo izvora vlasti i moci, nego zato sto su se starije generacije, disidentske, pozicione i opozicione, pokazale nesposobnim da vode ovu drzavu, da ocuvaju identitet i integritet sopstvene drzave i nacije, a da pritom mogu da komuniciraju sa svim savremenim tokovima. Upravo iz tog razloga mi niti hocemo, niti mozemo da stanemo sa programom koji smo zapoceli."

KOLIKO KOSTA SLOBODA

Pri kraju nase zbrkane i sve uzasnije price, sve se svelo na samo dva osecanja u coveku - osecanje sadizma i osecanje slobode. Sadizam nije samo batinanje polupismenog zandara iz doba regenture ili doba Juzne pruge, vec i sadizam osionog bogacenja koje vecinu naroda ostavlja bez hleba. To osecanje sadizma konzumirace sve oko nas i u nama, a hranice jedino osecanje slobode. Jos dve godine.

MOGLI SU ODMAH DA PITAJU MILUTINA

Kraljevo dva meseca posle drugog kruga lokalnih izbora jos uvek trese groznica u iscekivanju dejstva Lex specialis-a. Narod i opozicija revoltirani drskim izbornim mahinacijama i dalje uporno protestuju, cekajuci da se ispostuje njihova izborna volja. Prvi ferman iz centrale leve koalicije SPS-JUL bio je u stilu partizanskih vesterna - Kraljevo ne sme pasti. Drugi nagovestava rasplet izborne drame, ali kada - Ne zna se !?

NEMOZE NAM NIKO NISTA, JACI SMO OD SUDBINE!

JAGODINA,PALANKA,SABAC...Do kasno uvece leve snage proslavljaju pobedu, peva se: "Ne moze nam niko nista, jaci smo od sudbine". Sutradan ujutru, novi predsednik Opstine donosi porodicnu fotografiju u kabinet, odmerava udobnost kozne fotelje, sprema se da u njoj provede cetiri godine mandata - ali vec oko podne stizu sablaznjujuce vesti....

Serbian Unity Congress Web Page Announcement No: 101

SO HELP ME GOD!

V.Rev.Fr. Vojislav Dosenovich

So Help Me God! is a testimony to one of the great tragedies of our century - the genocide of the Serbs during World War II by members of the Croatian Ustashi. It is also a deeply personal accounting, for author V. Rev. Fr. Vojislav Dosenovich was an eyewitness to the slaughter in which he lost his father, one brother, his sister, and, ultimately, his homeland. This is the story behind that massacre, which had its roots in the years before the war, when the Serbs sought to overthrow the Turks and when Serbian nationalists played a major role in the assassination that triggered World War I.

Few chapters of the book: Sveta Gora, Vojvoda Djujic, and The Serbian Patrijarh are presented in full.

NIN NO. 2408, 21 FEB 1997

SKIDANJE ZVEZDE

U petak bi Zoran Djindjic, sef Demokratske stranke, trebalo da postane novi gradonačelnik Beograda, ukoliko svi dogovori sa koalicionim partnerima u sredu po podne i četvrtak proteknu prema očekivanjima.

RADOVAN GA NIJE TRPEO

Pukovnik Milovan Milutinovic bivši je načelnik Informativne službe Vojske Republike Srpske i portparol komandanta Glavnog stabla Vojske Republike Srpske Ratka Mladica.

CRV U SLJIVI

Zasto je partija koja se hvali doslednoscu postala remetilacki faktor i ko to hoće Kostunici da dodje glave

DOSTIGNUCA MINISTRA RADULOVICA

Godine 1990. "C-market" je bio 27 puta veci od "Pekabete". Danas je preduzeće kome je ministar srpske vlade manja od "Pekabete". Zasto?

KAKO IZ "CRNE RUPE"?

Posle "Programa radikalne ekonomske reforme" javnosti je ove nedelje ponudjen i "Predlog platforme za alternativnu spoljnu politiku" za koji je odmah receno da bi mogao biti ostvaren samo ako se promeni sadasnja vlast...

PREDSEDNIKOVA OPSESIIJA

Jos od kraja sedamdesetih, kada je bio predsednik Beogradske banke Slobodan Milosevic je nameravao da ujedini banke. Ovo sto gradjani sad vide kao kaos sa cekovima je njegov cetvrti pokusaj na tom putu

OPTIMIZAM BEZ IZLAZA

Da je situacija u matici (Srbiji) drukcija, ljudi bi mozda i isli tamo, ali ovako nemaju kud

DRAMA SELJENJA

Nasa srednja klasa, i u ekonomskom i u kulturnom smislu, bila je tanak sloj i pre 1941. i, cak da nije stradala u ratu i u revoluciji od pogroma revolucionarnih, ona ne bi mogla kulturno i politicki da utice na ovo masovno prigradsko stanovnistvo od 6 na 10 miliona stanovnika. Dakle, mi, posle svega sto se dogodilo, nemamo srednju klasu

INTERVJU NO. 404, 28 MAR 1997

NA IZANDJALOM KANABETU

Predizborno zagrevanje pred dugo iscekivanu trku za predsednicki deo namestaja, na kome jos uvek ima mesta za samo jednog pretendenta, nagovestava bespostednu borbu politickih kuhinja i lobija, ali zasto bas nama uvek mora da se dogodi neka inflacija, pa makar i predsednickih kandidata

ZASTO SAM SRUSIO SFRJ

I London i Pariz su tada rekli da se neće mijesati ukoliko dodje do vojne uprave. A 13. marta Kadijevic je bio u Moskvi kod Jazova i ovaj mu je sugerisao da sacekaju pad Gorbacova, a da se Zapad isto tako neće mijesati.

JA NISAM RAZBOJNIK

Kao srpski nacionalista ratovao je protiv Hrvata i Muslimana a završio u zatvoru kao navodni razbojnik. Shvatio je da postoji namera, ne da bude izrucen Hagu vec da bude pripremljen za to izrucenje, putem posebne zatvorske "obrade".

**TEXT OF VIDEO STATEMENT RECORDED BY GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,
GOVERNOR, STATE OF OHIO**

This is Djuro (George) Voinovich, Governor of the State of Ohio. As an American, I am proud of my Serbian heritage and my association with the Serbian community in the United States.

DELEGATION OF STUDENT'S PROTEST INVITED TO THE USA BY SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS

In early December, representatives of coalition ZAJEDNO, Mr. Miodrag Perisic and Dr. Miroljub Labus paid a very successful visit to the official Washington.

SUMMARY OF REPORT ON MOSLEM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

According to information held by the German intelligence service BND, Iran has been cooperating in Germany with the Bosnian intelligence service AID through Irfan Ljevakovic - the official adviser of Kemal Ademovic, who heads AID.

LAST SERB OUTPOST IN CROATIA IS SKEPTICAL REINTEGRATION WILL SUCCEED

Jonathan C. Randal, The Washington Post, February 11 1997

NATO AGAIN SPILLS DANGEROUS CHEMICALS OVER THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

There are all the signs that the county of Doboj in the Republic of Srpska, its people and the entire flora and fauna have been transformed into a large experimental testing site, where NATO, in the name and on behalf of the United Nations, is testing chemical substances.

TINY ALBANIA HAS SEEDS FOR MORE BALKAN TROUBLE

Tiny, impoverished Albania is virtually ignored by the West, but violent upheavals on the streets there could contain the seeds of yet more trouble for the unstable Balkans.

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL INVITED THE SERBIAN COMMUNITY

Sir Eldon Griffiths, president of the World Affairs Council of Orange County, invited the Serbian community of Southern California to have a table of 10 guests at the annual Christmas gala at the Disneyland Hotel in Anaheim, CA.

WAR WEARY BOSNIA AND WHO PROFITS FROM IT

I can think of few more suggestive situations than to be lurching through the winter night in 1996 in an inadequate heated mini-bus from Sarajevo to the Adriatic Sea - the only way we could get out of the city.

NIN 2409, 28 FEB 1997

BRATSTVO NA BRITVI

Crnogorski premijer Milo Djukanovic, kontinuirano, moze se reci, vec nekoliko godina kritikuje politiku Socijalisticke partije Srbije i Jugoslovenske udružene levice. Uvek se posebno osvruci na konzervativni, sputan snaznim ideoloskim miderom, ekonomski model Srbije.

DJINDJIC ISPRED MILOSEVICA!

Sta 200 slucajno odabranih telefonskih pretplatnika misli o odlasku Milosevica u Federaciju, republickim izborima, buducem predsedniku Srbije, opstanku koalicije Zajedno, novoj vlasti u velikim gradovima, odnosima Crne Gore i Srbije...

PITANJE CASTI

Studenti su odlucni da svoj boravak na ulicama zavrse potpunom pobedom. Vlast zeli da ih porazi kao '92. i '92. godine. Na ciju ce se stranu staviti dekani

CRVENI PUC

Smenjeni socijalisti misle da je ceo problem u tome sto JUL u srpskom Manchesteru nije osvojio vlast - ni na izborima ni posle njih

OBRISI SUZE, NASMESI SE...

Lila Radonjic, novi glavni urednik, kaze: Nisam partijski covek. Ne navijam za opoziciju, ja sam opozicija. Nikome nista ne dugujem i umem da kazem ne

CIJI KRST ONI NOSE?

Ne vole ih Romi jer im prave konkurenciju pred Crvenim krstom, ali su najnetolerantniji, zamislite - Srbi. A pocelo je kao u prici o sloznoj braci...

ZUTI "FERARI"

Ubijen je u palermo stilu: Niko ih ne zna, niko ih ne moze prepoznati, a rade profesionalno, po nalogu

KO JE POZVAO ARKANA

General Mladic je na trenutak prekinuo sastanak i telefonom pozvao predsednika Karadzica. Pozdravio ga, onako vojnicki, i rekao mu da je prekinuo lecenje i stigao u Banjaluku. Pitao je predsednika ko je dao ovlascenja SDG da strelja ljude. Radovan Karadzic je tvrdio da nista o tome ne zna. Kad mu je general Mladic rekao da je na ovlascenju njegov potpis i pecat, Karadzic je, navodno, bio iznenadjen. General Mladic je zahtevao da SDG u roku od 48 casova napusti RS

SPECIJALNA VEZA

Dvojica najmocnijih Srba razmenili su zahvalnost i otkrili da sve pociva na srodnosti dusa

INTERVJU, 402, 28 FEB 1997

INTERVJU DR ZORAN DjINDjIC

BEOGRAD CE BITI PRAVA PRESTONICA

Mi cemo vrlo brzo izaci sa predlogom zakona o glavnom gradu, po kome ce glavni grad da bude - glavni grad, a ne da bude mehanicki sabranih sesnaest opstina u nesto sto je grad, koji je sveden prakticno na nivo opstine. Vrlo brzo cu ja i traziti prijem u vladi Srbije da resimo neka pitanja funkcionisanja grada

SPASOJE KRUNIC, PREDSEDNIK GRADSKE VLADE ZA BEOGRAD...

Kada bih sada rekao da cemo porez od tri odsto ukinuti to bi imalo izvesnog politickog ucinka, ali ja vam to u ovom trenutku ne mogu reci, ma kako to zvuvalo. Naravno, to ne znaci da ce taj porez ostati. Jedino na cemu insistiram u ovom trenutku je da vidimo koliki je to novac, sta se sa njim moze uraditi i sta je sa njim radjeno

Ratni zlocini

Sudjenje predsedniku Bosne i Hercegovine

SRBI PROTIV ALIJE

Pred Velikim vecem Osnovnog suda u Banja Luci krajem februara nastavljeno je saslusavanje svedoka na sudjenju Aliji Izetbegovicu za krivicno delo ratnog zlocina protiv civilnog stanovnistva, ratnih zarobljenika, ranjenika i bolesnika

Ruska vojska

Neslaganje ministra odbrane i premijera

KRAH CRVENE ARMIJE

U vreme dok je Medlin Olbrajt pokusavala Borisa Jelcina da nagovori da prihvati sirenje NATO prema Moskvi, celnici ruske odbrane upozorili su predsednik da se vojska raspada.

Srbija danas

Gradonacelnici srpske prestonica

BEOGRAD BEZ PETOKRAKE

Izborom novog rukovodstva Beograda i simbolicnim skidanjem crvene zvezde sa kupole Skupstine grada otpocela je nova etapa zivota jugoslovenske metropole

Mecena Studentskog protesta

Dragan Zivanovic kao Danijel Bojer

PRIJATELJ MEDLIN OLBRAJT

Dobro secam Medlin Olbrajt, zajedno smo studirali. Ona je od pocetka bila strasno ambiciozna, da je to bilo prosto neprijatno. Zato je i usla u demokratsku stranku i otisla da radi za kongresmena Edmunda Maskija, kao pomocno osoblje. Medlin mu je bila bukvalno devojka za sve.

Istorija bescasca

Cenzura u SRJ

SILOVANJE JAVNE RECI

U nasoj zemlji, kako kazu drzavni cinovnici, nema cenzure i slobode medija su neogranicene. Desavalo se, medjutim, da mnogi programi, vesti, informacije, emisije, clanci, knjige nisu stigli do javnosti, samo zato jer ih je neko zabranio. Objavljujemo samo delimicni registar cenzurisanih dela u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori iz drugog izdanja " Crne knjige " novinara Marka Lopusine

Srbi i muslimani General Pero Colic

MUSLIMANI CE NAS NAPASTI

Vojsci Republike Srpske poznato je da se muslimani intenzivno pripremaju za izvodjenje aktivnih borbenih dejstava, posebno na podrucju drugog muslimanskog korpusa - upozorio je javnost nedavno nacelnik Generalstaba VRS.

OSLOBADJANJE MEDIJA

List za jedan dinar

DEMOKRATIJA ZA SRBE

Za stampanje " Demokratije " Zoran Djindjic, pozajmio nam je cetiri hiljade maraka pa iako list izgleda kao fabricki bilten, za njega se otimaju na beogradskim ulicama

Dejtonska Bosna

HRVATSKO-MUSLIMANSKA SVADJA

GRANATE IZNAD NERETVE

Amerikanci su upozorili Tudjmana da ostavi muslimane u Mostaru na miru. HDZ i dalje napada. Oruzanih ekscesa ima najvise u Mostaru, a etnickog ciscenja u Bugojnu, Travniku, Zenici, dok se u Sarajevu vodi bitka za vlast. Federacija BiH je u blokadi

Tajne medicine

NAJSMRTONOSNIJI TUMORI

KANCER NE BIRA POL

Americka istrazivanja su pokazala da podela kancerogenih obolenja, na muske i zenske, vise, gotovo ne postoji. Rizici su sve veci, ali i nade da se rak pobedi

Nemacka recesija

Helmut Kol na tapetu

KAKO ZAMENITI KANCELARA

Nezadovoljni nezaposlenoscu i neprestanim povecanjem poreza i smanjivanjem nivoa socijalne zastite Nemci su poceli da pokazuju otvorenu netrpeljivost i prema svom " vecitom kancelaru " Helmutu Kolu. Opozicija je zatrazila Kolovu ostavku, a u redovima Demohriscanske stranke i same vlade kancelar je doziveo neocekivane napade

DEMOKRATIZACIJA SRBIJE:

BORBA ZA MEDIJE

OSVAJANJE TELEVIZIJA

Vladajuca stranka ce biti prinudjena da otvori drzavne medije pre svega zbog pritisaka ovde, ali i sa strane. Oni i do 9. marta 1997. mogu da otvore drzavni radio i televiziju, da oslobode izvestan prostor i pokazu gradjanima da u Srbiji postoje i drugi osim SPS-a. To je pitanje politicke volje

STUDENTSKI PROTEST

SLUCAJ VELICKOVIC

REKTOR IPAK ODLAZI

Protest povodom mahinacija oko rezultata na lokalnim izborima, zapocet 22.novembra prosle godine, prerastao je u pokret neslucenih razmera

Film

Zvezda je rodjena

RUSO RUSI HOLIVUD

Nije uobicajeno da se slava stice sa 40 godina, bar ne kada su u pitanju holivudske dive kojima je lepota tada vec na izmaku. Rene Ruso je dokaz da ta teorija nista ne vredi.

Prof. dr Predrag Simic

Dileme srpsko-albanskog dijaloga

SAGLASNOST POSTOJI

Jedan od glavnih zakljucaka nedavnog razgovora Srba i Albanaca bio je da bi se dijalog morao voditi izmedju demokratski izabranih predstavnika dve strane jer bi mu jedino to dalo potrebnu legitimnost i postignuta resenja uciniti trajnim

Srbija danas

Strajk prosvetnih radnika

NE BOJIMO SE OTKAZA

Mislim da su to samo prazne pretnje - veruje Gordana Petrovic. - Objektivno na biroima je primetan deficit prosvetne struke. Danas je u Beogradu, na primer, tesko naci profesora matematike, hemije, fizike, informatike, pa za skolskom katedrom sede nesvrсени studenti ili nase penzionisane kolege.

SMRT AUTOMOBILSKOG ASA I BIZNISMENA

CETIRI METKA ZA VLADU TREFA

Bio je najveći zaljubljenik u automobilizam i najveći prijatelj Marka Milosevica. To daje posebnu tezinu ovom ubistvu, koje ce morati da se razresi, makar zbog sina Slobodana Milosevica -

OD CEGA BOLUJE FRANJO TUDJMAN

Uprkos silnim naporima da vesti o zdravstvenom stanju predsednika Hrvatske ne procure van lekarskog konzilijuma zagrebacki " Nacional " je iz pouzdanih izvora saznao da je Tadjman podvrgnut potpuno novoj, do sada nepoznatoj terapiji!

KO MANIPULISE IZBEGLICAMA

Srpska vlast o problemu izbeglica nikada nije raspravljala. Izbeglice optuzuju za nemire u Beogradu. Zato se manipulise, ili u ime pojedinaca, ili u ime pojedinih stranaka ili grupa

DEKONTAMINIRANI RAZGOVORI DJERDJE KONRAD NOVI PRODAVCI LUFT-BALONA Ukradose ti i lice iz ogledala...

SRPSKA DIPLOMATIJA

Zivorad Kovacevic, predsednik Foruma za medjunarodne odnose

SAMI PROTIV SVETA

Cela ideja o tome da se moze napraviti neka velika Srbija, taj projekt Velike Srbije koji je zapostavljao Helsinski sporazum i opredeljenje Evrope da se granice ne menjaju ako su prihvacene kao medjunarodno vazee, apsolutno je bilo nerealno ocekivati da svi Srbi mogu da zive u jednoj drzavi

DUGA 1662, 01 MAR 1997

SPECIJALNI STATUS GASI POZAR

Teritorijalno-politicka autonomija Kosova je apsolutno korisno esenje za obe strane. Jer, vecinsku populaciju i njenu elitu morate uciniti odgovornim za stanje na toj teritoriji, a ne da imate paralelnu administraciju koja kupi porez, a nikome ni za sta ne odgovara. Za sve sto ne valja, oni pokazu prstom ka Beogradu i to je sve. To je jedna dosta agodna situacija koja - vodi ratu.

NIN 2410 07 MAR 97

SOCIJALISTI SU SE PONIZILI

Nije SPS porazena 17. novembra, jer je normalno dobijati i gubiti izbore, porazena je kad je krenula u kradju i falsifikat

SPECIJALNE VEZE PREKO VEZE

Biljana Plavsic nije u dobrim odnosima ni sa Milosevicem ni sa Krajisnikom, pa je Sporazum o specijalnim vezama izmedju SRJ i RS potpisan bez njenog prisustva, sto je ojacalo vezu njegovih glavnih i istinskih autora

HIROSIMA KRAJ BEOGRADA

Specijalizovani list "Nukleonik vik" tvrdi da zvanicnici Nuklearnog instituta u Vinci traze od Medjunarodne atomske agencije (IAEA) u Becu da se 40 kilograma visokoobogacenog uranijumskog goriva iznese iz njihovog dvorista negde van SRJ da ne bi palo u ruke politickih ocajnika u slucaju da srpski rezim Slobodana Milosevica nastavi da slabi

VREME USPLAMTELOSTI

U petak, 28. februara, Upravni odbor NIN-a d.o.o., raspravljajuci o organizaciji rada i odnosima u redakciji nedeljnika NIN, smatrajuci da je ta organizacija losa, a odnosi rdjavi, razresio je Dusana Velickovica duznosti glavnog i odgovornog urednika NIN-a. Upravni odbor je zakljucio, jednoglasno, da je Velickovic, "ne postujuci Statut preduzeca, u poslednjim mesecima nastojao da preuzme nadleznosti koje mu ne pripadaju i da tako stvori u preduzecu paralelnu vlast".

VOLJA ZA MOC

Izjava Mila Gligorijevica, predsednika Upravnog odbora NIN-a d.o.o. za Radio-Indeks

DUGA NO 1663, 14 MAR 1997

SRPSKA APOKALIPSA

Na putu po Sjedinjenim Americkim Drzavama nas urednik je razgovarao u Vasingtonu sa profesorom Aleksom Dragicem, Amerikancem srpskog porekla, koji vec godinama pokusava da otkloni, odnosno da ublazi crnu legendu o Srbima kao jedinim vinovnicima balkanske

tragedije. Ko je kriv za to sto nam se dogodilo poslednjih godina, da budemo ne samo porazeni u sukobu sa jednim onemocalim Titovim generalom, vec i ponizeni i prokazeni u celom svetu?

SEME BUNE NE MOGU ZATRTI

"Svet zeli stabilnu Srbiju, a mi iz "Zajedno" smo spremni za sve izazove rezima, "koji je resio da ponovo potegne ratne karte sa onim istim snagama koje su nas do ove bede dovele."

BEZ ANESTEZIJE

Obolezavanje sestogodisnjice Devetog marta imalo je obrise lako nedeljnog umora, sasvim, medjutim, logicnog posle tromesecnog svakodnevnog demonstriranja po ulicama Beograda

AS YOU SEE BULLETIN NO 119 MAR 05, 1997

PRAVOSLAVOPHOBIA

Item: An American of Greek origin calls a congressional office to protest United States policies in Bosnia that would place Christian Serbs at the mercy of hostile Muslim regime. "So-called Christians," corrects a member of the congressman's staff, ignorant of the caller's religion.

BEHIND THE PIETY OF THE DAYTON ACCORDS

Expediency, far more than compromise, is the governing tool of politics, and this trait was again in evidence during the last two years of "peacekeeping" activities for I-FOR, the NATO-led forces to implement the Dayton/Paris peace accords on Bosnia- Herzegovina.

THE DICTATOR'S WIFE

The Observer of London has described Mira Markovic as a "classic Marie Antoinette [who] seems unaware of the plight of her people." Her husband, President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, has egg on his face after having initially annulled the results of the Nov. 17, 1996, elections, swept by the opposition Renewal Movement.

LEBED WARNS THE WEST

Russia's would-be leader and one-time head of the Security Council, General Alexander Lebed, has a taste for extravagant threats. He excelled himself during his 16-21 February visit to France, but there was reason behind his rhetoric.

PEACE IN THE BALKANS, IN A DECADE OR TWO

At the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation training center in Pazaric, near Sarajevo, the artillery pieces are lined up on the front lawn like grotesque tarred ornaments. Some are modern weapons, but others are museum pieces of World War II vintage and older.

HOLBROOKE LAMENT

Answering an article that appeared in the January issue of Foreign Affairs, former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, the godfather of the Dayton accords, writes in the magazine that ...

Alternate 1, Juror 206: Dragan Djurkovic

Dragan Djurkovic, well known throughout the Los Angeles Serbian community, for his church activities and support for the Serbian war orphans is a lifelong member of Serbian National Defense and member of Los Angeles chapter of the Serbian Unity Congress.

AS YOU SEE bulletin No. 120 MAR 15 1997

TRIP MEMO: STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING

The State Department invited (on the 19th) the Serbian-American leaders to attend a briefing followed by a free forum on February the 24th.

WAR-CRIME VERDICTS EMBARRASS BOSNIA

In a major embarrassment for the Bosnian government, two Muslim brothers, whose supposed slaying was used as evidence in the most publicized war crimes trial of the war to ...

MUSLIMS IN DOCK OVER BOSNIAN WAR CRIMES

As Slobodan Babic lay on the ground whimpering, a guard coldly drove a spike into his brain. The brutal murder occurred nearly five years ago. But it seems like yesterday to those who were there, writes Jon Swain in Bijeljina.

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT'S JEWISH DREAM TEAM

Once a WASP preserve, the State Department may soon be dominated by WJMs (white Jewish males).

PISMO SRPSKOG INTELEKTUALNOG FORUMA KARLU BILTU

Predmet arbitraze moze biti samo linija izmedju entiteta kod Brckog a ne sudbina grada. Svojom odlukom da se Brcko u narednih godinu dana stavlja pod medjunarodnu kontrolu Roberts Oven je prekoracio povereni mu mandat.

MOSTAR: SUMMER 1942

The city of Mostar has been featured in TV news often enough to teach the ordinary viewers three things. One, that Mostar has been famous through history for the exemplary harmony in which half of its Croat population lived with the Moslem half.

IN MEMORIAM - NORA BELOFF

Another friend of the Serbs has died. Nora Beloff, journalist and author, passed away on February 12 in London, England of cancer at the age of 78.

WHOM TO BLAME FOR PRAVOSLAVOPHOBIA

The article by James George Jatras (Bulletin # 119) is alarming, but we Orthodox Christians should first blame ourselves for the insults, discrimination and the "second class citizen" status when it comes to religion in the USA. We are disorganized and inept.

NIN NO. 2412, 21 MAR 1997

KRUNA DEMOKRATJE

Rec je o principu, a ne da li je neko za monarhiju ili nije. Kralj danasnjih narastaja i po meri naseg vremena. Ideoloske strasti slepe i za najrazumnije razloge

VUKOVARKI BUMERANG

Pitanje "remetilackog srpskog faktora", tako radikalno reseno vojskom, policijom i sahovnicom na Kninskoj tvrdjavi, zloslutno je uskrsnulo na samoj granici sa Srbijom gde glavnina preostalih Srba u Hrvatskoj sada trazi svoju politicku autonomiju

NIN NO. 2413, 28 MAR 1997

O PISTOLJIMA I VLASTI

Vojislav Seselj: Steta bi bila da koalicija "Zajedno" srusi Milosevica i preuzme vlast, a ne ja!

GASENJE SA POKRICEM

Savezni ministar za telekomunikacije mogao bi bez vecih problema da pogasi sve privatne elektronske medije, jer ga u svakoj varijanti pokriva bar jedan od desetak vazecih zakona.

MOGLO JE I GORE

Sad znamo: privatizacije ce biti ili privatizacije nece biti. A gradjanima Srbije kako bog da...
CRNOGORSKA OSMAS SEDNICA

U utorak nekoliko beogradskih dnevnih listova javilo je na prvim stranama da u Podgorici, iza zatvorenih vrata, traje dramatična sednica Glavnog odbora Demokratske partije socijalista, neka vrsta sudjenja premijeru Milu Djukanovicu.

RAZLAZ MILA I MOMIRA

Cistka reformisticke, procrnogorske struje iz podgorickog vrha, sa Milom Djukanovicem (verovatno i Svetozarom Marovicem) ne znaci samo odlazak najprogresivnijeg dela tog rezima, vec i potpun nestanak tzv. crnogorske prepoznatljivosti u jugoslovenskoj politici, toliko spominjanoj u demokratskom svetu. Podgoricka skupstina - drugi cin.

STA SE SMERA?

Otkako je NIN (br. 2410 od 7. marta) objavio izvestaj specijalizovanog americkog lista "Nukleonik vik" u kome se upozorava da "40 kilograma visokoobogacenog uranijumskog goriva moze da padne u ruke politickih desperadosa u slucaju da rezim Slobodana Milosevica nastavi da slabi", dugogodisnje nuklearne tajne pocinju polako da se obelodanjuju. Pokazuje se, izgleda, da snovi o atomskoj bombi nisu napusteni smenjivanjem "svemocnog" Aleksandra Rankovica i akademika Pavla Savica, naseg pionira fisije.

MOBUTUOV SINOVA U BEOGRADU

Za NIN govori Srbin iz Republike Srpske koji je prvi dosao u vezu sa onim Francuzima sto su iznajmljivali srpske ratnike za Zair.

INTERVJU NO. 405 11 APR 1997

MILOSEVIC VISE NIJE U IGRI

Ako je neko nekvalifikovan i nekompetentan nezasluzeno dosao na neku funkciju, on je spreman da rado prihvati odlazak svakog zasluznog i istaknutog coveka.

NAROD IMA KO DA BIJE

Slobodan Milosevic, predsednik, i Mirko Marjanovic, premijer Srbije, nisu jos odlucili ko ce u MUP-u zameniti Zorana Sokolovica. Za sada, funkciju prvog policajca Srbije vrsi general Radovan Stojicic. Pored njega za mesto ministra unutrasnjih poslova ozbiljno konkurisu Milan Puzovic, nacelnik Uprave za strance i advokat Marko Nicovi, a pominju se i imena Petra Zekovica, Radeta Markovica, Radmila Bogdanovica i Vlajka Stojiljkovica.

KUM SLOBO I DON MILO

Ocigledno da je Djukanovicu zavrnuti slavina jer je umislio da je i nekakav politicki faktor koji se moze suprotstaviti klanu Milosevic-Markovic. To je zapravo porodicni obracun. Milosevic je Djukanovicev tata kojem je sin rekao da je prevazidjen. Sada kum Sloba dokazuje don Milu da je neprevazidjen u lomljenju kicme nepocudnoj djeci. Oni ne brane demokratiju nego crni novac namaknut crnom trgovinom.

Serbian Unity Congress <http://www.suc.org/culture/history/>
THE CENTURIES UNDER TURKISH RULE AND THE REVIVAL OF STATEHOOD
By Rados Ljusic

One of the chapters from "The History Of Serbian Culture" is available on our page. Courtesy of Porthill Publishers.

MEDIEVAL SERBIAN

ROYAL ORNAMENTS http://www.suc.org/culture/history/Medieval_Ornaments

This unique electronic exhibition organized by the Serbian Unity Congress presents, for the first time, the attire, jewelry and ornaments of the Serbian kings and czars in the 12th through 15th centuries. Symbolic significance, political influences and pure fashion can all be traced as they intermingle in this fascinating presentation featuring 24 pictures with careful

reconstructions of masterpiece frescoes found in churches and monasteries throughout the Serbian lands.

AS YOU SEE No. 121, APR 1 1997

PRESIDENT'S QUARTERLY REPORT DR. VOJIN JOKSIMOVICH

This is my second report which provides a concise overview of the highlights for the first quarter of 1997.

WHY THE WEST SHOULD ACT

How much chaos in the Balkans does it take for the Western world to sit up and take notice? Scratch senior diplomats for any hint of strategic thinking, and all you get is excuses or a rather sheepish admission of inadequacy.

WEST IGNORED OMENS OF ALBANIAN UPHEAVAL

The financial scandal that has rocked Albanian society exposed the failings of what passed for democracy here.

OPPRESSION OF CHRISTIANS IS IGNORED

Religious leaders' pleas for support are met by silence of the cultural elites, not least in Hollywood.

SERBIAN WRESTLERS

Independent media in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) struggled throughout much of 1996.

YUGOSLAVIA'S ALBANIAN RETHINK SECESSION

The chaos in Albania may lead to peace in neighboring Serbia, where ethnic Albanians are rethinking their long-held strategy to secede in favor of negotiating with the government.

AS YOU SEE No.123, MAY 05 1997

BACK FROM THE GRAVE

ON MY MIND, By A.M. ROSENTHAL, NYT

CROATIA REHABILITATES FASCIST COLLABORATORS AS PATRIOTS

President Tudjman and his party cast the Nazi-allied World War II regime as heroes and precursors of modern Croatia.

LOOK AT BOSNIA BEFORE LEAPING INTO ALBANIA

Intervention: The U.S. must let it work out its internal problems; aid now would only extend its instability.

BOSNIA'S FUTURE LOOKS DIM

By Alex Dragnich. Europe should have had greater role in solving region's problems.

BOSNIA: BETTER LEFT PARTITIONED

By Michael O'Hanlon, The Washington Post. April 10, 1997

GERMAN SPIES ACCUSED OF ARMING BOSNIAN MUSLIMS

By Tim Judah, Sunday Telegraph, 20 April 1997

NIN Magazine No 2419 MAJ 09 1997

HITNO U EVROPU

Nova demokratija opet istupa sa jednim predlogom koji ce, sasvim izvesno, izazvati razlicita reagovanja. Navodno, ova stranka - koja je u vladajucoj koaliciji, ali bliska i nekim opozicionim strujama--vec je prosledila Saveznoj skupstini " plavu knjigu " nazvanu " Srbija

na Zapadu " . Rec je o ulasku Jugoslavije u Evropsku uniju. O tom projektu i aktuelnim politickim desavanjima razgovaramo sa predsednikom Nove demokratije Dusanom Mihajlovicem.

VOZD JE POTROSEN

Dok grupacija oko Djukanovica i Marovica smatra da je Milosevic, posebno od kradje glasova u Srbiji, vec bivsi politicar i da predstavlja politicki nemocnu figuru, koja uz to jos i smeta u ostvarivanju kontakata sa svetom, dotle Bulatovicevi sledbenici misle da Milosevic po Crnoj Gori moze i dalje smenjivati i postavljati funkcionere

URBANA GERILA?

Ubistvo je izvršeno automatskim americkim pistoljem " ingram M-11 " i mecima " luger " i to je, za sada, sve sto se moze doznati

NA BRIJACU SUDBINE

Nereseno statusno pitanje, teskoba, ponizenost i uzaludnost zivljenja, mnoge izbeglice navodi na ocajnicki cin - da sebi oduzmu zivot

ZEC IZ SESIRA

Lider Lige socijaldemokrata Vojvodine Nenad Canak smatra da su Srem, Banat i Backa pod okupacijom

NEDELJNI TELEGRAF BROJ 55, MAJ 14 1997

USPROTIVIO SAM SE MOMIRU BULATOVICU ZBOG ELEMENTARNE PRAVDE

Karijera Filipa Vujanovica, 42-godisnjeg ministra unutrasnjih poslova u Vladi Mila Djukanovica, ima skoro tipicnu americku putanju. Rodjen u uglednoj advokatskoj porodici, studirao je prava i bio jedan od najboljih studenata na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu. Nastavio je porodicnu tradiciju, u Podgorici se sa velikim uspehom bavio advokaturom. Radio je u Ustavnom sudu Jugoslavije.

SPS MORA NAJPRE DA SE IZJASNI O TAJNAMA "OSKAROVOG ZAKONA "

Ministarstvo za ekonomsku i vlasnicku transformaciju Vlade Srbije stopiralo je u poslednjih desetak dana gotovo sve aktivnosti na daljoj izradi Zakona o svojinskoj transformaciji, ekskluzivno saznaje Nedeljni Telegraph u dobro obavestenim krugovima bliskim republickom premijeru Mirku Marjanovicu.

SVE BOGATSTVO KRALJEVA SRPSKE TEKSTILNE IMPERIJE - MITE

TEOKAROVICA, KOSTE

ILICA I GORCE PETROVICA

U proslom broju Nedelnog Telegrafa uputili smo direktan predlog ministru za privatizaciju u Vladi Srbije Milanu Beku - vratiti naslednicima firmi i poseda imovinu koja je konfiskovana i nacionalizovana posle Drugog svetskog rata. Posle spiska firmi u metalском kompleksu, u ovom broju objavljujemo spisak privatnih preduzeca u tekstilnoj industriji.

KAKO NE BI IZGUBILI GLASOVE SELJAKA NA PREDSTOJECIM

IZBORIMA, SOCIJALISTI UBRZANO PRIPREMAJU SCENARIO ZA "SPAS AGRARA"

Ministar Sipovac trazi stampanje para, savezna drzava uvodi poseban porez DO 2009. godine!

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sections of this work have previously appeared elsewhere. Chapter 1, under the title "No Man's Land: U.S. Grand Strategy in the Wake of Yugoslav Intervention," was published in the Spring 1997 Mediterranean Quarterly, in a special "Mediterranean Security Issue" with an introduction by former Secretary of State George Schultz. "After the Lost War: The End of NATO" will be published as a monograph by the Research Institute for European Studies: Athens, Greece. Vladimir Čupevski, special adviser to the foreign minister, the Republic of Macedonia, translated various sections of The Wreckage Reconsidered into Macedonian at the request of the Macedonian Foreign Affairs Council.

I owe professional thanks to a number of institutions and individuals. The Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, and the Advanced Research Department, within the Center for Naval War Warfare Studies at the Naval War College provided national security fellowships that allowed me to return to the Balkans in May 1997. Within the department itself, I should acknowledge the support, patience, and good humor of Professor John B. Hattendorf, Commander J. Vanderlip, and Ms. Barbara Prisk. I owe a special debt to Robin Lima of the war college staff for prolonging the miracle known as interlibrary loan until the last possible moment. Professors Andrew Ross and Timothy Somes, in particular, deserve credit for practical and purposeful inputs in shaping this work. My year at the Naval War College has proven to be the most singularly defining experience of what continues to be an extraordinary military career; I feel privileged indeed to join the ranks of its faculty in the summer of 1997.

I should also acknowledge a number of senior American, Balkan, and NATO officials who provided comment on the condition of anonymity. Anestis Th. Symeonides, senior political adviser to the American embassy in Greece, and John Nomikos, Executive Research Director for the Research Institute for European Studies, have provided crucial support; without their

constant advice and feedback, my limited Balkan knowledge would have been even more evident in this project. Professor Nikolaos Stavrou of Howard University and the Mediterranean Affairs Council also continue to support my interest in Balkan security issues.

Two individuals deserve my exclusive personal thanks: my wife, Donna, and our daughter, Gaia. Although they did not appreciate my prolonged absences, they came to understand my intense devotion to this project and why it has proven crucially important to each of us in separate ways.

Finally, I owe thanks to numerous cultural and political influences. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Professor of International Relations at the University of Washington, has been writing about the Balkans and Eastern Europe with brilliance and wit for years. Her focus on Yugoslavia, in particular--including her focus at a time when most others considered Yugoslavia hardly more than just another "interesting little country"--has helped me both define and understand what my own experiences in the region have meant. I am honored that she chose to quote from my own creative work in the chapter titled "Repercussions of the War in Religion, Gender Relations, and Culture" in Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War. Others who deserve my thanks, praise, and admiration are: the poets Bogomil Gjuzel and Liljana Dirjan; the economist Dragiša Miljković; the artists Bosiljka Kićevac, Dančo Ordev, and Vladimir Georgievski; the educators Danko Šipka, formerly of the University of Sarajevo, and Naima Bailić, lecturer for the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars; the playwright Goran Stefanovski; the journalists and writers Misha Glenny and Sašo Ordanoski; the musician Goran Bregović; and the filmmakers Thodoros Angelopoulos and Emir Kusturica--for their brilliant failures as well as brilliant successes.

Sadly, a number of those who first introduced me to the language and culture of the Yugoslav peoples died in the last Balkan war.

NOTES

The first dedication epigraph--**Ми о Вуку, и Вук на врата**--is from the Kosovo Cycle of Vuk Stef Karadžić and holds dual meaning: "We speak of the wolf, and the wolf is at the door; We speak of Vuk (Stefanović Karadžić), and Vuk is at the door." Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, educator, philologist and folklorist, deserves credit both as the collector of Serbian legends and proverbs known as the Kosovo Cycle: Popular Songs and Epics of the Serbs and for systematizing the grammar of the Serbian language and structure of the Serbian alphabet. He declared that the dialect of Ragusa (today known as Dubrovnik) should become the language of all South Slavs--a people that included Slovenes, Croatians, Serbs, and Bulgars. The Serbian clergy opposed him, preferring that all writing be preserved only by Old Church Slavonic. Karadžić received great support outside Serbia, including help from the Brothers Grimm. He is buried in Belgrade at the entrance to the church of the Orthodox patriarch.

My translation of the second dedication epigraph is: "And grant them the homeland of their prayers,/Make them once again citizens of Paradise."

The third dedication epigraph is the opening line of The Mahabharata, the classic Sanskrit epic written between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D and comprising more than 90,000 couplets.

The excerpt by C. L. Sulzberger is from A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries [1934-1954] (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969). I refer consistently throughout the text to Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (London: Penguin Books, 1940).

Standard texts used in this work include H. W. Fowler's Oxford Dictionary of Modern English Usage, second edition, as revised and edited by Sir Ernest Gowers; The Elements of Style by former Cornell Professor William I. Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White; as well as Margaret Shertzer's as The Elements of Grammar. This should help explain the occasional use of the split infinitive as stylistic device and not grammatical mistake, as well as the absence of the phrase, "in fact." The use of umlauts in words such as "coöperate" is equally deliberate to

discriminate between separately articulated vowels that might otherwise assimilate in the English idiom; thus, the umlaut in its use here is precisely the opposite of its use in German-- which represents the assimilation of vowels in words such as, for example, "König" for Koenig.